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ABSTRACT 
The Compleat Infidel is a study in discursive psychology (Edwards and Potter, 
1992: Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Its topic is defensive practice in the discourse 
of marital and para-marital infidelity. The objectives were threefold: to document 
and explicate the discursive terrain: to demonstrate an application of the 
principles of discursive psychology; to develop a critique of selected areas of 
social science generally and social psychology in particular. A database of more 
than 230 samples of discourse drawn from heterogeneous sources including 
newspaper reports, works of popular psychology and original research interviews 
was amassed and subjected to discourse analysis according to the methods 
described by Edwards, Potter and Wetherell. The findings are that in 
contemporary, Anglo-American discourse five discrete types of construction are 
routinely produced to defend infidels and infidelity: (1) non-events; (2) isolated 
episodes; (3) special categories of self; (4) specific reasons: (5) generic rationales. 
The variability within and between these constructions reflects their orientation to 
differing aspects of the interactional context and their different functions therein. 
Relevant aspects of context include: interviews and other question-and-answer 
sessions; silent, anonymous and sympathetic recipients, tabloid and broadsheet 
news; contexts of argument and debate. The range of defensive functions being 
performed includes: (1) exoneration, (2) appeal to mitigating circumstances: (3) 
appeal to diminished capacity or diminishe d responsibility; (4) defence of 
provocation: (5) justification. The conclusions are that social scientific 
investigations of infidelity, adultery, cheating, extramarital sex and similar 
phenomena must acknowledge that discourse is action orientated if a complete 
and coherent analysis is to be achieved. This conclusion is shown to be relevant 
to endeavours in sociology, evolutionary psychology, social cognition, the 
psychology of individual differences, psychopathology and applications of 
psychology in public health surveys and couples therapy, as well as studies of 
discourse that are informed by feminist and other varieties of social 
cons tructionism. The contribution of The Compleat Infidel to the accounts 
literature and to action orientated approaches to discourse such as discursive 
psychology is discussed and directions for further research are recommended. 
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Introducing The Compleat Infidel 
Overview 
The Compleot Infidel is a study that explores the discursive construction of marital 
and para-marital infidelity and develops a theoretical account of the means by 
which infidelity and infidels are defended. This is accomplished through practical 
analysis of a wide range of discursive materials including talk and texts. 
In the few years since this study was originally conceived it has sometimes 
seemed that, in one form or another, infidelity has hardly been out of the 
headlines. Two stories in particular dominated the mass media, one on each side 
of the Atlantic. In November 1995, Diana, Princess of Wales, made history with her 
television interview for the BBC's Panorama in which she admitted her adultery 
with Captain James Hewitt. "Were you unfaithful? " probed interviewer Martin 
Bashir and Diana replied, "Yes, I adored him. Yes, I was in love with him. But I was 
very let down. " In January 1998, the Zippergate scandal broke and news 
circulated of Linda Tripp's tape-recorded telephone conversations with Monica 
Lewinsky in which Lewinsky spoke of her affair with President Bill Clinton. Within 
days Clinton had organised a press conference at the White House and issued his 
famous denial: "I did not have sexual relations with that woman. " 
Away from the spotlight of the mass media, in the most ordinary situations 
where no-one happens to be a princess or a president, infidelity remains a 
conspicuously accountable matter. Where there is infidelity, there is occasion for 
justifications and excuses; denials and concessions, appeals to mitigating 
circumstances, provocation and diminished responsibility. This accounting for 
infidelity is a form of behaviour that has gone virtually unstudied by social 
scientists. The Compleat Infidel is about to plug the gap. In the process, some 
traditional social scientific concepts and perspectives on what sort of 
phenomenon infidelity might be will be challenged and reconceptualised. 
This first chapter supplies a review of previous sociological and 
psychological work that has taken infidelity as all or part of its object of study. The 
idea is to set the stage for the analytic questions addressed in The Compleat 
infidel and also to introduce the traditional or mainstream social scientific themes 
and concepts that will be picked up one by one and re-worked in the course of 
performing the analysis. The main criticism in this review will be that previous 
social scientific investigations of infidelity have paid little attention to the 
immediate constructive effects and interactional consequences of infidelity talk. 
Thus, they have revealed little about the nuts and bolts of discursive (defensive) 
practice. Chapter 1 ends by detailing and clarifying the research problem with 
which The Compleat Infidel is principally concerned. For now, let me summarise it 
thus. The task will be to: (a) discover what kinds of defences for infidelity and 
infidels are being articulated, taking note of any systematic variations, (b) 
scrutinise the construction of these defensive arguments to find out how they work 
in situ and eventually, (c) arrive at a satisfactory explanation for the 
aforementioned variability. 
The Compleat Infidel belongs to the methodological tradition of discursive 
psychology. Chapter 2 explains what discursive psychology is and locates it on 
the theoretical map with regard to some neighbouring approaches such as 
rhetorical analysis, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. I then go on to 
describe the collection of discursive materials that forms the data-base for this 
research. I discuss the sources of these data (they include original research 
interviews, participants' contributions to previous research projects on infidelity, 
newspaper and television news reports and public internet discussions, to name 
but a few) and consider some of the ethical and practical questions that thereby 
arise. The final part of Chapter 2 marries together the method and the data, 
producing an account of the analytic procedure that underpins the work to be 
undertaken in the following five chapters. Thus, by the end of Chapter 2 we will 
be equipped with a set of specific analytic questions and a practical method of 
finding out the answers. 
Chapters 3-7 are referred to at various points as the analytic chapters of 
this document. In these I conduct an empirical analysis of the data described in 
Chapter 2. Each analytic chapter takes up a prominent style of defence or line of 
argument and examines its construction and practical application. Chapter 3 
examines people's reports of their behavioural history and experiences and also 
their reports of their attitudes, opinions, beliefs and views about infidelity. In these 
reports we will see infidelity constructed as a type of event, defined by the 
performance of certain acts in certain circumstances or conditions. Chapter 4 
looks at how speakers and writers describe the settings and circumstances in 
which individual episodes of infidelity sometimes happen. Chapter 5 considers 
the use of personality and psychopathology in accounts of infidelity. Chapter 6 
analyses the construction of reasons and motives for infidelitous behaviour in 
reports of unreasonable spouses, unsatisfactory dyadic relationships and 
irresistible third parties. Chapter 7 then turns to infidelity discourse in which people 
put together accounts of human nature, modern society and its division into 
social groups. Collectively, the study of these five topics will constitute a review of 
the major strategies and practices of defending infidelity and infidels that are 
available to users of contemporary, Anglo-American discourse. 
However, the purpose of The Compleat Infidel is not solely to document 
and explicate the discursive defence of infidelity and infidels. As an exercise in 
discursive psychology it is additionally designed to serve a purpose of critique. 
The analytic chapters relate the discursive practices identified therein to certain 
theoretical arguments and issues that are raised by attempts to make a social 
scientific study of infidelity. In some cases there will be an overlap to be pointed 
out between the discursive practices of research participants and the social 
scientists who study them. 
Chapter 3 develops a discursive psychological account of practices such 
as making evaluations, expressing ambivalence and being vague. This account 
will be developed in rhetorical contrast to social scientific studies of infidelity that 
try to gather the simple facts about people's attitudes to infidelity and their actual 
behaviour by means of questionnaires, surveys and polls. Similarly, Chapter 6 
builds a critique of social psychological studies that solicit and speculate on 
people's reasons and motives for being unfaithful. In contrast to those studies I will 
develop a discursive psychological account of the practice of constructing 
infidelity as reasoned, motivated action. 
In Chapter 4, while considering how to construct an isolated episode of 
infidelity, I will have some comments to make about the relationship between lay 
discourse, professional journalism of the human interest variety and also 
psychological studies that investigate infidelity as a matter for causal inference 
and attribution. Similarly, in Chapter 5 there will be occasion to discuss the 
appearance of personality theory and the psychology of individual differences in 
lay people's accounts of infidelity. I shall draw attention to the overlap between 
these accounts, confessional accounts of the sort that constitute news in certain 
tabloid newspapers and accounts that are produced by and for professional 
counsellors and psychologists. Later. in Chapter 7,1 will look at same discourse of 
research participants in which they tackle big quest; ons to do with the human 
condition and modern society. We will see that these accounts bear a marked 
resemblance to the more formal, academic sort of natural and social theory. 
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Overall, in Chapters 3-7 1 will try to show that a discursive psychological 
analysis of infidelity discourse does more than provide for discoveries about the 
discursive behaviour of those non-professionals who kindly agree to participate in 
programmes of social scientific research or who make their discourse available for 
the general purpose of public consumption. A discursive psychological 
approach also has something to say about research itself and the discursive 
behaviour of the researchers. Ultimately I want to develop an account of 
infidelity discourse that is capable of explaining The Compleat Infidel as a 
discursive phenomenon in its own right as well as rival analyses and all the 
heterogeneous bits and pieces of discursive material that are presented herein 
under the heading of data. 
The Compleat Infidel ends with Chapter 8 in which I draw together the 
discoveries of the five analytic chapters and propose an answer to the primary 
research question that was specified at the close of Chapter 1. Specifically, this is 
the point at which we will be in a position to explain the particular range and 
nature of the defences that we have considered. I shall then indicate what has 
been contributed by The Compleat Infidel with regard to two distinct spheres of 
academic endeavour. The first is the sphere of traditional or mainstream social 
scientific studies of infidelity and I shall conclude that there is strong evidence in 
support of the argument for foregrounding the local, situated action orientation 
of discourse if a coherent analysis of infidelity as a social and psychological 
phenomenon is to be accomplished. The second is the sphere of studies of 
discourse and in this part of Chapter 81 will show how The Compleat Infidel builds 
on previous discourse-analytic work and thus makes a useful contribution not just 
to studies of infidelity discourse but to the general endeavour of discursive 
psychology. Finally, I shall take the findings reported in these pages as a starting 
point from which to propose some directions for future research. 
Some Social Scientific Approaches to Infidelity 
In this section I shall conduct a brief review of some previous social scientific 
investigations of infidelity. My objectives here are as follows. Principally, I hope 
that a concise but critical review of the social scientific literature on infidelity will 
help begin to clarify and chorocterise what will be going on methodologically in 
The Compleot Infidel that is different to what has gone before. Particularly, I want 
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to set the stage for a discursive approach to infidelity by reviewing some other, 
more traditional approaches. Relotedly, each one of the analytic chapters of this 
document (that is, Chapters 3-7) will take up topics and themes that intersect with 
issues in conventional sociological and psychological research into infidelity. Thus, 
it will be useful at this early stage to take in a broad overview of these research 
endeavours, forming an idea of how infidelity has been conceptualised, the sorts 
of questions that have been asked and the types of answers and conclusions that 
have been attempted. 
Studies of hurnan nature and society 
One way to conceptualise infidelity is as a form of behaviour that is manifest in 
large populations (up to and including the entire human species). This overall 
approach characterises both of the following distinct strands of theory and 
research. 
Firstly, there is the strand based on evolutionary theory, including the 
relatively new discipline of evolutionary psychology. In this line of research 
infidelity is usually taken to be a sexual activity to which the human species as a 
whole is naturally inclined. People may form ostensibly monogamous emotional 
and domestic partnerships in pairs but when it comes to sex they are apparently 
universally prone to covertly engaging in extra-pair copulation or double mating. 
Fairly typical are these remarks made by well known behavioural ecologist Helen 
Fisher (e. g., see Fisher, 1992) in an interview for the periodical Urban Desires: "I've 
looked at adultery in 42 cultures and, even in societies where you can have your 
head chopped off for philandering, men and women cheat. (I Monogamy has 
never meant fidelity. It's a parenting strategy. (W]e were built to do two separate 
things - to pair up and to cheat" (Quan, 1996, untrue. html). 
Researchers seek to explicate the evolutionary foundations of this 
phenomenon and their findings are promoted as adding to the existing body of 
scientific and medical knowledge about human life and behaviour, especially 
sexuality, reproduction and mat ing behaviour. A-good example is the study 
reported by Baker and Bellis (1995, also see Baker and Bellis, 1993, Bellis and Baker, 
1990). A nationwide survey of 3,679 British women requested select items of 
information about their sexual habits and histories. Variables of special interest to 
the researchers included sexual experience (opera tionolised as the total lifetime 
number of copulations so for), the average amount of time spent in the company 
of a regular male partner (including time spent sleeping) and the time intervals 
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between copulations with two different males. The collected data were used by 
Baker and Bellis to support their version of sperm competition theory, which argues 
for the reproductive utility of extra-pair sexual congress. The authors include 
among their findings such discoveries as: "in humans, the less time that a male 
spends with his female partner between copulations, the more likely her lost 
copulation is to have been with another male" (Baker and Bellis, 1995, p. 21). The 
essence of their conclusions is that "in Britain in the late 1980s, about 4% [and 
possibly as many as 12%] of children were conceived via sperm competition (i. e., 
were conceived while their mother contained within her reproductive tract 
competitive sperm from two or more different males)" (p. xiii). Other notable 
examples of work that investigates the evolutionary foundations of infidelity 
include: Ast and Gross (1995); Buss (1994,1999); Buss and Schmitt (1993); Buss, 
Shackelford, Kirkpatrick, Choe, Hasegawa, Hasegawa and Bennett (in press); 
Kirkpatrick and Buss (1996): and Shackelford and Buss (1995,1997). 
Secondly, there is the strand of work that studies human societies rather 
than the human species. Extramarital sex and extradyadic sexual relationships - 
categories of activity that are assumed to be roughly equivalent to the activities 
denoted by the more explicitly morally-charged terms infidelity and unfaithfulness 
- are investigated as a common form of sexual behaviour and also an object of 
societal evaluation. Attitudes to extramarital sex can be sampled and taken to 
indicate something about the prevailing moral climate in a given population. An 
example is Sexual Behaviour in Britain: The National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and 
Lifestyles (Wellings, Field, Johnson and Wadsworth, 1994). The impetus and 
rationale for this government-funded survey was a concern about HIV. Reliable 
quantitative data about sexual behaviour were needed to "predict the likely 
extent and pattern of the spread of HIV" (p. 1). Data about attitudes were 
treated as a supplement to behavioural data, revealing something about the 
preferences, beliefs and views of the national psyche that would assist in 
endeavours such as mounting effective public health education campaigns. 
Aggregation of the data and generalisation from the individual respondent to 
British society were made possible by giving the questionnaire items one or 
another forced-response format, including Likert scales on which participants 
could indicate the extent of their agreement or disagreement with various 
attitudinal statements. The authors include among their findings the discovery 
that "only one respondent in fifty believes extramarital sex to be not at all wrong, 
and some four out of five people are of the opinion that it is always or mostly 
wrong" (p. 249). Their inquiries about sexual behaviour did not include specific 
questions such as "have you engaged in extramarital sex? " but the authors infer a 
certain amount of such activity by cross-referencing answers to questions about 
the number of heterosexual partners in the last year with answers to questions 
about marital status. For instance, "4.5% of men and 1.9% of women who are 
married reported more than I heterosexual partner in the lost year, and a tiny 
fraction (1.2% of married men and 0.2% of married women) reported more than 
two partners in the last year" (p. 104). Finally, by assuming that this sex with more 
than one heterosexual partner was equivalent to extramarital sex (i. e., assuming 
that respondents had not been married less than one year and also assuming 
that they were not in group marriages, open marriages or whatever), Wellings et 
at. were able to observe a certain concordance between attitudes and 
behaviour such that "a tendency towards greater lenience can be seen among 
those with some experience of the behaviours they were judging" (p. 259). 
Other examples of this kind of work include Airey (1984), Glenn and 
Weaver (1979), Harding (1988), Hunt (1974), Janus and Janus (1993), Michael, 
Gagnon, Laumann and Kolata (1994), Quilliam (1994), Smith (1990,1992), Tavris 
and Sadd ( 1977), Wiederman (1997) and Wolfe (11982). These studies characterise 
themselves as basically fact finding exercises: Quilliam (1994, p. 1) describes her 
report on her questionnaire survey of 200 women as "not a philosophical treatise. 
or a sociological thesis, but a direct statement of the way women see sex today. " 
Other investigations of infidelity as a societal phenomenon are more explicitly 
informed by social theory such as those of Hite (1976,1989,1991,1993) and 
Lawson (1988) and are correspondingly more likely to embellish and enrich a 
quantitative analysis with illustrations from interview material and other qualitative 
data. 
This kind of investigation of infidelity implies a certain ontology and concomitantly 
a certain method of analysing discourse. The aim is to describe the properties of 
some large, composite entity such as the human race or modern society and so 
research participants are treated not as individuals but as representatives of that 
larger body. If they are differentiated, it tends to be in terms of demographic 
characteristics: researcher-defined categories of nationality (e. g., Maykovich, 
1976), gender (Baker and Bellis, 1995), age (Roscoe, Cavanaugh and Kennedy. 
1988), social class (Wellings et a/., 1994), urban/rural community of residence 
(Wilson, 1995) and so on. Because of this homogenisation there is relatively little 
consideration of what individual respondents must make of the business of data 
collection as a social situation. 
Certainly, the subject matter of these investigations is acknowledged to 
be sensitive. The concern here is that people may be reluctant to honestly 
disclose the facts about their sexuality. The nature of this problem as it is 
conceptualised in evolutionary and sociometric investigations of infidelity is 
indicated by the sorts of solutions that are applied. At the outset of Sex in 
America: A Definitive Survey, the authors confidently announce: "Like studies of 
less emotionally charged subjects, studies of sex can succeed if respondents are 
convinced that there is a legitimate reason for doing the research, that their 
answers will be treated nonjudgmentally, and that their confidentiality will be 
protected" (Michael et aL, 1994, p. 25). Similarly, Wellings et aL are sure that 
A guarantee of confidentiality con do much to ensure veracity of response. 
Reassuring respondents of the confidentiality of the survey was of greatest 
importance in relation to the self-completion booklet which contained the more 
intimate and personal questions. A non-judgemental approach on the part of the 
interviewer and a guarantee of confidentiality were also essential. A firm 
understanding on the part of the respondent of the urgent need for the data and 
the credentials and integrity of the originators also does much to overcome this 
problem. In this respect the introduction was mode easier by a reference to 
health and AIDS and the need for the information. 
(Wellings et al., 1994, p. 20) 
With the right kind of reassurance, then, participants can be expected to 
overcome any initial reticence and revert to a mode of behaviour that seems to 
be the default response to inquiries of a less sensitive flavour: delivering the 
information as requested; straightforwardly supplying the facts that constitute the 
answers to the researcher's questions. After the initial hesitancy, and aside from 
any nagging suspicions that men routinely over-report while women under-report 
their sexual activity (e. g., Wheeler, 1993), the discourse that research participants 
produce is treated as simply reflecting reali ty. 
This is a treatment of research participants and their discourse with which I 
shall take issue in the following chapters, especially in chapters 3 and 7. For one 
thing, accounts of human nature and human behaviour and evolution are just 
that: accounts. They are discursive products and deserve to be recognised as 
such, with no inherent differences distinguishing the accounts of evolutionary 
psychologists from those of their research participants. The some point can be 
made regarding accounts of modern society, sexual behaviour in Britain, sex in 
America and so on. Moreover, the forthcoming examination of discursive 
practice will make it clear that expressions such as extra-pair copulation, adultery, 
philandering, cheating, infidelity, extramarital sex and extradyadic sexual 
relationships ought not to be treated as more or less interchangeable signs or 
tokens for what is fundamentally the same underlying behaviour or piece of 
reality. As we will see, the selection and situated deployment of these and other 
terms reveals them to be interactionally consequential. That is, when respondents 
are given a free rein in the matter of how to describe legitimate and illegitimate 
sexual practices, they choose terms that shape, organise and actively construct 
reality according to the interactional situation in which they find themselves. 
These insights contra-indicate the treatment of research participants as 
though they were all doing the some thing, responding to the some stimulus and 
speaking as representatives of the same population. Researchers' decisions that 
the defining characteristics of their groups of subjects have to do with age, 
gender or whatever do not guarantee that these are the membership categories 
that participants themselves are treating as relevant concerns when they 
formulate their replies. Similarly, displays of non-judgemental integrity on the part 
of the researchers and assurances of confidentiality do not automatically de- 
gauss the research situation, cleansing it of messy social and interactional 
variables that might otherwise interfere with respondents' ability or inclination to 
reveal the essential facts and bits of social truth which they possess. In the 
following chapters of The Compleat Infidel we will examine accounts of personal 
behaviour, expressions of attitudes and impromptu bits of natural and social 
theory which show that membership categories, ideas of identity and anonymity 
and displays of non-judgemental integrity are discursive resources which belong 
quite as much to research participants as to the social scientists who study them. 
Studies of individuals and interpersonal relationships 
A contrasting approach to infidelity is to focus on it as the behaviour of an 
individual who acts and reacts with respect to his or her immediate network of 
personal relationships. This approach characterises both of the following strands 
of research and writing. 
Firstly, there is the study of social cognition and close relationships, a 
distinct area of social psychology. The main concern is to explicate the cognitive 
processes underlying people's behaviour in marital and para-marital relationships 
and research is often conducted with a view to practical application of the 
findings in the context of delivering the cognitive-behavioural variety of marital 
and family therapy. Some social cognition research concentrates on identifying 
the beliefs, expectancies and patterns of attribution that seem to be associated 
with marital discord, the idea being that faulty or maladaptive cognitions can 
then be restructured. Here, infidelity can become relevant as a known source of 
marital conflict, a common but upsetting relational transgression that expectably 
triggers cognitions to do with inferring cause and making attributions of 
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responsibility and blame (e. g., Beach, Jou(iles and O'Leary, 1985; Buunk, 1984; 
Fincham, Beach and Nelson, 1987, Fincharn and Bradbury, 1987). Researchers 
use a variety of tools and techniques such as inventories and questionnaires (e. g., 
the Marital Att6butional Style Questionnaire of Fincham et al., 1987), vignettes and 
scenarios (e. g., Boon and Sulsky, 1997, Mongeau, Hale and Alles, 1994) and 
formally coded clinical observations (e. g., Bradbury and Fincham, 1993) to 
generate quantitative data that can be correlated together, subjected to 
regression analyses and so on. For instance, upon examination of their 
Relationship Attribution Measure, Fincham and Bradbury (1992) were gratified to 
discover that married people's responsibility attributions (i. e., ratings of the extent 
to which a badly behaved spouse was acting intentionally and deserves blame) 
were positively correlated with the amount of anger reported by respondents and 
also with the extent to which participating couples were observed to "whine" 
during a problem solving exercise. 
Other social cognition research concentrates on developing one of a 
range of social exchange theories of close relationships. such as 
interdependence theory (e. g., Kelley, Berscheid, Christensen, Harvey, Huston, 
Levinger, McClintock, Peplau and Peterson, 1983; Kelley and Thibaut, 1978) and 
equity theory (e. g., Hatfield and Troupmann, 198 1, Walster, Walster and Berscheid, 
1978). Social exchange theories incorporate behaviou6st principles of 
reinforcement and proceed on the assumption that people in couple 
relationships are subject to experience various rewards and costs as a 
consequence of their involvement. The outcomes for an individual (rewards 
minus costs) are conceptualised in such terms as satisfaction, dependence and 
commitment: psychological states that have a practical significance in the sense 
that they are thought to influence behaviours such as staying in the relationship or 
alternatively leaving (a dichotomy close to the heart of the therapeutic 
endeavour). Here, infidelity or a strong interest in it may be treated either as an 
indicator of causal psychological processes (e. g., Forste and Tonfer, 1996: 
Johnson and Rusbult, 1989; Rusbult, Johnson and Morrow, 1986) or as an aspect of 
their practical effect (e. g., Buunk, 1987; Hatfield, Traupmann and Walster, 1978). 
Again, research is geared to generating quantitative data that can be subjected 
to inferential statistical tests. For example, the Hatfield Global Measure of Equity- 
Inequity (Hatfield et a/., 1978) is a scale that attempts to transform individuals' 
feelings about the equity of their relationships into simple numerical values. 
Respondents who report feeling that their relationship is equitable - that they get 
as much from their partner and relationship as they give in return - are assigned a 
scale value of zero. Those who feel over-benefited - getting more than they give 
- may be assigned a score of up to three. Accordingly, those who feel under- 
benefited - giving more than they get - may be awarded a score as low as minus 
three. This quantification made possible the discovery of Hatfield et aL (ibid. ) that 
of 2000 married respondents, those who felt under-benefited had significantly 
more extramarital affairs (and sooner into their marriage) than those who felt 
either over-benefited or equitably treated. 
Secondly, there is a body of literature on affairs, their causes and relational 
consequences, that is published for the consumption of the general public. This 
self help literature usually arises from more or less clinical experience in a range of 
therapeutic settings. One example is Litvinoff's (1998) Guide to Better 
Relationships, which imports the collective wisdom of Relate, a British relationship 
counselling organisation. Another is Private Lies: Infidelity and the Betrayal of 
Intimacy (Pittman, 1989), the reflections of a psychiatrist. Other texts in this genre 
include Couthery, Stanway and Stanway (1983), Pittman (1993), Reibstein and 
Richards (1992), Schneider (1988), Tysoe (1997) and West-Meads (1997). As with 
the social cognition account, this body of writing conceives of infidelity and affairs 
as a common but distressing category of relational event (perhaps even a crisis) 
that matters because it is a known antecedent of divorce and other kinds of 
relationship break-up. To take an example, Litvinoff introduces her discussion of 
affairs as follows: 
An affair is what most people think of as the crisis in a relationship. Far many the 
idea of their partners becoming involved with someone else is their greatest fear. 
[I By affair we mean any relationship with a third person that threatens the existing 
relationship between a couple. (] Later we will look in detail at what 
choracterises the relationships that stay together rather than split up. 
(Litvinoff, 1998, pp. 160-16 1: emphasis in original) 
The causes of infidelity are located within the individual and the couple 
relationship. For instance, Litvinoff includes in her list of causes the factor of 
insecurity: 
If a partner feels rejected for some reason (as a man might if he loses the main 
focus of his partner's attention during pregnancy, or while she is caring for young 
children, or a woman might do if the man is wrapped up in his work) he or she 
might look for attention or closeness from someone else. So might someone who is 
feeling vulnerable about his or her age or waning sexual attractiveness: only the 
excitement of a new relationship and the admiration in the eyes of someone new 
can seem like proof that all is still well. 
(Litvinoff, 1998, p. 163) 
In social cognition research, the task of the scientist is to distil formal explanatory 
models and theories from the observable test performances and other behaviours 
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of specific research participants. Contrastingly, in the self help and public 
education literature the task of the writer is to communicate theory in an 
accessible way. The abstract laws and general principles that constitute the 
wisdom of the experienced counsellor or clinician are re-particularised through 
case studies and emblematic instances, translated back into the realm of 
empirical experience for the benefit of the lay reader. 
Compared to studies of human nature and society, studies of individuals and 
interpersonal relationships adopt a more nuanced approach to infidelity 
discourse. There is somewhat more recognition that data collection happens in a 
social situation, a more locolised appreciation of why people say the things they 
do and a more contingent, relativised concept of the business being reported. 
Studies of human nature and society treat respondents as basically honest souls 
(cf. Potter and Wetherell, 1987) whose preferred or default modus operandi is to 
truthfully and accurately describe their experiences and views. Studies of 
individuals and interpersonal relationships admit that the truth about infidelity is 
not so easy to get at. It is recognised that dyadic partners may produce very 
different histories of the some relationship and its difficulties and that there is not 
necessarily much to be gained from a therapeutic point of view by trying to get 
to the bottom of the matter, sorting out which among competing versions or 
accounts is correct. On the contrary, a more usual concern is that the therapist or 
counsellor should appear impartial, which entails being seen to be not taking 
sides with respect to the matter of what really happened (e. g., see Potter, 1996a). 
Moreover, it is accepted that ind ividual respondents are more complex 
psychological entities than is implied by studies of human nature and society. 
Their expressions of their views, opinions, points of view and so on may be 
affected by more than a modest hesitancy about discussing sensitive issues. For 
instance, they might be speaking as someone who is insecure or suffering from 
low self-esteem or even as someone who is in denial. These possibilities will be the 
subject of further comment in the following chapters, especially Chapters 4,5 and 
In his discussion of psychological investigations of close relationships, 
Antaki (1994, p. 93) notices that their treatment of participants' discourse is "rather 
equivocal. " On the one hand, it is recognised that accounts are contingent and 
not straightforwardly reflection s of some real-world, historical sequence of events 
or set of objective facts. On the other hand, accounts are treated as arising from 
and representing reality insofar as they are scientifically demonstrated to 
correlate with other indices of mental life; measures of dyadic (mal) adjustment, 
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for instance, or commitment or self-esteem or whatever. This equivocation is, 
Antaki suggests, disappointing for relativist critics because it fences off 
participants' accounts in such a way that they can only be approached through 
the researcher's own interpretative framework. Participants' versions are treated 
as eligible for examination but the kind of analysis that can be performed is 
restricted because the professional's own discourse of infidelity as having to do 
with marital distress, crises, threats, staying together and splitting up is allowed to 
remain exempt from scrutiny. 
In the therapeutically-orientated literature that I have been discussing 
here, one of the effects of this equivocation is the maintenance of a heavy 
emphasis on the victims of infidelity. Throughout, extramarital and extradyadic 
relationships are predefined as a problem and of course this problematisation sets 
limits on the range and nature of conclusions that are reached at the stage of 
disseminating professional knowledge and publishing findings. As Kipnis (1998) 
observes, the therapeutic idiom is one that excludes any analyses of the 
phenomenon of adultery that reach beyond a small network of interpersonal 
relationships with the nuclear family at its centre. Investigations of this ilk may 
improve upon studies of human nature and society insofar as they attend more to 
local relational issues but they do so at the expense of recognising the possibility 
of ideological and political critiques: "You can be fairly certain it's not going to be 
the social order that's organized pathologically, it's you" (Kipnis, 1998, p. 304). 
1 do not propose to choose between studies of human nature and society 
and studies of individuals and interpersonal relationships. It is not my intention to 
suggest that one of these is the superior means of investigating infidelity. The 
point is that neither of these broad approaches pays great attention to the 
discursive nature of the material from which infidelity is constituted. In both cases, 
infidelity is externalised: abstracted and exiled from the flow of discursive 
exchange in which researchers and participants. writers and readers make it 
available to each other in the first place. As an object of study infidelity becomes 
part of a selectively reified world: an aspect of human mating behaviour or sex in 
America, a marital crisis or a single individual's attempt to restore their own private 
sense of equity. There is a. segregation of the thing being studied from the 
scholar's own activity. 
Clearly, the extent to which this needs to be regarded as a problem 
depends on one's priorities and methodological perspective. Similarly, there are 
variations in the extent to which a relativistic, discursively focused approach to 
research can be regarded as a solution. For instance, the over-riding concern of 
the researcher may be to produce evidence about human nature and/or the 
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state of modern society in order to bring about some large-scale change in social 
policy. This could be a simple response to the requirements of the funding body, 
as with government-commissioned surveys or it could be a form of independent 
political activism. Some researchers choose their area of work according to 
highly personal criteria and a conventional methodology may be underpinned 
by a radical agenda. To take an alternative example, a project may proceed 
pragmatically from the observation that when people encounter problems in their 
relationships, they expect that psychotherapists will be available and able to 
help; ergo, research may be demanded so as to design and deliver therapy that 
ultimately seems to generate the highest possible ratings on some measure of 
efficacy, be it customer satisfaction or whatever. In cases such as these, the sorts 
of epistemological tensions and limitations of scope that I have described above 
may not be regarded as fatal to the enterprise and a more thoroughly discursive 
perspective on the research activity may not be recognised as doing much to 
help researchers satisfy the requirements of their particular objectives and 
circumstances. However, The Compleat Infidel is a study of language and the 
immediate interactional dynamics of defensive discursive behaviour. As such, 
issues to do with the reification of infidelity and its abstraction as a topic from the 
researcher's own discursive practice must be taken seriously. Accordingly, in this 
document I shall try to ensure that my own commentary is recognised as very 
much part of the phenomenon being studied and is not granted diplomatic 
immunity from analysis. Overall, I shall aim for what Antaki (1994, p. 93. ) calls a 
11 really committed relativism. " What this entails will become more and more clear 
as we progress through the latter part of Chapter 1. 
Some Unsatisfactory Treatments of Infidelity Discourse 
In recent years a very few pieces of research have appeared that take infidelity 
discourse as the object of study. Consequently, from the methodological 
standpoint of The Compleat Infidel, they represent an advance on the more 
traditional social scientific investigations discussed above. However, they also 
feature one or two lingering problems and areas of tension that make them not 
entirely satisfactory. In the following paragraphs I shall briefly review these studies 
and indicate where they and The Compleat Infidel finally part company. Three of 
the key studies to which I refer are those of Burns and Griffin (1996), Dryden (1999) 
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and Kitzinger and Powell (1995). All of the authors are social psychologists and 
they share a feminist perspective on the social construction of infidelity. 
The analytic materials used by Dryden (1999) in her exploration of 
discourse in and about marriage are research interviews with seventeen couples. 
The interviews were, Dryden reports, "loosely structured (around topics such as 
family, friends, children, daily life etc. )" (p. 13). Predictably, at least some of the 
conversations turned to matters of (in) fidelity. From the outset of her book Dryden 
makes it clear that she is not trying to examine marriage in any stark, objectivist 
sense but rather that she is interested in how the reality of marriage is ongoingly 
constructed by her research participants, through their meaning-making activities 
with discourse. "The emphasis throughout this book, " she states firmly, 'is on the 
active and constructive nature of talk" (p. 15). However, Dryden has misgivings 
about constructionist and discursive analyses that focus on the "human being as 
textual product" (p. 20) to the total exclusion of individuals' actual, lived 
experience. In contrast, she is concerned with constructions and versions of 
reality and also with the "materiial and emotional consequences" (ibid. ) that these 
constructions bring about for the people who build them. 
How does the theory convert into analytic practice? Dryden's discussion 
of (in)fidelity centres on a longish extract of interview transcript (pp. 138-140). The 
interviewees are a couple named Gillian and Patrick Henderson. The 
conversation is not proceeding smoothly. For instance, Patrick remarks that 
married people are "expected to remain faithful but er [pause] I don't think it's a 
very sort of natural thing to do" and a note in Dryden's transcript records that "[At 
this point Gillian looks as though she might burst into tears. 1" (p. 140). Now, this 
stretch of data is used by Dryden to show that this unremarkable married man is 
adept at constructing versions of reality and accounts of marriage that seem 
"destined to make his wife feel insecure" (p. 141). Indeed, Dryden adds "Given 
that Gillian was highly economically dependent on her husband with three young 
children to care for [I her position was insecure" (ibid.. emphasis in original). 
Moving from the particular to the general, Dryden's conclusion is that men 
commonly produce discursive constructions that create emotional insecurity in 
their partners and this is likely because it provides them with "an effective way of 
keeping control over the marital agenda" (ibid. ). 
The analysis of Burns and Griffin (1996) is also based on semi-structured 
research interviews, this time with individuals instead of couples. The overall topic 
was love and intimate relationships. Burns, the interviewer, found that participants 
.. often talked about infidelities, their partners'and their own, and all of them said 
something about their ideas about infidelity if not their experiences of it. " In the 
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ensuing report Burns characteriises her research method unambiguously as 
discourse analysis. She explains that discourse analysis'ls not concerned with 
allocating descriptions to pre-agreed conceptual categories, but with exploring 
how conceptual categories are constructed through talk" (emphasis in original). 
That is, "the focus is on the talk" and not on some extra-discursive notion of 
infidelity that is presumed to underlie or precede it. Specifically, the research 
questions about infidelity discourse are as follows. Firstly, Burns wants to look at the 
overall shape of constructions of infidelity and identify the "common themes" that 
emerge in the talk. Secondly, she intends to explore constructions of gender 
within these accounts and discover whether "double standards are 
constructed in talk about infidelity. " 
As it turns out, by the end of the report these modest objectives are 
exceeded. Like Dryden, Burns is additionally (if not more) interested in the 
material and emotional consequences of infidelity talk. For instance, her 
concluding remarks prominently include the following. 
The gendered Positions offered by the discourse of infidelity used by the women 
makes [sic] it easier for men to be unfaithful to women than for women to be 
unfaithful to men. because it is male infidelity that is constructed as expected. This 
may be translated into women's insecurity in heterosexual relationships for which 
they may blame themselves. By blaming themselves for being insecure, they need 
not leave the relationship. This seems similar to women who stay in violent 
relationships, blaming themselves for his violence. 
(Burns and Griffin, 1996) 
Both Dryden and Burns explicitly bracket their work with the investigation of 
infidelity discourse of Kitzinger and Powell (1995). In this study over one hundred 
students were given a story completion task. The cue story featured either a male 
or female protagonist (John or Claire) who realises that their (heterosexual) 
partner has been "seeing someone else... " (p. 352). The students' completed 
stories were subjected to "thematic content analysis" (ibid. ). Kitzinger's and 
Powell's report of their findings shows that the analysis was particularly geared to 
discovering how constructions of infidelity varied according to the gender of the 
research participants. For instance, "male and female subjects pointed utterly 
contrasting pictures of a heterosexual relationship of one year's standing. Women 
tended to romanticize and men to sexualize the relationship" (p. 355). Moreover, 
one of the most striking differences between stories written by male and female 
subjects was in the number and nature of words describing emotions. More than 
twice as many men as women wrote stories which contain no emotion words at 
all: only 12 percent of the stories written by women contain no emotion words, 
compared with over a quarter (26 percent) of the stories written by men. 
(Kitzinger and Powell, 1995, p. 359) 
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Finally, Kitzinger and Powell draw out interpretations or "readings" of these findings 
from two theoretical perspectives, which they term "essentialist" and "social 
constructionist. " Thus, "from an essentialist perspective, these stories could be read 
as uncovering sex differences in 'understandings', 'beliefs', 'personal needs' or 
'underlying motives'with respect to heterosexual relationships" (p. 365). That is, 
"from an essentialist perspective, [I our findings can be read as claims about 
psychological differences between young men and young women" (p. 366; 
emphasis added). In contrast, a social constructionist reading (implicitly the 
preferred option) could 
relate the stories told here to the various narrative genres with which student 
subjects are likely to be familiar: pornography, romantic fiction, stories in women's 
magazines and soap operas, the agony columns and the Oprah Winfrey Show. 
Given that male students are much more likely to be familiar with the 
pornographic genre and female students with the romantic genre (Wilson, 1983), it 
is perhaps not surprising to find that their stories draw on and reproduce these 
different genres 
(Kitzinger and Powell, 1995, p. 366) 
All three of these studies are to be commended for their explicit, resolute and 
largely consistent attention to infidelity as a discursive phenomenon. There is a 
concerted effort (on the one hand) to avoid treating participants' accounts as a 
mere conduit for information about infidelity as a pre-existing feature of the "real" 
natural or social world and (on the other hand) to avoid treating accounts as 
symptomatic of hidden psychological structures and processes. Overall, these 
researchers exercise considerable caution about claiming any causes for their 
participants' constructions that are located in the obviously extra-discursive 
realms of mind and behaviour. However, when it comes to identifying the effects 
of infidelity discourse, the same restrictions do not apply. This is no accident. The 
studies discussed here represent (various kinds of) feminist approaches to 
discourse and as such they belong to an even broader church of "critical" 
approaches that is unified and distinguished by its primary political objective. In 
the words of Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995, p. 59), this objective is one of 
.1 emancipating ordinary individuals, especially those subordinated through 
membership of social categories which render them powerless: 'ethnic minorities', 
women', 'the working class'and so on. " The basic premise is that discourse 
matters because it is through discourse that hegemonic and oppressive power 
relations are maintained and their technologies implemented. In this respect, the 
reports of Burns and Griffin ( 1996), Dryden (1999) and Kitzinger and Powell (1995) 
are allied with the well known, more explicitly Foucaultian, feminist discourse 
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analyses of Gavey (1989,1993) and Hollway (1984,1989), which identify discrete 
and (for women) malevolent "discourses" of sexuality. They also have something 
in common with the more Marxist enterprises of "critical discourse analysis" and 
"critical psychology"clescribed by Parker and his associates (e. g., Burman and 
Parker, 1993; Parker, 1990a, 1990b, 1992,1999, Willig, 1998). 
Thus, from the standpoint of The Compleat Infidel there is a problematic 
aspect to the three key studies of Burns and Griffin, Dryden and Kitzinger and 
Powell. The long range experiential and ideological effects of discourse are given 
centrality at the expense of analytic comment on the more immediate social 
practices that a6se in contextualised discursive interaction (except where they 
can be "made to yield political conclusions, " Widdicombe, 1995, p. 108). A 
detailed account of this problem is worked out by Potter, Wetherell, Gill and 
Edwards (1990) and I shall not attempt to duplicate it here. Instead, let me 
proceed by means of an illustrative example. Recall Patrick Henderson's remark 
about fidelity that I quoted in the discussion of Dryden's study, above. 
Dryden is primarily interested in long range issues to do with social power 
and gender relations and this priority informs her analysis of the interview 
transcripts that are her data. Thus, Patrick's talk is treated as reducible to the gist 
that there is something objectionably unnatural about "remaining faithful" and is 
taken by Dryden as evidencing men's "separation behaviour'in (discursively 
constructing) marriage (Dryden, 1999, p. 119). The significance of this separation 
behaviour is that it causes women (in general, not just Gillian Henderson) to feel 
insecure. From this insecurity, men (in general, but including Patrick) reap the 
benefits of increased relational power and control. 
The problem with this reading is that it leaves the analyst with no principled 
way to account for the finer details of Patrick's talk and their role in the immediate 
context of the interview. For instance, there is no way to explain why Patrick 
should have picked on the particular topic of the unnaturalness of fidelity as the 
platform for his separation behaviour. out of all the myriad possibilities. There is no 
basis but intuition for making sense of the many hesitations and disclaimers that 
accompany his delivery (e. g., compare it to the much more blunt, 
uncompromising presentation of this some argument by Helen Fisher in the 
section on studies of human nature and society, above). There is nothing to be 
said about whether and how his discursive behaviour is geared to the specific 
and perhaps rather unusual circ urnstances of being professionally interviewed by 
Dr Dryden. 
These unanswered questions about the pragmatics of infidelity discourse 
are just the kind that will be addressed in The Compleat InfideL This is the first 
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study to examine the active and constructive nature of infidelity discourse that 
does not at some point "step away from language, " as advised by Parker (1992, p. 
A; emphasis added) in order to produce political conclusions. I do not mean to 
suggest that The Compleat Infidel is a document sealed into an air lock of 
political neutrality: far from it. I do mean to suggest that political import will not be 
attempted by imposing on the research a framework that treats discourses as 
discrete causal agents (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 90) and thereby neglects to 
comment "on discourse as social practice, on the context of use and thus on the 
act of discursive instantiation" (ibid. ). 
In the next part of this chapter I shall say more about what sort of 
document The Compleat Infidel is, the readers who might be expected to find in 
it something of utility and the rhetorical dilemmas and debates in which it 
participates. After that I shall end this chapter by delineating the exact questions 
that collectively constitute the research problem. 
Defensive Practice: 
The Dual Identity of The Compleat Infidel 
Infidelity discourse is a massive terrain that cannot be exhaustively explored within 
the pages of the single volume you are reading now. It is therefore a practical 
necessity to home in on some area of the discourse in order to do it justice. In this 
section I shall specify the area I am going to focus on and explain my choice. 
Since its inception I have thought of The Compleat Infidel as a document 
with a dual identity. First and foremost, it is a research report, an exercise in 
discursive psychology, about which I shall have a good deal to say in the next 
chapter. It presents an extensive yet fine-grained study of the discursive 
construction of infidelity, focussing on constructions that account for infidelity and 
explain the behaviour of infidels. However, The Compleat Infidel is also a political 
paper: a manifesto and a technical handbook for unrepentant infidels who are 
interested in developing the rhetorical skills that their occupation demands. Each 
of its five analytic chapters describes a distinct set of arguments and discursive 
manoeuvres which collectively amount to a practical guide to conducting one's 
own defence. This dual identity is no accident but arises from two related 
considerations. 
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Reflexivity 
In the following examination of defensive practice in infidelity discourse we shall 
encounter a number of interesting phenomena. For instance, we shall look at the 
ways in which accounts are made to appear factual and convincing through 
linguistic devices such as vivid description, empiricist accounting, consensus and 
corroboration and the rhetoric of argument, to name but four. Now these fact- 
constructive devices are not exclusive to the infidelity discourse that we shall 
scrutinise later on as data. They are common to all reports that present 
themselves as somehow factual, including social scientific reports on infidelity 
(discourse), including the very one you are reading now. 
Research reports are supposed to convince readers by presenting units of 
knowledge which are true by virtue of having been more or less objectively 
discovered, they are supposed to support their theoretical claims by showing a 
concordance with discoveries and arguments that have been developed 
previously by researchers in the some methodological field and they are 
supposed to identify and display an improvement upon flows and inadequacies 
in previous research on the some topic. That is. research reports (like other kinds 
of reports, accounts, descriptions and so on) "are not just about something but 
they are also doing something: [] they are not merely representing some facet of 
the world, they are also involved in that world in some practical way" (Potter, 
1996a, p. 47; emphasis in original). For instance, they are not just about infidelity 
discourse but they also contribute to a world of scientific knowledge and 
academic debate. The word for this feature of discourse is reflexivity (ibid.; also 
see Ashmore, 1989; Ashmore, Myers and Potter, 1995). 
Not all of the reflexive actions and functions of research reports are as 
obvious and explicit as the examples I have cited above. For instance, as a 
whole the body of mainstream social scientific literature on infidelity is rhetorically 
designed so as to participate in making a case or presenting one side of a moral 
argument about sex, marriage, heterosexual relationships and so on. To take a 
very simple example, the position is adopted in much of the literature of sexology, 
the psychology of interpersonal relationships and so on that trust is naturally a 
good thing, while secrecy, lying and illicit sexual relationships are all bad things. 
Now, the problem I want to identify with these mainstream approaches to 
infidelity is not so much that their side of the moral argument in which they 
reflexively participate is simpiy wrong but rather that these texts do not recognise 
themselves as being reflexive in the first place. They do not acknowledge the 
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debate in which they are participating and taking up an argumentative position. 
This is a mistake which I shall try to avoid and one way to do that is through 
constructing a dual identity for The Compleot Infidel. Calling this document a 
manifesto and a handbook for unrepentant infidels is a way of deliberately 
exposing its inescapably rhetorical character and visibly taking a side that 
responds to the side that is being occupied more quietly and implicitly by most of 
the rest of the social scientific literature on infidelity. 
Analytic interest in difficult interactional manoeuvres 
I hope that it is already becoming clear that discursive psychology involves not 
only an interest in how objects such as infidelity are constructed but also in what 
those constructions can be seen to accomplish interactionally. Of course. some 
interactional manoeuvres are much easier to accomplish than others. It would 
be easy and arguably somewhat redundant to produce a piece of analysis that 
effectively showed how to assign blame, issue accusations and generally hold 
infidels and infidelity accountable, especially in the wake of a prosperous 
tradition of social scientific writing that has overwhelmingly attended to the pain 
and jealousy of the cuckolded partners and the disruption to marital or primary 
relationships. In deliberate contrast this study attends to the interactional tasks 
and problems faced by infidels themselves, the occupants of a rhetorical position 
in which they are required to justify the seemingly unjustifiable and defend the 
apparently indefensible. Too often presumed guilty of material "ho m ewrec king" 
and emotional "devastation" for the sake of a meaningless sexual thrill, infidels 
face enormous strategic disadvantage in discussing their own infidelities, requiring 
the agile moral relativism of the convicted burglar or murderer. It is the available 
methods of coping with this strategic disadvantage that will be treated here as 
analytically interesting. We will return to this topic for a more theoretically 
nuanced discussion of the interactional challenges faced by compleat infidels in 
the section on analytic procedure at the end of Chapter 2. 
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The discourse analyst's dilemma: 
A note about the language of agency, strategy and design 
As Potter (I 996a, p. 65) points out, when writing about stretches of discursive (oral 
or written) interaction and finding metaphors to convey what is being 
accomplished, the discourse analyst is often faced with a difficult choice 
between two kinds of language. 
On the one hand there is an agentic lexicon of strategy and design. The 
drawback here is that the analyst may appear to be suggesting that a good deal 
of inner cognitive planning and decision making must go on behind the scenes in 
the production of discourse. Without getting into a debate about how far this is 
actually the case (Potter, 1996a, 1999, remains agnostic, after Socks, 1992; 
interested readers may also refer to Heritage, 1990/91: Pomerantz, 1990/91), such 
suggestions would seem to be inharmonious with discursive psychology, an 
approach that tries to focus maximally on language and as little as possible on 
psychological, social or material worlds that are somehow extra- or supro- 
discursive. 
On the other hand there is a mechanistic, deterministic lexicon that avoids 
being mistaken for cognitive psychology but is proportionally more likely to be 
mistaken for behaviourism, although behaviourism is an etic approach that tries to 
describe the objects and events of social life from the outside in objective, neutral 
terms while discursive psychology is an emic approach that takes as its starting 
point the sense made of social life by participants themselves, within their own 
culturally and temporally specific interactions: see Edwards (1997): Edwards and 
Potter (1992). 
On balance, the language of agency is often marginally the better 
choice. Most people are so practised at ordinary conversation and other kinds of 
dis , cursive interaction that they at least give the impression of knowing what they 
are doing, most of the time. To borrow an example from Potter (I 996a, p. 46) 
most people appear quite proficient at ending telephone conversations, though 
these have been shown by conversation analysts to involve quite complicated 
structures and sets of conventions. However, it is possible to notice that 
appearance of procedural knowledge without necessarily assuming that (or how) 
speakers are cognitively busy, "plotting how to end [the] phone conversation, or 
how to stop [it] ending" (ibid. ). 
Moreover, though I shall use both the strategic and the mechanistic sets of 
metaphors, the former particularly suits the dual identity and purpose of The 
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Compleat InfideL There is not really any pure behaviourist theory of infidelity 
currently existing in social science. However, cognitivist approaches are 
common. Consider the studies of individuals and interpersonal relationships that I 
reviewed earlier in this chapter. Even the social exchange theories, which 
incorporate some behaviourist principles, rely heavily on notions of inner 
psychological states such as commitment and processes such as decision making 
to describe the significant outcomes of interpersonal relations. This is the literature 
I referred to in the above section on reflexivity, which makes a quiet, even implicit 
judgement about the moral responsibility of infidels and the morality of infidelity. 
Consequently I shall give preference to the strategic metaphor in this text 
because it suits the reflexive purposes of The Compleat Infidel to challenge the 
rhetorical position of the mainstream social scientific literature by matching it and 
thereby exposing and ironising it. Where the strategic metaphor is used in this 
document I hope that this reflexive note will help to set reasonable limits on what 
it may be taken to imply about the mental life of the speakers. 
The Research Problem 
In earlier parts of this chapter I have identified what can now be summarised as 
two distinct sets of problems with previous research in the general area of 
infidelity. As we saw in the section headed "Some Social Scientific Approaches To 
Infidelity, " much of this research presumes to abstract infidelity from discourse and 
make that abstraction the principal object of study. As a result, the discursive 
n ature of the materials that researchers have to work with is necessarily 
downplayed and ultimately shunned. In the following section I discussed some 
research that begins to improve matters by acknowledging the discursive form in 
which infidelity is available as a topic for investigation. The findings of these 
projects concern the long range effects of discourse on psychological and 
societal entities that populate an extra-discursive world. There is arguably nothing 
wrong with this if the researcher's agenda is explicitly one of social reform. 
However, if one sets out to make a study of infidelity as a discursive phenomenon, 
surely it ought to be possible to end up with findings that concern exactly that, 
being located firmly within the realm of the discursive. The present study is an 
analysis of passages of discourse in which infidelity and infidels are defended. In 
this section I want to specify the questions that are to be asked of these data so 
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that we might leave The Compleat Infidel knowing something more about the 
discourse than when we arrived. 
The question of mapping the discursive terrain. 
The data examined in this study, while being drawn from a wide range of sources, 
are all examples of contemporary, Anglo-American discourse. Arýong users of 
this discourse there is recognisably a broad, tacit agreement about what sorts of 
things may and may not be intelligibly and plausibly produced to account for 
infidelity. For instance, I have yet to encounter the claim that there is any link 
between infidelity and vegetarianism. Neither is there any evidence that it is 
presently acceptable practice to account for infidelity by appeal to the waxing 
and waning of the moon. However, there is abundant evidence of people 
introducing such themes as boredom and true love into their accounts and of 
other parties to the conversation treating these themes as relevant to the topic of 
infidelity and worthy of debate. This being the case, a primary goal of this 
research must be to chart the prominent features of the discursive landscape. 
The question of construction. 
Having taken in an aerial view, it will be appropriate to examine the data at close 
range. That is, individual conversations and texts can be scrutinised for the local 
details of their construction. To put a very simple gloss on what that might involve, 
it is partly about content: identifying what discursive resources and materials have 
been used in building a case for the defence. It is also about design: noticing 
how the various constituent parts of the account are organised and arranged. 
EaTlier in this chapter I observed that defending infidels and infidelity is not 
the most usual or the most popular of discursive projects. Those who attempt it 
can not afford the luxury of assuming that their efforts will be warmly received. In 
building such a case, then, it is more than usually necessary that the resulting 
structure should appear factual and convincing. How this factuality is 
accomplished is one of the puzzles to be addressed in the construction strand of 
this research. 
The question of function. 
This question is closely related to the previous two. From the aerial view, one may 
wonder how a person wishing to defend infidelity could make a choice from 
among the available range of explanatory themes. Why should an instance of 
defensive accounting come to depend on such-and-such a line of argument 
rather than one of the others? From the close up view, one may wonder how a 
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person accounting for infidelity comes to produce and arrange the details of an 
apparently factual construction in this particular configuration in preference to 
any other. 
There is no doubt that defensive accounts for infidels and infidelity are not 
produced in a vacuum. Rather, they appear in some distinctive discursive 
context. Sensitivity to this context entails more than making a general display of 
factuality and plausibility. It also involves attention to local issues to do with 
personal accountability and blame. Thus, the question of function with regard to 
some discursively ýcontextualisecl instance of defensive accounting is likely to 
concern what is accomplished for its producer. What, in discursive terms, might 
be gained? 
2 
Methodological Issues 
Methodological Overview 
The accounts literature 
As I observed in Chapter 1, this study is not an attempt to analyse the entire 
terrain of speech and writing about infidelity. In order to accomplish more than a 
sweeping overview it is necessary to home in on a specific area of the discourse. 
In this case, the area of interest is defensive practice. In this section I want to 
emphasise my overall preference for the term defensive practice rather than 
defences and likewise for accounting over accounts. This will be accomplished 
through comment on how The Compleat Infidel is positioned relative to what has 
become known as the accounts literature (e. g., Antaki, 1994, p. 44; Buttny, 1993, 
p. 13). 
In everyday discourse infidelity is a topic characterised by interpersonal 
conflict. It is the basis for launching personal accusations and ascribing personal 
blame. It is characteristically construed not as a sociological phenomenon or a 
philosophic puzzle but as an individual's action; one that matters because it inflicts 
pain and injury on another individual. From this perspective infidelity seems to 
belong in the same bracket of behaviours as insults, threats, physical assaults and 
other crimes against the person. One might say that all these behaviours are 
interpersonal offences for which accused and suspected individuals are obliged 
to produce an account. This notion is a defining one in an important early 
chapter of the accounts literature: Scott's and Lyman's Accounts (1968). An 
account, Scott and Lyman proposed, is a linguistic form that is offered for 
1. untoward actiorV(p. 47). Indeed, extramarital sex is one of the examples 
supplied by Scott and Lyman as an action that calls for an account. 
Scott's and Lyman's project, along with those reviewed and refined by 
Semin and Manstead (1983) and Nichols (1990), involved developing a taxonomy 
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of accounts, identifying various types and subtypes of excuse and justification. In 
the data to be examined in the analytic chapters of this document we will see 
some discursive constructions that look as though they could be easily classifiable 
in this way: denials in one chapter, provocation defences in another, appeals to 
diminished capacity in yet another and so on. On this basis it might then be 
possible to speculate about the effectiveness of different types of account or 
defence, in the style of Felson and Ribner (1981) or Cody and McLaughlin (1985, 
1988). However, such a classificatory system is not used to divide up the subject 
matter in The Compleat Infidel. Three related problems arise from this approach 
to accounting that The Compleat Infidel seeks to avoid. 
Firstly, to impose a predetermined typology of accounts or defences on 
the data would draw the researcher's attention towards abstracted, idealised 
discursive forms and away from people's actual, contextualised discursive 
behaviour (Antaki, 1994; Buttny, 1993, Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1996a; Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987). For example, intoxication might be presumed to be the basis for 
a classic diminished capacity defence. However, collecting together examples 
of diminished capacity defences by the simple criterion of appeals to 
drunkenness would overlook the differences in my data between, on the one 
hand, accounts where a person's drunkenness is tied to the reporting of some 
single, particular celebratory event that also involved time spent away from 
home, reunion with old friends and former sweethearts and so on and, on the 
other hand, accounts where the person is constructed as an habitual alcoholic 
(cf. Edwards and Potter, 1992, pp. 98-99). It would also overlook the insight of 
Atkinson's and Drew's (1979) study of courtroom interaction that a simple 
reference to drunkenness might not, in fact, be performing as any kind of 
account and that identifying what counts as an account can depend on its 
orientation to something accusatory within a sequentially organised discursive 
sequence or conversational exchange. 
Secondly, taxonomic approaches tend to promote a view of accounting 
as the production of the account, a momentary, definitive, on-the-record speech 
act (Antaki, 1994; Buttny, 1993). This is exemplified by Scott's and Lyman's 
definition and operationalisation of an account as a discrete, linguistic 
manoeuvre that repairs a social breach. The problem here is that more subtle, 
diffuse styles of accounting are in danger of being ignored. For instance, Conley's 
and O'Barr's (1990) study of defensive practices in a small-claims court warrants a 
move away from the isolated speech-act view of accounts by displaying the long 
range differences in accounting practice between "rule o6ented" and "relation 
oriented" forms of discourse. In the former plaintiffs and defendants take up the 
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preferred language of f he law, supply precise facts, maintain a tone of objectivity 
or neutrality and stick to information that is "relevant to the narrow principles of 
contract law" (ibid., p. 63). In the latter they speak a more vernacular language, 
supply descriptions that rely on the inferential work of the listener, maintain an 
emphasis on social and interpersonal morality and include information that is 
relevant to building a convincing narrative. Similarly, my data show that there is 
more to accounting for infidelity than announcing the defence in a single move. 
For example, speakers sometimes sideline the issue of accounting for their own 
infidelities and avoid addressing the injurious consequences of that behaviour by 
focussing on infidelity as a generic human practice that is explicable in terms of 
various positive benefits and advantages. Depending on the discursive context, 
this may be necessarily achieved cumulatively, over several conversation turns. 
Thirdly, taxonomies of accou nts tend to imply some discrete, definitive 
offence or breach to which the account pertains. Granted, an espoused interest 
in the defensive practices surrounding infidelity presupposes that speakers and 
writers have something to defend. However, it is hardly the case that accounting 
for infidelity is confined to courtroom-type situations where people are obliged to 
answer for specific crimes, elsewhere remaining silent. My data include accounts 
produced in research interviews, on public internet bulletin boards and in 
response to surveys, to name but three alternative circumstances. Often it is not 
clear what particular occasion of infidelity a speaker is accounting for or even 
whether they have ever committed such a specific behavioural offence. 
Typically in these data the recipient for whom the account is produced is not 
straightforwardly the victim of the speaker's infidelitous actions. Nonetheless, in 
these situations too, speakers have interactional interests to protect. For example, 
consider the research inter view. Interviewees may have any number of possible 
reasons for participating in an interview about infidelity; thinking the subject an 
interesting topic for discussion, a desire to help with the researcher's project or 
whatever. Despite this, simply occupying the position of someone who knows 
about infidelity and is authoriised to speak on the subject can be an accountable 
matter (cf. Widdicombe's and Wooffitt's approach of potential interviewees in 
public places on the strength of their "looking like" rockers and punks: 
Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995). What interviewees have to say may thus be 
defensively designed with respect to guarding against unfavourable inferences 
about their personal codes of behaviour or moral character without a specific 
accusation of infidelity or a voluntary confession ever having to arise. It is in this 
ongoing, situated sense that I use the notions of accounting and defensive 
practice in The Compleat Infidel. The topic of speakers' accountability, as distinct 
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from the accountability of the events reported in their speech, will be the subject 
of further comment in the next section. 
Action orientated approaches to discourse 
In f his section I want to indicate where The Compleat Infidel is located on the 
conceptual map relative to neighbouring action orientated approaches to 
discourse. In Chapter 11 characterised unsatisfactory treatments of infidelity 
discourse as those that start out discursive but end up somewhere else; projects 
that locate their conclusions about the discourse they study in a realm beyond 
the discursive (e. g., in the individual psyche or in the machinations of society). In 
contrast, in this section I will highlight some approaches to discourse that start out 
discursive and stay that way. Studying accounts, narratives, arguments and other 
discursive data and then locating one's conclusions within the realm of the 
discursive necessarily entails noticing that discourse acts on itself in a very 
immediate way. That is, what people say builds on what has been said before, 
anticipates what will be said next, shapes the discursive context in which they are 
speaking and so on. Approaches that attend to the local, situated action of 
discourse on discourse and that are close neighbours of the approach taken in 
The Compleot Infidel are the subject matter of this section. They will be 
considered in two sub-sections, beginning with rhetorical analysis and following 
with ethnomethodology (EM) and conversation analysis (CA). 
The study of rhetoric has enjoyed something of a renaissance since the 
mid-] 970s (Potter, 1996b) and the analysis of scientific rhetoric now boosts a 
diverse body of literature Soyland (1994, p. 24). Of particular relevance to The 
Compleat Infidel are the studies of scientific disagreement and debate of Gilbert 
and Mulkay (1984) and Mulkay (1 985a) and (of particular importance to 
discursive psychology) the critique of cognitive and social psychology developed 
by Mick Billig (1987,1989,1990,1991,1992; Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, 
Middleton and Radley, 1988). This kind of rhetorical analysis is concerned with 
how discourse is structured argumentatively, to be persuasive and undermine 
alternative positions. It employs a wide range of discursive materials including 
interviews, spontaneously occurring talk and a variety of written texts to display 
the rheto6cal devices used in making a case and the broad social or ideological 
character of personal and interpersonal dilemmas. 
The Compleat Infidel is not solely a rheto6cal analysis. It incorporates 
analytic insights and resources from other disciplines, notably CA, in the project of 
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investigating the defensive practices of infidelity discourse. As remarked by Potter 
(1 996b, p. 134), "conversation analysis and rhetorical analysis emphasize two 
different orders of relationship: CA stresses sequential organization across turns; 
rhetorical analysis stresses the relationship between opposing argumentative 
positions. The latter may themselves be sequentially organized, but this is not 
necessarily so. " Having sold that, rhetorical analysis is an important aspect of this 
project. Particularly, rhetorical analysis helps in identifying the argumentative 
orientation of some of the less obviously conversational texts in the data-base and 
attention is paid to the appearance in the data of various rhetorical devices such 
as logical argument forms (Billig, 1987) and speakers' espousal of strong views 
(Billig, 1989). 
The sociological movement of ethnomethodology was founded in the 
mid- I 950s by Harold Garfinkel. As an area of sfudyit investigates how ordinary 
members of society make sense of and accountably act on their social world 
(Heritage, 1984). It stresses the central role of discourse in conducting this 
normative social business. Conversation analysis was principally founded by 
Harvey Sacks in the 1960s and is now a prominent form of ethnomethodologicol 
work that homes in on the specifics of conversational interaction, especially the 
mundane and the everyday. The objective of CA is to discover how participants 
in ordinary conversation "understand and respond to one another in their turns at 
talk, with a central focus being on how sequences of actions are generated" 
(Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, p. 14; emphasis in original). Research in CA has 
been responsible for the discovery of a host of conversational devices through 
which speakers orientate to and accomplish their interactional business. Classic 
examples of such discoveries include adjacency pairs (Sacks, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 
521-570), dispreference markers (Pomerantz, 1984) and pre-sequences (Schegloff, 
1979,1980). 
The Compleat Infidel is not principally an exercise in conversation analysis 
although it does take an action orientated, situated approach to its materials. It 
incorporates data that are by no means naturally occurring conversations. It 
introduces analytic insights and resources from other disciplines (notably rhetorical 
analysis) in the project of investigating the defensive practices of infidelity 
discourse and its focus is not coterminous with the sequential organisation of talk. 
However, CA makes a substantial contribution to this project. Certainly, there is 
much of relevance to The Compleat Infidel to be gleaned from CA studies of 
interaction in institutional, especially judicial, settings. It is impossible and perhaps 
inappropriate to cite a complete bibliography here, but to provide a taste of 
things to come, there is the analysis of action sequences associated with 
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accusations, justifications and excuses in the work of Drew (1978,1992) and 
Atkinson and Drew (1979); the analysis of litigants' use of descriptions in the work 
of Pomerantz (1987); the "practical epistemology"uncovered by Whalen and 
Zimmerman (1990) in people's reports of trouble to the police. Moreover, as is 
amply suggested by the works of Wetherell and Potter (1989,1992), Widdicombe 
and Wooffitt (1995) and Antaki and Widdicombe (1998), conversation-analytic 
discoveries about such matters as category membership (Sacks, 1979) and "doing 
being ordinary" (Sacks, 1984) can helpfully provide an analytic handle on how 
speakers manage to produce believable trait-laden identities and defensible 
role-based behaviours in the course of accounting for infidelity. 
Discursive psychology 
The Compleat Infidel is a study in discursive psychology or DP (Edwards, 1997; 
Edwards and Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996a). In other incarnations this approach is 
known as discursive social psychology (Potter, 1998) and discourse analysis (e. g., 
see Potter, Wetherell, Gill and Edwards, 1990), where the latter term refers to a 
distinctive form of analysis cultivated in social psychology by Potter and Wetherell 
(1987) and before that in the sociology of scientific knowledge by Gilbert and 
Mulkay (1984). The disciplines of CA and rhetorical analysis have been two of the 
most important attendant influences on the development of this new analytic 
programme (Potter, 1998,1999; Potter and Wetherell, 1994). In the incarnation 
invoked here, discursive psychology is both an action orientated methodological 
approach to the study of discourse and a radical critique and respecification of 
traditional concepts and topics in psychology (Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1998). 
Discursive psychology is underpinned by the discursive action model, or DAM 
(Edwards and Potter, 1992,1993), a "conceptual scheme that captures some of 
the features of participants' discursive practices [] and illustrates some of the 
relationships between them" (Edwards and Potter, 1992, p. 154); a set of 
1. principles that orientate any psychologist to important features of everyday 
reports and explanations" (p. 155). In this section I will make a sketch of DAM and 
begin to show how its principles apply in The Compleat Infidel. The specificities of 
application will be illustrated more fully later in this chapter, in the section on 
analytic procedure. 
The discursive action model is built in three sections, headed "action, " "fact 
and interest" and "accountability. " The first section, "action, " articulates the focus 
of DP on "people's practices: communication, interaction, argument; and the 
32 
organisation of those practices in different kinds of settings" (Edwards and Potter, 
1992, p. 156; emphasis added). The outward-bound term "action" stands in 
deliberate contrast to "cognition" and that term's reference to inner psychological 
states and mental life. Edwards and Potter (passim) show that traditionally 
cognitivist concepts such as "remembering" can be recast discursively as 
"reporting, " "attitudes" can be recast as "evaluations" and so forth. This shift of 
emphasis from thought to action reminds us that people's reports about their 
memories, attitudes and so on are not produced in a discursive vacuum. Rather, 
these discursive behaviours always take part in some activity sequence in which 
discourse users handle bits of interpersonal business; importantly including 
attributional business such as establishing responsibility and allocating blame. 
The second section, "fact and interest, " remarks that people 
conventionally treat each other as having various motivations, loyalties and 
prejudices that give them a stake in the things they say. Reports, accounts, 
descriptions and versions of the world run the risk of being undermined by appeal 
to the speaker's personal stake in producing that version and not some other one. 
To take a topical example, consider Kenneth Starr's prosecution of Bill Clinton over 
the latters relationship With Monica Lewinsky. What Starr presented as simple 
pursuit of the truth, Hillary Clinton set out to undermine, famously redescribing 
Starr's motives in terms of a "vast right-wing conspiracy" (The Guardian, 28 January 
1998). Stake is an attended-to, orientated-to issue in everyday discourse. 
Because of this, speakers are faced with a "dilemma": "how to produce accounts 
which attend to interests without being undermined as interested" (Edwards and 
Potter, 1992, p. 158). This can be accomplished through a range of discursive 
techniques for fact construction, including a range of externalisIng devices, many 
of which we will meet in action later on. Moreover, because the issue of stake is 
such a pervasive one, bearing on conversations for less obviously controversial 
than Clinton versus Starr, accounts can be seen to be rhetorically organised so as 
to promote and bolster one version of the world while contraindicating and 
undermining others. 
The third section, "accountability, " identifies two levels at which "speakers 
routinely deal with issues of agency and responsibility when they offer reports of 
events" (ibid., p. 165). Traditional psychological research on attribution has always 
acknowledged that participants who are presented with hypothetical examples 
or vignettes of accountable events are capable of talking in such a way as to 
assign responsibility to the different characters involved and to different aspects 
of the situation in which the event occurs. Discursive psychology acknowledges 
that reports also orientate to the accountability of the speaker, the person doing 
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f he reporting. Furthermore, these two levels of accountability are interrelated 
such that each may serve the purposes of the other. 
On the one hand, as Edwards and Potter (ibid. ) remark, in many situations 
the accountability of the speaker is the primary concern. Again, consider the 
Lewinsky investigation and Clinton's reports and testimonies therein. The 
investigation threatened to impeach Clinton, questioning his fitness to be 
President and taking him to be principally concerned with defending his own 
moral character. Many of the objects and events described in his testimonies are 
thus produced by Clinton himself as bits of evidence; selected, exemplary items 
that matter because of the bearing they have on the principal concern about his 
accountable status as an honest man or a liar. 
On the other hand, in other situations, the main concern is treated by 
participants as accounting for the object of reports, while the personal 
accountability of speakers is constructed as a more secondary consideration. In 
later chapters of The Compleat Infidel we will see some internet and interview 
data that foreground the business of accounting for infidelity as a problematic 
phenomenon. This is not to say that speakers' accountability stops being an issue. 
However, speakers may make a point of treating their position or footing 
(Goffman, 1981; Levinson, 1988; and see Edwards and Potter, 1992, pp. 3B, 168), 
the basis on which they offer their account (be it personal experience or 
disinterested observation), as one of a range of possible positions; one that 
matters insofar as it bears on their claims about the accountable nature and 
status of infidelity. 
The discursive action model and the studies of discourse and rhetoric from 
which DAM emerges provide a means of getting to grips with defensive practices 
in infidelity discourse; a practical modus operandi for investigating the different 
ways in which these accounts are constructed and the various discursive activities 
and functions that are thereby accomplished. 
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Participants and Materials 
Data sources 
The data-base from which this analysis of discourse is developed consists of more 
than 230 pieces of talk and text in which infidelity and infidels are defended. Of 
that number, more than 30 are either briefly quoted or reproduced in full in the 
pages of this document. My interest is in the defensive resources and practices 
that are used in contemporary, Anglo-American discourse. That is a broad remit 
and so I attempted to not restrict the range of potential data sources 
unnecessarily. Rather, I took an inclusive approach to data collection and 
gathered material from a deliberately eclectic mix of sources and media. For the 
immediate purpose of concisely describing this extensive data-base, it is possible 
to impose upon the data a simple classificatory system that divides materials 
according to the format in which they arrived on my desk. 
Print media. 
Hard copy, priinted documents that yielded defensive accounts of and for 
infidelity included British national newspapers (both broadsheet and tabloid) and 
the 136tish editions of va(ious glossy "lifestyle" magazines (titles for male audiences 
as well as those addressed to female readers). Another rich source in the print 
media format was published work in the social sciences, both the formal 
academic variety and the more popular genres that are addressed to mass 
audiences of lay readers. The social scientific texts were fruitful not least because 
of the common practice of block-quoting research participants; their interview 
talk, written responses to survey questions and so on. Some of the print media 
data that we will examine later in the analytic chapters of The Compleat /nfidel 
derive from the following sources. Newspapers include The Guardian and the 
Sunday People. Lifestyle magazines include Marie Claire, New Woman and 
Arena. The more formal sort of social science texts include Atwater (1979) and 
Lawson (1988). The more informal social science texts include Quilliam (1994) and 
Wolfe (1982). Of particular interest were the data and accompanying analyses of 
discursive psychologist Derek Edwards (e. g., Edwards, 1995,1997). In the course 
of his own research Edwards transcribed the talk of unhappy couples in session at 
a British relationship counselling facility. He has published lengthy extracts from 
these conversations, some of which contain defensive talk about infidelity. 
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New digital media. 
Documents in plain text, hypertext mark-up language and other formats can be 
downloaded from the World Wide Web. The internet is an immeasurably 
capacious resource that was useful in collecting the data for this study in four 
ways. Firstly, it provides access in digital format to newspapers and periodicals 
that might otherwise be difficult to obtain. For instance, my data-base includes 
cuttings from the Boston Globe and The Detroit News. Secondly, it is a means by 
which documents that are of public interest and in popular demand are 
published and circulated. Examples include transcripts of the interview given by 
the late Princess of Wales to the BBC's Panorama and President Clinton's grand 
jury testimony. Thirdly, searches can be undertaken for information about 
particular organisations and highly specialised topics. For instance, at various 
times during the data collection process I gathered information about such 
organisations as the American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy. 
Fourthly, more open-ended searches can be serendipitous in turning up swathes 
and samples of lay people's discourse. Let me illustrate this last point with an 
example that anticipates some of the data analysis that we will be doing later on. 
In Chapter 6 we will look at messages that were posted by English- 
speaking, lay people to an online debate that bore the title"The Other Side of an 
Affair' (henceforth OSA). OSA is one discussion thread of several that were 
running concurrently on the some public-access bulletin board in 1997. The other 
threads also dealt with relationship issues, their titles included "marriage sex is not 
the same, " "Cheating - Those who will not forgive" and "Husband Using Internet for 
Sexual Gratification. " Discussants contribute under an assumed name and there is 
evidence that many of them were participating in more than one thread at a 
time. The host for these discussion threads - that is, the provider of the bulletin 
board facility - is the HomeArt. s Network Forum at www. homearts. com, itself a 
division of the Hearst Corporation. Hearst is the American publisher of women's 
magazines such as Cosmopolitan, Redbook and Good Housekeeping, a fact 
reflected in the HomeArts website which is aimed at women with an interest in 
topics such as "health ... .. recipes, " "home" and "family. " However, there is no 
reason to assume that the contributors to OSA arrived via the front door of 
www. homearts. com, only then to discover the bulletin boards. An unspecifiable 
number (perhaps a majo(ity) will have arrived by more direct methods, for 
example, as I did, by typing words such as "infidelity"into a search engine and 
finding that individual pages from OSA were listed among the many resulting hits. 
OSA was a conversation that lasted over several months and more than a 
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thousand messages or posts. It particularly attracted my attention because of a 
heated argument that broke out between two factions: on the one hand, those 
who were or had been illicitly involved with persons who were already married or 
similarly committed to someone else; on the other hand, those who had been 
deceived and betrayed by unfaithful partners and spouses. 
Spoken word. 
Some data took the form of tape-recorded speech that had to be transcribed 
before any analysis could proceed. For example, a few cases were recordings of 
radio broadcasts, notably the sort of programme that invites members of the 
public to telephone with their opinions on various momentarily significant topics. 
However, the bulk of the spoken word data came from recordings of 14 original 
interviews on the subject of infidelity that I conducted for the specific purpose of 
this research. 
The participants were six women and eight men in their twenties and 
thirties who very kindly volunteered for interview when they become aware of my 
research. Twelve were previously known to me as colleagues and/or personal 
friends. Of these 12, three had participated in a study of mine on the subject of 
marriage a few years earlier (see Lawes, 1999) and were enthusiastic about 
getting involved in this second wave of research. Alongside these 12, two 
respondents were students who offered to participate after hearing me talk 
about my research in a seminar. By the time of their interviews, all participants 
were well informed about the topic that I wanted to discuss: infidelity, in general, 
and methods of defending it, in particular. The interviews took place in their 
homes or mine or at some other quiet and mutually congenial venue. 
Clearly, I was not trying to assemble a random sample of interviewees. 
Moreover, it should be borne in mind f hot extracts from the spoken word 
category of data were not intended to constitute the entirety of The Compleat 
Infidel's data-base and in fact amount to approximately one third. As an exercise 
in discursive psychology this study belongs to a methodological tradition in which 
the point is not to generolise from a sample of individuals to a population but from 
specific instantiations of talk and text to culturally sustained conventions of 
discursive practice. That being the case there were good reasons for doing some 
interviews, which I shall adumbrate here. 
Informal, open-ended interviews with fourteen participants provided me 
with considerable opportunities to think out loud about the conventional logic of 
defending infidelity, to explore and re-explore questions with participants and - 
most importantly - to record the development of these discursive activities in the 
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slowly unfolding interactional context of a ninety-minute, private conversation. 
Without restricting ourselves to a formal interview schedule, each participant and 
I discussed questions such as the following. What does the word "infidelity"mean? 
is infidelity a basis for concluding that something is malfunctioning in a couple's 
relationship? If most people agree that infidelity is wrong, why should it seem to 
be highly prevalent? Additionally, I welcomed and collected narratives about 
distinctive, infidelity-related experiences such as "being confronted by other 
people's angry partners" or (to put it another way) "being accused of 
homewrecking. " 
As articulated by Potter and Wetherell (1987,1995; Potter, 1996b, 1997; 
Wetherell and Potter, 1992), a discourse-analytic approach to research 
necessarily treats interviews as dialogic interactions in their own right and not just 
a one-sided string of answers to various decontextualised questions. The 
interviewer's contributions are just as eligible for analysis as those of the 
interviewee. Accordingly, any policy of remaining or attempting to remain 
conspicuously neutral and uninvolved with the respondent's discourse is 
inappropriate. It is far more analytically fruitful if the interviewer takes a fully 
active role in the conversation, expressing views and opinions and even arguing 
with participants. Indeed, the participants in this study responded in kind to my 
characteristically animated, conversational style of interviewing. Between us we 
generated discursive material that describes a diverse range of resources and 
practices in everyday reasoning about the defensibility of infidels and infidelity. 
Ethical considerations 
Other than the fourteen research interviews on infidelity, all of the data used in 
this study were freely available for anyone to examine, through publication or 
broadcast in the public domain. This includes the internet discussions such as 
OSA, an important point to mention because of the personal minutiae and 
passionate arguments that these kinds of data not uncharacteristically contain. 
Two routine interactional rules circumscribe the revelations and accusatory 
displays of discussants at these online bulletin boards and similar fora. Firstly, 
individuals' contributions are not marked by any identifying information such as 
the string of digits that constitutes their personal ISP (internet service provider's) 
address. Contributors are expected to use a pseudonym if they wish to sign their 
contributions, for example, for the purposes of debate. Occasionally, depending 
on the format of the board or forum, people are invited to indicate what part of 
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the world they are from. This is always optional and the usual protocol is to 
indicate a state if one is in North America or a nation for people outside the US. 
Secondly, the organisation that hosts the bulletin board or similar facility - in the 
case of OSA this is ultimately the Hearst Corporation - displays on site an 
announcement that it automatically assumes the copyright to all messages and 
other materials that are posted therein. My own research interviews are thus 
unique among the data that form the raw material of The Compleat InfideL As 
such they are accompanied by various ethical considerations that merit 
discussion in the immediately following paragraphs. 
Firstly, there is the issue of informed consent. All those who volunteered to 
be interviewed for this study had a minimum of one preliminary conversation with 
me in which they were encouraged to ask questions while I supplied information 
about the research itself and the process of participation, based on my 
anticipation of what they ought to know in order to give informed consent and 
on my reading around ethical issues (e. g., Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor and 
Tindall, 1994; Foddy, 1993; Lee, 1993; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Minichiello, Aroni, 
Timewell and Alexander, 1990). This included information about the overall nature 
and purpose of the research; information about the mechanics of participation 
(for instance, that the interview would expectably take about ninety minutes and 
that it would be tape-recorded and later transcribed); and information relevant 
to the period after being interviewed (for instance, that interviewees retain the 
right to withdraw from participation and information about how to contact me 
after the interview, for that purpose or any other). Clearly, there was no reason to 
withhold information or deceive participants about any aspect of The Compleat 
/nfidel; indeed, as colleagues, friends and students these fourteen individuals had 
listened to me expound at length on the project (many of them on more than 
one occasion) and it is arguably the case that the risk of under-information was 
exceeded by the risk of overloading participants with more detail about the 
topic, and my take on it as a researcher, than they could have possibly required. 
There was no offer of any kind of reward for participation and certainly no 
occasion for inducement. I would like to reiterate that interviewees volunteered 
their services rather than being recruited and that three participants from a 
previous, similar study were evidently happy enough with that experience to put 
themselves forward for involvement in this subsequent chapter of research. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that more people from among my network of 
contacts volunteered for participation than I was practically able to 
accommodate; I interviewed the first fourteen who happened to be available 
from a given date (7 April, 1998) and ceased interviewing one calendar month 
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later because of the constraints on my time rather than because I had exhausted 
the available supply of willing interviewees. 
Secondly, there is the issue of confidentiality and anonymity. In the 
interview extracts that appear in Chapters 3-7 of this document, participants' 
names and all other information from which they could potentially be identified 
have been fictionalised. Indeed, I used pseudonyms rather than participants' 
own names from the very earliest stages of transcribing the recorded interviews. 
While the fictionalised interview extracts that were eventually included in the 230- 
piece data-base that underpins this project could, if necessary, be made 
available for inspection without compromising the anonymity of participants, the 
original tapes, the unabridged interview transcripts and the various hand-written 
notes and computer files relating to those transcripts enjoy complete 
confidentiality and remain accessible to no-one but myself. As research materials 
go, infidelity talk is a form of co-operatively generated data that participants 
might expectably have a particular interest in keeping private and confidential. I 
would like to say that as a co-conversationalist I did not shy away from sharing my 
own qxperiences and thoughts about infidelity, even where unflattering 
conclusions about my failure to live up to the moral standards that are 
conventionally implied by involvement in dyadic relationships became 
inferentially available. I think there is reasonable evidence that participants 
understood from this that, compared to a self-constructedly distant, "objective" 
and "neutral" researcher, I had more than the usual amount of stake in ensuring 
that the privacy and confidentiality of our conversations would be respected. 
Thirdly, there is the issue of protection of participants. From the outset of 
the interviews, participants were made aware that at any time they could ask for 
the interview to be paused and/or the tape recorder to be switched off; one or 
two of them availed themselves of the chance to initiate a short break. It is 
beyond doubt that participants understood that they were not obliged to answer 
individual questions: we will see later that one of the features that especially 
distinguishes my research interviews from some of the other data in this study is the 
speakers' exercise of opportunities to negotiate and transform the meaning of a 
question or line of questioning such that potentially unflattering inferences about 
themselves as moral characters could be effectively avoided. 
Banister et aL (1994, p. 154) remark that "disclosure often invites 
reciprocation" and caution that the more involved, active kind of researcher so 
often associated with qualitative research makes necessary a special attention to 
participants' grasp of the principle that they are not compelled to disclose 
information that is uncomfortable for them. While taking full account of the 
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wisdom of that caution, I believe that the ethical and practical implications of 
"disclosure invites reciprocation" also work the other way. That is, collecting 
research data from participants via interviews, surveys and similar methods 
invariably makes disclosure a feature of participants' performance. In "normal" 
circumstances such as everyday conversation, disclosure brings with it for these 
speakers the right to expect that their recipient will respond in kind and not award 
themselves the privilege of remaining disproportionately secretive about their own 
disclosable opinions and activities. Indeed, formal, institutionalised exchanges 
that are pointedly not "everyday conversations" such as police interviews and 
courtroom cross-examinations constitute themselves as such precisely through 
practices such as soliciting disclosures from one party, the witness, while 
privileging the other party, the questioner, with exemption from any normative 
reciprocation. Thus, it could be argued that the detached, neutralised type of 
interview and survey research that follows this institutionalised model is the more 
ethically questionable. In contrast, the involved, active, disclosing interviewer 
takes steps to honour the norm of reciprocity and speakers' reasonable 
expectations no less adequately in the research situation than participants would 
enjoy on any other occasion as part of their normal lifestyles. 
Practical considerations 
Some practical questions that might arise with regard to the heterogeneous data- 
base of The Compleat Infidel concern whether and how to define and 
characteriise different kinds of data. In the earlier section on data source5l made 
a provisional distinction between printed copy, digital media and the spoken 
word for the purpose of inclusively describing the range of materials that I have 
collected. Some readers may wonder whether that system of classification has 
practical consequences for the business of data analysis. Moreover, there may 
be additional questions about how analysis may be affected. For instance, is it 
necessary to set down in advance the characteristics of the archetypal research 
interview, as distinct from other dialogues (newspaper and television interviews, 
for instance)? What are the crucial differences between works of academic and 
popular psychology? Is there a basis for distinguishing between different types of 
journalism? 
In this early chapter of The Compleat Infidel, prior to the unfolding of the 
analytic chapters, the stance I am going to take is that any such categorisation 
must be approached with extreme caution. I propose that classificatory systems 
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ought not to be imposed a priori on the data, according to the analyst's 
background knowledge or assumptions about the distinguishing characteristics of 
research, the machinations of different branches of the publishing industry and so 
on. One of the most fundamental principles in conversation analysis or CA is the: 
next-turn proof procedure (e. g., Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998) which recommends 
that the background knowledge of analysts takes second place as an analytic 
resource to participants' orientations to their talk as orderly and constitutive of one 
or another genre or discursive occasion. Thus, I am going to refrain from passing 
judgement on the matter of how best to group and define different categories of 
data. If one category of discourse or discursive context is importantly different 
from another, that will be revealed in speakers'and writers'behaviours that mark 
the categories as being different. These differences will properly become a 
concern for us as analysts at the stage of drawing conclusions about the various 
discursive practices we have witnessed. For now, we have yet to see any 
evidence from discourse users about whether and how categories need to be 
treated as not substantially the same. 
That said, there are two avenues for doubt about how to analyse 
discourse that deserve a mention here. One concerns the possible differences for 
analysts between, on the one hand, transcripts of what was formerly live talk and, 
on the other hand, materials that have only ever existed as written text. The 
second, related avenue has to do with analysing dialogues and monologues. 
The question common to both arises from conversation analysis and it asks 
whether the insights and analytic tools of CA can be productively applied to 
materials that do not resemble the conversation analysts'usual fare, either 
because they are textual or because they are monologic. 
In his analysis of orally produced but monologic accounts of psychic and 
paranormal experiences, Robin Wooffitt (1992) asks whether the principles of CA 
can be legitimately said to have been applied, given that the all-important next- 
turn proof procedure seems to depend rather heavily on the availability of a 
second speaker to supply the next turn. He concludes that analysing talk that is 
not constituted through a turn-taking system may present problems but not 
intractable ones. Firstly, it is true that CA traditionally treats ordinary 
conversational interaction as having a foundational or bedrock status (ibid. ). Far 
from excluding other kinds of talk from analysis, that treatment has provided a 
basis for saying how forms of talk other than ordinary conversation acquire a 
distinctive character. For instance, formalised, institutionalised modes of talk 
(saliently including divorce mediation sessions: Greatbatch and Dingwall; 1997, 
1998) can be theorised according to their adaptation and manipulation of the 
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conventional procedures for "doing conversation. " Secondly, Wooffitt observes 
that the producers of his monologues about the paranormal did not do so in an 
interactional vacuum. They told their tales in the presence of, and for the benefit 
of, Woof fitt-the-researcher. Moreover, the discursive resources on which all 
speakers necessarily draw are "sensitive to specifically moral and inferential 
activities negotiated through taV (Wooffitt, 1992, p. 69). Thus, however passive 
the recipient, the descriptions put together by these particular speakers could not 
do otherwise than display their attention to, and interpretation of, the 
interactional impact of their talk. 
What of written texts? Alec McHoul (1987) remarks that conversation 
analysts have not ignored such materials. Newspaper narratives and more or less 
scientific texts have been especially attended to. For instance, Mulkay (I 985b, 
1986) uses conversation analyst Pomerantz's findings about (dis)agreements in 
conversation (Pomerantz, 1984) and responses to compliments (Pomerantz, 1978) 
to make sense of epistolary exchanges among biochemists and also the written 
proceedings of Nobel Prize ceremonies. What Mulkay finds is that both sets of 
written texts exhibit organisational features that are known to characterise 
conversational discourse. McHoul himself goes further and argues that this style of 
analysis should not be confined to obviously non-fictional texts. He undermines 
the distinction between fictional and non-fictional conversations on 
epistemological grounds, citing both as instances of Derridean iterability. That is, 
he argues that speakers and writers draw on shared resources - lexical and 
compositional conventions - that render discourse meaningful insofar as they are 
iterable or repeatable. For instance, as McHoul points out, transcripts of "actual" 
conversation and dramatic texts such as play scripts share a number of devices 
for indicating things like interruptions, silences and special stress or emphasis on 
selected bits of speech. It is because of their iteration that devices such as 
dashes, ellipses and underlining are able to function as devices in which 
recipients can find intelligible instructions about how to read the surrounding text 
or speech. This being the case, McHoul argues against treating fictional and non- 
fictional conversations as inherently different and especially warns against 
assuming that one is imitative of, or parasitic upon, the other. He then dismantles 
a short extract of conversation from ýa novel, Mr Pye (Peake, 1972). He discovers 
that this ostensibly fictional exchange is littered with the "investigables" (McHoul, 
1987, p. 100) of orthodox conversation analysis such as blame negotiations, 
corrections and membership categoriisation devices, to name but three. 
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The overall conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that whatever 
the classificatory systems and categorical differences that could be imposed a 
priori on my data (oral/textual; forma Vinformal; public/p(ivate; professional/ 
amateur and so on), it is not necessary to do so for analysis to proceed. The 
conversation-analytic "proof procedure" can be applied, if not to the letter of the 
.. next turn" then certainly in spirit, as a means of validating analytic claims 
independently of the analyst's background knowledge or assumptions about how 
abstracted, idealised categories of discourse (ought to) differ. The point is that if 
an account of infidelity is at all intelligible, then it is intelligible through its use of 
iterable, conventional devices and discursive practices. These iterata, their 
selection and configuration, will unavoidably reveal whatever, in particular, is 
being treated in that given account as blame-implicative and requiring some 
defence. If, as you may suspect, the variable content of defences turns out to be 
a function of the varying discursive contexts in which they are produced then the 
distinguishing features of those contexts will be revealed through the varying 
discursive practices in which speakers and writers orientate to each context as in 
some respects distinctive, if not original or unique. 
Analytic Procedure 
In this section I want to elucidate the range of ways in which the principles of 
discursive psychology can be brought to bear on the data-base of The Compleot 
/nfide/. How is a discursive psychological analysis of these data practically 
accomplished? With two exceptions, to be addressed at the end of this chapter, 
my alm here is not that of providing a retrospective account of 'What was done" 
behind the scenes, before the eventual announcement in this document of "the 
results. " One of the particular merits of this form of research (Potter, 1996b; Potter 
and Wetherell, 1987,1995) is the live performance of practical analysis entailed in 
any presentation of the research findings. In Chapters 3-7 a series of analytic 
projects awaits us so that readers can witness and indeed become involved in 
the processes and procedures of research. In each chapter several illustrative 
"target" pieces of discourse will be examined and dissected, often with the help of 
supplementary pieces of data. What th ey reveal about defensive practice will 
be explicated and displayed. Readers will be able to assess specific 
interpretations of the data for themselves. and reach an informed decision overall 
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about whether they are leaving The Compleat Infidel knowing more about the 
defensive practices of infidelity discourse than when they arrived. Consequently, 
this section need not be used to convince readers that the chosen method was 
adequate to a task long since completed. Rather, the aim is to help readers 
organise a rudimentary methodological toolkit in preparation for the various 
analytic projects to follow. 
While setting out the three questions that capture the research problem in 
Chapter 1,1 rhetorically constructed a fairly sharp, graphic difference between 
analysis that takes an aerial view of the data (particularly "mapping the discursive 
terrain") and analysis that is performed on data in situ, at short range. Here, at the 
close of Chapter 2, we will benefit from turning down the contrast. Potter (1997, 
p. 150) adumbrates a more subtle difference, "between a focus on the kinds of 
resources drawn on in discourse and the practices in which those resources are 
used" (emphasis added). Analysis is not a two-stage operation that dispenses 
with the aerial view before beginning the ground-level work. Rather, different 
points of analytic focus are ongoing, simultaneous concerns. The focus is 
necessarily simultaneous and the difference between points is necessarily subtle 
because, as Ashmore, Myers and Potter wittily point out, studies of discourse and 
rhetoric have broken down easy distinctions between form and content: "It is not 
just a matter of how it is put; the it is mixed up with the putting" (1995, p. 322; 
emphasis in original). This is important because I am about to follow the scheme 
used by Potter and Wetherell (1994) in proposing five practical activities for the 
analysis of discourse. They ore not linked in any special procedural sequence; the 
distinctions between them are not sharp or clear-cut. With that caveat, here are 
five of the things that we will be doing in the analytic chapters of The Compleat 
Infidel. 
Using variation as a lever. 
In the section on the research problem at the end of Chapter 1,1 observed that 
there is a broad, tacit agreement among users of contemporary, Anglo-American 
discourse about what sorts of resources may be drawn on to account for infidelity. 
There is a certain co-operatively maintained consistency of content among 
defensive accounts. However, there is also a good deal of variation, between 
accounts and within them. Variiation is important to notice and investigate when 
doing analysis because it helps the researcher to get a handle on how the 
substantive content of a defence translates into actual defensive practice. 
Acc. ounts for the some phenomenon vary insofar as they are routinely needed by 
discourse users to do different interactional (or intertextual) things. 
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Patterns of consistency and variation on the surface of the data can be 
observed in a fairly organised way. It can be helpful to think in terms of 
explanatory themes and lines of argument that thread through the whole 
database but it is also possible to look quite specifically for tropes, popular 
metaphors, idiomatic expressions and clich6s, appeals to items of common 
knowledge and common sense and so on. For example, one way to defend 
allegedly infidelitous behaviour is by appeal to an argument that certain 
behaviours "don't count" as actually being unfaithful. This is the subject of 
Chapter 3, "Construct a Non-Event. " Alternatively, a defence may be founded on 
the metaphor of addiction as an explanation for sexual behaviour, as we will see 
in Chapter 5, "Construct a Special Category of Self. " To the extent that these 
specific discursive items cluster together in actual use, the discourse analyst is 
able to identify distinctive "interpretative repertoires" (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; 
Potter and Wetherell, 1987,1995; Wetherell and Potter, 1992). These repertoires 
are sets of discursive resources from which speakers and writers shape what I 
earlier characteriised as the prominent features of the discursive landscape. 
Variation is also key to identifying points of disparity and disagreement in a 
given area of discourse. By this I mean to suggest more than that different 
repertoires are often treated as mutually exclusive and even opposing when 
speakers are engaged in hot debate. Again, variation often can be observed 
quite specifically, within small samples of discourse. For example, consider the 
sentence, I don't think people who have strong, loving relationships would 
jeopardize that for a roll in the hay. " Here we see an explicit variation between 
two kinds of description: the rather weighty, worthy, morally-charged formulation 
"strong, loving relationships" is switched for the light, harmless-sounding "roll in the 
hay. " This is an actual quote from a contribution to a public internet discussion 
about adultery; the author is defending infidels (including himself) by claiming 
that many are provoked to infidelity by the very commitments and social 
arrangements they are accused of having betrayed. The juxtaposition of these 
formulations evokes a category of relationship that "people in general" 
accountably would risk for a mere roll in the hay: one that is sanctionably"weak" 
and "loveless" (an idea that the author goes on to develop and make explicit). 
The contrasting formulations are of analytic interest not because the entities they 
describe necessarily differ but because of what they reveal about the author's 
contextualised, interactional concerns. 
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Looking for rhetorical organisation. 
As Potter and Wetherell (1994) remark, there is significant overlap between a 
concern with rhetoric and the previous concern with variation. The point here is 
that while discourse users develop arguments by constructing contingent versions 
of the world, they are simultaneously constructing against arguments developed 
from alternative, competing versions (cf. Billig, 1987,1991). Again, consider the 
author of, "I don't think people who have strong, loving relationships would 
jeopardize that for a roll in the hay. " His overall claim that many infidels are 
provoked into action is not being made out of the blue, 6 propos of nothing. The 
author is making his case in the context of a multi-party debate where all 
participants have been orientating (some very forcefully) to the competing idea 
that at least as many infidels are sanctionably guilty of wilful damage to their 
primary relationships. He has a clear rhetorical position: he is arguing against that 
competing version and, through that, achieving his own defence. It is useful for 
analysts of discourse to be able to recognise the features of rhetorical design in 
people's speech and writing because rhetoric and argumentation are such 
pervasive features of discourse. They are not limited to face-to-face, obviously 
confrontational situations (Edwards and Potter, 1992), but can be identified 
wherever there is controversy, including newspaper reports (ibid. ) and internet 
discussions where participants have the option of signing in under any 
pseudonym they choose and there is not so much as an email address to tell 
readers who they really are. 
There is a range of features of rhetorical organisation that may be 
available in a piece of discourse for detection by analysts. One example would 
be the moulding of an argument around some logical form. Some arguments are 
syllogistic, methodically setting up two premises and drawing a conclusion. This 
can be a handy strategy for discourse users in a range of rhetorical contexts, such 
as when making a claim that is likely to be attacked on the grounds that it runs 
counter to common sense or common knowledge. To take another example, 
some accounts prepare the ground for their preferred version of the world by 
critically pointing out inconsistencies in, and thus undermining, a relevant 
alternative version. A third example would be speakers' expression of some 
reflexively self-characterised strong view (Billig, 1989): "the person with strong views 
is elaborating views in relation to other views, which are being denied and 
criticised, whether implicitly or explicitly" (p. 211). 
47 
Reading the detail. 
The details at issue in this strand of analysis are the kind prioritised by conversation 
analysts, following Sacks's argument that "all the details in a stretch of discourse - 
the pauses, repairs, word choice and so on - are potentially there for a purpose; 
they are potentially part of the performance of some act or are consequential in 
some way for the outcome of the interaction" (Potter and Wetherell, 1994, p. 58). 
For instance, the dilemma of stake to which I referred in the "fact and interest" 
part of the discursive action model may oblige discourse users to construct 
accounts that are more or less factual and convincing. This is especially the case 
when people are taking on the relatively difficult and controversial task of 
defending infidelity. The versions of the world produced in such defences need to 
be able to withstand attack and attempts at undermining from other people's 
counter-arguments. Analysis of discourse, then, involves examining how robust, 
apparently disinterested versions are constructed. It involves attention to what 
Potter (1 996a; after Woolgar, 1988) calls the externalising devices through which 
people play down their own constructive activity as speakers and play up the 
objective, independent reality of the worlds they describe. 
How are these manifested in infidelity discourse? Let's consider another 
quote, again an example from a public internet debate about infidelity. The 
author, "Meghan, " is a woman speaking at length over several turns about her 
relationship with a married man. At one point in narrating her story, she observes 
"You can't turn love on and off. " We could pick out at least four interesting 
features of this sentence alone. Firstly, the object being described and 
commented on is "love. " Love is reified: it is not presented as an effect or 
consequence of human behaviour but is introduced as an actual player in the 
social world where it does things, like refusing to be turned off. Secondly, the 
grammatical subject of the sentence is "you. " Not "I" (not Meghan in particular) 
but an indefinite "you" that is akin to "one" or "people in general. " Thirdly, "can't" is 
in the present tense. The resistance of love to being turned off is spoken of as 
temporally continuous and ongoing, reaching beyond the specific occasion of 
Meghan's encounter with it. Finally, the whole sentence is pithy and to the point. 
The claim about love is presented as something that does not need elaboration 
or modification with great numbers of clauses. It has a proverbial format that 
helps to bolster it against undermining (I will make a further discussion of such 
constructions later, with reference to the analysis of idiomatic expressions of Drew 
and Holt, 1989). These structural details work together to externalise the power of 
love, drawing attention away from Meghan's own agentic behaviour in her 
infidelitous relationship and from Meghan herself as the author of her report. 
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The sentence "You can't turn love on and off"is, of course, the tiniest 
fragment of discourse. Were we to analyse it in the context of its surrounding 
discourse (as will be the practice in the following chapters), there would be much 
more to be observed about how it contributes to Meghan's construction of a 
factual-sounding retrospective and prospective account of her relationship. 
Practices of defensive accounting that rely heavily on drawing attention away 
from the nature and identity of the person producing the account will be our 
particular concern in Chapter 7: "Construct a Generic Rationale. " 
Looking for accountability. 
In previous sections of this document I have suggested that there is more to the 
details of discourse than a visible effort to build factual-looking constructions. 
More than this, constructions are sensitive to their context in the sense that they 
display speakers' orientation to their own, accountable status. They display 
participants' concern with local, situated issues of managing personal 
accountability and ascribing blame. In this strand of analysis, the sorts of things 
analysts need to look for importantly include participants' footing and their use of 
categories, especially to construct various social identities, because of the 
inferences that are thus made available for recipients of an account about who is 
to blame and for what. This provision for selected inferences is crucial to the 
business of defensive practice. 
Let me quickly present three simple (indeed, simplified) examples. Firstly, 
speakers and writers who are recounting their own experiences of being unfaithful 
sometimes display very explicit attention to the unfavourable inferences about 
themselves that can potentially be reached by participants from what they are 
admitting. Interview participants interrupt their own reminiscences to insert 
formulations such as "this makes me sound really bad doesn't it" and "I know it 
sounds a bit tacky. " Participants in internet discussions, who have just a few lines 
to introduce themselves and establish the basis of knowledge and experience 
from which they speak, often begin with such announcements as: 
Hello all, I am what you would refer to as the other man. I've read through all the 
posts and I found that almost all of your views have basis and valid reasoning 
behind them. Everything I am about to say is said with caring and interest and no 
hostility is meant or desired... 
(Hearst Communications Inc., 1997, 
htip: //www. homearts. com/cgi-bin/WebX33. htm) 
Secondly, as we will see in Chapter 5, dividing up the world's population into 
different categories or types of people can be a method of sympathetically 
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accounting for infidelity. Rhetorical contrasts may be drawn between people 
who "are and are not capable of" fidelity; people who are dispositionally inclined 
to being "cheats" and "cowards" versus the rest of the population; "sex addicts" 
versus "normal" people, to mention but a few. In this way the inference is 
provided for that selected individuals (often including the person producing the 
account, not surprisingly) are distinctively vulnerable to the temptations of 
infidelity. By these accounts, not everyone is equally responsible for their actions. 
Thirdly, as we will see in Chapter 4, accounting for infidelity can involve the 
categorisation of various events and objects rather than people. Particular cases 
of infidelity can be discursively produced as instances of some general category 
such as "a one night fling" or "a drunken, immature grope. " The great advantage 
of this is that it helps speakers and writers to resist possible inferences by recipients 
that they are, in fact, members of sanctionable categories such as deliberate 
"cheaters, " "philanderers" or generally "that sort of person" who makes a habit of 
"this sort of thing. " 
Cross-referring discourse studies. 
Finally, analysis always involves cross-referencing to other studies of discourse. Of 
special relevance to The Compleat Infidel are studies where speakers and writers 
account for (what they treat as) some controversial or even sanctionable aspect 
of their own lives, experiences, tastes, habits and so on. Similarly relevant are 
studies where participants speak defensively in situations where their co- 
participants are (treated as) sceptical or even openly hostile. I will mention just a 
few of the most salient examples here. 
Wooffitt (1992) analyses accounts of paranormal experiences: 
clairvoyance, contact with ghosts and spirits and so forth. Wooffitt observes that 
"there is a powerful cultural scepticism about people who claim to have 
encountered paranormal phenomena" (p. 1); "people who claim such 
experiences place themselves in an inauspicious position. The mere act of 
claiming such an experience can lead to assumptions of, at best, crankiness, or 
worse, some form of psychological deficiency"(p. 2). Accordingly, speakers pay 
particular attention to the task of convincing recipients that the described 
experiences actually happened. Wooffitt identifies devices such as the 
standardised format I was just doing X ... when Y" through which speakers bolster 
their veracity and reliability. The inauspicious position of defending infidelity may 
be subtly different to that of claiming encounters with the paranormal. However, 
there is a common risk of not being believed to which speakers in both positions 
can be expected to orientate. 
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Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995; Widdicombe 1993,1995,1998) 
interviewed "punks, " "goths" and members of similar "youth subcultures. " Their 
analysis of discourse shows how speakers accomplish such tasks as accounting for 
"becoming punks, " resisting membership of the category "punks, " complaining 
about unfair treatment by non-members of the category and so on. Throughout 
the discourse participants display concern with a distinctive collection of 
negative stereotypes and assumptions that are (they claim) routinely applied to 
people who adopt punk's distinctive appearance. Their strategies for dealing 
with this problem of negative inference prominently include "doing being 
ordinary": constructing the identity of an ordinary person. As we will see, this is a 
strategy also used by defenders of infidelity, who orientate to the ongoing 
possibility that their behaviours will be interpreted according to a body of highly 
negative common knowledge about infidels and infidelity. 
The data of Atkinson and Drew (1979; Drew, 1978) are transcripts of 
tribunal hearings in which, for example, police officers are cross-examined about 
events in which they were involved, especially about their failure to take various 
sorts of action. The police do not suffer the some problems of identity as Wooffitt's 
and Widdicombe's participants. However, they are liable to be accused and 
they are shown to anticipate attempts by co-participants to attribute fault or 
blame to their behaviour. Atkinson's and Drew's analysis of interactional 
sequences between witness and counsel pairs reveals a number of fascinating 
organisational features of the talk. For instance, Atkinson and Drew highlight a 
strong mutual expectation among participants that the recipient of an 
accusation should produce some sort of denial in preference to accepting the 
blame. They also show how defendants construct sets of circumstances that 
rendered them powerless to act; how defensive use can be made of description 
rather than providing bald reasons for (in)action; how failure to act can be 
rhetorically contrasted against failure to take some other (even more necessary) 
action and so on. Though the speakers and writers in the data-base of The 
Compleat Infidel do not, on the whole, find themselves in the situation of being 
formally cross-examined before a tribunal, they exhibit many of the same 
discursive behaviours as Atkinson's and Drew's police officers as part of their own 
defensive practice. 
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How were the data extracts selected? 
Given the size of the data-base from which this study was developed, it would 
have been possible to include within the chapters of The Compleat Infidel a 
much greater number of extracts of data than the thirty or so which actually 
appear. Indeed, at one stage in the development of this document, I considered 
presenting it as two volumes, one devoted entirely to raw data and the other 
containing the theoretical work and analytic comment. However, it is arguably 
the case that that mode of presentation would have been unnecessarily 
cumbersome and certainly it would have made additional demands at the point 
of reading, since both volumes would have had to be read side by side for the 
analysis to make sense. Ultimately, even had I adopted this strategy there still 
would have been decisions to make about where to stop and what to leave out. 
Take the fourteen research interviews, for instance; there was little in those 
interviews that was decidedly not relevant to some aspect of the analysis, or 
some theoretical point raised within the pages you are reading now. However, 
had I reproduced them in full, apart from raising ethical questions about 
compromising the anonymity of participants, those data alone would have 
amounted to several hundred pages of text. Add to that the other transcripts of 
spoken word data and the data originating in print and new digital media and 
the result would have been impossibly unwieldy. Thus, decisions about what to 
include and what to leave to one side proved unavoidable. 
The decisions were finally made as follows. Firstly, I argue in Chapter 8 that 
the defensive practices discussed in each of the analytic chapters are 
characteristically constitutive of certain discursive environments; that is, certain 
kinds of situations and occasions, some being noticeable as conventionally oral or 
textual and others not. For instance, one feature of the defensive practice that 
we shall examine in Chapter 4 is that it has the capacity to function as a 
confession of the type that invites the recipient to view the recounted events from 
the confessor's point of view, thereby soliciting a response of sympathy or even 
empathy rather than condemnation, say, or amazement. This explains why it is 
highly prevalent in texts of a variety that is often called human interest journalism 
(in contrast to forms of journalism such as "serious news" or "celebrity gossip"). Thus, 
one criterion for selection was that the extracts appearing here should not be 
misleadingly unrepresentative of the sorts of discursive environments in which the 
described defensive practices commonly flourish. 
Secondly, there was a criterion of economy. For instance, Extract 3.01, the 
first extract in Chapter 3, is a written response to a survey conducted by one 
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Susan Quilliam, who went on to publish a report of her findings. The extract takes 
quite a bit of introducing, it includes mention of who Quilliarn is, comments on the 
nature and design of her study, and features an ancillary extract of data that 
shows the questions that her participants were responding to. Extract 3.02, the 
second of four data extracts in the opening analytic section of Chapter 3, 
illustrates the same discursive practice (a practice which I have called "not 
commissioning the act") and could have been any one of a large number of 
possible slices of data. For instance, for the sake of variety, Extracts 3.03 and 3.04 
show versions of Not Commissioning the Act being constructed in Bill Clinton's 
grand jury testimony of September 1998 and in one of my own research interviews 
respectively. However, the piece of data that I chose to use for Extract 3.02 was 
generated by another respondent of Quilliam's. As such, it needs no separate 
introduction and the column inches thereby saved become available for the 
more important business of doing analysis. 
Thirdly, data extracts were selected when it was possible that they could 
serve to illustrate some analytic point not only in and of themselves but also 
because of their relationship to data extracts in other chapters or in other parts of 
the some chapter. For instance, extracts from my interviews with participants Kyle 
and Emma appear in Chapter 5 and also in Chapter 7. This is because the 
extracts in question are in themselves examples of discursive constructions such as 
"poor general aptitude" and "public morality, mainstream society". It is also 
because, being drawn from the same interviews, they demonstrate that the 
discursive practices described in Chapters 5 and 7 ("Construct a Special Category 
of Self"and "Construct a Generic Rationale") are treated by speakers as having a 
special relationship, such that they convert easily from one to the other and back 
again as the situation demands. This is not true of all the discursive practices 
described in the following analytic chapters, but I argue that it is the case with 
those described in Chapters 5 and 7, and the re-appearance of Kyle and Emma 
in Chapter 7 supplies the evidence in support of that argument which would 
otherwise have to be taken on trust. 
Overall, the data extracts selected to appear in this document have been 
chosen in order to make the reader's task of understanding the analytic points 
and arguments which they support as easily and quickly accomplished as 
possible. I have made an effort to choose extracts from across the range of 
sources and media represented in the original data-base, for the sake of interest 
and variety and to convey an impression of the heterogeneity of that database. 
On the other hand, that effort has been counterbalanced with an attempt to 
choose extracts which are not actively unrepresentative of the discursive 
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environments described in my conclusions, which obviate uneconomical 
introductory exposition and which are capable of demonstrating more than one 
discursive practice at a time. 
The origin of the five categories of defensive practice 
in order for the analysis in the following five chapters to proceed in an organised 
manner it has been necessary to pick out ahead of time five categories of 
defensive practice which can now be systematically addressed one by one. It 
therefore behooves me to say something about how those categories were 
arrived at. In particular, readers may be wondering whether they were reached 
by a process of induction from the data set or whether they were more the result 
of the application of a common-sense, logical or otherwise conceptual analysis 
of possible defensive behaviours. 
I have previously argued against the application to discursive materials of 
predetermined, conceptual classificatory systems of justifications and excuses. 
The process of arriving at the five sets of defensive practices discussed in this 
document has very much been a case of induction from the data. In the classic 
texts of discursive psychology, the usual method of explaining how this kind of 
work is done is through reference to the notion of interpretative repertoires, an 
idea I introduced earlier in f his chapf er, in the section entitled "using variation as a 
lever. " Each of the five kinds of construction to be discussed in the following 
chapters can be regarded as the product of a distinct interpretative repertoire. 
The business of identifying interpretative repertoires is discussed and developed in 
texts such as that of Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), Potter and Wetherell (1987,1995), 
Potter, Wetherell, Gill and Edwards (1990) and Wetherell and Potter (1992). 
In the time and space available here I will not attempt to reiterate all of 
these authors'work. Suffice to say that the approach to identifying repertoires of 
Potter et aL is noticeably developed in contrast to the method of identifying 
discourses that is described and applied by Ion Parker and colleagues in the 
tradition of critical discourse analysis (a topic of discussion in the previous 
chapter). Put very simply, Parker's approach (e. g., Parker, 1990a) involves using 
resources that prominently include the analyst's own common sense 
understandings of what constitutes a topic to group together sets of propositional 
statements as "a discourse. " Thus, one might proceed with an analysis by looking 
at a range of texts and intuitively grouping together sets of propositions which 
collectively amount to a family discourse, a Christian discourse, a scientific 
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discourse and so on. The approach described by Potter et aL (ibid. ) differs in two 
important respects. Firstly, identifying repertoires relies less on common sense and 
analysis that is "purely conceptual, " and more on examining the rhetorical 
organisation of particular instances of discourse and the deployment of language 
therein "as a constitutive part of social practices situated in specific contexts" 
(ibid., p. 209; emphasis in original). Secondly, induction from examination of 
contextualised discursive practice holds open the possibility that institutions such 
as the family, Christianity and science are constructed and sustained by multiple 
discourses or repertoires which are treated by speakers as distinct and even in 
conflict with each other. 
Let me clarify matters with an example that is foundational to discursive 
psychology. While Parker's approach permits a largely conceptual identification 
of a unified scientific discourse, the well-known study of Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) 
looked at the practical business of how scientists described their work and 
explained their findings, in contexts that included formal, published papers and 
informal, oral interviews. The results that emerged from this examination of 
scientists' actual discursive practice were that two distinct interpretative 
repertoires were in use. On the one hand there was an empiricist repertoire that is 
characte(ised by an objective, impersonal vocabulary and grammatical style, 
assertions that research proceeds according to scientific method, untainted by 
human factors, and a commitment to the notion that facts speak for themselves, 
independently of human agency. On the other hand there was a contingent 
repertoire in which scientific practice and scientific findings were portrayed as 
much more dependent on speculation and subjective and individualised human 
qualities such as personality and membership of certain social groups. In this 
repertoire a more flexible and diverse range of linguistic resources was used and 
the distinction between hard data and human factors was allowed to blur. 
Importantly, Gilbert and Mulkay did not stop at remarking the existence of these 
two repertoires but went on to identify their various uses and functions, which 
included resolving scientific disagreement and accounting for contradictory 
findings. Similarly, in The Compleat Infidel I have concentrated on concrete, 
practical examples of infidelity and infidels being defended. From these data I 
have derived five categories of defensive practice which are not just sets of 
propositions but which are uniquely characte(ised by a combination of linguistic 
resources such as vocabulary and grammatical composition, the substantive 
content of an argument, and the contextualised use or purpose that each is 
made to serve. 
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A related question now arises: to what extent do these five categories of 
defensive practice form a comprehensive set of the range of possibilities for 
defence types? There is no doubt that the functional differences between these 
categories of defensive practice, which are discussed as part of the findings in 
Chapter 8, emerge so as to display the categories as an orderly system, this giving 
an impression of completeness as a range of possible defences. The findings are 
in line with Atkinson's and Drew's (1979) discovery of an orderly system of 
justifications and excuses in the talk of police officers on the witness stand. 
Moreover, they are concordant with Wetherell's and Potters (1992) remarks about 
the range of responses produced by participants in their research among Pakeha 
New Zealanders when questioned on the topic of prejudice: ' 
During the course of the interview, most of our sample were asked the following 
question or some variant of it: do you think Pokeha New Zealanders are 
prejudiced? Is there much discrimination against Maorii people? Our introduction 
of the topic and typical question format presented an accounting problem for our 
respondents. Given the negative identity attributed to prejudice, it sets up a 
certain kind of accusation, or was interpreted in this way. We could thus treat 
responses to this question as a set which oriented to a commonly occurring 
discursive situation: dealing with an unwelcome evaluation. 
What are the standard discursive moves for coping with a negative evaluation? 
(Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 212) 
Wetherell and Potter answer their own question as follows. Firstly, they notice that 
it is possible either to deny an offence outright or admit it in its entirety. Added to 
that, the standard moves are to "admit the offence but offer mitigations or 
excuses" (cf. constructing an isolated episode or a special category of self: 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this document), "claim that one is wrongly accused" (cf. 
constructing a version of "not prohibited": Chapter 3), "undermine the accusation 
itself by renegotiating the nature of the offence, recategorizing it as something 
less negative and more excusable" (cf. constructing a version of "not 
commissioning the act": Chapter 3, and the generic rationales of Chapter 7), and 
finally "redirect the accusation to another group of people" (cf. constructing a 
specific reason for infidelity: Chapter 6). 
The concordance of the findings of The Compleat Infidel with these other 
discursively orientated studies is a reasonable basis for confidence that the range 
of defensive practices described in this document is indeed a complete 
collection of what Wetherell and Potter call the "standard discursive moves. " It is 
no accident that the system described here resembles those discovered by other 
discursively orientated researchers, nor that it resembles the orderly systems found 
in other forms of discourse such as legal classifications of justifications and excuses 
(the defensive practice of "not commissioning the act" in Chapter 3 is titled by 
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way of allusion to that legal discourse). It is also not the case that the present 
system has had to be invented afresh, devised through logical or conceptual 
reasoning, or borrowed from elsewhere prior to examining the data. The point is 
that when speakers are obliged to defend themselves, directly or through the 
defence of va(ious kinds of behaviour, they routinely behave as though there is a 
set of standard moves avallable to them. They orientate to a limited set of 
possibilities which include renegotiating the nature of the offence, appealing to 
mitigating circumstances and diminished capacity, passing the blame by 
producing a specific reason for the contested actions, and so on. This orientation 
is noticeable in the discursive materials analysed by Atkinson and Drew (1979) 
and Wetherell and Potter (1992). It is noticeable in the meta-discourse of lawyers 
and the authors of the accounts literature such as Scott and Lyman (1968). It 
would be surpriising, then, if it were not also noticeable in the discursive materials 
that form the data-base of The Compleat InfideL There may be variations in the 
detail of the ways that these standard discursive moves are executed; that is, the 
details of the constructions through which this range of defensive functions is 
performed may vary. However, the range of defensive functions itself is hearably 
a finite one and as such it has been possible to describe and document it in the 
chapters that follow. 
3 
Construct a Non-Event 
Introduction 
Welcome to Chapter 3, the first of the analytic chapters of The Compleat Infidel. 
In this chapter we shall look at the first of five prominent features of the landscape 
of infidelity discourse: the non-event. Let me begin by explaining what will be 
going on in this chapter and how it is organised. 
As a preliminary measure I shall describe the gross structural characteristics 
of the non-event as a discursive phenomenon, our object of study. Recall that in 
Chapter 21 introduced the idea of interpretative repertoires (Gilbert and Mulkay, 
1984; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; 1995; Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Interpretative 
repertoires are "broadly discernible clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of 
speech often assembled around metaphors or vivid images. [I They are 
available resources for making evaluations, constructing factual versions and 
performing particular actions" (Potter and Wetherell, 1995, p. 89: Wetherell and 
Potter, 1992, p. 90). At this stage, non-events can be usefully considered as the 
product of an interpretative repertoire. Speakers and writers who construct a 
non-event draw on a distinctive set of discursive resources and that is what I shall 
try to sketch in this section by way of an introduction to the subject matter of 
Chapter 3. 
The middle section of this chapter, "Data Analysis, " is where the real work 
begins. Some extracts of raw data will be presented and readers are invited to 
join in with their analysis. We shall continue to look at discursive resources but this 
time in closer detail. searching out and examining specific discursive devices and 
mechanisms. By "reading the detail. " looking for accountability, cross-referring 
with other discourse studies in rhetoric, conversation analysis and so on, the 
construction and design of the unique non-events we are about to examine will 
reveal something about the interactional functions that they are required to 
serve. 
In the final section of this chapter, "Critique and Conclusions, " we shall 
return to the aerial view of the data and draw some conclusions about the overall 
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function of constructing a non-event as a defensive practice. Moreover, the 
evidence that the discursive business of constructing a non-event is action 
orientated will be used to fulfil the critical function of discursive psychology by 
reconsidering and reworking some salient notions and concepts from selected 
areas of traditional or mainstream social science. 
What is a non-event? The data to be examined in this chapter are all accounts in 
which infidelity is presented as a singular type of event, defined by the 
performance of a certain act, in certain circumstances and conditions. Or, to put 
it more accurately, infidelity is treated as a label, definition or category term that 
is precluded by the non-performance of some act, and/or the nan-applicability 
of some circumstances and conditions. Recall Bill Clinton's famous statement 
about Monica Lewinsky: I did not have sexual relations with that woman. " Later 
in this chapter we shall examine an extract from Clinton's testimony at the grand 
jury hearing of September 1998 in which he carefully constructs a difference 
between the category of activities denoted by "sexual relations" and a second, 
remarkably similar category that he terms "inappropriate contact. " This 
construction of difference is central to the business of building a non-event. 
The dimensions along which the distinction is made are limited in number 
but nonetheless quite varied. Sometimes the dimension is one of physical activity, 
as with Clinton's sexual relations/inappropriate contact dichotomy. Similar non- 
events can be constructed by drawing attention to the difference between "sex" 
versus "just a case of getting off with one of my friends ... .. 
if you actually fuck 
somebody" versus "having a bit of a fumble, " and "doing a whole lot of stuff" 
versus "having intercourse, " to take just a few examples from my data-base. 
Sometimes the dimension provides for comparison of physical activity with 
something more cognitive, as in "physical infidelity' versus "mental infidelity ... .. sex" 
versus "emotions, " "shagging" versus "making love" and so on. Alternatively, the 
difference between fidelity and infidelity (or the difference between "being 
faithful" and "being unfaithful, " or whatever the category term to be contra- 
indicated happens to be on that particular occasion) may depend on a 
dimension of types or states of relationships, whereby "open relationships" are 
distinguished from "closed relationships ... .. just dating" is not the some as "married" 
and being "together"is crucially different from being "broken. up. " Accordingly, in 
the data analysis part of this chapter we shall tackle two varieties of non-event. I 
have called the first one "not commissioning the act" and it incorporates the 
distinctions between different kinds of sexual and romantic activities, as 
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exemplified above. The second variety is called "not prohibited" and it covers the 
construction of distinctions between different types of relationships. 
It is interesting to note that distinctions between categories are usually 
constructed in pairs (of activities or types of relationship) but this is not inevitably 
the case. I have a few examples in my data-base of differences between 
categories being constructed in sets of three. One of my research participants, 
Johnny, made the following remark in the context of a discussion about what 
counts" as being unfaithful: "I think there's three levels, I think there's three levels of 
(. ) looking (. ) then there's snogging and then there's intercourse (. ) on the highest 
(branch). " Another interviewee, Emma, speculated that: "if it's not sex but 
everything but, I don't really consider that (. ) urn (. ) being unfaithful (. ) urn (. ) I 
think you know sex starts to be (. ) bottom line (. ) and emotions (. ) definitely, I think 
(. ) are unfaithful but then you can't stop yourself feeling emotions. " However, the 
overwhelming majority of distinctions seem to be constructed in twos and these 
are the kind we will be looking at in the samples of data to follow. Non-events are 
constructed by dyad-bound infidels and also by third-party infidels, though some 
of the other defences to be considered later are noticeably preferred by 
speakers cost in either one role or the other. 
As I observed in Chapter 1, the non-events that are the focus of this 
chapter are produced in the context of people's reports about their own 
behavioural history and experiences and also their reports of their own attitudes, 
opinions, beliefs and views about infidelity. For the purpose of comparison let me 
point out that later chapters in The Compleat Infidel will attend to some different 
kinds of discursive material. For instance, in Chapters 4 and 7 we will encounter 
some discussions of infidelity in which the authors seem to go out of their way to 
anonymise their talk, sticking to de-personalised, general theory. In Chapters 5 
and 6 our investigations will lead us to some examples of discourse that take the 
form of reports on the behaviour and cognitions of specific individuals other than 
the present speaker or writer. I also observed in Chapter I that the self-reports to 
be considered here in Chapter 3 are pieces of discourse in which the speakers 
and writers characteristically engage in heterogeneous and fairly subtle activities 
such as making evaluations, expressing ambivalence and being vague. These 
two observations are not unrelated. I shall discuss the connection between the 
two in the final part of this chapter and develop my account in contrast to social 
scientific studies of infidelity that try to distil the simple facts about attitudes and 
behaviour from just these kinds of self-reports. 
It is now time to move on the data analysis part of this chapter and look at 
some actual instances of non-events, in the twin forms of "not commissioning the 
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act" and "not prohibited. " The objective in this section will be to analyse these 
non-events and the fairly easy-to-observe similarities and differences of their 
content in a way that will avoid the mistakes of the approaches that I earlier 
described as unsatisfactory treatments of infidelity discourse. The aim is to 
discover something about the effects of constructing a non-event that remains 
within the arena of contextualised interaction and situated discursive practice. 
Specifically, we should be able to answer the question of how constructing a non- 
event actually works as a defence by the end of Chapter 3. Ultimately, this will 
prepare the way for us to draw conclusions about the variability of the five major 
defences for infidels and infidelity when we reach the final chapter of The 
Compleat Infidel. 
Data Analysis 
Not Commissioning the Act 
Let us begin without further preamble by looking at some data. Extracts 3.01 and 
3.02 appear in a book entitled Women on Sex by popular psychologist Susan 
Quilliam (Quilliam, 1994). Women on Sex reports on Quilliam's questionnaire 
survey of 200 British women on a range of topics to do with sex and sexuality, such 
as "Dating, " "First Experience of Intercourse, " "Masturbation" and 
"Unfaithfulness/Af fairs. " The questions in the Unfaithf ulness/Af fairs part of the 
survey begin as follows (in total, there are eleven questions on unfaithfulness, 
lettered A-K). 
23. UN FAITH FU LNESS/AFFAI IRS 
23A. What do you consider is meant by the word 'un faithful'? 
23B. How important is it for you or your partner to be faithful to one another? 
Essential, extremely important, fairly important, not important? 
23C. Have you ever been unfaithful to a partner? 
23D. How did you feel after the first time you were unfaithful? Was it with someone 
you knew or a casual acquaintance? How old were you? Did this situation 
develop into an affair or was it a one-off? Did you tell your partner? Ifso, how 
honestwereyou? How did this affect your relationship? How did this sex compare 
w. th thal of your relationship? 
(Quilliam, 1994, p, 2511 
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Extracts 3.01 and 3.02 are presented in the "Being Faithful" chapter of Women on 
Sex as examples of participants' original, written survey responses to these 
questions. 
Extract 3.01 
01 1 had an affair with someone I met at a conference. After the first time, 1 
02 felt confident, happy, thought everything would work out. We hadn't had 
03 penetrative but just oral sex. so I didn't really feel I'd been unfaithful. I told 
04 my partner exactly what had happened, very honestly. 
(Quilliam, 1994, p. 215) 
Extract 3.02 
01 Being unfaithful is falling in love with a person other than your partner. 1 
02 don't consider that having sex with someone other than your partner can 
03 always be considered unfaithful; love and sex are not the some thing, and 
04 it's the love that counts. 
(Quilliam, 1994, p. 206) 
These two short extracts are a good place to begin because they exemplify the 
constructions of difference to which I referred in the introduction to this chapter. 
Extract 3.01 constructs a difference between "penetrative se)('and "oral sex. " 
Extract 3.02 constructs a difference between "having se)e'and "falling in love. " 
Notice that in both extracts the category at issue is that of "being unfaithful" (and 
not adultery, for example, or infidelity, the category term used most often in the 
document you are reading now). 
These pairs of items (penetrative/oral sex: sex/love) are not merely 
constructed as two classes of things but as two opposing or mutually exclusive 
classes of things (cf. Edwards, 1997, p. 237). In technical terms, the pairs of 
opposing items each form a contrast structure, a device that scholars of discourse 
and conversation have identified in a variety of contexts and occasions. These 
include political speeches (Atkinson, 1984; Heritage and Greatbatch, 1986), 
market trading (Pinch and Clark, 1986) and accounts of the decline into mental 
illness of a young woman, "K" (Smith, 1978). It was Smith who originolly coined the 
term "contrast structure. " She noticed that when K's friends wanted to present 
instances of K's behaviour as pathological or anomalous, the description of the 
behaviour was immediately preceded by a statement that contained instructions 
about how to see that behaviour as anomalous. For instance: "She would take 
baths religiously every night and pin up her hair, but she would leave the bath 
dirty" (ibid., p. 39). As Edwards (1997, p. 237) observes, the pathologising work is 
done by presenting instances of K's behaviour controstively against an implied 
norm. The first part of the contrast provides for certain inferences about the 
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relative normality, desirability or general accountability of the subsequent, 
opposing part or parts. 
We can see something similar going on in the two data extracts above. In 
Extract 3.01, "we hadn't had penetrative [sex]" sets up penetrative sex as the 
normal, defining characteristic of being unfaithful. The subsequent part, "[we 
had] just oral sex"is displayed as something less than penetrative sex (note the 
"just") and the inference is made available that what "we" actually "had" fails to 
correspond to or meet the requirements of that normal, defining criterion. In 
short, a warrant is provided for the author's rather controversial conclusion that "I 
didn't really feel I'd been unfaithful. " 
In Extract 3.02 the author's contrast structure begins with the assertive 
statement that "being unfaithful is falling in love with a person other than your 
partner. " This provides the defining criterion, the norm against which the 
alternative behaviour, "having sex, " can be contrastively displayed. That is, 
"having sex" is displayed as not being unfaithful. Notice the relative tentativeness 
of the second part of the structure (I don't consider that ... can always be 
considered a signal that the author anticipates that what she is saying at this 
point is liable to be challenged or to provoke argument (cf. Hewitt and Stokes, 
1975, on disclaimers). Moreover, though she does not make an explicit admission, 
it would clearly be possible for a recipient to infer from this that "having sex with 
someone other than your partner"is exactly what the author herself has been up 
to. Thus, rather than end on that relatively weak note. she rounds off her 
argument with a robust formulation or summary of her case: "love and sex are not 
the same thing, and it's the love that counts. " This is an idiomatic expression (cf. 
the popular maxim "it's the thought that counts") so it is difficult to rebut (Drew and 
Holt, 1989). 
Extracts 3.01 and 3.02 are fairly simple pieces in which contrast structures 
are used by Quilliam's respondents to redeem their own admitted or inferable 
behaviours and recover them from the category of "being unfaithful. " Now let's 
take a look at some data that are slightly more complicated. 
Extract 3.03 is an extract from Bill Clinton's videotaped testimony on the Monica 
Lewinsky debacle to the grand jury hearing of September 1998. Sol Wisenberg, 
questioning Clinton in this extract. is a representative of the Office of Independent 
Counsel. The jury is investigating whether Lewinsky or others obstructed justice, 
intimidated witnesses or committed other crimes related to the sexual harassment 
case of Jones versus Clinton. 
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In a deposition about the Paula Jones case in January 1998 Clinton had 
denied having engaged in sexual relations with Ms Lewinsky. Now, in September, 
Sol Wisenberg's argument is that Clinton lied about the status of his relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky that January and also that he was instrumental in the 
affidavit that Lewinsky filed at the time, saying that she had had "no sex of any 
kind" with the President. Clinton continues to deny having had sexual relations 
with Monica. However, in a prepared statement to the jury he has 
acknowledged "conduct that was wrong" and admitted to "inappropriate 
contact. " 
Extract 3.03 
Wisenberg: Mr. President, these next series of questions are from the 
grand jurors. And let me you tell you that the grand jurors 
want you to be more specific about the inappropriate 
conduct. The first question was - one of the grand jurors 
05 has said that you referred to what you did with Ms. 
Lewinsky as inappropriate contact. What do you mean by 
that? 
Clinton: I mean just what I said. But I'd like to ask the grand jury, 
because I think I have been quite specific and I think I've 
10 been willing to answer some specific questions that I 
haven't been asked yet, but I do not want to discuss 
something that is intensely painful to me. This has been 
tough enough already on me and on my family, although 
I take responsibility for it. I have no one to blame but 
15 myself. What I meant was, and what they can infer that I 
meant was, that I did things that were -- when I was alone 
with her that were inappropriate and wrong, but that they 
did not include any activity that I -- that was within the 
definition of sexual relations that I was given by Judge 
20 Wright in the deposition. I said that I did not do those 
things that were in that - within that definition and I 
testified truthfully to that. And that's all I can say about it. 
Now, you know, if there's any doubt on the part of the 
grand jurors about whether I believe some kind of activity 
25 falls within that definition or outside that definition, I'd be 
happy to try to answer that. 
Wisenberg: Well, I have a question regarding your definition. And my 
question is, is oral sex performed on you within that 
definition as you understood it? 
30 Clinton: AS I understood it, it was not, no. 
(reproduced from the transcript at http: //wwy,,., oress- 
enterprise. com/specialreport/starr/transcriptindex. htm1) 
At the point of this extract Clinton is trying to maintain of least two things as true: 
(1) his January claim not to have engaged in sexual relations; (2) his September 
acknowledgement ol inappropriate contact. This discursive endeavour depends 
on some very fine contrasts and distinctions. There is a serious risk that it will be 
dismissed as an encleavour of fact construction: its claim to reflect the simple (or 
complicated) truth of the matter could be undermined by appeal to the 
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President's expectable motivations and his personal stake in the ultimate 
outcome of the jury's investigation. However, it is not a project entirely without 
hope. Amongst other things, Clinton's account is peppered with externalising 
devices (Woolgar, 1988) and a range of other devices and procedures for 
constructing versions as external, real and disinterested. Of these, one of the most 
prominent in this extract is systematic vagueness (Edwards and Potter, 1992). 
Edwards and Potter (and Potter, 1996a) observe that including a lot of 
detail in an account, perhaps through vivid description, can be a way of 
bolstering its factuality. It may promote an impression of authentic memory on 
the part of the speaker or hint at their superior powers of observation as a witness 
to the described events. However, detail is a double-edged sword. It can easily 
become fodder for a hostile recipient to ridicule, expose as inconsistent or 
otherwise undermine. Vague generalisations and clich6s are a lot more robust in 
that respect. 
Wisenberg, on behalf of the jury, asks Clinton what he meant by 
"inappropriate contact. " However, Clinton does not answer the question. 
Instead, he provides an account for not answering. First, he suggests that no 
further explication or clarification is (or should be) necessary: "I mean just what I 
said, " line 8. Then he describes the costs that would be incurred if he were to 
answer, to himself ("I do not want to discuss something that is intensely painful to 
me, " lines II- 12) and to others ("this has been tough enough already on me and 
my family, " lines 12-13). Eventually he commits himself to the vaguest possible 
definition of inappropriate contact through his construction of a contrast pair, in 
lines 15-22. His practical definition of inappropriate contact is so broad and non- 
specific that it amounts to no more than a residual category for things that don't 
meet the criteria for "sexual relations. " 
It is not surprising that Clinton wants to avoid answering Wisenberg's 
question. Volunteering detailed examples of his and Monica's inappropriate 
contact cannot help his claim that they did not engage in sexual relations. To 
maintcin his self-characteriisation as a truth teller (in direct opposition to the 
prosecution's counter-claim that he is a liar), Clinton needs to avoid getting into 
an argument about semantics and the positive definition of inappropriate 
contact. He particularly needs to avoid encouraging the jurors to reach their 
own, independent decision about inappropriate contact and its inherent 
difference (or lack ihereof) from sexual relations. From his point of view it is 
infinitely preferable to concentrate on the truthfulness of his claim not to have 
engaged in sexual relations, letting "inappropriate contact" soak up everything 
that can possibly be excluded from that category of activities. Indeed, this is 
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what he does. Clinton is not only systematically vague about what inappropriate 
contact might involve. More than this, he actively refocuses the conversation 
and redirects Wisenberg's attention towards (what he constructs as) the for more 
relevant category of sexual relations, emphasising in lines 20-26 his positive 
willingness to answer questions about that category. 
There is a technical name for what Clinton is doing here. Building on the 
work of Woolgar and Pawluch (1985). Potter (I 996a) has developed the concept 
of ontological gerrymandering. Potter observes that, "one of the aspects of 
making any description is that it will pick out a particular range of phenomena as 
relevant and ignore other potential ones. [Olne realm of entities is constituted in 
the description while another is avoided" (I 996a, p. 184). This selective 
categorisation of the relevant and the not-relevant is informed by the speaker's 
orientation to specific interactional or inferential tasks. Let me clarify the idea with 
a quick example from another discursive analysis, for the purposes of comparison. 
The following exchange comes from the Scarman tribunal hearings into violence 
and civil disorder in Northern Ireland in 1969. A senior police officer, a member of 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary, is being cross-examined about his actions (and 
failures to take action) with respect to a particular occasion and set of events. 
Counsel: So when you baton charged the Catholic crowd for the second 
time you knew, because of your previous experience, that the 
Protestant crowd were liable to follow you? 
Witness: I did. 
Counsel: How for did you drive the Catholic crowd at that time? 
Witness: I stopped in Dover Street and nobody went very far past me and 
no-one went on Divis Street from the Protestant crowd. 
Counsel: No-one went very for past you, you say? 
Witness: No-one got more than a few yards post me. 
Counsel: So some people did go post you? 
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p. 157) 
The point made by Atkinson and Drew is that the witness provides a description of 
how far post him some Protestants went: "nobody went very for post me, " "no-one 
went on Divis Street" and so on. Now, that is a mitigating description that attends 
to potentially blameable failures such as the failure to take action against the 
Protestant crowd at that point, perhaps driving them back in the direction from 
whence they carne. However, it conspicuously avoids discussing the witness's 
"failure to prevent Protestant crowds following the police and getting past them in 
the first place. And there is good sequential evidence that the counsel is treating 
that as the blameable failure" (ibid.: emphasis in original). In other words, the 
police officer's description selects one set or category of phenomena (the extent 
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to which Protestants got post him) as the ground to be defended, while diverting 
attention away from another (how they come to be in a position to attempt it). 
That is ontological gerrymandering. In Extract 3.03, Clinton describes his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky, albeit vaguely. The description picks out one 
realm of entities to discuss and defend (the extent to which their activities did not 
amount to sexual relations) while ignoring another realm of entities and thus 
steering away from another potentially blameable issue (exactly what activities 
Clinton and Lewinsky did participate in). As we can see from Wisenberg's 
contributions in Extract 3.03, that realm of entities is the one that the grand jury 
would like to hear more about. 
There is much more that could be said about the design and construction 
of the Clinton extract. However. it is not practically possible in the eight chapters 
of The Compleat Infidel to analyse as great a number of data extracts as I would 
like, so I propose to complete this discussion of not commissioning the act with a 
look at something new. Readers will be able to spot contrast structures, 
systematic vagueness and ontological gerrymandering in the text and the 
analytic arguments developed above will continue to apply. 
Extract 3.04 is drawn from one of my own research interviews. Lizzy. the 
participant, is a single woman in her late twenties. The following extract occurs 
quite early on in the interview (page 8 of the transcript). At the very beginning of 
our conversation Lizzy offered an interesting monologue on the nature of infidelity. 
She then wandered round a few related issues such as "how to tell when your 
partner's making a fool of you" and the subject of Tory wives who publicly "stand 
b, /'their unfaithiul man. Eventually the talk lapses and Lizzy says "where were 
we? " Of course, in interactional terms this is not a question in the sense of being a 
request for information but a cue for us to pull the conversation back on topic. 
That is where Extract 3.04 commences. 
Extract 3.04 
Rachel: you've raised loads of interesting points there, what I 
originally wanted to know Fwas] you said something 
Lizzy: LmmJ 
Rachel: about your o: wn sort of track record in being Ffaithful 
05 Lizzy: Lmm] 
Rachel: to people Fond] I was wondering (. ) and 1, obviously, 
Lizzy: Lyeahj 
Rachel: when somebody says something like that you, the 
immediate response is to think can I say that? have I ever 
10 been faithful to anybody? and I wasn't sure what, what I 
wanted to know was what you meant Fbyl being 
Lizzy: LMMI 
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Rachel: completely faithful, because I wonl, I can't answer that 
question about myself until I know what, what standard 
15 we're applying. what being completely faithful to 
somebody would (. ) constitute. 
Lizzy: but I think, as I say I think it's er it's very much an individual 
thing = 
Rachel: = well light, but I want to know what you meant when you 
20 fsaidl I think you said you hadn't been faithful to anybody 
Lizzy: Lmel 
Rachel: applying Fitl in the strictest rsensel and I'm wondering 
Lizzy: Luml Wgih-d 
Rachel: what, if you can give me a cl-, mo: re (. ) more of a 
25 definition of that. 
Lizzy: ri: ght, well basically how I define that in my head f. ) in 
these situations is that I've (. ) been going out with 
someone, obviously sleelDina with them and then 
something else has happened where I've ended up 
30 not (. ) I've never, I don't think I've ever slept with anybody 
else other than my boyfriend or whatever 
Rachel: mm 
Lizzy: well (. ) once, yeah [laughs] 
Rachel. [laughs) 
35 Lizzy: bu: t you know (. ) ordinarily, it's always been a case of I've 
got off with someone 
Rachel: mm 
Lizzy: and it's not ended up in sex but you rknowl I've been in 
Rachel: Lyeahj 
40 Lizzy: bed with someone. = 
Rachel: = ri: ght 
Lizzy: but (. ) desoite that I do see how it could eas- one thing 
easily leads to another, just cus I haven't actually 
physically done it mysel while I've been (. ) going out with 
45 someone f. ) urn (. ) doesn't mean that I couldn't accept it 
if it did happen. 
Rachel: mm 
Lizzy: but (. ) from my own point of view, so for (. ) an occasion's 
never arisen whe: re (. ) it's resulted in that anyway. 
50 Rachel: mm= 
Lizzy: = so f. ) I can't really say, I mean I can sa: y, you know 
what I've done is (. ) not probably that bad to most 
rpeoplel but it's happened, it's been with someone else 
Rochek L mm J 
55 Lizzy: when I'm supposedly seeing one person. (. ) and although 
I haven't had sex with them I can see that it could have 
easily led to me having Fsexl and Fthereforel you, you 
Rachel: LrightJ L yeah J 
Lizzy: know, it's a very fine line between you know 
60 Rachel: mm = 
Lizzy: =a sixty nine and a shag! [laughs] 
This stretch of data begins with the interviewer (to whom I shall refer in the third 
person as "Rachel, " for the sake of clarity) harking back to a question already 
asked: "what I originally wanted to know was... " (lines 1-2). Returning to the 
question makes available the inference that Lizzy has failed to provide a 
satisfactory answer the first time round; that she is not performing adequately as 
an interviewee. Rachel orientates to and works to counteract this possible 
inference by offering an explanatory account for her enquiry, flagged up by the 
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"because" in line 13. Indeed, the preparation for this account begins as early as 
line 6. "Obviously"in line 6 and'immediate" in line 9 are extreme case 
formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) and as such they are members of the category 
externalising devices that I mentioned above. They help to naturalise and reify 
Rachel's curiosity to "answer that question about myself' (lines 13-14) which she 
presents as the account and the explanation for asking the question about "what 
you meant by being completely faithful" (lines 11 -13) a second time. 
Now look at Lizzy's reply of lines 17-18. She does not immediately answer 
Rachel's question in the sense of supplying the requested information. Instead, 
she offers an account for not answering it, signalled by the "but" in line 17. In 
Lizzy's account we can see what she takes to be the significant features of the 
previous conversation turn. "It's very much an individual thing" is an account that 
explains that she is not able to answer the question (in contrast to not being willing 
to answer it, for example) and orientates to that question as an invitation to 
commit herself to formulating an objective, universally applicable standard or 
definition of fidelity; one that would thereby. be applicable to Rachel as well as 
Lizzy herself. If you are wondering why Lizzy would decline that invitation, in both 
earlier and later parts of the interview she indicates that she is aware that Rachel 
has unconventional ideas about infidelity and its (in)significance, which she is very 
careful to avoid denigrating when she has occasion to disagree. Moreover, the 
pair orientate to each other as interviewer and interviewee and for Lizzy this partly 
involves constructing Rachel as someone who knows about infidelity and 
constructing herself as a lay person who is not to be held accountable for not 
having thought about it in any great detail. Thus, it is possible that the 
interactional point for Lizzy of re-emphasising ("as I say, " line 16) that "it's very much 
an individual thing" is that she will not have to get into a confrontation or 
argument with Rachel about what (or whose) is the correct or the best definition. 
However, she is willing to talk about infidelity as it exists for "me" (line 21) 
personally, and elaborate on "how I define that in my head" (line 26). On this 
.1 subjective" topic she may become responsible for providing further explication 
but it would be difficult for Rachel to argue that Lizzy is somehow wrong about 
such a personal matter (cf. Potter, 1998). 
The overall point I want to make here is that, like the speakers and writers 
considered previously, Lizzy takes an active role in constructing the nature of the 
questions she is being asked and therefore the range and nature of appropriate 
and acceptable replies. Compare her discourse in the early part of Extract 3.04 
with that of Clinton in Extract 3.03. Clinton's interactional project is to display 
himself as scrupulously truthful in dealing with the grand jury's questions. Despite - 
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or because of - the rather contrived and tenuous difference between 
inappropriate contact and sexual relations, Clinton treats the jury's questions as 
relevantly requiring simple facts about specific items of his behaviour (as opposed 
to his personal musings and thoughts about abstract systems of categorisation). 
This orientation provides for the use of various fact-constructive and externafising 
devices that draw attention away from his own stake or interestedness in the 
proceedings. In particular, recall that he attributes the crucial version of "sexual 
relations" that underpins his January statement to one Judge Wright rather than 
claiming authorship himself. That is, he refers to an authority figure's official 
definition of sexual relations and thereby displays himself as not self-interestedly 
.. making it up. " In a parallel manoeuvre, Lizzy (a valued, veteran research 
participant who is not on trial for corruption and not accused of mendacity) is 
busy with the simpler interactional task of not being drawn into a dispute with 
Rachel over the true and universal facts about infidelity. Thus, in the answers she 
supplies in Extract 3.04 (from line 26 onwards), she actively orientates to Rachel's 
questions as relevantly requiring her individuated, personal views, thoughts, 
experiences, feelings, attitudes and opinions on the topic at hand. 
Lizzy is left with one remaining problem that "not commissioning the act" 
works to address. We have seen that she resisted and rejected one version of 
Rachel's question, a version that solicited a generalisable and potentially 
disputable statement of fact about what (in)fidelity is. She subsequently accepts 
an alternative version of the question, a version ! hot asks for elaboration on a 
remark about her own experience that she made earlier in the interview. In 
Extract 3.04 Rachel initially characterises this as "you said something about your 
own sort of track record in being faithful" (lines 2-4), which doesn't specify 
anything about how good or bad that record might be. However, when Lizzy 
seems to decline to answer in lines 17-18, Rachel interrupts and re-presents her 
question and this time she formulates Lizzy's remark much more specifically: "you 
said you hadn't been faithful to anybody applying it in the strictest sense and I'm 
wondering [I if you can give me [I more of a definition of that" (lines 20-25). 
What this means is that in accepting the more personal, individuated version of 
Rachel's question, Lizzy now has to contend with a construction of herself as 
somebody who, reportedly by their own admission. is chronically unfaithful. 
Even at this early stage in the interview Lizzy has expressed considerable 
personal attachment to the idea of fidelity. As in Extract 3.04, she has carefully 
displayed a tolerance for the views of other individuals and couples who might 
not take (in)fidelity very seriously. However, she has also indicated that she herself 
hopes for fidelity from her partners and generally thinks it valuable and important. 
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In her answer of lines 26-61, she is visibly concerned to reconcile (what she treats 
as) these rather conflicting facts: on the one hand, desiring an exclusive 
relationship; on the other hand, her own persistent failure to be "completely 
faithful. " In a nutshell, her problem is that the unflattering inference becomes 
available that she demands more from her partners than she herself is able or 
seriously willing to supply. In everyday terms, this is not fair. Some might even call 
it hypocrisy. 
Lizzy redeems herself by constructing a version of not commissioning the 
act. Notice the contrast pairs, "I don't think I've ever slept with anybody else" 
versus "ordinarily it's always been a case of I've got off with someone" (lines 30-36) 
and "sex" versus'in bed with someone" (lines 38-40). This is a construction of a 
classic non-event that provides for her bold claim of lines 33-34: "1 haven't actually 
physically done it myself. " Moreover, through this claim, Lizzy's fairness and non- 
hypocrisy is revealed to generously extend to activities by a partner that are not 
just equal to but actually slightly greater than she herself is guilty of. "It's a very fine 
line between [Ia sixty nine and a shag" (lines 59-61) is the culminating moment of 
Lizzy's display of non-hypocrisy. The brilliant thing is, of course, that even making 
the distinction in the first place (however fine the line) is isolating and 
distinguishing two crimes of different magnitude and making sure that Lizzy is 
safely positioned on the less culpable side of the fence. 
Not Prohibited 
As before, the best introduction to this line of defence is to look at some data in 
which we can witness it being constructed. Extract 3.05 is another extract from 
the interview with Lizzy, this time taken from much later on in our conversation 
(page 50 of the transcript). The story that Lizzy recounts in this extract is quite long 
but it is a fascinating piece of discourse so I have reproduced it here in full. Just to 
briefly introduce the main characters, Doug is a married man with whom Lizzy had 
an affair. Kim is his wife. Earlier references to Doug and Kim in this interview 
indicate that they had an "open" (i. e., sexually non-exclusive) relationship around 
the time that Doug and Lizzy were involved, although this is about to become 
rather an issue in the lines that follow. 
Extract 3.05 
Rachel: have you ever been um H told off by an angry f. ) %vife or 
girlfriend? 
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Lizzy: yea: h oh aod yes I have, yeah 
Rachel: [smiling voice] te: 11 me, Ftell me about itl and then I'll tell 
05 Lizzy: L oh, you know J 
Rachel: you one of mine 
Lizzy: (smiling voice] all right then, I think, I think you know about 
this one anyway it's basically when um (. ) that dreadful 
night of Doug's birthday 
10 Rachel: oh tell me that story, I love that story 
Lizzy: (laughs) 
Rachel: go on [laughs] I really want you to 
Lizzy: all right, I haven't told this for a: ges actually so you'll have 
to bear with me, no, we all went to Doug's birthday do, 
15 Doug had decided to invite the whole of C- [their home 
town) to his [laughs] birthday do at the Slug and Lettuce 
[a large pub] and was consequently very disappointed 
when only thirty people turned up [laughing] 
Rachel: right 
20 Lizzy: [laughing] and I kno: w the feeling after the other 
weekend [laughing] but anyway that's another story 
Rachel: [laughing] 
Lizzy and um f. ) we oil went along you know, everyone was 
determined to make (. ) the most of it (. ) and urn (. ) no, 1 
25 don't want, I'm off cigarettes ractuallyl 
Rachel: Lare you] 
Lizzy: yeah, thanks anyway (. ) and (. ) we went along to the 
Slug (. ) and I hadn't really made much of an effort I just 
sort of thought, we'd all gone alo: ng and sort of thought 
30 make the most of it for Dou: g and then urn (. ) Kim turned 
up F and she'd ob- 1 Rachel: Lwhat, what wasJ their marital status at this stage? 
were they separated or married ror (xxx)l 
Lizzy: Lthey were living in the 
35 some houseJ they were living in the some house and I 
think still sleeping in the some bed 
Rachel: did she know about you? 
Lizzy: yeah, he'd mentioned me, he'd mentioned me, but 
bearing in mind by the time we went to this do I'd already 
40 finished with Doug because I'd Fdecidedl I was going to 
Rachel: L ri:: ght J 
Lizzy: try to make a bit of a Fplay for Jackl so I'd already 
Rachel: L okay, right J 
Lizzy: decided to sever the ties at this point 
45 Rachel: okay, good 
Lizzy: so we'd broken up, we'd gone out and (. ) Kim turned up, 
she'd obviously really made an effort with her (. ) 
appearance (laughing] and so on, and Lino turned to me 
and said (. ) put it this way Lizzy, if this was the Eurovision 
50 Song Contest, she'd be Switzerland and she'd have nil 
points (laughs] 
Rachel: [laughs] 
Lizzy: well, she was wearing a ro ra skirt, so (laughing] very sort 
of European er Fdress sensel but anyway I digress and 
55 Rachel: L mm J 
Lizzy: [laughs] anyway I thought well I'll gauge how Kim is with 
me: as to how I behave rsol (. ) Kim was very frosty 
Rachel: Lyeahl 
Lizzy: whenever I met her and I thought right fine I'll keep out of 
60 your way, so that's what I did and then of the end of the 
night Doug had already arranged to go to Peacock's [a 
nightclub] with a load of people and we wanted to go to 
Rush [another club] f. ) and cus he wanted to spend his 
birthday with me 
65 Rachel. = mm = 
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Lizzy: = he was in a real dilemma so he ended up dragging half 
of his party along to Rush and Kim was doing the real 
dutiful wife bit at this point 
Rachel: = mm = 
Uzzy: = a: ll over him for my Fbenefitl and then as soon as we 
Rachel: L yeah J 
Lizzy: got into the club she copped off with another bloke 
Rachel: 19-0-11Y 
Lizzy: [laughing] yeah and then (. ) Lino and I were just having a 
nice gLrly time on our own and Doug kept togging along 
and really getting on our nerves and er it just 
degenerated into (. ) Dou: g (. ) telling Tony to fuck off 
[laughs] because he was gresuming to know more about 
Kim than he did and then he punched Lip Tom Snelling 
Rachel: (laughing] Fthat wasl that must have been the high point 
Lizzy: [laughing] L er J 
Rachel: of the evening, FI'm surel [laughing] 
Lizzy: Loh yeohJ [laughing] I missed that bit 
though, I only heard him (. ) cus he told me Fabout itl 
Rachel: Lgood for 
DougJ most sensible move on his part, probably the only 
one all night = (laughing] 
Lizzy: [laughing] = yes (. ) and then he told me to fuck off 
because I'd never loved him and how dare I say I love 
him cus I never did blah blah blah blah bloh and so I just 
walked off and left him [laughs] 
Rachel: MITI 
Uzzy: and like the five of us were waiting for a co: b and Dou_q 
comes running up and says (. ) I've done it and I said oh 
what's tha: t and he said you kno: w 1, I've left Kim for you, I 
wanno move in with You and I'm like what [laughs] 
Rachel: [laughs] 
Lizzy: and he was like I want an answer now, what do you 
want, I said Dou: q, no way and he was like why not why 
not and I was like (. ) no no I said it wouldn't lost together 
for fi: ve minutes and he got in a real mood and stropped 
off and then Ki turns up arm in arm with this guy [laughs] IM 
saying where's Dou: g and we were like (. ) (shrugging] she 
says oh fine fucking friend you turned out to be (. ) and 
Lino was like well vou're the one who took the marriage 
vows dear [laughing) like this, so she went off with her 
boyfriend and then a bit later on her and Douq were in 
the queue together, Doug come down and then 
proceeded to have a go at Anne because he'd asked for 
her advice about the situation and Anne quite sort of 
re: asonably had said (. ) well if you'd have been prepared 
to offer Lizzy a bit more maybe she'd think more seriously 
about a lo: ng term relationship and so on (. ) so he'd done 
this great sort of (. ) grand gesture on Fher advicel and he 
Rachel: L mm J 
Lizzy: was out for revenge so he was having a real go at her, 
about look where it's Fqot mel [laughing] you're going to 
Rachel: L right I 
Lizzy-. suffer for this f. ) Anne was reduced to a sort of quivering 
moss [laughing] 
Rachel: yeah = 
Lizzy: =soshewascryin Mac was comfortinq her ri went overl 
Rachel: L oh god J 
Lizzy: to see if she was all right, bearing in mind there was about 
a hundred people in this (laughing] taxi queue 
Rachel: yea: h 
Lizzy: and um went over to see if she was okay, next thing I 
knew I had this screa: ming harridan [laughing] lurching 
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herself at me shouting (. ) you know, you, you're playing so 
130 hi: gh and mighty and all this time you've been SHAGGING 
MY HUSBAND like this (laughing] Fond I'm like o: hl and she 
Rachel: L oh my 9: od J 
Lizzy: said and he said and he said you were crop and I just 
turned round and said oh that's not what he's told me 
135 and the next thing [laughing] like this cat fight was 
breaking out [laughing] and she had her hands round my 
throat and she was choking me and you know when 
somebody Iggily, you know 
Rachel: mm 
140 Lizzy: my space gets violated when someone strange sits next 
to me on the bus you know, and you've got somebody 
with their hands round your throat and you're just thinking 
(. ) I don't wanna be here, you know, I don't, you know, 
dignified [laughing] Fgloofl 
145 Rachel: Lyea: hj 
Lizzy: you know and there was her behaving like a complete 
fishwife [laughing] and er (. ) you know Lino apparently 
had to drag me away from her cus I was gonna go after 
her at one point (laughing] you know when you get really 
150 a: ngry rand you justl ! gLget everything, you just think oh I 
Rachel: L yeah J 
Lizzy: oh I can take on, you know (. ) Mike Tyson F (laughing] 1 the 
Rachel: L yeah i 
Lizzy: the way I feel at the moment so: (. ) it was just a bit 
155 horrendous really but that's, and them (. ) when I gat back 
he: re I was completely numb by this time anyway and 
then er (. ) Doug phoned up and he was like f. ) I've lost my 
vAfe, I've lost my house, I've lost my Lh ýild 1. ) what are you 
gonna do about it and I'm like [laughing) I'm sorry Doug, 
160 but you brought this on yourself, I said I finished with you 
about a month ago, fyou knowl this has nothina to do 
Rachel: L yeah I 
Lizzy: with me and (. ) he just started re:: ally sort of (. ) having a 
dig and just really reduced me to you know. reduced me 
165 to tears and he was being really Fawfull oh he was 
Rachel: L go: d J 
Lizzy: oh he was horrible, you know 
Rachel: mm 
Lizzy: really scre: wed up and u: m f. ) so that's how it all ended 
170 but my experience of (. ) you know an ex wife, a wife, has 
been f. ) most unpleasant I have to sa: y, I wouldn't 
recommend it to anybody, fit was erl quite distressing at 
Rachel: L yeo: h I 
Lizzy: the time, I remember being scared to even (. ) stay here 
175 by myself, on the Saturda Anne and Mac went out and I 
wen, round to see Pete and Jenny because I knew (. ) he 
wouldn't know where they lived rand I thoughtl (. ) cus 
Rachel: L mrn J 
Lizzy: he's so (. ) unpredictable, I mean he came round on the 
180 Saturday (. ) to deliver all his presents that [laughing] 
everyone had bought him cus he didn't want to accept 
aifis from all these rhorrible peoplel 
Rachel: Outs] oh my qodJ how dramatic 
Lizzy: I kno:,., /, well you know. I was quite pleased actually. but 
185 [general laughter] 
Lizzy: they were really good presents that I bought him so you 
know 1,1 did quite well out of it to be quite honest 
Rachel: [laughs] 
Lizzy: but urn (. ) I was sot up in my room just shakin , waitin 
for 
190 him to go cus I thought FI just don't] wonna see rhiml 
Rachel: L mrn I Lyeahj 
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Lizzy: I just don't think I could handle it you know, but (. ) I think 
gort of it was because I didn't see why I should have to go 
through all that hassle over a relationship that I knew was 
195 transient anyway Fand yetl she was getting completely 
Rachel: L mm J 
Uzzy: up in arms, arms about it, suppo'sediv having advocated 
this open relationship in the Ffirst placel and I thought well 
Rachel: L mm J 
200 Lizzy: if you can't stand the heat da: rling (laughing] you know 
get out the kitchen 
As with versions of "not commissioning the act, " versions of "not prohibited" are 
built on the foundations of a contrast structure. in this case the mutually exclusive 
categories are not types of sexual and/or romantic activity but types or states of 
relationships. Following Extracts 3.01 and 3.02 1 noted that contrast structures tend 
to be designed so that one part provides instructions about how recipients should 
understand the normality, desirability or general accountability of the counter- 
part(s). Thus, in the case of constructing a version of not commissioning the act, 
11 penetrative sex" or "falling in love" might be presented as the normal, defining 
criterion for "being unfaithful, " making available for recipients the inference that 
.. oral sex" and just "having sex" are accountably and legitimately to be excluded 
from that troublesome category of activities. "Not prohibited" works in a similar 
way. The interesting thing about the contrasting types or states of relationships 
that are brought together in constructions of "not prohibited" is that typically one 
is presented as the normal or default condition for a relationship to be in while the 
other is displayed as an anomaly or unusual exception to that general rule. 
In Extract 3.05 the anomalous state is that of being in an "open 
relationship, " as we can see from lines 192-201 in which Lizzy finishes off with a 
punchy summary and upshot; a formulation of her case (e. g.. Heritage and 
Watson, 1979,1980). In their analysis of news interviews, Heritage and Watson 
found that formulations allow speakers to package and thereby re-constitute the 
character of the immediately preceding talk. That is, just in case there is room for 
any confusion on Rachel's part about who is really in the right in the story about 
the dispute between Lizzy and Kim, or perhaps any doubt about which of the 
various disputes in this story is the important one, Lizzy's formulation clears the 
matter up. "She" - Kim - was "up in arms" despite "supposedly having advocated 
this open relationship in the first place" and it is principally the open state of the 
relationship that makes Kim's anger appear unwarranted and unjustified, leading 
Lizzy to a conclusion which has the considerable fact-constructive force of a well 
chosen idiom (Drew and Holt, 1989): "if you can't stand the heat get out the 
kitchen. " 
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Notice that while the unusual or anomalous condition of an open 
relationship is explicitly formulated and highlighted in line 198, the contrasting 
state of a closed (i. e., sexually exclusive) relationship is taken for granted in Lizzy's 
story and is not treated as needing an explicit mention or reference to mark it off 
as the preferred, normal state. I want to expand on this point with reference to 
Heritage's thoughts on double constitution and the logic of normative 
accountability (Heritage, 1984, p. 1] 5; and see Heritage, 1988; Potter, 1996a). 
What does it mean to say that this unmarked state of sexual exclusivity is normal? 
To begin with, it does not mean that people in exclusive relationships are 
simply acting out of obedience to governing social rules, while infidels and 
people in open relationships are breaking them. Rather, people's conduct in and 
treatment of these kinds of situations is normatively organised. When a couple is 
(represented as) "in a relationship, " there is an expectation that things like sexual 
exclusivity will naturally obtain or at least be relevant. There is no necessary 
causal determinism; evidently at least some people succeed in not being sexually 
exclusive with their partners. What is more, the absence of exclusivity (e. g., an 
open relationship) is not an exception that undermines the expectation of 
exclusivity. Encountering (a report of) such a relationship is not an occasion to 
conclude that actually there is no expectation of exclusivity attached to 
relationships in general. Rather, phenomena such as open relationships are 
treated by ordinary discourse users as affording a range of contingency accounts 
and inferences. For instance, "the couple must be mutually unsatisfied or perhaps 
sexually incompatible, " "they must be a bit kinky and perverted" and so on. Lizzy 
hints at a further possibility regarding the relationship of Doug and Kim. With the 
heavily ironised "supposed ly" of line 197, Lizzy anticipates that Kim's attempt to 
strangle her could be explained in terms of Kim not having agreed to an open 
relationship at all. Certainly, this is strongly implied by Kim's, "you've been 
SHAGGING MY HUSBAND" in lines 130-131. Through "supposedly, " Lizzy is able to 
acknowledge the existence of this possibility while also emphasising that as for as 
she knew, an "open relationship" was indeed the current state of play. 
The thing to notice about the norm of exclusivity is that it is available for 
use as an interpretative framework for a relationship, whether the relationship is in 
fact closed or open. Thus, witnesses do not only construct and maintain the more 
usual, closed sort of relationship as "normal" by treating it in accordance with the 
norm of exclusivity. They al so use the same norm to notice and comment on 
relationships that deviate from it. In Heritage's terms, then. "the norm [of 
exclusivity] is doubly constitutive of the circumstances it organises" (Heritage, 
1984, p. 108, emphasis in original). "It provides both for the intelligibility and 
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accountability of 'continuing and developing the scene as normal' and for the 
visibility of other, alternative courses of action" (ibid. ). 
One point arising from this is that norms such as norms to do with sexual 
exclusivity do not exert an effect on pre-defined objects and circumstances. 
Rather, they are reflexively constitutive of the objects and circumstances to which 
they are applied. The "open relationshipý' that Lizzy says Kim agreed to is only an 
intelligible object because of the reflexive application of the norm of exclusivity. 
One might say that such norms are interactional, discursive resources through 
which the reflexive construction of "couple relationships" and other objects and 
events in the social world becomes possible. 
A second point is related to the above observation that phenomena such 
as open relationships which deviate from the norm are liable to be noticed and 
explained by a range of contingency accounts. It is the deviation that is treated 
as in need of explanation and so the normality of (for instance) closed, sexually 
exclusive relationships is provided for even though it only becomes visible"in the 
breach" (He6tage, 1984, p. H 6). There are no explanations for "normally' 
exclusive relationships unless one cites the norm of exclusivity itself. In contrast, 
breaches of the norm are equipped with a range of explanatory accounts. Thus, 
normative accountability is not a free-standing rule that individuals and couples 
may choose (or be reported as choosing) to comply with or break. Rather, 
normative accountability is the framework against which whatever is done and 
whatever kind of relationship seems to have been organised will be viewed and 
assessed. 
Let me bring this possibly rather abstract discussion back to the data in 
Extract 3.05. Two fairly simple points remain. Firstly, we can see that Lizzy uses a 
version of "not prohibited" based on the dichotomy of open and closed 
relationships to shore up her moral position by the end of her report. This is not an 
easy task, given Rachel's initial question of lines 1-2. Users of "not prohibited" talk 
about times when they were or could have been unfairly accused of infidelity by 
other people. Their problem is to construct a scenario that plausibly provides for: 
(a) the speaker being correct abou, the state or status of the relationship, and (b) 
another involved party firmly subscribing to a different version. Thus, if Lizzy is to 
fulfil Rachel's request and come up with a self-report (certainly the normatively 
accountable or preferred option, given her role as interviewee), the next 
immediately foreseeable interactional concern for her is that if she fails to tell the 
story "right" it might sound as though Kim actually had something to be 
legitimately angry about. Having accepted the invitation to supply a personal 
report that meets the requirements of the question, Lizzy needs to tell a plausible 
77 
story about how she was angrily "told off"without appearing to have deserved it. 
if she makes Kim's position seem too unreasonable (for instance, by claiming that 
no relationship had ever existed between herself and Doug), there is the risk that 
she will be heard as "making it up" because of her personal stake in the business 
being reported, perhaps making crucial omissions in her account of her own 
behaviour that would otherwise make sense of Kim's complaint. 
How, then, does Lizzy account for Kim's being "completely up in arms" 
(lines 195-197)? 1 have already mentioned the ironised "supposedlv'that 
acknowledges that Lizzy may have been given wrong information about what 
Kim had agreed to, although Lizzy herself acted in good faith. However, if Kim did 
in fact advocate this open relationship then she was wrong to do so, being 
clearly of the wrong temperament, as indicated by Lizzy's'if you can't stand the 
heat [] get out the kitchen" (lines 200-201). That is, Kim becomes accountable for 
being in the kitchen in the first place. Moreover, notice that Kim suddenly turns 
into a "screaming harridan" in line 128. We have only just seen Kim being 
reasonably civil to Lizzy as she saunters along arm in arm with her boyfriend in line 
102. Kim's behaviour is made to look like a sudden fit of jealousy or a tantrum. 
She is presented as erratic and perhaps irrational. One minute she's holding Lizzy 
accountable for not knowing where Doug is ("fine fucking friend, " line 104), the 
next she's initiating a "cat fight" (line 135). 
Secondly and finally, remember that in this story Lizzy is a third-party infidel. 
I have already referred to the norm of exclusivity that is available for reflexively 
constituting dyadic infidelity as a bad thing. In Extract 3.05 the defensive practice 
of constructing a version of "not prohibited" also constitutes third-party infidelity as 
a form of behaviour that is in need of an account. Lizzy's point seems to be that 
(as for as she knew) Doug and Kim were in an open relationship and because of 
that she was legitimately entitled to some sort of otherwise infidelitous relationship 
with Doug, at least "transiently" (cf. line 195). In other words, had they not been in 
an open relationship (or had Lizzy been informed that they were not) then her 
own relationship with Doug would have been a blameable matter. 
Again, there is a doubly constitutive norm at work here. In this case it is a 
norm that can be characterised as "do not have sexual relationships with married 
men" (cf. "you've been SHAGGING MY HUSBAND, " lines 130-131). That this has 
been the nature of her relationship with Doug, Lizzy does not deny (consider line 
134: "oh that's not what he's told me"). However, she does treat it as in need of an 
account, namely that it was not prohibited by virtue of being an open 
relationship. This is normatively orgonised discursive behaviour, "not prohibited" 
successfully manages this particular speaker's accountability but reflexively 
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constitutes the general category of third-party infidelity as a bad thing. it is 
interesting because, on first approaching data in which infidels take the 
opportunity to defend themselves, we might have expected their talk to soften or 
mitigate the "badness" of the category but there is definitely a sense in which it 
keeps the badness in play. This is a topic to which we shall return in the next 
chapter. 
Critique and Conclusions 
We have now come to the final part of Chapter 3 and so I would like to return to 
an aerial view of the data and draw some conclusions about the overall 
defensive practice of constructing a non-event. In the data analysis section of 
this chapter we have examined two varieties of non-event: "not commissioning 
the act" and "not prohibited. " At the outset, I characterised the differences 
between these two versions of constructing a non-event in terms of their gross 
content. Not prohibited refers to a category of accounts that build a contrast 
between different types and states of relationships. Not commissioning the act 
describes accounts that build a contrast between different types of romantic and 
sexual activities. Subsequent to analysing the data, I suggest that these methods 
of constructing a non-event vary meaningfully, in their design and their 
interactional effect. 
Versions of "not prohibited" are produced as narratives of personal 
experience in which speakers describe occasions when they were or could have 
been wrongly accused of (third-party, or dyadic) infidelity. However, versions of 
11 not commissioning the act" tend to be produced in more abstracted, temporally 
non-specific terms. Moreover, versions of "not commissioning the act" are more 
abundant than versions of "not prohibited" in my data-base. 
Look again at Quilliam's survey questions at the start of the section on not 
commissioning the act, just above Extract 3.01. Question 23A asks "What do you 
consider is meant by the word 'unfaithful'? " and this is just the sort of question that 
versions of not commissioning the act are suited to answer. It solicits a subjective 
view, opinion or perspective on a conceptual category. Question 23C asks "Have 
you ever been unfaithful to a partner? " This is a different sort of question that 
solicits a report about a temporally specific, personal experience. Clearly, 
questions such as the latter which deal with instances of personal behaviour have 
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more potential to incriminate the respondent and provide for unflattering 
inferences about their character than questions which solicit points of view on 
matters of public debate. 
In providing their written replies to section 23, Quiliiam's respondents have 
some opportunity to choose which questions to focus on, and their constructions 
of versions of not commissioning the act show that they prefer to concentrate on 
the temporally non-specific, conceptual category type of question. Answering 
one question can be a way of not answering another. That is, speakers produce 
versions of "not commissioning the act" rather than versions of "not prohibited" 
because they may; because the discursive situation in which they find themselves 
permits it. In contrast, when speakers produce versions of "not prohibited" it tends 
to be in response to situations that more directly imply the respondent's personal 
experience of infidelity (or at least accusations thereof) as a relevant feature of 
their category membership as a research participant: a good example is Rachel's 
question to Lizzy at the opening of Extract 3.05. Moreover, it should be noted that 
.. not prohibited, " a collection of accounts of "open" and terminated relationships, 
has the distinctive feature of co-implicating the victim of infidelity in their own 
downfall. This may lend "not prohibited" some extra rhetorical force. However, it 
also makes "not prohibited" a more controversial, inflammatory kind of account 
and so it may be the case that versions of "not prohibited" are characteristically 
restricted to situations such as Rachel's highly sympathetic interview with Lizzy, 
where criticising the victim of infidelity is a permissible course of action. 
At the beginning of this chapter, as well as constructing differences between "not 
commissioning the act" and "not prohibited, " I constructed certain similarities. 
That is, I was able to provide an overall description of a non-event in terms of its 
gross content. The data examined here are accounts in which people use 
constructions of difference between one thing and another in order to preclude 
the application of labels and category terms such as infidelity and being 
unfaithful to one of the items that they mention. We can now understand the 
non-event in terms of its interactional function. 
The point of constructing a non-event is that it exonerates the speaker. In 
later chapters we will meet some defences that share with the non-event the 
feature of high distinctiveness. This term is one I have borrowed from attribution 
theory (e. g., Brown, 1986) and it captures the idea that inferences about the 
cause of some particular infidelity become available through comparisons 
against whatever is known about the infidel's usual or normal behaviour. Infidels 
who use defences of high distinctiveness construct versions of themselves in which 
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they are presented and displayed as not habitually or characteristically unfaithful, 
thus providing for recipients' inference that if they were unfaithful on some 
particular occasion, the cause must have been something in the external world 
rather than something interior to the individual such as their own private, 
deliberate motives and decisions (this constructive complementarity of the 
internal and the external will become relevant again in later discussions when I 
shall refer to the work of Edwards and Potter, 1992, on world- and self-making). 
Within defences of high distinctiveness, some admit high consistency of the 
particular infidelitous relationship at hand (that is, they admit it is presently 
continuing and perhaps has a future) while some mitigate their offence by 
claiming low consistency (i. e., they claim that the particular infidelity at issue was 
a brief one-off and is now over). However, the speaker or writer who constructs a 
non-event effectively claims zero consistency; they claim that the infidelity of 
which they are, were or might be accused simply never happened. They clear 
themselves, that is what I mean by exoneration. 
' In the above discussion of Extract 3.03 (and in the final section of Chapter 
2) 1 mentioned Atkinson's and Drew's (1979) discursive study of the Scarman 
tribunal hearings. Their analysis of the interactional sequences between witness 
and counsel pairs culminates in the discovery of three major types of defensive 
practice: a justificatory defensive practice and two types of excuses. The 
practice of constructing a non-event bears a marked resemblance to Atkinson's 
and Drew's justificatory defence type (ibid., pp. 155-160). Most importantly, the 
type I (justificatory) defence occurs prior to counsel's specific noticings of the 
witness's failure to take action. It is volunteered by the witness as soon as the 
threat of an accusation of failure to act starts to loom and thus the witness is able 
to "choose which out of a possible set of projected failures to mitigate, thus 
selecting the grounds for his defence" (Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p. 157). As we 
have seen, speakers and writers who construct a non-event also anticipate 
trouble ahead of any direct accusation or questioner's confirmation of themselves 
as blameable infidels. They volunteer their nan-events when unfavourable 
inferences about themselves begin to threaten and, like Atkinson's and Drew's 
participants, clear themselves with devices and techniques such as ontological 
gerrymandering. 
This chapter has focused on the categorisations and the evaluative discursive 
practices involved in constructing a non-event. We have examined these 
practices as defensive manoeuvres that are sensitive to speakers'and writers' 
local, situated concerns with managing accountability. I hope I have mode it 
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clear that people's self-reports of their attitudes and behaviour are action 
orientated and indeed constitutive of the things they describe, not merely 
reflecting a world that existed before the report. 
Chapter 3 has thus followed up some theoretical points that were initially 
raised in Chapter 1.1 have said that I will develop my account of the action 
orientation of this discourse in contrast to social scientific studies which try to 
glean the truth about people's attitudes to infidelity and their actual behaviour 
from self-reports, by means of questionnaires, surveys and polls. At first glance. 
evaluative statements about "how I define infidelity in my head"and 
categorisations of events and behaviour that distinguish sex from love and open 
from closed relationships often appear to be reasonably direct and transparent 
pieces of reportage. Some social scientists, too - in Chapter II listed Wellings et 
a/. (1994) and Michael et al. (1994) and many others alongside Quilliam ( 1994) - 
have taken insufficient notice of the reflexive, normatively organised and 
interactionally functional nature of these kinds of discursive practices. It is now 
easier to see why that should be regarded as a problem. The survey approach to 
studying human societies (e. g., the "sexual attitudes and lifestyles" of the British 
notion) runs into difficulties in at least two areas. 
Firstly, this sociometric approach idealises the object of reports and 
translates participants' responses into analysts' own categories (cf. Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987). For instance, Quilliam's question 23A ("What do you consider is 
meant by the word 'unfaithful'? ") seems to acknowledge that "unfaithful" 
potentially means different things to different people. However, in her write-up of 
her findings (Quilliam, 1994) she seems bent on drawing conclusions that depend 
on treating the category of "being unfaithful" as a pre-discursive, real-world 
activity, instances of which can be aggregated across a whole sample of 
research participants' reports (cf. questions 23B and 23C). For example, in her 
chapter on "being faithful" Quilliam announces that, "As many as 69 per cent of 
women have, at some time or another, been unfaithful to a partner. Just under a 
third, only, have stayed faithful to their partners throughout their lives" (Quilliam, 
1994, p. 212). A few pages later she continues, "Up to 59.5 per cent of women 
have at some point had an affair with a married man" (p. 217). These kinds of 
statistical calculations are only possible because of the practices of idealisation 
and translation. Let me supply a couple of quick examples of those practices to 
clarify matters. 
Quilliam's analytic version of "unfaithful" is idealised compared with its 
manifestations in the language of her participants. That is to say, individual 
mentions of "being unfaithful" are likely to have been regularised, meaning that 
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Quilliam will have ignored or tidied away any crossings-out and other such 
evidence of participants' various momentary hesitations and repairs. 
Furthermore, individual references to being unfaithful will necessarily have been 
decontextualised, excised from the text in which they were originally, specifically 
produced in order to make a contribution to a quantitative summary. Rather 
than attending to the subtleties and specificities of discursive practice, statements 
such as"69 per cent of women have been unfaithful" depend on a researcher's 
idealisation of "being unfaithful, " a kind of philosophical stipulation of a category 
that precedes and is superordinate to specific cases and occasions of its 
application (Edwards, 1997). 
Translation comes in when the researcher makes independent decisions 
about what kind of activity participants are involved in when they produce 
responses to questions such as 23A, B and C. The aim of Quilliam's survey is not to 
discover how capable people are at filling in questionnaires (cf. Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987) but to identify "the way women see sex today"(Quilliam, 1994, p. 
1) and of course to discover something about those women's actual sexual 
histories and practices. The unspoken assumption is that the survey respondents 
are unanimously engaged in expressing their enduring attitudes and views and 
reporting items of knowledge about their experiences. Participants' responses are 
thus translated into the researcher's unacknowledged, underlying categories to 
do with cognition and behaviour. 
Now recall the data that Quilliam had to work with, for instance, Extract 
3.01. Here, in what is apparently a piece of continuous prose, the respondent 
admits. "I had an affair"but also remarks, "I didn't really feel I'd been unfaithful. " 
From Quilliam's point of view, is this respondent one of the 69% who have been 
unfaithful to their partners? The status of the superordinate, analytic category 
scheme of "being unfaithful" becomes questionable when applied to this actual 
discursive material because clearly there is no objective way to decide whether 
the respondent has been unfaithful or not. To the extent that Quilliam must have 
made that decision about this and other pieces of discourse in order to reach her 
figure of 69%, the rules for correct and appropriate application of the analytic 
category of being unfaithful have depended on unarticulated theories of sexual 
relationships and behaviour. Moreover, as we can gather from the data analysis 
performed earlier, the author of Extract 3.01 makes use of various known 
discursive devices and techniques which show that her words are attuned to 
specific contextual, interactional issues to do with managing credibility and 
accountability. For instance, she uses rhetorically potent contrast structures and, 
at specific junctures, inserts various externalising devices such as extreme case 
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formulations. Indeed, this is what we would expect and there is every reason to 
suppose that every one of Quilliam's research participants produced material that 
exhibited some kinds of sequential, organisational features in a manner 
concordant with their authors' particular concerns. Once the existence of these 
features has been noticed, a sociometric approach to analysis that translates 
unique and interactionally sensitive discursive constructions into neutral, 
homogenised "answers" or transparent reports is revealed as not wholly adequate 
for coping with the data. 
The second area where the sociometric approach encounters problems is 
that of variability. In order for aggregate findings to be compiled on matters such 
as how women see infidelity, women's attitudes to infidelity and so on, variability in 
the discourse of individual respondents has to be ignored or actively suppressed. 
Let me pick out a couple of instances of the sorts of variability I have in mind. 
In Extract 3.02 we saw one of Quilliom's respondents express the view that 
"being unfaithful is failing in love with a person other than your partner. " However, 
this was hardly an unqualified attitudinal statement. A disclaimer immediately 
followed in the second part of a contrast pair, which served to acknowledge the 
availability and relevance of an opposing point of view, namely that being 
unfaithful is principally defined by "having sex with someone other than your 
partner. " In other words, there is a built-in ambiguity here in which the respondent 
recognises another, very different "attitude" to infidelity even as she confirms her 
commitment to the first one mentioned. A very similar practice is engaged in by 
Lizzy in Extract 3.04, lines 48-6 1, where she makes quite a point of recognising both 
sides of a debate about whether "a sixty nine" is an infidelity of the same order or 
magnitude as "a shag. " Quilliam's participant and Lizzy are not quite replying 
"don't know" to the question of what defines infidelity but they come close. 
As Potter (1998 and passim. ) has remarked, "don't knows" are usually 
treated as uninteresting by attitude researchers and their ilk. Indeed, as I 
observed of The National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles (Wellings et a/., 
1994) in Chapter 1, instruments such as questionnaire items with a forced-respanse 
format are commonly employed to render the data generalisable. Put another 
way, these instruments serve to screen Out Variability - and we can now see why 
this is necessary. Quilliam's research clustered questions together and allowed 
participants the opportunity to write their answers in complete sentences rather 
than ticking boxes or marking points on a scale. The result was that respondents 
produced material of the sort exemplified in Extract 3.02 where one viewpoint or 
expression of opinion is counterpoised with quite another. However, an approach 
to research that requires participants to express attitudes at the rate of one per 
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person cannot readily deal with discursive materials of ambivalence and 
ambiguity. 
Another kind of variability that is manifest in the data we have examined is 
where respondents seem to move between expressions of private, subjective 
attitudes or beliefs and statements of behavioural or experiential fact. This was 
particularly evident in Extracts 3.03 and 3.04. Again, this kind of variability would 
normally be screened out by more sociometrically-inclined studies of infidelity. As 
well as using devices such as forced-response options, survey and questionnaire 
items tend to solicit either an attitudinal statement or a behavioural report but not 
both in the some breath. A study that is designed to make generalised claims 
about the attitudes and/or lifestyles of a population can only be hindered if 
respondents are permitted to flit from one to the other in their answers to a given 
question. Again, Quilliam's study is unusual here because hers is clearly the 
sociometric ambition of reporting the facts about the attitudes and behaviours of 
a population of British women and yet the design of her survey (as question 23: 
Unfaithfulness/Af fairs illustrates) allows participants to supply an answer that 
focuses on one, or the other, or both. 
In contrast to what I have characterised here as the "sociometric" 
approach to the study of infidelity, discursive psychology is not vulnerable to the 
analytic difficulties that I have described above. In this chapter we hove not 
become bogged down with trying to develop a neutral, idealised definition of 
infidelity that encompasses all of the context-specific meanings given to that term 
(and others like it). Ideas of "what is infidelity" and"what is being unfaithful" have 
become the topic for analysis instead of being treated as an analytic resource. 
We have allowed our assessment of what speakers and writers are doing to be 
guided by evidence from the organisation, arrangement and participants' 
orientations within their talk rather than "translating" or deciding a priori that what 
they will be doing is disclosing their privately held attitudes and issuing factual, 
behavioural reports. We have not been methodologically inconvenienced by 
expressions of a certain ambivalence and ambiguity: rather, we have worked 
with these structural features and allowed them to reveal something about what 
the discourse has been designed to accomplish. Finally, we have recognised 
that the action orientation of discourse makes sense of otherwise confusing 
alternations in respondents' text and talk between the realms of fact and opinion. 
These alternations have been treated as functionally meaningful shifts between 
the complementary discursive practices of, on the one hand, externalisation and 
doing impersonal fact construction through categorisation, and, on the other 
hand, the business of individuation and doing subjective evaluation. As we have 
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seen, these are forms of talk through which speakers and writers manifest 
themselves not as interchangeable representatives of analyst-defined 
populations such as "British women" (or whatever) but as people who are 
attentive to their own relevant category memberships and jealous of the 
inferences about their identities that become possible when they are required to 
discuss matters of infidelity in the form of a self-report. 
4 
Construct an Isolated Episode 
Introduction 
In this, the second analytic chapter of The Compleat Infidel, we turn to a new 
feature of the discursive landscape: the isolated episode of infidelity. Following a 
format similar to that of Chapter 3, this chapter will begin by describing the gross 
structural characteristics of isolated episodes of infidelity. The largest, middle part 
of the chapter is the data analysis section where we shall look at several different 
accounts of isolated episodes of infidelity and explore their use of various known 
conversational and discursive devices and mechanisms. Finally, the chapter ends 
with a section in which we shall draw some overall conclusions about the function 
of constructing an isolated episode as a form of defensive practice, as well as 
taking a critical approach to a relevant aspect of mainstream social science. 
In this case, the object of our critique will be psychological studies of 
attribution and those based on attribution theory; recall the section on studies of 
individuals and interpersonal relationships that appeared in Chapter 1. We shall 
rework some traditional ideas about how to study attribution and indeed develop 
a fresh account of what kind of activity attribution might be, while expanding 
upon the notions of distinctiveness and consistency that I introduced at the end 
of Chapter 3. 
The analytic concepts that were employed in the previous chapter, 
including externalising devices, ontological gerrymandering and double 
constitution and the logic of normative accountability, will be ongoingly relevant 
and useful in this chapter and the subsequent ones. The five analytic projects of 
The Compleat Infidel are not unrelated to each other but should be regarded as 
the pieces of a jigsaw, finally building up an overall picture of defensive practice 
in infidelity discourse. 
The data to be examined in this chapter are accounts that construct s6me case 
or cases of infidelity as momentary aberrations or anomalies, the product of 
temporally situated circumstances. To this end, the accounts importantly include 
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details about the times, places and other aspects of the various settings in which 
individual episodes of infidelity sometimes occur. Sometimes accounts focus on 
one particular feature of the occasion or setting but perhaps more often they are 
composite constructions that bring lots of details together. To assist with the job of 
analysis, the middle part of this chapter is divided into four superficially discrete 
sections but the often composite nature of constructions of isolated episodes of 
infidelity is reflected in the data so that features and details discussed in one 
section will often be identifiable in the data extracts that come up for 
examination in other sections. The four parts to our analysis are entitled, "First/Only 
Offence, " "Intoxication, " "Holiday Flings" and "Mistake of Fact. " 
The classic isolated episode is a one night stand or a very short affair that is 
now over, represented as being firmly in the past. Viewed retrospectively, it is 
constructed as an historical event. The kinds of details that are introduced are 
details that help to explain "what happened, " that is, how the described infidelity 
came to pass. In the data to follow we will see a few relatively telegraphic 
references to isolated episodes of infidelity but also a number of extended 
narratives that supply all sorts of details about the occasion (e. g., some sort of 
special occasion as opposed to an ordinary working day), the location (e. g., 
some place of temporary residence that is different from one's usual place of 
home or work), the previous relationship between the infidel and the third party 
(or lack thereof), the temporally specific knowledge state of each of the 
participants (i. e., the facts that happened to be in their possession at the time) 
and so on. 
Whatever the individual circumstances, the isolated episode is presented 
as a member of a familiar category or class of events. The recipient of such an 
account, the reader or hearer, need not have experienced a brief holiday fling, 
for example, or a bout of drunkenness, to recognise that such phenomena exist 
and are commonly encountered by other people. There is usually an emphasis in 
accounts of isolated episodes that infidels are not a special, deviant group of 
people. Rather, the point seems to be that at least some varieties of infidelity can 
happen to anyone if they are unfortunate enough to fall prey to the type of 
circumstantial hazards being described. In interesting contrast, in Chapter 5 we 
will look at a form of defensive practice which makes precisely the opposite case: 
that there is indeed a special identity or membership category to which the infidel 
belongs. 
In Chapter 3 we looked at claims 'that (some kind of) infidelity has not 
taken place, either because some crucial act had not been commissioned or 
because the acts in question were not prohibited. Of course, we did not take 
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those claims at face value, accepting the truth and factuality of their status as 
nan-events as a given or pre-requisite for some subsequent data analysis. 
instead, our analytic focus was precisely on how non-events come to be 
constructed as such in the first place. The same rule will apply here in Chapter 4. 
We are not going to accept from the outset the one-off, individual nature of the 
infidelities described in the forthcoming data. Rather, we shall make a point of 
discovering how infidelities become constructed as isolated episodes and not, for 
example, as enduring, ongoing affairs. 
Non-events are mainly constructed in the course of people's self-reports 
about their views and opinions, experiences and behaviour. One interesting 
feature of isolated episodes is that they ore constructed in a wider and more 
diverse range of discursive contexts and materials. As we shall see, isolated 
episodes do appear in infidels'own self-reports but they are also to be found in 
the discourse of professional commentators on infidelity of one sort and another, 
including psychiatrists, psychologists, agony aunts and popular journalists. We 
shall explore the implications of this diversity in due course. First, though, let us 
take a look at some examples of isolated episodes as they appear in the form of 
raw data. 
Data Analysis 
First/Only Offence 
One of the most common elements of accounts that defend (actual or potential) 
infidels by constructing an isolated episode is a claim that the infidelity in question 
is the first or only event of its kind in the infidel's behavioural history. The data in my 
collection show that a first/only offence may often be presented as an accident. 
For example, consider Extract 4.01. It comes from a "relationships" website called 
Friends and Lovers that features an advice column, feature articles, fiction, 
poetry, reader discussion boards and so on.. One part of the Friends and Lovers 
website solicits readers' responses to the following invitation. 
Why do lovers cheat? 
He cheated and broke your heart. 
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Or maybe you're the one who cheated and broke his. 
WHY do lovers cheat? 
Why not end the relationship cleanly before dating others? 
Have you cheated? 
Are you cheating now? 
Have you been cheated on? 
We're asking our readers for the answer. If you've cheated, or if you've been 
cheated upon, we'd like you to tell us about it. 
(Home & Leisure Publishing Inc., 1998, 
http: //cyberspud. com/friends_lovers/question. html) 
Extract 4.01 is a reader's contribution, reproduced here in full. The author identifies 
him/herself as "penne from albany, new york. " 
Extract 4.01 
Ol i think that cheating more than once is stupid.. one time like on accident 
02 or something is not ok but is forgivable... more than once is bad because if 
03 you really have an ongoing cheating relationship then there is obviously 
04 something wrong with your current relationship.. 
(Home & Leisure Publishing Inc., 1998, 
http: //cyberspud. com/friends_lovers/read] I. htm) 
Notice the contrast pair in which "one time" (line 1) is differentiated from "an 
ongoing cheating relationship" (line 3). Also notice that the moral status or value 
of "not ok but [] forgivable" (line 2) that is assigned to one-time cheating (in 
contrast to the status or value "bad") is warranted by reference to the notion of 
accident. That is, "an accident or something" is cited as an explanatory account 
and an example of how a one-time infidelity can come to pass, in such a way as 
to render the offence distinct from other kinds of infidelities and therefore 
"forgivable. " There are lots of examples of this kind of discursive practice in my 
data-bose; for now I shall cite just one more. this time from a very different source. 
Frank Pittman, M. D., is a psychiatrist. His 1989 book Private Lies presents his 
reflections on infidelity and clinical experiences with infidels for the benefit of a 
mass audience of lay readers. 
Extract 4.02 
People don't really go looking for infidelity, at least not the first time. They stumble 
upon it. It is nearly always entered into by accident. 
(Pittman, 1989, p. 135) 
Again, notice that "the first time" is rhetorically distinguished from subsequent 
occasions of infidelity and that an account for this distinction is presented through 
explicit reference to an accident. There are two analytic points to be made at 
this juncture. Firstly, to describe some happening or event as "an accident" is to 
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invoke a familiar set or category of phenomena. This is a form of ontological 
gerrymandering through which the infidelity is normalised. "Accident" provides a 
partial description of an event in terms of its cause rather than (for instance) its 
effects. Moreover, according to the conventionally organised "folk logic" of 
accidents (to borrow an expression from Buttny, 1993), the causes of accidents 
are things like environmental hazards that occasionally escape or exceed human 
control. That is, accidents are to some extent a natural feature of the world, 
hence idiomatic expressions such as "accidents will happen. " 
Secondly, "accident" is a description that is properly or normatively 
applied retrospectively. It is not usual practice to claim that one is currently 
having an accident. This is possibly because accidents are accountably 
supposed to be unforeseen and sudden and the observation that one is presently 
in the midst of an accident would imply time for reflection in which one might be 
expected to take the opportunity to act on the situation and stop the accident 
from developing and proceeding even if it had not been possible to prevent it 
occurring in the first place. Thus, because "accident" is normatively a 
retrospective description, calling some infidelity an accident is a very effective 
way of bolstering the claim that the infidelitous event is now over, finished with 
and temporally isolated in the post. 
I would now like to return to the idea of "distinctiveness" that I introduced in 
the last chapter. Like constructing a non-event, constructing an isolated episode 
is a defence of high distinctiveness, meaning that the infidel is presented as not 
characteristically engaging in this type of behaviour. Clearly, making a claim of 
first/only offence is a fairly explicit way of drawing attention to a contrast 
between this piece of behaviour and the otherwise unbroken background of the 
actor's usual mode of behaviour. As before, description of the incident at hand 
as an accident can have a useful bolstering effect in this regard. As observed by 
Scott and Lyman in their exploratory work on accounts (1968), "The excuse of 
accident is acceptable precisely because of the irregularity and infrequency of 
accidents occurring to any single actor. Thus while hazards are numerous and 
ubiquitous, a particular person is not expected ordinarily to experience the same 
accident often" (pp. 47-48). That is, because of this expectation or conventional 
property of accidents, describing some infidelity as an accident can be a means 
of calling attention to the infrequency with which sirTiilar misfortunes have befallen 
the actor on previous occasions. 
As they are used in studies based on attribution theory, notions such as 
distinctiveness assume a perceptual dichotomy between the actor and the 
situation in which they are encountered. Attribution is taken to be a cognitive 
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activity and experimental studies such as those I reviewed in Chapter 1 attempt 
either to affect actor/situation attributions by manipulating the distinctiveness of 
laboratory-manufactured stimulus materials or else to measure and describe 
individuals' attributional patterns and "styles" in response to specified, naturally 
occurring events such as marital infidelity. For instance, consider the work of 
Fincham, Beach, Nelson, Bradbury and colleagues; scholars of social cognition 
who were responsible for the development of such instruments as the Marital 
Attribution Style Questionnaire (Fincham, Beach and Nelson, 1987). In this line of 
research the stimuli are often discrete "marital behaviours" that unhappily married 
participants are known to have identified as sore points or "marital disagreement 
areas. " In the view of Finchom et al., such stimuli trigger cognitive attributions that 
can be relevantly measured by asking participants to indicate their perception of 
(for example) the "locus of cause" of the problem event or behaviour. The 
cause" is presumed to have one of basically two possible loci: something 
"internal" in (the psyche of) the spouse or something "external" in the situation. 
The sense in which notions such as distinctiveness and locus of cause are 
deployed here in The Compleat Infidel is somewhat different. After Edwards and 
Potter (1992,1993), the position I am taking is that attributions of internal and 
external cause are discursive (not cognitive) behaviours and, moreover, that such 
attributions do not occur automatically in response to artificially engineered 
stimuli or according to individual cognitive style but are embedded in discursively 
constituted descriptions such as descriptions of "accidental infidelity. " In their 
analysis of materials relating to the 1989 resignation of British former Chancellor, 
Nigel Lawson, Edwards and Potter (1992) observe that sceptical audiences will 
not readily accept accounts that appeal solely to either an internal cause (such 
as the actor's personality or ulterior motives) or an external one (such as the 
circumstantial demands of their employment). Rather, a rhetorically robust 
account will play off each against the other so that versions of the actor's inner 
self are shown to warrant versions of his or her external world and vice versa. We 
have seen this principle exemplified in the data above which do not only claim 
high distinctiveness in the sense of constructing a/the infidelitous encounter as a 
one-off, singular behavioural blip but additionally warrant this construction of the 
actor's normal, characteristic behaviour with a description of circumstantial or 
situational causes, by reference to environmental hazards that an actor may 
siumble upon" (Extract 4.02), "or) accident or something" (Extract 4.01). 
Let me round off this discussion of first/only offence with a quick look at 
one lost piece of data. Extract 4.03 comes from an article in the glossy women*s 
magazine Cosmopolitan (UK edition). The author, Irma Kurtz, usually functions as 
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the magazine's agony aunt but this particular extract comes from a feature 
article entitled "Is it ever okay to be unfaithful? " Predictably, Kurtz's overall view is 
that it is certainly not "okay. " 
Extract 4.03 
Of course, many infidelities ore one-night stands, like as not under the 
influence of drink, in which case the best thing the perpetrator can do is 
thank his lucky stars if no STD occurs, and then promise, not his partner but 
himself or herself, it will never happen again, and in due course forgive 
05 himself or herself, and keep his or her trap firmly shut. 
However, infidelity can also be knowingly undertaken as -I hesitate to 
use the hackneyed phrase - "a cry for helpý', especially as an act of 
infidelity is more like a shrill and childish shriek that says, "Me! Me! Me! Me! " 
When a beautiful piece of machinery stops working, a petulant brat will 
10 smash it to bits instead of trying to find out what's wrong and fix it, and that 
is exactly what the consciously unfaithful partner is doing to a damaged 
relationship. 
(Kurtz, 199 1, p. 240) 
There is a lot that could be said about this extract but, to sum up the previous 
analysis, the points I want to raise are limited to the following. The idiomatic 
expression "one-night stands" (line 1) invokes a familiar set or category of 
phenomena to which a first/only offence might belong. The temporal 
specification "one night" emphasises that such phenomena are isolated episodes 
and these are rhetorically contrasted against longer-term, more ongoing kinds of 
infidelity. Notice the formulation "consciously unfaithful partner' (line 11) which 
says something about that type of partner's self or internal mental state and thus 
implies that the perpetrator of the one night stand is typically "unconsciously" or 
unintentionally unfaithful. Finally, this representation of the one-night infidel's 
innocent, inner self is warranted with an account that refers to an implicitly causal 
feature of the actor's situation or external world. In this case the causal 
circumstance does not take the form of a generic "accident" but points more 
specifically to an alternative: the "influence of drink7 (line 2). This is a topic to be 
explored further in the next section. 
Intoxication 
The emphasis on normalisation in constructions of isolated episodes of infidelity 
brings with it certain rhetorical weak points or areas of vulnerability to being 
undermined. Unlike some of the constructions we will see in the next chapter. it is 
not the case that toles of isolated episodes of infidelity are so outlandish as to risk 
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being disbelieved. Rather, a heavy emphasis on the mundaneity and 
ordinariness of phenomena such as accidents may become the victim of its own 
success in the sense that the idioms begin to sound like clich6s, trite over- 
generalisations that are criticisably non-specific or vague. Thus, the credibility of 
accounts of isolated episodes is often enhanced by the addition of much more 
detail than we saw in the first two extracts of data. The sorts of details that are 
routinely invoked to do this fact-constructive work prominently include 
intoxication, by alcohol or (occasionally) drugs. 
Irma Kurtz, the author of Extract 4.03, makes a cursory reference to "the 
influence of drink" by way of offering one possible explanation for the occurrence 
of "unconscious" or unintentional one night stands. This is the type of discursive 
practice described in the analysis of Scott and Lyman (1968) in which it is 
acknowledged that intoxication can be the basis for a claim that the infidel's free 
will or control over his or her own behaviour may have been temporarily impaired 
at the time of commissioning the offence. However, Kurtz is (apparently) not 
defending her own infidelitous behaviour in this article. Indeed, she is not 
defending infidelity at all. The seemingly liberal normalisation of drunken "one- 
night stands" turns out to be merely the first part of a contrast pair, against which 
knowing or conscious (i. e., deliberate) infidelity can be all the more forcefully 
condemned. When the data to be examined are isolated episodes constructed 
by people with more of a personal stake in the proceedings (e. g., when the 
infidelity being described is their own), it becomes apparent that Scott and 
Lyman have captured only some of the rhetorical potential of intoxication. In 
fact, intoxication will provide for a range of phenomena that help to attenuate 
the infidel's personal culpability. One example that occurs rather frequently in my 
data is the claim that intoxication distorts sensory perception such that a sudden, 
illusory attractiveness is bestowed upon people whom the speaker would usually 
find entirely uninteresting. Another example is the claim that intoxication blunted 
the speaker's ability to engage in moral reasoning of the sort that would normally 
keep him or her from straying into infidelity. A third example is embedded in 
Extract 4.04, below. 
Extract 4.04 is a complete posting to one discussion thread of several in a 
public internet forum that has the overall theme of romantic and marital 
relationships. The thread is titled "Cheating - Those who will not forgive" and it was 
begun in February 1997 by a contributor who announced that she would never 
forgive her fianc6 if he "cheated" and wondered if any other readers felt the 
same way. Extract 4.04 appeared 147 posts later, in October of the same year. 
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Extract 4.04 
I would like some feedback on my situation... I cheated on my fionce'and 
regret it more than you will ever know. I love him more than life and this 
11 other"guy is a mutual friend of ours. This guy and I have always had a 
connection & have wondered what it would be like for us to be together. 
05 1 have known him for years. Well not to long ago I got really drunk and it 
happened. It was only once and i can't even remember. (i was really 
trashed) I wish it was a nightmare and i could wake up at anytime 
thanking God it was a nightmare, but i dont' think thats going to happen. 
Since that night we haven't spoken about it, and don't plan on it. We are 
10 friends and i know now that that is all i will ever want with him. In the 
meantime i feel terrible about what i have done, and debating on 
whether or not i should be honest with my fiance' or just put it behind me 
and try to forget! HELPfl 
(Hearst Communications Inc., 1997, 
www. homearts. com/cgi-bin/WebX? I 4@A I 3069@. ee88b8e/0) 
We can see from this extract that the author, who calls herself "Skye, " uses 
Intoxication not only to provide an account of how "it happened" (lines 5-6) but 
also to discursively erase memories of matters on which she might otherwise be 
questioned (line 6). That is, "I got really drunk" (line 5) and "i was really trashed" 
(lines 6-7) is made to serve as a complete and free standing explanation for what 
went on between Skye and her friend, while "I can't even remember" (line 6) acts 
as a kind of discursive insurance against requests for any further explanation or 
information about how the situation developed, exactly what she got up to with 
this man, what conversation took place between them, whether thoughts of her 
fianc6 at any time crossed her mind and so on. Moreover, claiming that "i can't 
even remember. (i was really trashed), " just like the accident claims that we 
examined earlier, helps to temporally isolate the problematic incident as an 
incident (i. e., not an ongoing process) and locate it firmly in the past. Firstly, 
constructing something as a matter for memory and recall is a way of 
constructing a rhetorical difference between (what happened) "then" and (what 
I can remember) "now. " Secondly, "getting drunk" or "getting trashed" is 
accountably an activity or experience that lasts for a fixed amount of time, 
usually a few hours - in contrast to "being an alcoholic, " say, which could be 
mode to imply a much more enduring, open ended and personal relationship 
with the intoxicating substance. 
The treatment of intoxication in Extracts 4.03 and 4.04 reinforces the point I 
made earlier about locus of cause and how it is discursively managed. From the 
point of view of the social cognition researchers and writers such as Scott and 
Lyman, who are interested in establishing a synthetic typology of accounts and 
causal explanations, intoxication is usually taken to be a reliably "internal" factor. 
Scott and Lyman describe intoxication as an impairment of an actor's "will and 
knowledge" (1968, p. 48) which in turn are described as"components of the 
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mental element" that "all actions [by widespread agreement] contain. " Similarly, 
in their discursive critique of attribution theory, Edwards and Potter (1992, p. 98) 
quote a few revealing lines from the social psychology textbook of Brown 11986, 
p. 133) in which attribution theory's fundamental distinction between internal and 
external causes is exemplified with the words, "Causes internal to the actors would 
include alcohol, drugs, a disposition to violence, and so on. Causes external ... 
include everything in the situation where and when they acted. " Certainly, the 
discursive construction of intoxication cis an internal state is a possible manoeuvre, 
as Brown and Scott and Lyman themselves demonstrate in their own texts. 
However, in Extract 4.04 we can see Skye constructing complementary versions of 
herself and her world such that intoxication or "getting really trashed" becomes a 
description of the situation in which she found herself, bolstering and helping to 
warrant a portrait of her own self as someone who loves her fianc6 "more than 
life" (line 2), "regrets it" (line 2) and in fact feels "terrible about what i have done" 
(line 11), a person for whom "cheating" is a behaviour of high distinctiveness. 
Skye's isolated episode of infidelity of Extract. 4.04 takes the form of a 
personal narrative and is richer in detail than the extracts we have examined 
previously. However, most narratives in this style are richer still. While explaining 
that one was "really drunk" or "really trashed" may be a more satisfyingly complete 
account for infidelity than just saying "it was an accident, " it is still vulnerable to 
attack on the grounds that this is a vague generalisation and that important 
information is being left out. For instance, many authors of isolated episodes like 
to provide a more explicit warrant or reason for getting drunk in the first place, 
orientating to that in itself as an accountable matter. An example is Extract 4.05, 
the lost piece of data in this section. 
Extract 4.05 
Ol what began as a few enjoyable lunches ended up in bed. Karen and 1 
02 had been to a training conference together in Leicester. and although 
03 we resisted temptation for the first few days, on the last night we both got 
04 drunk and ended up having sex. 
(Campbell, 1993, p. 3 1) 
Extract 4.05 comes from a collection of (what appear to be) married men's "true 
confessions" about their infidelities, published in the women's magazine Marie 
Claire (UK edition). This speaker, identified as "Lawrence, " explains that he had 
had "a few enjoyable lunches" (line 1) with Karen, a work colleague. in much the 
some way that Skye explains that her third-party infidel was a "mutual friend" (line 
3) to her and her fianc6 and that they had known each other "for years" (line 5). 
However, Lawrence does not jump from a description of this relatively innocuous 
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relationship to an account of intoxication, as though he and Karen had suddenly 
got-really trashed" together for no discernible reason other than lust. Rather, he 
builds in a temporal and spatial context that provides a legitimate occasion for 
their being drunk together: the lost night of a training conference. We shall 
investigate some more contexts of this type in the following section. 
Holiday Flings 
Extract 4.06 is from a feature article in another British, women's magazine, New 
Woman. The title of the piece is (rather contentiously) "No-Guilt Affairs', and it 
collects together a handful of what are seemingly women readers'"true 
experiences" of infidelity. Extract 4.06 is taken from the very beginning of a story 
attributed to "Claire" who has a long term boyfriend named "Pete. " 
Extract 4.06 
I guess you'd have to call it a holiday bank really, as there's no point in 
glarnorising it. It was the classic holiday situation. I was away alone and I 
felt that anything I did would be wiped from the slate when I returned 
home. 
05 His name was Mack and I met him on the beach. I don't even know his 
last name - in fact you could say I didn't know his name at all, as Mack was 
a nickname. It was pure lust - I'm sure that if we'd spent more than a few 
hours in each other's company we would have found nothing in common. 
He wasn't much of a talker but, to be honest, it wasn't a good chat I was 
10 after. That sounds cross, I know. I wasn't consciously looking for anything, 
but I must hove been open to offers in a way that I'm not at home. 
(Holder, 1992, p. 42) 
For our immediate purposes, the important thing to notice about Extract 4.06 is 
the pair of expressions "holiday bonk" (fine 1) and "the classic holiday situation" 
(line 2) that Claire introduces at the outset of her account. Like the accidents 
and one night stands encountered earlier, these expressions normalise the 
described events by invoking a familiar category of phenomena to which they 
belong. Derek Edwards (1995,1997), in his analysis of "event descriptions in 
couples' talk about relationship troubles" (1995, p. 319), has observed that such 
events tend to be constructed with attention to their status as exceptional or 
routine: anomalies or instances of a pattern. Moreover, "one notable feature of 
everyday event descriptions is how they make inferentiolly available particular 
dispositional states of the actors; their moral character, personality, state of mind 
or whatever" (1995, p. 320). 
97 
In Edwards's terms, "holiday bonk" and (especially) "the classic holiday 
situation" are episodic, scrip t-ins ton tia ting formulations. These expressions 
idiomatically formulate and thus construct Claire's infidelity as an episode in a 
culturally recognisable collection of like episodes, an instance of a general 
sequential pattern or script. They emphosise the generalisable, even routine 
nature of the situation or circumstances to which Claire fell prey and thus they ore 
also disposition-implicative: they warrant Claire's later depiction of her-self (the 
"inner person, " if you will) as someone who is law-abidingly faithful in the normal 
run of things when discrete sets of circumstances such as "the classic holiday 
situation" are not exerting their causal influence. These formulations bolster her 
claim of lines 10- 11 that "I wasn't consciously looking for anything, but I must have 
been open to offers in a way that I'm not at home. " Her acknowledgement of the 
"holiday bonk" is a way of helping to construct her usual or characteristic 
behaviour as essentially good, making that claim difficult to undermine merely by 
appeal to this particular indiscretion. 
As a narrative device, the setting of "the classic holiday situation" is 
packed with implicative potential. Like the "training conference" of Extract 4.05, it 
provides for all manner of mitigating inferences to be drawn about what sort of 
behaviour Claire was engaging in and why; for example, it makes a reasonable 
possibility of the condition of being unconsciously "open to offers. " As discursive 
constructions, holidays are defined by anomaly or brevity: whatever else they 
might be, they are definitively unusual, not at-home, not part of the domestic 
round of work and family life (Lawes, 1998). Indeed, Claire explicitly contrasts her 
holiday with "at home" in line 11. She is, then, temporally and spatially displaced 
from the circumstances that describe her usual "home" life. Moreover, holidays, 
like "the lost night" of training conferences, tend to be celebratory occasions that 
provide for intoxication (an accounting device in itself as we saw in the last 
section). Additionally, notice that Claire specifies that it was a "beach" holiday 
(line 5). This is a commonly used detail in toles of holiday flings (Lowes, 1998) and 
it provides for the use of the extra mitigating factor of an unfamiliarly hot climate 
which, rhetorically speaking, can serve many of the some functions as 
intoxication when it comes to explaining unusual behaviour. 
What we see in Extract 4.06 that is different to the previous extracts is an 
increasingly detailed narrative account of the isolated episode being developed, 
with the details being used cumulatively and in concert with each other to create 
an interactionally well defended, robust and believable world. As Potter (I 996a) 
remarks, items of information such as Claire's about the situation being a holiday 
and especial: y the details about being "away alone" (line 2), the beach and so 
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on lend a narrative structure to an account (Potter, 1996a, p. H 8) and "narrative 
organization can be used to increase the plausibility of a particular description by 
embedding it in a sequence where what is described becomes expected or 
even necessary" (ibid. ). While it would perhaps be putting it too strongly to say 
that Claire succeeds in making her infidelity appear necessary, her narrative (of 
which Extract 4.06 is only the beginning) certainly displays it as something routine 
and predictable under the circumstances. In particular, it provides for her very 
minimising, almost casual, description of the infidelity as a mere "bonk" (line 1). 
Let us pursue this line of analysis with a look at some more data. Extract 
4.07 comes from Mental Health Net (www. cmhc. com), a "fun & friendly [web] site 
(that] covers information on disorders such as depression, anxiety, panic attacks, 
chronic fatigue syndrome and substance abuse, to professional resources in 
psychology, psychiatry and social work, journals and self-help magazines" 
(www-cmhc-com. html). Its regular "Question of the Month" discussion forum 
encourages the participation of both lay people and mental health professionals. 
Each question is immediately followed by readers' (mostly short) responses on the 
some page. Responses are listed chronologically, in the order they were 
submitted. Many contributions can be seen to refer directly to the immediately 
preceding entry, in the manner of a conversation. 
Extract 4.07 
QUESTION OF THE MONTH 
This forum is devoted to hearing other people's answers to some difficult 
moral and ethical questions that society is grappling with today. There are 
05 no'right' answers and all viewpoints are welcomed. You may be as 
anonymous as you'd like when responding. 
A QUESTION OF INFIDELITY 
10 One night while visiting with your old friends for a school reunion in a far- 
away city, you find that you had a little too much to drink. After being 
propositioned by one of these friends whom you find attractive, you agree 
to have sex. While the sex was good, you both agree that your respective 
lives and relationships are too important to each of you for anything more 
15 to come of that one night. As you are on a plane back to your home and 
spouse the next day, knowing you will never see or hear from the old friend 
again. you have a decision io make. 
Do you tell your spo. use of your one-night fling? Why or why not? 
20 
If you know in advance thal if your spouse discovers that you have been 
unfaithful, he or she v/;! ' leave %,, cu ond file for a divorce with no chance of 
reconciliation, would this influence your decision? In what way?? 
(Mental Health Net & CMHC Systems, 1996, 
www. cmhc. com/ques96-5. htmi) 
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As in the previous extract, here in Extract 4.07 we see a minimising, script- 
instantiating formulation of a case of infidelity: it was merely a "one-night fling" 
(line 19). Once again, narrative details about a celebratory occasion (that of a 
"school reunion, " line 10), a distant location ("a for-away city, " lines 10-11: a long 
journey home by plane, line 15), alcoholic intoxication (line 11) and so on provide 
an interpretative framework from which the protagonist emerges as an essentially 
or dispositionally faithful person who happened across an isolated episode of 
infidelity - in this case, the point being to open up the debatable possibility that it 
might be reasonable to not perform the ritual of confessing to the cheated-upon 
spouse about what has gone on. That is, the new and interesting feature of 
Extract 4.07 is the construction of the text with regard to its anticipated reader. 
The story unfolds in the present tense and the second person, with "you" as the 
leading character. The audience that "Question of the Month" addresses is any 
and every English-speaking netizen. This is a huge body of potential recipients, 
temporally and geographically dispersed, and the infidelity story itself (lines 10- 17) 
is produced as an open ended piece of narrative that anyone should be able to 
understand and get involved with. 
As such, it bears a striking resemblance to the vignettes that are often 
used in studies of attribution. A good example is the study by Mongeau, Hale and 
Alles (1994) which investigated "accounts and attributions produced following a 
relational transgression, specifically, sexual infidelity"(p. 326). Mongeau et at. 
required their research participants to read one of a handful of scenarios. 
All scenarios described a heterosexual dating relationship where one partner (the 
transgressor) goes to a bar, meets a friend of the opposite sex, talks and drinks with 
the friend, goes to the friend's apartment to watch a movie, and ends up having 
sexual intercourse with him/her. [I After reading the scenario, participants were 
asked to put themselves in the tronsgressor's place and respond to a series of 
attribution measures. 
(Mongeou, Hole and Alles, 1994, p. 334) 
The sorts of variables being manipulated by Mongeau and colleagues were 
narrative details concerning (for example) the "intent" of the transgressor, 
operatianalised by describing the transgressor as meeting his/her friend by 
chance (the low intent condition) or, alternatively, going to the bar in the hope of 
meeting the friend (the high intent condition). In the case of Extract 4.07 and also 
the case of Mongeau's scenarios, vignettes are presented that define a kind of 
reality and ask readers to engage in debate or do attributional work in the course 
of making their response. In both cases the reality being presented is an infidelity 
of very low consistency, to use the language of attribution theory (although, 
again, the sense in which it is used here is discursive rather than cognitive). 
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Something blameable is claimed to have happened but it is discursively confined 
to the limits of a"one-night fling" or a single occasion of "having sexual 
intercourse. " I shall have more to say about the relationship of vignettes such as 
Mongeau's to narrative exercises such as that of Extract 4.07 at the end of this 
chapter. Before that, however, there is another aspect of the isolated episode of 
infidelity that mefits a little data analysis. This additional element is "mistake of 
fact. " 
Mistake of Fact 
Mistake of fact is a variety of isolated episode that is constructed exclusively by or 
with regard to third-party infidels. Accounts of mistake of fact report incidents 
where people engage in sexual encounters or embark upon relationships, only to 
discover afterwards that their partner was already committed to someone else. 
The dyad-bound infidel is blamed for having deceived the third-party infidel as 
well as the victim, allowing the third-party infidel to claim that they would not 
knowingly have got involved with someone who was already attached. The 
stronger versions align the third-party infidel with the victim, claiming that they 
have incurred essentially the some injury. Discursively speaking, mistakes of fact 
are a lot like the accidents we saw being constructed earlier. They are only 
identifiable as such retrospectively and they combine an element of 
unintentionality with temporal isolation of the key events. 
Let's take a look at an example of mistake of fact in action. Extract 4.08 
comes from one of my own research interviews. The interviewee, Earl, is a single 
man aged about thirty. The extract below occurs roughly mid way through the 
interview (page 20 of the transcript). It is quite a long stretch of data and we shall 
not attempt an exhaustive analysis here. Instead we shall concentrate on the 
areas and features of the data that are most relevant to the superordinate 
analytic task of understanding the construction of isolated episodes of infidelity. 
Extract 4.08 
Rachel: have you ever been confronted by an angry partner 
Earl: F [laughs] I 
Rachel: Llike you've] been shagging my (. ) par- my boyfriend 
stroke girlfriend kind of angle? 
05 Earl: er yeah I have 
Rachel: = have you 
Earl: (laughingi ryeahl 
Rachel: L [laughing] J ah tell me about that, go on 
Earl: (okay) um (. ) I got into a situation where it was like uni 
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I'd been away from D- [his home town] for like some time. 
Rachel: mhm 
Earl: and er (. ) and then when I come back to D- er a friend 
who or someone who I used to class as a friend 
Rachel: mhm 
Earl: who urn (. ) then like we became distant 
Rachel: mhm 
Earl: um (. ) we got distanced from each other and I came 
back to D- and er (. ) I ended up um eventually meetinci 
her 
Rachel mhm 
Earl and and (. ) we ended up going out for a while, Fjustl like 
Rachel: LrightJ 
Earl: going out and having a drink for like a while or going out 
and, and er (. ) she was always like putting it over as if to 
say oh she wasn't with him any more, Fthat typel of thing 
Rachel: L right J 
Earl: d'mean 
Rachel: = did you believe this or was it 
Earl. = U: m 
Rachel: didn't it matter 
Earl: I think I did believe it. I think I did believe it but there was 
like a certain amount of er FI wasl getting a certain 
Rachel: L mm J 
Earl: amount of fun anyway 
Rachel: yeah 
Earl: d'mean, I was quite young at the time 
Rachel mhm 
Earl: and u: m (. ) in the end it obviously like (. ) cus we were 
going out as well, it got out that like (. ) we, we were going 
out (. ) and then like I ended up meeting this guy 
Rachel: yeah 
Earl: and like (. ) we didn't end up talkinq I!. ) d'meon, we didn't 
talk at all 
Rachel: mhm 
Earl: and um (. ) I re- obviously I realised at that point, do you 
get what I mean 
Rachel: mm 
Earl: so er (. ) I ended up going and (laughing] going and 
confronting him 
Rachel: you confronted him? 
Earl: yeah [laughing] F1 confronted himl 
Rachel: L oh my go: d J (laughing] what did 
you sa-Y? (. ) shit, that was so bra: ve (laughing] go on, 
what did you say 
Earl: [laughing] like um I suppose like you just use um (. ) use 
attack as defence don't you Fsometimesl and it was like 
Rachel: L mm J 
Earl: er (. ) what you giving me the (. ) (like it was like) (laughing] 
! put it over like as a mod thing really like, (xxx what you 
giving the xxx) against me for? (. ) and then from the: re 
like, the argument started, do you know what I mean 
Rachel: mhm 
Earl: and it was even dragged up to her house (laughing] 
Rachel: [laughing] 
Earl: d*mean 
Rachel: o: h shit 
Earl: and um (. ) it just fizzled out, I mean he's gone his way, I've 
gone mine and like whenever we see each other now we 
got nothing to say to each other, but other situations 
have come up, hove have like come up like since then 
Rachel: mhm 
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Earl: d'mean where (. ) where um (. ) we're probably like I'm 
warring, warring enemies now really (laughing] 
Rachel: mm 
75 Earl: do you get what I mean (. ) but like (. ) rm friends with his 
brothers but like I- I- like ey I don't talk to him Fso we'll bel 
Rachel: L mm j 
Earl: out sometimes and I'll be out with his brothers d'mean but I 
won't talk to him. ridiculous really 
80 Rachel: mm mm 
Earl: so you know 
[10 lines omitted] 
Rachel: so when, when this argument, argument was developing 
between you and Fthis blokel what happened, did he 
85 Earl: L yeah J 
Rachel: accuse you and then you went yeah (. ) that's dght 
Earl: um (. ) well er I admitted (. ) I admitted but like er (. ) I 
suppose like to some extent, because I'd been away from 
D- and I didn't know what was happening (. ) I was to 
90 some extent ndive. fI was taken inj by this story (. ) it was 
Rachel: L yea: h i 
Earl: like f. ) I didn't know 
Rachel: oh you said, you said like (I've be-) I didn't know 
Earl: I didn't know 
95 Rachel: ri: ght ri: ght 
Earl: I didn't know, d'mean and like nothing (. ) in that way 
happened F anywo d'mean 1 so there was no 
Rachel: Lyeah yeah yeah yeahj 
Earl: like (. ) as such 
100 Rachel: yeah 
Earl: do you get what I Fmeonl but that's like, still to him, that's 
Rachel: LmmJ 
Earl: debatable 
Rachel: right = 
105 Earl: that would be Fdebotablel to him. it would be to Fmel 
Rachel: L yeah I LmmJ 
Earl: and it, and probably would be to you 
Rachel: mm 
Earl: there's al, there would always be that doubt 
110 Rachel: = it's quite, it's a (. ) cost iron excuse though isn't it, oh I 
didn't know (. ) cus nobody can prove that you did 
Earl: no 
Rachel: but then it's not ak, you were fortunate to have that 
excuse available, cus often it's (. ) [laughing] bloody 
115 obvious r that you knew 1 
Earl: Lbloody obviousj yeah 
(general laughter] 
In the technical language that I have employed in various parts of this document, 
Earl is a third-party infidel. His part ner-in-cri me, the nameless "her' and "she" of 
lines 19,24,25 and 63, is the dyad-bound infidel. Earl's friend of lines 12-13 is her 
dyadic pariner, the "victim. " Earl's story about his mistake of fact bears all the 
hallmarks of an isolated episode of infidelity. His relationship with the dyad-bound 
infidel is temporally circumscribed: they were "going out- not for very long but only 
"for a while" (line 21). It is constructed as a relationship of low consistency: 
although Earl does not explicitly claim that he broke it off as soon as he "realised 
at that lLoýint" (line 45) that the woman was already involved with his friend, he 
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certainly provides for that inference to be drawn by Rachel, the recipient of the 
tale, The nareative details he provides about having been away from his home 
town (lines 10- 12,88-89) and about the information he was given regarding the 
dyadic relationship (lines 24-25,89-90) are designed to explain how this brief 
infidelity came to pass; how Earl "got into a situation" (line 9). Earl presents himself 
as someone for whom third-party infidelity is a behaviour of high distinctiveness - 
particularly note the disclaimer I was quite young at the time" of line 36 which 
emphasises that this is not representative of his behaviour now, as a fully mature 
adult. The central argument Nvith which Earl defends himself is the claim that 
circumstances conspired to keep him in ignorance about the true state of the 
dyadic relationship, displaying his infidelitous activities as unintentional: he had 
"been away from" home (line 88) and was "taken in by this story" (line 90). He 
repeatedly stresses on lines 89,92,94 and 96 that I didn't know" and it is 
interesting to note that this is conveyed with increasing force and directness each 
time. 
An especially revealing feature of Extract 4.08 is Earl's use of the 
expressions "ended up" (lines 18,21,40,48). "in the end" (fine 38) and "end up" (fine 
42). These expressions cluster around certain events in the narrative, fronn Earl's 
initially meeting the woman on line 18 to his confrontation of her partner on lines 
48-49. The use of "in the end" components is a fairly common practice in 
constructions of isolated episodes of infidelity and in fact we have already seen 
another example in Extract 4.05. That extract was taken from near the beginning 
of Lawrence's narrative and we can see that he packages the infidelity in terms 
of how it "ended up" (line 1), accompanied by an explanatory account of how 
things "ended up" that way. 
Pioneering conversation analyst Harvey Sacks has commented on the use 
of tense and temporal indicators in defensively designed stories (e. g., Socks, 1992, 
v ol. 1, pp. 515-522; Sacks, 1992, vol. 2, p. 453-457). One of the most important 
observations about Extract 4.08 that arises from Socks's analysis is that it would 
have been perfectly possible for Earl to tell his story without the use of these "in the 
end" components. For example, he could have constructed his report entirely in 
the present tense, saying something like, "so I come back to D- and this woman 
and I go out together and she's putting it over as if to say oh I'm not with him any 
more. " He also could have told a story that concentrated more on how it all 
began: "we started going out. " "this guy and i started not talking, - "straight away I 
confronted him" and so on. Also consider that, as Edwards (1997, p. 277) 
observes, "a basic issue in telling a story of events in your life is where to begin[. ] 
Where to start a story is a major, and rhetorically potent, way of managing 
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causality and accountability. " Of course, the some principle applies to the 
question of where the story ends. Earl need not have begun with "I'd been away 
from D- for some time" (line 10) and completed the narrative with "I ended up 
eventually meeting her' (lines 18-19) and "I ended up going and confronting him" 
(lines 48-49). For instance, an alternative would have been to begin with the 
confrontation and finish the story somewhere else, perhaps displaying the 
confrontation with the woman's partner as a reason for subsequently developing 
a relationship with her (we will see some accounts that follow this format in 
Chapter 6). 
Earl's packaging his story in terms of how certain events finally "ended up" 
is, then, just one possibility, selected from among a range of alternatives. The 
question for the discourse or conversation analyst is what that selection or that 
particular discursive organisation manages to do: what it accomplishes for this 
speaker interactionally. The answer is two-fold. Firstly, the business about how it 
all ended up is a very passive set of formulations that plays down Earl's own 
agency and decision making. He describes not so much what he did but rather 
what happened to him. This is anticipated in lines 15 ("we become distant") and 
17 ("we got distanced from each other") and the "ended ups" with which Earl then 
peppers his narrative are equivalent to describing "how it turned out" or "how the 
cookie crumbled, " as though there were precious little he could have done to 
alter the unfolding of history one way or the other. 
Secondly and relatedly, Earl provides a description of his position and 
circumstances ("I'd been away from D- for some time ... 
then when I came back 
to D-") that hearably preceded the numerous events that are compressed into 
the "ended up" portion of the story. Interactionally speaking, the inference 
provided for by this narrative arrangement is not merely that the "end" part of the 
story happened by chance alone to follow on chronologically from the 
"beginning" part but that the events "in the end" were results that were caused by 
the things described as "the beginning. " That is, the relevance of "I'd been away 
from D- for some time ... then I came back to D-" is that it contains instructions for 
the recipient about how to interpret what follows, namely that it provides a 
framework for understanding how things came to end up as they did. It is the 
nature of the particular beginning that Earl provides (the passive descriptions of 
"I'd been away" and "when I came back") that anticipates and supplies a warrant 
for his final plea: "I didn't know. " 
I shall resist the temptation to develop any further analyýis of Extract 4.08, 
interesting though it is. The main point to bring away from this section is that 
mistake of fact may be unique in the sense that it is the exclusive preserve of third- 
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party infidels but in every other respect it is as much a member of the family of 
isolated episodes of infidelity as accounts of first offences, intoxication and 
holiday flings. Across the board, discursive practices of ontological 
gerrymandering, script instantiation and narrative organisation are employed to 
isolate a singular case or occasion of infidelity, assign it a normialised, situational 
cause ("accidents will happen") and correspondingly display the infidel as 
someone free of malicious or wilful intent ("anyone can make a mistake"). 
Critique and Conclusions 
In this chapter we have examined several aspects of the practice of constructing 
an isolated episode of infidelity. I would now like to say a few words about that 
overall defensive practice before moving on to the critical implications of our 
data analysis. 
Functionally speaking, the point of constructing an isolated episode is that, 
while not attempting to negate the infidelity (or whatever the blameable 
behaviour happens to be constructed as), it invokes certain mitigating 
circumstances which show that the acts in question were not entirely or at all 
within the infidel's personal control. This is a defensive practice that combines 
claims of high distinctiveness (i. e., that this is unusual behaviour for the individual 
who is, by implication, not dispositionaily inclined to this sort of thing) with claims of 
low consistency (i. e., that the infidelitous sequence of events is now finished with 
and in the past). We have seen that a key element of constructing an isolated 
episode of infidelity is an effort of normalisation, not only of the infidel as a person 
but also of the event itself and the causal factors that are picked out in the 
infidel's account. Thus, reports of isolated episodes are studded with idiomatic, 
scrip f-instantia ting formulations such as "accidents ... .. one-night stands ... .. the classic 
holiday situation ... .. under the influence of drink" and so on. An effect of this 
normalisation and invocation of familiar and recognisable categories is that the 
recipient of the tale is encouraged to look at things from the infidel's point of view. 
This can be useful in a variety of social situations, as we can see from the diverse 
range of sources and media in which isolated episodes appear. 
in the concluding section of the previous chapter I made a comparison 
between constructing a non-event and Atkinson's and Drew's type I (justificatory) 
defence that they discovered being used by police witnesses in the Scarman 
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tribunal hearings (Atkinson and Drew, 1979). Thus, at the present juncture it is 
worth remarking that there is a striking resemblance between the defensive 
practice of constructing an isolated episode of infidelity and another discovery of 
Atkinson's and Drew's: a form of excuse that I shall refer to here as type 1 (a) 
because Atkinson and Drew describe it as intermediate between their two other 
identified defences. Here is an extract from Atkinson's and Drew's data that 
follows immediately from the sample that we looked at in Chapter 3. Recall that 
the speaker is a senior police officer giving evidence about incidents of civil 
unrest. In this extract he is being cross-examined about his actions (and failures to 
take action) with respect to the activities and movements of a "Protestant crowd. " 
Counsel: No-one went very for past you, you say? 
Witness: No-one got more than a few yards post me. 
Counsel: So some people did go past you? 
Witness: I was hit in the leg by a stone and went down and that is when they 
went past me. 
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p. 171) 
The excuse component appears in the witness's second turn: I was hit in the leg 
by a stone and went down and that is when they went post me. " Atkinson and 
Drew observe that the unique feature of such excuses is that they are constructed 
in the form of a narrative which conveys how the b lameable incident (people 
getting past the police) could have happened. This is different from Atkinson's 
and Drew's type I defence which (like constructing a non-event) tries to clear the 
speaker by showing that no action or alternative action was necessary. It is also 
different from their type 2 excuse which (similarly to the constructions we will see 
in Chapter 6) provides a reason for the blomeable behaviour. As Atkinson and 
Drew put it, the type of excuse we see illustrated in the extract above is 
distinguished by "putting the descriptions of the witness's position in first position in 
the turn (e. g., "I was hit in the leg by a stone and went down... ") so that the other 
party's action, reported in a subsequent position ("and that is when they went 
past me"), is formulated as having resulted from the witness's inability to stop them 
at that point" (Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p. 172: emphasis added). Like the type I 
justificatory defence, this type of defence is produced prior to specific 
accusations of witness's failures to take action and thus "seeks to forestall the issue 
of failure" (ibid., p. 173). That is. the witness takes the opportunity to construct 
his preferred version of events rather than wait for the blameable aspect of his 
behaviour to be pointed out by Counsel. 
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This chapter has focused on the descriptive and narrative practices involved in 
constructing an isolated episode of infidelity. I have shown that isolated episodes 
are constructed in such a way as to attend to issues of blame and accountability 
by providing certain information or providing for certain inferences to be drawn 
about the distinctiveness of the infidelity (i. e., that it was highly distinctive 
behaviour) and its consistency (i. e., that the consistency - the longevity and 
ongoingness - of the infidelitous relationship was low). The data we have 
examined show that accounts of isolated episodes of infidelity are actively 
constitutive of those episodes as such, not merely existing as neutral and 
transparent reports. 
Subsequent to the above analysis, we are in a position to re-address some 
of the concerns about psychological studies based on attribution theory that I 
raised earlier. Let's begin with the questionnaire approach of Fincham, Beach, 
Nelson and colleagues, which aims to discover and measure individuals' 
cognitive attributional style. Research participants are typically provided with 
Likert-style five- or seven-point scales on which to make "ratings" about the cause 
of marital disagreement areas and undesirable spouse behaviours, according to 
researcher-defined categories or dimensions of cause such as internal/external 
locus. These ratings are treated as expressions of underlying cognitions and 
collectively they are taken to describe an individual's overall cognitive style or 
characteristic mental state. As I observed in Chapter 1, this composite 
quantification of cognitive style may then be correlated with other measures such 
as expressions of anger and indices of marital satisfaction (e. g., Fincham and 
Bradbury, 1987,1992). The stance taken by these researchers is that marital (and 
para-marital) relationships are not only social, interpersonal interaclions but very 
importantly include intrapersonal "covert processes" (Bradbury and Fincham, 
1990, p. 3) so that a satisfactory analysis of marriage must attend to the cognitive 
at least as much as the outwardly behavioural. 
From a discursive-psychological point of view, a major problem with this 
kind of approach is that the portrait of the individual respondent is achieved at 
the expense of an analysis of what or who they are responding to and how that 
contributes to and shapes the response. Clearly, any questionnaire, interview 
schedule or other instrument that is designed to describe the assignment of 
responsibility and blame for phenomena such as infidelity in terms of an 
individualised cognitive style is itself offering a causal explanation and thereby 
doing some attributional work. For instance, if marital (dis) sa tisf action is presumed 
to exist in some sort of causal relationship. with individual attributional style then 
that is distinct from explanations for marital dissatisfaction which prefer to locate 
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the cause in the demographic characteristics of the partners, or the 
institutionalised nature of the relationship or whatever. 
Devising questionnaire items about the internal and external causes of 
relational events and developing theoretical accounts of things like marital 
dissatisfaction, maladjustment and unrealistic expectations of marriage are 
discursive, interactional behaviours. However, these are excluded from the 
analysis of Fincham et at. and are treated as superordinate to the utterances and 
writings of participants as they obligingly mark off points on Likert scales, answer 
interview questions, take part in labolatory problem solving tasks and so on. These 
activities are taken to be the product and the natural expression of the 
individual's underlying mental state and so we are discouraged from asking how 
they might have been affected if the researchers' discursive behaviour had been 
different; if they had asked alternative types of questions, used other language or 
chosen a contrasting environment in which to conduct the business of data 
collection. 
We have looked at several different kinds of data in this chapter and it is 
not difficult to see that they draw upon some shared discursive resources. For 
instance, the notion that internal versus external causes and causes that exist in 
the actor versus the situation can be played off against each other in a zero-sum 
game whereby more of one implies less of the other is evident in the discourse of 
psychiatrist Frank Pittman (Extract 4.02), agony aunt Irma Kurtz (Extract 4.03), 
internet discussant Skye (Extract 4.04) and research participant Earl (Extract 4.08). 
It is also manifest in the questionnaires and reports of social cognition researchers 
such as Fincham and of course in my own discursive-psychological commentary 
on the subject. The crucial difference between the cognitive and the discursive 
approaches is that the discursive approach recognises its own commentary as 
part of the phenomenon it is studying, while the cognitive approach accounts for 
the discursive behaviour of participants but is unable (or perhaps simply unwilling) 
to account for itself. 
Now let us turn to the experimental studies which use scenarios and 
vignettes, such as that of Mongeou, Hale and Alles. This kind of research presents 
participants with the stimulus material of a ready-made narrative about the topic 
at hand and requires them to make causal and responsibility attributions by way 
of a response. As it happens, in the 1994 study of Mongeau et at., the researchers 
wanted to investigate both "atiributions" (which were taken to be private 
cognitions) and "accounts" (which were taken to be public reports). Earlier in this 
chapter, in the section on holiday flings, I quoted the researchers' description of 
the scenarios that participants were given to read. Now I shall briefly explain 
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what participants were obliged to do in formulating their response. As an index of 
their private attributions, participants used five-point Likert scales to indicate the 
extent of their agreement or disagreement with a collection of statements such 
as "J's actions were intentional ... .. I would expect 
J to feel responsible for his/her 
actions" and "I would expect that J feels guilty for his/her actions, " where J stood 
for either John or Jane depending on the sex of the infidel in the story. After that, 
participants were asked to provide an account. In the words of Mongeou et at. 
(p. 334), "instructions indicated that one week following the transgression, their 
partner discovers the transgression through a mutual friend. Respondents were 
told "if you were (transgressor's name), what would you say to (partner's name) in 
an attempt to explain your behaviour? '"' The resulting accounts were then coded 
as belonging to one of five categories in a predetermined hierarchy of excuses 
and justifications. Broadly speaking, the experimental hypothesis was that the 
manipulation of variables such as the high or low'intent" of the transgressor to 
meet their friend on the night of the infidelity would exert an effect on the types of 
attributions and accounts produced by participants. 
The approach taken by Mongeau and colleagues embodies the 
assumption that the researcher's vignette is a description that exists separately 
from and prior to attributional and accounting work of the kind that is to be 
undertaken by participants. It treats the researchers'and the participants' 
discursive work as two fundamentally different categories of activity. However, 
the discursive psychological analysis of attribution of Edward s and Potter (1992, 
1993) exposes two important shortcomings of this approach. 
The first point relates to the above criticism of questionnaire-based studies 
of cognitive attributional style. There is an under-acknowledgement in studies 
such as Mongeau's of the researcher's vignette as itself a discursive phenomenon, 
just like the research participant's response. In fact, studies based on attribution 
theory are characteristically based on the premise that causal attributions are 
reactions to a perceived event, not a verbal description of an event such as 
Mongeau's description of the sexual adventures of John/Jane. Thus, there is not 
much room in cognitive attributional studies for a discussion of the action 
performed by the speaker or writer in putting together their description. The 
business of reporting or describing remains under-theorised and is allowed to blur 
into the events being described so that there is a confusion between the 
descriptive and the ontological. 
This under-acknowledgement is consequential because, as we have seen, 
descriptions do not merely reflect the world but actively construct and constitute 
it in the course of attending to various interactional concerns. The data we have 
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considered in this chapter show that even in the least confrontational of social 
situations, descriptions are attributionally loaded, constructing certain versions of 
the world and providing for certain inferences to be drawn about issues of 
personal accountability and blame. For instance, recall Extract 4.07, Mental 
Health Net's "Question of the Month. " Of all the data extracts in this chapter, 
Extract 4.07 is probably the most similar to the vignette presented to Mongeau's 
research participants. The scenario is hypothetical, the recipients are invited to 
respond but not to expect a direct reply and so on. Nonetheless, even in Extract 
4.07 we can see that some attention is being paid to the interactional 
accountability of the narrator of the tole. The narrator provides an account for 
what s/he is doing in the description of what "you" did that could otherwise sound 
like some kind of accusation: specifically, the "Question of Infidelity" is announced 
and presented as just another example of "some difficult moral and ethical 
questions that society is grappling with today" (lines 3-4). This much 
accomplished, an isolated episode of infidelity is constructed that admits the fact 
of someone having "been unfaithful" (lines 21-22) while at the same time heavily 
mitigating it so as to create the opportunity for some doubt and debate on the 
part of recipients about whether or not it is really necessary to "tell your spouse" 
(line 19) about what went on. Indeed, the equivocation between positive 
assertion and guilty denial and the normalising techniques that characterise 
isolated episodes of infidelity make them ideal for these kinds of reasoning 
exercises in a way that more uncompromising defences (such as constructing a 
generic rationale) and more controversial ones (such as constructing a special 
category of self) cannot hope to be. 
In short, vignettes such as Mongeou's are a long way from being 
discursively or interactionally neutral. Despite their neglect in cognitive 
approaches to attribution, such vignettes, like that of Extract 4.07 and alongside 
the other tales of isolated episodes that we have looked at in this chapter. are 
attributionally busy and constructive. They deploy a collection of rhetorical 
devices and techniques including episodic, scrip t-ins ta ntia ting formulations and 
techniques of sequential narrative organisation to create scenarios that not only 
provide for inferences of a situational cause but are understandable by recipients 
as relevantly performing a range of interactional functions. Isolated episodes of 
infidelity can serve cis the topic for a reasoning game of the sort devised by 
Mongeou and colleagues or for a debate in a public forum (as in Extracts 4.0 1. 
4.04 and 4.07). They can serve as an interesting and relatively sympathetic 
confession that fulfils the requirements of a research interview (as in Extract 4.08) 
or the "reader's true experience" section of a glossy magazine (as in Extracts 4.05 
and 4.06). They are an available resource for writers who address mass audiences 
in the pop psychology and self help genres (as in Extracts 4.02 and 4.03). The 
business of attribution does not follow as a recipient's cognitive reaction to the 
discourse but is very much a part of what the discourse itself is doing. 
The second shortcoming of the approach taken by Mongeau and 
company is that it tends to ignore the fact that research participants are capable 
of more than producing codeable, quantifiable answers to questions about what 
caused the behaviour of fictional characters in hypothetical situations. It is an 
approach that screens out all but a thin slice of participants' attributional 
discursive activity. That people are zible to make sense of tightly constrained, 
laboratory-designed attributional tasks and produce intelligible responses using 
instruments such as Likert scales is arguably the least interesting aspect of their 
capacity to "do attribution" through discourse and certainly not very 
representative of anyone's ordinary, day-to-day discursive behaviour. As Antaki 
(1994), after Edwards and Potter (1992) has remarked, participants in these kinds 
of studies are "committed, by experimenter-subject protocol, to make up some 
answer to the explicitly stated or covertly implied question 'why did this happen? ' 
whether an answer [is] necessary or not. " Recipients of experimental vignettes are 
discouraged from trying to enter into negotiation with the experimenter over the 
meaning of the discourse they encounter and they are prevented from taking 
issue with the need for an explanation of the described events in the first place. 
There is little opportunity to argue about the wording or the style of description: 
participants have to accept the vignette as it is given. Moreover, the nature of 
the experiment as a social situation is such that participants are presented with 
descriptions of characters and events which they know to be fictional, contrived 
exclusively to suit the purpose and design of the research and in which, therefore, 
they cannot be expected to have any real interest or personal stake. This might 
not matter so much if the raison d'C-tre of a vignette is merely an attempt to inform 
or entertain, but the social cognition researchers have the grander ambition of 
discovering something about attributional processes as an important and 
pervasive element of social life. It is a pity, then, that their preferred research 
methods leave so many of people's wide ranging attributional activities 
untouched. 
In gathering the data for The Compleat Infidel I deliberately collected 
defences of infidels and infidelity frorn an eclectic r-nix of sources and rnedia, 
including live talk, print media and new digital media. Sometimes the speakers 
and writers who produced the discourse can be seen supplying an answer to 
some direct question with a limited range of expected responses; sometimes they 
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reminisce and speculate in long, loosely structured monologues. Sometimes they 
engage in face-to-face conversation with the recipient of their accounts and 
sometimes they are found to be addressing a largely unknown and anonymous 
audience from a distance, across divides of time and space. This inclusive policy 
means that within the pages you are reading now it has been possible to survey a 
wider variety of attributional and otherwise action orientated discursive forms 
than would have been available to Mongeou, Hole and Alles from their collection 
of quantitative or quantifiable responses to the Jane/John story. Notably, a 
glance back over the accounts of isolated episodes of infidelity that appear in 
this chapter confirms that s. ocial cognition researchers do not have a monopoly 
on constructing vignettes. Given the opportunity, research participants use just 
the same rhetorical devices and techniques, as do internet surfers, human interest 
journalists, popular psychologists et at.. Constructing self-contained stories - 
episodic narratives, if you will - that describe the circumstances surrounding 
contested events and thereby accomplish specific kinds of attributional work is a 
form of discursive behaviour which social cognition researchers such as Mongeau 
practice'themselves but fail to notice as relevant or interesting when it is 
displayed by their participants. 
From the standpoint of discursive psychology, attributions of cause and 
responsibility are not passive reactions to perceived reality, happening 
somewhere deep inside the skulls of individual subjects. Rather, they are artefocts 
of talk and text, accomplished at the level of social interaction. They are 
provided, and provided for, in contextually specific and socially meaningful 
exchanges where issues of personal accountability arise and are settled among 
co-participants. This need not imply face-to-face conversation: the action 
orientation of discourse is evident even in unsigned public documents such as 
Mental Health Net's "Question of the Month" with its reflexive self-characterisation 
as one among several "moral and ethical questions that society is grappling with 
today. " Indeed, it is evident in the routinely impersonal, generalisable vignettes 
that are got up for experimental purposes, since that idiomatic, scrip t-insta ntia ting 
narrative style is itself a form of talk, used outside the laboratory as well as inside, 
as and when it is needed to achieve a particular rhetorical effect. 
'5 
Construct a Special 
Category of Self 
Introduction 
From time to time, the defensive practices of infidelity discourse involve an 
appeal to some special group or membership category to which the infidel 
belongs. Such appeals are the subject matter of Chapter 5.1 shall begin by 
supplying an overview of that feature of the discursive landscape which I have 
called "construct a special category of self. " As in the previous two chapters, the 
approach taken at this stage is to view the construction of a special category of 
self as drawing on a particular interpretative repertoire so I shall briefly indicate 
some of the themes, images and other discursive resources from which this 
defence is characteristically built up. 
After that, it will be time to move on to the clata analysis part of the 
chapter where we shall look at a generous handful of extracts of data that show 
special categories of self being constructed in situ. We shall retain a focus on 
discursive resources but zoom in so that it is possible to identify some of the more 
detailed features of construction and design in these accounts and thereby 
discover something about their interactional functions. 
Finally, in the critique and conclusions part of the chapter we will step 
back and consider the broader functions of constructing a special category of 
self. This section will also include a discussion of the critical implications of our 
findings for a named area of social science. In previous chapters we have looked 
at the implications of The Compleot Infidel for sociometric studies of (attitudes to) 
infidelity and also for studies based on attribution theory. In the present chapter 
the object of our attention will be that body of literature which tries to explain 
infidelity using theories of personality and psychopathology, often to a mass 
audience of lay readers. 
The insights of the earlier analytic chapters will continue to apply in the 
chapter you are reading now. In particular, it will be useful to recall the mutual 
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co-constitution of the self and the world or the actor and the situation which we 
discussed in Chapter 4. When isolated episodes of infidelity are discursively 
constructed, recipients are invited to see that the cause of the troublesome 
behaviour was something in the protagonist's local environment. In contrast, the 
special categories of self that we will see constructed in this chapter encourage 
recipients to understand that the cause of the infidelity was or is something 
located within the individual themselves. 
The common theme among all the accounts to be examined in this chapter is 
that they construct some infidel or infidels, as members of a special category of 
people who are especially prone or vulnerable to being unfaithful. There are, in 
fact, several categories that can be appealed to in this way and there will not be 
room to look at absolutely all of them within the few pages available here. For 
instance, my data base shows that some appeals rest. on the idea that certain 
groups of people receive a disproportionate number of romantic and/or sexual 
offers that eventually tempt them into infidelity. These groups include: very 
attractive people; celebrities and people with high profile occupations: people 
with occupations that thrust them into sexually charged situations (working in 
nightclubs being one example). The categories that we will be looking at in this 
chapter are as follows. Firstly we will consider appeals to "poor general aptitude" 
which invokes a category of people who are simply inherently "bad at" sustained 
fidelity. Lastly we will examine appeals of "verified and treatable disorder"in 
which people invoke confirmed psychological illnesses such as addiction as an 
explanation for their infidelitous behaviour. As an intermediate step we will also 
investigate some accounts of "unidentified or suspected psychological 
disturbance" in which speakers explore multiple possibilities, wavering between 
the mental illness type of explanation and other, more situational types of 
account. 
In this chapter we shall make heavy use of the idea of membership 
categories so I shall take the opportunity to clarify that expression now before we 
get underway with the data analysis. The originator of the term was conversation 
analyst Harvey Sacks (e. g., Sacks, 1992). Membership categories are discursive 
resources for identifying and describing people; speakers use membership 
categories to refer to others and also to themselves. So far in The Compleat 
Infidel I have invoked quite a number of membership categories including the 
following: men: women; single people, married people; third-party infidels; dyad- 
bound infidels: victims of infidelity: social scientists, lay people: research 
participants and so on. 
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The thing to notice about membership categories is that they are more 
than just"convenient labels, " in the words of Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998, p. 214) 
and Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995, p. 69): they are also inferentially rich. They 
provide a means of interpreting and making sense of behaviour because 
category memberships are conventionally associated with certain category 
bound activities. Let's take an example that is relevant to the content of this 
chapter. "Addict" is a membership category that does more than describe a 
person and distinguish them from a population of non-addicts. It makes relevant 
a set of conventional propositions to do with free will, compulsion and need that 
can be invoked to explain the behaviour of the person so described. That is, 
describing someone as an addict in the context of discussing their sexual 
behaviour makes available the inference that the behaviour is not of their own 
conscious volition; that they engage in it automatically and perhaps unwillingly in 
order to fill some psychological void or compensate for some deficit. Moreover, 
since "addict" is a term with a clinical etymology. it makes relevant the 
expectation that the addicted individual has been and/or should be in receipt of 
professional, clinical attention. Clearly, this is different from describing a person as 
being naturally or dispositionally talentless at curbing their sexual behaviour. 
Invoking a membership category of "people who are just not very good at fidelity" 
is a less medicalised option. As such, it locks the credibility of official, professional 
endorsement implied by "addiction. " However, it is also free of the normative 
expectation that persons with a clinical condition ought to seek treatment and 
be motivated to achieve an eventual cure. 
With these points in mind, let us move on to the first of our special 
categories of self: people who suffer from a poor general aptitude for fidelity. 
Data Analysis 
Poor General Aptitude 
Constructions of poor general aptitude deploy a trait-based theory of the self, in 
contrast to the role-based theory implied by, for example. accounts which excuse 
infidels by appeal to their occupational circumstances. Of course. within the 
formal academic enterprise of psychology it is a familiar and well rehearsed idea 
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that people possess personalities which are composed of a number of relatively 
fixed traits. possibly including various natural abilities. A classic example of this 
kind of thinking can be found in the work of Raymond Cattell (e. g., Cattell, 1950, 
1957). In Cattell's view, traits can be inferred from behaviour; they are underlying 
mental structures that predispose individuals to act consistently from one 
occasion or situation to the next. Some traits are "ability traits" which importantly 
include "intelligence. " Other traits serve a more motivational function and these 
include things like curiosity and gregariousness. In the data extracts to follow we 
will see speakers engaged in much the same reasoning as Catteil's. They give the 
impression in their discourse of observing their own behaviour and inferring 
something from that about what sort of person they must be. As we will see, the 
traits and abilities that they notice in themselves are functional in explaining and 
defending both third-party and dyad-bound infidelity. 
Let's take a look at an example of poor general aptitude in action. Extract 
5.01 is drawn from one of my own research interviews, about three quarters of the 
way through the conversation. The interviewee, Kyle, is a man aged about thirty. 
He describes himself as single although he reports extensive experience of 
upsetting women who expected him to be faithful and is seemingly a recidivist 
third-party infidel. With regard to the following extract, Rachel has earlier referred 
to the experience of "being accused of homewrecking" and asks Kyle, "have you 
been confronted in that way? " At first Kyle says that he has not but then he 
appears to remember differently. 
Extract 5.01 
Kyle: oh I have been (. ) I have been once 
Rachel: have you 
Kyle: I have experienced it once (. ) and um (. ) again, it put me 
in good stead, because it, 1,1,1 went somewhere (. ) in a 
05 sense with the other person (. ) an I went somewhere 
where in a moral sense, I shouldna went 
Rachel mm 
Kyle: and I ýid (J and it couldo been very very tricky (. ) for me 
(. ) socially and personally (. ) but (. ) but it smoo: thed itself 
to out but it's still a (. ) a u: m (. ) tri: cky (. ) situation, yeah? 
u: m and that and that was sleeping with my brother's 
girl 
Rachel: ri: ght (. ) yeah yeah yeah (. ) i can imagine how pissed 
off. he was about that! [laughing] (. ) did you have words 
15 on the subject? 
Kyle: [nodding) 
Rachel: [loughing] Fdid youl 
Kyle: L mm I 
Rachel: oh I guess I shouldn't be laughing, you look serious, it just 
20 Fstrikes me as funny though (laughing] I 
Kyle: Lwell no no no I'm thinkina about it, I'm thinkinal about it. 
[laughing] it's rude, you knowwhat I mean, it's rude 
I 17 
that's why like, that's why I look at myself (. ) and I say well 
kid (. ) you know (. ) you know, if it's there you'll have it and 
25 that's fucking obvious[ so. 
Rachel: see, I'm with you about realism on this one, I do think of it 
like that, it's like you've gol to be realistic about what you 
are and are not capable of. 
Kyle presents the events he recounts as a learning experience: "again, it put me in 
good stead" (lines 3-4); "that's why I look at myself and say... " (line 23). 
Throughout the interview he is a keen promoter of the virtues of self-knowledge 
and self-awareness and, as we will see from his contributions to Chapter 7, this is 
partly because it supports his favoured defensive practice of constructing a 
generic rationale for infidelity. However, generic rationales tend to be vague 
and/or di smissive about any offence or distreýss caused by infidelity to individual 
victims and concentrate mainly on the broad sociological and political aspects 
of fidelity as a means of constraining human behaviour. As one result they are 
less useful for addressing requests that solicit stories about particular, individual 
transgressions such as the request issued by Rachel immediately prior to Extract 
5.0 1. As we have seen from some of the interview extracts in previous chapters, it 
is possible to answer questions such as Rachel's with such rhetorical structures as 
1. not prohibited" (Chapter 3) and "mistake of fact" (Chapter 4). However, these 
are measures that present the protagonist as basically law-abiding. Kyle has not 
developed that kind of self-representation and happily admits to a variety of post 
and potential infidelitous adventures. Thus, his construction in this extract of a 
version of a special category of self is a logical choice because it reconciles the 
overall fact of his self-identified sexual career with the immediate requirements of 
the interviewer's question. namely that he should produce an account of and for 
some particular wrong-doing. 
What we see in Extract 5.01 is actually a fairly simple, straightforward 
example of a construction of poor general aptitude. Kyle's account is not one 
that makes especially subtle provision for the recipient to draw an inference of a 
dispositional inclination to infidelitY. 'Rather, he clearly spells it out. He * 
acknowledges, however minimally, the cost of his behaviour on this occasion to 
the victim ("it's rude, you know what I mean, it's rude": line 22) and then takes that 
unfortunate effect of rudeness as a warrant for inferring something about his own 
personality, his own dispositional tendency to follow up all kinds of romantic and 
sexual opportunities: "that's why I look at myself (. ) and I say well kid [I if it's there 
you'll have it and that's fucking obviously so" (lines 23-25). As we can see, Rachel 
then builds upon and allies herself with this defence, refining Kyle's general trait- 
118 
based account with a more specific reference to the notion of individual ability: 
what you are and are not capable of" (lines 27-28). 
Notice that in Kyle's crucial final turn in this extract (lines 21-25) he uses 
various externalising devices to bolster his case and again this is something Rachel 
co-operates with in her references to "realism" (line 26) and being "realistic" (line 
27). Kyle's fact-constructive encleavours include the generalisable, idiomatic 
formulation'if it's there you'll have it" (line 24) and the very emphatic extreme 
case formulation "fucking obviousl so" (line 25). Moreover, in his account of how 
he "looks at himself" (line 23) and even addresses himself in the third person as "kid" 
(line 24). he distances himself from his own observable behaviour and inferable 
personality traits, displaying himself simultaneously as a helpless miscreant and a 
rational commentator on that miscreancy. This is a strategy that we will see 
repeated throughout the present chapter and about which I shall shortly have 
more to soy. In the meantime, let us take a look at another stretch of data. 
Extract 5.02 comes from a glossy, British, men's, lifestyle magazine called 
Arena. The particular article from which Extract 5.02 is taken is called "What Men 
Want" and it purports to be a transcript of a group discussion about men's sexual 
lives and personal relationships. The facilitator's questions appear in italics. There 
are four participants: Bruce, Chris, Ion and Tony, who seem to have been 
selected for their ordinariness or representativeness of what Arena takes to be 
11 men in general. " Chris is introduced with the words, "Chris, 30, was in a four-and- 
a-half year relationship until he met another woman 18 mcnths ago. They are to 
marry next summer. " For our present purposes I am especially interested in the 
quotes attributed to Ian who is introduced as follows: "Ian, 29, has had a string of 
relationships, mostly long-distance, and is currently seeing a woman who lives in 
Italy. " The two questions that are reproduced below are presented in the Arena 
article as though they are the first two questions to be tackled by the discussants. 
Extract 5.02 
Is there anything wrong with having or-, affair? 
Ian: Strictly speaking it is wrong, but I must admit I've only ever been 
faithful to one girl in my life and then she was unfaithful to me. So there 
was a kind of hidden lesson for me that infidelity pays. somehow. 
05 [Bruce's and Tony's turns omitted. ] 
Chris: The relationship I'm in now is the first where I've been faithful. 
Previously I've always been unfaithful and never really cared about it very 
much. I had got to a point where I couldn't see a scenario in which I was 
ever going to be able to be monogarnous. And then it happened. 
10 Without wanting to sound smug, it's a fucking great relief when you just 
think "Brilliant! This is what you're supposed to get! " And you don't think 
you're going to get it, and you do, and I'm really happy and I'm going to 
get married in the summer next year. 
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15 It's weird isn't it? Because what's the reality? Is the reality the you who's 
playing around, or is the reality the you who goes back to this other 
person? Which is real and which is front? 
ton: Sleeping around's the deal. Because that's what you do, and if you 
do it serially, then that, sadly, is the real you. In every relationship I have 
20 had there's always been a barrier, and that barrier has been my infidelity 
and the lies that are inside me; because I've never been totally open with 
anyone. I'm a cheat and I'm a coward: I will sleep around but I don't want 
to face the consequences. 
(Eshun, 1997, p. 78) 
Ion's turn of lines 18-23 is not just a reply to the facilitator's question. It is also a 
reaction to Chris's turn of lines 6-13. Notice Chris's disclaimer about not wanting to 
sound "smug" (line 10), a clear indication that that is precisely how he risks being 
heard. He risks sounding smug because he is constructing a then/now distinction 
(a technique also used in constructing isolated episodes of infidelity. as we saw in 
Chapter 4) and attaching that to his present monogamy and forthcoming 
marriage, the latter being a category bound activity associated with the 
membership category of "mature adults. " This could be construed as a critical 
comment on Ion's habitual infidelity, an implication that (an is comparatively 
immature and has yet to grow out of his bad behaviour. 
Now, Ion's first turn of lines 2-4 looks as though it could have been headed 
for a generic rationale, perhaps hinging on the idea that "everyone does it even 
though most people won't admit it. " However, by the time Ian's second turn 
comes round, this kind of argument is no longer sustainable without sounding as 
though Ian is coiling Chris a liar. Thus, Ian is now landed with constructing a 
special category of self: a form of defence that will consistently support his earlier 
description of his own routine infidelity without aggressively co-opting the other 
parties to the discussion. Having said that, [on's second turn is orientated to 
resisting the more "smug" aspects of Chris's account and this helps to explain why 
Ian constructs a version of poor general aptitude in contrast to one of the "illness" 
defences that we will examine later in this chapter. Interactionally speaking, for 
Ian there is not much to be gained by admitting the possibility of change 
because of Chris's story of early degeneracy and sudden reform into responsible 
adulthood - and illness is a discursive form that holds open the possibility of 
change through the notion of recovery. However, poor general aptitude admits 
no possibility of change; if that is your pers onality then you are stuck with it. 
Now look at how Ian's version of poor general aptitude is put together. He 
does not simply announce "well, that's just me and I know what I'm like. " Rather, 
he picks up on the notion articulated in the facilitator's question that there is 
potentially a difference between "the real you" and "the front" and he builds on it. 
Like Kyle in Extract 5.01, Ian selectively attends to the contested behaviour - in this 
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case "sleeping around" (line 18) - and treats it as empirical evidence from which 
reliable inferences may be drawn about the actor's personal, inner psychology or 
"the real you" as it is characterised in this extract (line 19). Again, like Kyle, Ian uses 
a generalisable, idiomatic formulation to advance his argument, paraphraseable 
as "if that's what you do then that's the real you" (lines 18-19). This is not just an 
externalising device in the sense that it boosts the factual status of Ian's 
proposition, distancing him from his claim by commenting upon himself as an 
object. More than that, its generalisability cites the phenomenon Ian describes as 
an example of some larger category of cases. The net effect is to counter and 
resist Chris's developmental account of (in)fidelity (rather than having "grown out 
of it, " the inference becomes available that Chris has simply failed to recognise 
the real him that is evidenced by his track record) without directly attacking or 
confronting him. Contrastingly, Ian is presented as someone who at least 
possesses the virtue of knowing his own failings, however "sadly" (line 19). His 
category memberships are invoked in the formulation "I'm a cheat and I'm a 
coward" (line 22). much as Kyle in Extract 5.01 observes of himself that "if it's there 
you'll have it. " 
Let's end this section with Ion's parting shot: "I will sleep around but I don't 
want to face the consequences" (lines 22-23). There is a future tense as well as a 
present tense built into this formulation which thereby prospectively accounts for 
Ion's infidelities as well as the ones he has already committed. What is more, his 
construction of a version of poor general aptitude and his concomitant 
presentation of himself as someone who is naturally and dispositionally given to 
lying, cheating and cowardice does not just admit that future lapses into infidelity 
are possible but in fact renders them inevitable, given the fixed and stable nature 
of "personalitV'as a phenomenon. Thus, Ian's account, like other examples of 
poor general aptitude, is uncompromising and in fact quite unapologetic, despite 
the "sadly" of line 19 (akin to Kyle's cursory acknowledgement of rudeness in 
Extract 5.01). In the remaining sections of this chapter we will look at some 
methods of constructing a special category of self that are slightly less blunt and 
make more of a feature of ambiguity regarding the future of the serial infidel. 
Unidentified or Suspected Psychological Disturbance 
In Chapter 1, in the section on studies of individuals and interpersonal 
relationships, I commented on and quoted from self help texts such as the Relate 
Guide to Better Relationships (Litvinoff, 1998) that identify the causes of infidelity in 
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terms which are not just individualised and psychological but broadly 
psychopathological, a common example being the catch-all term "insecurity. " 
Now, insecurity may not be a formalised mental illness but, on the other hand, it is 
hardly an indicator of mental health and stability. In fact, it is the abnormalised 
part of a contrast pair, the other, more normalised, half obviously being "security. " 
Moreover, insecurity is not necessarily treated in this literature as an innate and 
permanent personality trait. More usually, it is linked to individually variable life 
experiences; something that might result from an early experience of betrayal by 
someone close or from a mid life sense of declining sexual attractiveness or 
whatever. Thus, insecurity and related psychological conditions are constructed 
as internal to the self in the sense that a person whose behaviour is driven by 
insecurity one day will be similarly motivated the next but they are also 
constructed as characteristics which are acquired and learned and therefore 
have the potential to be un-acquired and un-learned. This renders insecure 
individuals and their troubled relationships at least potentially amenable to 
change through therapy which is of course what the writers of self help books on 
infidelity are in the business of selling. 
Speakers and writers who defend themselves with a version of unidentified 
or suspected psychological disturbance draw on much the same discursive 
techniques and resources as Litvinoff and colleagues. On the occasions when 
they give a discrete label to their psychological condition (and this is not an 
inevitable manoeuvre), they choose broad, moderately abnormalised terms such 
as insecurity. Otherwise, they, like the self help authors, put together vaguely 
suggestive character sketches about "not being very confident ... .. not 
feeling 
attractive" and so on, which provide a psychologised explanation for post and 
prospective serial infidelities and which hold open the possibility of eventual 
psychological change without. actually demanding it (as might normatively be 
the case with a more formal, clinicol-sounding description). 
Let's take a look at some data. Extract 5.03 is the simplest example of 
unidentified or suspected psychological disturbance in my database so it will 
serve well as a place to start before moving on to something more complicated. 
It is a contribution to the Friends and Lovers website, described earlier in 
connection with Extract 4.01 in the previous chapter. To briefly recap, 
contributors are netizens who have responded to an open invitation to answer 
the broad question of "why do lovers cheat? " This particular contributor identifies 
himself as "3RD EYE from THA BURY. " 
Extract 5.03 
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01 1 JUST CAN'T STOP CHEATING. MY FEELINGS WON'T ALLOW ME TO BE 
02 FAITHFUL. I AM IN LOVE WIT THREE GIRLS. I DON'T WANT TO LOSE ANY OF 
03 THEM, I THINK I NEED HELP. I WANT TO GET MARRIED ONE DAY SO I CAN 
04 HAVE REAL LOVE WITH NO WORRY. 
(Home & Leisure Publishing Inc., 1998, 
http: //cyberspud. com/friends_lovers/read I O. htm) 
3rd Eye provides a very concise, punchy account of his predicament. 
Nevertheless, from a discourse-analytic point of view there is quite a lot in here to 
be unpacked. To begin with, this account has several elements in common with 
the previous material in the section on poor general aptitude. Take the first line: "I 
just can't stop cheating. " This is clearly a generalised activity description, much 
like those produced by Kyle and Ion, which provides for an inference about 3rd 
Eye's disposition and warrants the following claim that"my feelings won't allow me 
to be faithful. " However, there is an increased emphasis in 3rd Eye's account on 
the possibility of psychopathology as the relevant dispositional ingredient, in 
contrast to Kyle's and Ian's descriptions of their moral failings. Kyle talks about 
how he"went somewhere where (. ) in a moral sense, I shouldno went" (Extract 
5.0 1, lines 5-6), while Ion talks about "the lies tha' , are inside me" (Extract 5.02, line 
2 1) and refers to himself as "a cheat" and "a coward" (line 22) which are hearably 
moral character flows rather than problems of psychological health. But 3rd Eye 
explicitly articulates a problem of being prevented from controlling or modifying 
his behaviour. 
In Chapter 31 mentioned Derek Edwards's commentary on Dorothy Smith's 
K is mentally ill (Edwards, 1997: Smith, 1978), in which Smith analyses descriptions 
by K's friends of her decline into mental illness. One bit of Smith's data that 
Edwards particularly notices runs as follows: "K was unable to put on a teapot 
cover correctly, she would not reverse its position to make it fit, but would simply 
keep slamming it down on the pot" (Smith, 1978, p. 46; emphasis added). 
Edwards remarks that "the specification of K as 'unable' provides a dispositional 
basis for a series of actions. " "the use of keep reinforces the repetitive nature of 
the action and, together with simply, helps build a picture" (Edwards, 1997, p. 150; 
emphasis in original), a picture of compulsion and also of irrationality. As Edwards 
concludes, "it is through these kinds of linguistic details that links are produced 
between a specified set of recurrent actions and the status of these patterns as 
documenting the actor's inner disposition (pathological, in K's case) to act in 
those ways" (ibid. ). In 3rd Eye's account the pathologised character portrait 
builds up to the formulation "I think I need help" (line 3) which encapsulates nicely 
the spirit of unidentified or suspected psychological disturbance. 
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What we are seeing here, as in the last chapter, is more evidence that the 
self and the world are mutually co-constituted (Edwards and Potter, 1992). When 
isolated episodes of infidelity are constructed, events and circumstances are 
characterised as episodes and packaged in script-instantiating formulations so as 
to display the speaker themselves as the sort of person who is law-abidingly 
faithful and sexually continent in the normal run of things. When special 
categories of self are constructed, the speaker's observable actions and social 
behaviours are presented in episodic. script-instantiating formulations which are 
designed to show that this is infidelity of low distinctiveness, they display the 
speaker as the sort of person who is dispositionally infidelitous. Thus, whether the 
discursive output of a speaker or writer is interactionally geared to an "external" 
locus of cause or an "internal" one, the discursive resources being used are 
basically the some. As Edwards (1997, p. 152) sums it up, dispositions (of 
whichever variety) "are built from and warranted by generalized action 
formulations, and from norm-exceptions. " 
Now let's move on to a slightly richer, more complex example of unidentified or 
suspected psychological disturbance. Extract 5.04 is a stretcý of data from one 
of my own research interviews. The extract occurs about one third of the way 
through the interview (page 16 of the transcript). The interviewee, Emma, is a 
student aged about twenty. During term time she lives with her boyfriend, Ben, 
who is a similar age and to whom she is frequently unfaithful. In particular, 
unbeknownst to Ben, she has regular meetings with an older man named Brad 
who lives nearby. 
Extract 5.04 
Emma: I'm playing a Iggily dangerous game because I live with 
this guy (. ) um (. ) and I'll be living with him for another (. ) 
month and a half [until the end of the academic year] 
and if he finds out then you can imagine the rows in the 
05 house, I live with all his friends in (. ) the house 
Rachel: yeah 
Emma: next year (. ) he's on a year out (. ) which is quite good for 
me 
Rachel: Fmhm [laughing] 1 
10 Emma: Lhe's on a year outJ but (. ) I'm (. ) moving into a house with 
anothe group of his friends 
Rachel: ri: ght 
Emma: cus we all know each other (. ) so: if ever it come out that I 
was cheating on him, not only would it hurt him and 
15 there'd be rows between me and him but then (. ) all his 
friends would be very down on me as well (. ) so I'm 
playing a dangerous game, but I can't stop. 
Rachel: F [laughing] 1 
Emma: LI can not stop. ] (. ) and I know that if there was an 
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20 opportunity for me to sleep with (. ) Brad today 
Rachel: yeah 
Emma um cus you see we can't ever do it at my house cus 
Rachel: r yeah yeah I 
Emma: L(xxx) lives thereJ but if there was an opportunity for me to 
25 sleep with Brad today then I would 
Rachel: yeah yeah 
Emma: because (. ) it's a huge turn on. 
Rachel: yeah. I know what you're saying. 
[about 20 lines omitted] 
30 Emma: I don't know, I mean 1, I've got this very (. ) two way 
bizarre moralistic system because if anybody did it to 
me I'd be pissed off, I'd expect my friends to be pissed off 
with the bloke (. ) um (. ) I can also understand why t2is 
friends would be pissed off but at the some ti: me (. ) I still 
35 go ahead and do it and it makes me feel good. 
Rachel: mm (. ) yeah 
Emma: [laughing] so I don't know quite (. ) and then I think (. ) um 
both my sisters are married um f. ) my family's a very 
christion family. um (. ) both my sisters were engaged at 
40 twenty one, married by twenty two (. ) one of my sisters got 
married a couple of weeks ago, in fact (. ) um (. ) and 1: (. ) I 
have been in long term relationships since a very early 
age, about fourtee: n (. ) sort of at fourteen I was seeing 
a guy that was ten years older than me (. ) and I had, went 
45 out with him for two years and then (. ) I seem to have very 
long term relationships with guys (. ) that I'm unfaithful to all 
of them 
Rachel: mm 
Emma: during the long term relationships um (. ) and I just can't 
50 imagine myself um (. ) ever being totally faithful to 
somebody = 
Rachel: = MM 
Emma: and then I think about ooh dear you know am I ever 
gonna be able to get married or whatever (. ) um (. ) and 
55 then I've got this whole big (. ) yeah but when you're 
married to a guy (. ) then you're with them because 
you've had this big service and certificate and stuff 
whereas if you live with a guy then you're there because 
(. ) um (. ) they want to be there and there's more 
60 opportunity for them to Fleavel if they want rto leavel 
Rachel: L mm J Lmm mmJ 
Emma: um (. ) but then I think if I've met the right person I will be 
faithful 
Rachel: mm = 
65 Emma: = which is, and because I belie: ve that, because I've 
twisted myself into believing Fthisl then I think (. ) with 
Rachel: LmmJ 
Emma: anybody that I'm with that I'm unfaithful to (. ) then it's not 
the right person 
70 Rachel: mni mm 
Emma: [laughing] see how confu: sed and mixed up I am? 
In this extract, compared to the lost, we can see more of the display of doubt 
and ambiguity about the health or sickness of one's own psyche which is the 
hallmark of unidentified or suspected psychological disturbance. Early in her 
account, Emma uses the some language as 3rd Eye in Extract 5.03 to 
problernatise her infidelitous behaviour: "I can't stop" (line 17), "1 can not stop" (line 
19). She emphasises her lack of control over her own behaviour by pointing out 
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that it has a cost not only to her victim, Ben, but also to herself: "I'm playing a 
Lqally dangerous game" (lines 1,17); "and then I think about ooh dear you know 
am I ever gonna be able to get married or whatever" (lines 53-54). This is 
paralleled in Extract 5.03 by 3rd Eye's plaintive call, "I want to get married one day 
so I can have real love with no worry'(Iines 3-4). Constructing a personal cost 
incurred by one's own infidelity is a practice that increases in frequency and 
intensity as speakers move up the scale of pathologisation from poor general 
aptitude to verified and treatable disorder. In the case of unidentified or 
suspected psychological disturbance, the cost to the infidel of their behaviour 
provides a basis for speculation about the status of their psychological condition; 
for example, in Extract 5.04 it provides for Emma to wonder out loud what could 
be causing her to act in this counter-intuitive way. 
In lines 30-35 Emma reiterates the problem, proposing that the moral 
reasoning implied by her behaviour is "bizarre" and contrasting her ability to 
understand that what she is doing is wrong with the observation that, nonetheless, 
"I still go ahead and do it" and, even more puzzlingly, "it makes me feel -Qood. 
" 
She is then in a position to talk in some detail about the possible implications of 
this puzzle. We saw in Chapter 3 some examples of speakers demonstrating their 
ability to see more than one side of an argument, using a proleptic "on the one 
hand 
... on the other hand" technique, for example when Lizzy pondered the 
(dis)similarity between "a sixty nine and a shag" in Extract 3.04. In Extract 5.04 
Emma engages in a similar practice. She first proposes that there is something 
anomalous or abnormal about herself as an individual by introducing evidence 
that contrasts an extrematised description of her own sexual history with the 
conspicuously normalised and conventional biographies of her sisters (lines 38-54). 
Then, in lines 55-60 she explores the possibility that her family's approach to these 
matters might not, after all, be the obvious model to aspire to; perhaps marriage 
is a only a system for enforcing fidelity and commitment rather a natural and 
desirable result of it. In line 62 another disjunctive "but then" appears and Emma 
tries out the possibility that she simply has not yet met the -ight person; that is, she 
experimentally locates the cause of the problem in her partners. to date all 
members of the category "the wrong person. " In line 66 she is quick to ironise that 
hypothesis - "I've twisted myself into believing this" - and thereby highlights once 
again a discrepancy or dissonance in her thinking: she can see that thinking that 
anyone she's unfaithful to is the wrong person is "twisted" but she thinks it anyway. 
All this debating and discursive to-ing and fro-ing is eventually wrapped up and 
reformulated as evidence for Emma's final statement about the doubt and 
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ambiguity that characterises her present position: the delightfully reflexive 
rhetorical question "see how confu: sed and mixed up I am? " (line 71). 
What we have seen in this section on unidentified or suspected 
psychological disturbance are examples of discourse users de-naturalising their 
serial infidelities. The misbehaviour they describe is not presented as the result of a 
natural and stable, if unfortunate, character flaw like being "a cheat and a 
coward" (cf. Ion) or being inclined to "have it" if "it" is there (cf. Kyle). Rather, it is 
presented as at least suggestive of a potentially soluble psychological problem. 
Clearly, this is a more pathologising defensive practice than "poor general 
aptitude. " Nonetheless, builders of unidentified or suspected psychological 
disturbance like to keep their options open. The infidelity is suggestive of 
psychopathology but this is never formalised and confirmed. 3rd Eye only thinks 
he needs help; Emma toys with hypotheses about marriage cnd her partners to 
date which preserve the possibility that her rationality. and mental health actually 
remain intact. In the next section we will look at some special categories of self 
that brook no doubt that something is definitely wrong. 
Verified and Treatable Disorder 
Constructions of verified and treatable disorder identify individuals' recidivist 
infidelity as the symptom of a discrete, nameable psychological illness; something 
more formal than generalised, catch-all categories such as insecurity, not feeling 
attractive and low self esteem which are the type to be invoked in constructions 
of unidentified or suspected psychological disturbance. Of course, there are not 
many discrete mental illnesses that can perform this function. Terms such as 
satyriasis and nymphomania dropped out of use a long time ago. Psychiatrist 
Frank Pittman in his book on infidelity, Private Lies, (1989) makes a medicalised 
mental condition out of the term "philandering" but he is almost unique in this 
respect and most people would recognise philandering as a description of a form 
of behaviour rather than a psychological state. However, since the mid 1980s a 
new disease category has begun to emerge, especially in the United States: this is 
1. sex addiction, " sometimes with "love addiction" tacked on as a companion 
disorder (e. g., Carnes, 1991,1992a, 1992b, 1994; Earle and Crow, 1989; Earle and 
Earle, 1995; Kasl. 1989; Lauser, 1992. Schaeffer, 1987; Schneider, 1988,199 1; 
Schneider, Corley and Irons, 1998, Schneider and Irons, 1996; Schneider and 
Schneider, 1990,1996). While sex addiction is undoubtedly still a highly 
controversial notion and most clinicians are deeply sceptical about its existence, 
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it is not completely without professional support. The US now boasts a Notional 
Council for Sexual Addiction and Compulsivity, a consortium of professional 
treatment providers. Some of its members , like 
Jennifer Schneider, are equipped 
with medical degrees. Others boost respectable career histories in psychology 
and psychotherapy: Ralph Earle is a former president of the American Association 
for Marriage and Family Therapy, for instance. 
Lay speakers and writers who construct versions of verified and treatable 
disorder use the same discursive resources as Schneider, Earle and company. 
They appear keen to exploit the explanatory power of "addiction" with its well 
established clinical history (e. g., through the notions of alcoholism and drug 
addiction), familiar set of behavioural symptoms and accepted prescriptions for 
treatment (ranging from professional cog nitive-behavioural therapy to informal 
twelve-step groups like Alcoholics Anonymous). As I observed in the introduction 
to this chapter, compared to the alternative special categories of self, 
constructing a verified and treatable disorder ernerges as a way of buying some 
official, professional endorsement for one's alleged disposition or psychological 
state. However, such endorsement is accompanied by the normative 
expectation that sufferers of known "conditions" ought to at least attempt some 
kind of treatment. Moreover, being mentally ill is rather a stigmatised type of 
category membership (e. g., Potter, 1996a, p. 127) and addiction especially so 
(e. g., Sedgwick, 1992). Volunteers for membership of the category "addicts" 
become accountable not only for seeking treatment but also for having fallen 
sick in the first place. 
It is surely time to anchor this discussion to some data. Extract 5.05 is drawn 
from a volume, of interviews published under the title Affairs of the Heart: Men & 
Women Reveal the Truth about Extramarital Affairs (Lee, 1993). Virginia Lee is an 
American journalist. The interviewee in this extract is a man called Philip and he is 
introduced as follows: "Philip was married twice, and both his marriages were 
disrupted because of affairs with other women. To him, sex was a drug, a high he 
lived for. In order to heal his sex addiction, Philip embarked on a path of personal 
therapy and conscious abstinence" (ibid., p. 39). 
Extract 5.05 
Do you think people use sex as a drug? 
Sex has served as a drug for me. It has helped me numb my feelings of 
deep loneliness and deep hurt, feelings left over from childhood. Just as 
you need to continue using a drug, I needed to keep consuming women. 
05 There were never enough. And sex was never really satisfying -I always 
hungered for more. 
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(I paragraph omitted] 
10 Did you feel that having affairs was wrong? 
Because of the numbness, it was difficult for my inner soul to have much 
influence whatsoever. I knew that what I was doing was inappropriate, 
especially if both of us were married to other people. When a secret 
rendezvous become necessary, I knew it was wrong, but there was 
15 excitement and suspense in it. Sometimes, one of our spouses would even 
be in the same house, and we would sneak off to a private place. The 
feeling of fear, of being discovered, was always there. 
[2 pages omitted] 
20 
How have you dealt with your sex addiction in this [second] marriage? 
Sex and love addiction is more than just having intercourse. It is an 
attitude called "being on the make. " Any woman you see is someone you 
may potentially seduce, even though you may choose not to seduce her. 
25 It's an element that involves eye contact, flirting and being physically 
close. I was still doing those things but thought I had it under control since I 
wasn't taking it oil the way. Sometimes a man will go to an event with his 
wife, but not really be with her. He will be with every other woman in the 
room. I thought my sex addiction had been broken, but it wasn't true. On 
30 a subtle level, it was still going on. Finally, I can have eye contact with a 
woman without that scary feeling that it's going to lead to an affair. I can 
fantasize, but I don't take it any further. I know my boundaries now. 
whereas I didn't know them before. My m6ther didn't know them. I think 
my sex addiction grew out of being sexually violated by my mother as a 
35 child. 
(3 pages omitted] 
Has that hunger in you finally been satisfied? Do you think you are cured 
40 of your sex addiction? 
Yes. I would like to think so. One therapist explained that once you have 
an addiction, it is always part of you. You just learn how to manage it so it 
doesn't control your life. You may always be an alcoholic, but it doesn't 
mean you have to drink. 
(Lee, 1993. pp. 39,42-43,46) 
This extract and Lee's introduction to it which I quoted above show both Lee and 
Philip making the connection between sex addiction, drug addiction (lines 1-6) 
and alcoholism (lines 43-44). Indeed, the rather leading question "Do you think 
people use sex as a drug? " is presented in Lee's book as the very first question of 
the interview, although what conversation analysts have discovered about the 
dynamics of conversation suggests that this is extremely unlikely to have been the 
case on the actual day. Nonetheless, for our purposes the point is that the 
reader's attention is drawn to the similarity of these conditions straight away. As a 
first priority, the controversial and relatively unfamiliar disorder of sex addiction is 
externalised and reified through association with these more well established 
disease categories . 
In lines 2-3 we can see that Philip no sooner affirms the drug-addiction-like 
nature of his problem than he provides an account for having developed such a 
condition. It is not just that he liked. sex and irresponsibly over-indulged to the 
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point where addiction set in. Rather, he refers to deep-seated and long-standing 
"loneliness" and "hurt, " "feelings left over from childhood" with respect to which the 
sex served as an analgesic. This is an account full of emotional appeal and is 
thereby quite rhetorically robust; a sceptical recipient who wished to challenge 
the truth of Philip's claim would themselves become accountable for being 
insensitive and unsympathetic to someone who was injured at a young and 
tender age. For good measure, Philip elaborates on the nature of this injury in 
lines 33-35. He was, he claims, "sexually violated" by his mother. By contemporary 
standards - that is, according to the set of normative expectations that currently 
adhere to the experience denoted "child abuse" (prominently including the 
principle that children reporting abuse should never, ever be disbelieved) - this 
claim is nearly impossible to contest. 
In lines 26-33 Philip orientates to the need to provide an account of the 
steps he has taken to treat his addiction. In fact, he attends to this issue at 
numerous points throughout his interview (e. g., notice the construction .. one 
therapist" in line 41 which makes available the inference that he has been 
concerned and vigilant enough to consult more than one and possibly several 
over an extended period of time) but his efforts in lines 26-33 are particularly 
interesting. Specifically, he recalls an occasion when he tried to treat the 
problem unaided and failed: "I thought I had it under control"; "I thought my sex 
addiction had been broken, but it wasn't true. " That he recognised this failure 
and went on to seek professional assistance displays him as someone who is 
mindful of and responsibly attending to his psychological ill health. 
Let us continue our examination of verified and treatable disorder with a new 
piece of data, this time from a British source. Extract 5.06 is a story that appeared 
in the Sunday People, a tabloid newspaper. It is reproduced here in full. The 
subject of the report, Jim Davidson, is a minor celebrity and television 
.. personality. " 
Extract 5.06 
TV JIM: I'M SEX ADDICT 
Amozinq confessiOn of anquished comic 
05 Comedian Jim Davidson confesses today: "I am a sex addict. " 
The four-times-married star tells the Sunday People in the most frank 
interview he has ever given that he regularly cheated on ALL of his wives. 
Jim, 44. says: "i wanted to have sex with every woman I saw. " 
He insists he has been faithful to his current ! over Debbie Corrigan, 26 - 
10 despite their constant public bust-ups. 
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But the Generation Game host says: "The world already knows I am an 
alcoholic. Being an alcoholic means I have an addictive personality 
which means I can get addicted to everything. It's fair to say I am also a 
sex addict. 
15 'There used to be a time when I couldn't do without the casual sex. I liked 
having sex and then just being able to walk away. I loved the chose, 
getting the girl and the sex - sex with a stronger and no ties, then moving 
on. 
"I got grumpy when I saw beautiful women I couldn't have. 
20 W's so hard to say no when you know it's available, so difficult to stop 
wanting someone you haven't got. 
"But not so much now - hopefully like the drink it is under control. " 
Jim admits it wasn't simply because he was the happy-go-lucky, jack-the- 
lad the world knows him as - it was a driving emotional need to find love. 
25 With obvious pain he confesses that he particularly cheated during his lost 
marriage to beautiful Tracy Hilton, the mother to three of his five children. 
It was the start of his affair with Debbie two years ago that finally destroyed 
his 10-year marriage to former Page 3 girl Tracy. 
Jim confesses: "I really wish it hadn't happened. I really wish it could have 
30 worked out for us as a family. 
"But I never felt loved enough by her. So I found comfort elsewhere. 
"Not affairs, just one-night stands. There were so many - yet, ironically, I 
think I rather hoped she'd realise and find out. Then at least I'd know if she 
really cared. " 
35 But his cheating ways have left current [over Debbie consumed with 
jealousy and suspicion about other women, leading to savage bust-ups. 
Jim began to face up to his sex addiction when he began treatment for 
the alcoholism. 11 
He decided to go public about his drink problem as part of combating it. 
40 Until now, however, he's never talked about being hooked on sex. 
He said: "You can't be addicted to one thing and not another. 
"Some people say I'm even addicted to wedding cake! 
"I can't control my life. Business I can control, but life, I haven't got a clue. 
1 just say I'm going down the river, if round the next bend there lies wife 
45 No. 5- well, we're oil in trouble. " 
(Wallis, 1999, pp. 1,4) 
Like Philip, Davidson and his self-appointed spokesman, the journalist Wallis, make 
a point of accomplishing three things. Firstly, they reify the contentious notion of 
sex addiction by attaching it to the more rhetorically robust category of 
alcoholism (lines I 1- 14,22,38-4 1). Secondly, they provide an account for 
Davidson having developed an addiction, especially one that manifested itself in 
the form of excessive sexual behaviour rather than some other activity. It is not 
only that Jim has "an addictive personality" (line 12) and "Jim admits it wasn't 
simply because he was the happy-go-lucky, jack-the-lad the world knows him as - 
it was a driving emotional need to find love" (lines 23-24). Thirdly, they orientate to 
the normative requirement to explain what action Davidson has taken to address 
his problem. In lines 37-40 this action is worked up as "going public" and by 
analogy with his alcoholism the inference is made available that going public is a 
sign that Davidson is at least attempting to "combat" his sex addiction and may 
even have begun treatment for it. 
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The new analytic points that I want to raise are as follows. Firstly, Extract 
5.06 shows that, compared to poor general aptitude and unidentified or 
suspected psychological disturbance, constructions of verified and treatable 
disorder place greater emphasis on recognising the cost to others of the infidel's 
behaviour. Kyle, in Extract 5.01, admits only to rudeness. Emma, in Extract 5.04, 
acknowledges not that her boyfriend has been hurt but only that he would be 
hurt if he found out what she had been up to. However, Davidson's account of 
Extract 5.06 is presented as an"anguished confession" (line 3), delivered "with 
obvious pain" (line 25). A well chosen selection of categories and category 
memberships are invoked to indicate that he recognises the extent of the 
damage that his behaviour has caused: he particularly injured a woman who is 
not only "beautiful" but "mother to three of his five children" (line 26); the 
relationship he destroyed was not some brief fling but a 10-year marriage" (line 
28); things did not only fail to work out for him but "for us as a family" (line 30). That 
is, constructions of verified and treatable disorder make comparatively more 
effort to be heard as not attempting justification. 
Secondly, it is significant that Wallis does more than simply report that 
Davidson is getting treatment for his sex addiction: the reader is explicitly invited 
to notice Davidson's going public as a relevant action. This is a discursive 
manoeuvre which alludes to the twelve-step tradition of treating alcoholism. In 
the rhetoric of Alcoholics Anonymous and groups which follow that model, 
admitting and thus responsibly taking "ownership" of the problem of addiction is 
the crucial first step of the recovery process. A rhetorical effect of this practice is 
that even a discursive event such as Davidson's "amazing confession" to the 
readers of the Sunday People can be claimed to be legitimately and creditably a 
part of the therapeutic endeavour, not just a pre-cursor to it - although the victims 
of infidelity and other critics might well argue that merely agreeing that you have 
behaved badly (especially in the context of a rather salacious story in a tabloid 
newspaper) is not synonymous with making reparation for your behaviour or 
redressing the balance. 
Thirdly and finally, it is important to note that although defences of verified 
and treatable disorder are accompanied by a normative requirement to seek or 
attempt treatment, being treated is not the same thing as being cured. In 
common with the other special categories of self, this is a defensive practice 
which makes provision for repeated and future episodes of infidelity to occur, no 
matter how convincing the infidel's present display of "anguish" and remorse. The 
structure of addiction rhetoric is such that although it appears to be eminently 
treatable with a range of measures and methods, some as simple as confession, it 
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is nevertheless a chronic and ultimately incurable condition. This point is made in 
both Extracts 5.05 and 5.06. In Extract 5.05 (lines 41-44) Philip explains that one 
cannot extinguish addiction but only learn how to manage it, which provides for 
all sorts of future instances and episodes where the problem temporarily escapes 
the grip of management. In Extract 5.06 Davidson is reported as only "hopeful" 
and not certain that his problem is under control (line 22). Furthermore, at the 
end of Wallis's story, Davidson's lack of control is converted from a future possibility 
to a present reality ("I can't control my life, " line 43: emphasis added), that which 
resists control is dramatically expanded from "sex" to "my life" (ibid. ) and thus Wallis 
is reasonably able to finish with a promissory note, not just that one day Jim might 
titillatingly lapse into another bout of "casual sex" (line 15) but, more newsworthily, 
that another "destroyed" marriage and"wife No. 5" (line 45) could suddenly 
appear from just around "the next bend. " 
Critique and Conclusions 
The final part of this chapter is divided into roughly three s, ections. To begin with I 
shall round up the insights of the above data analysis and draw some overall 
conclusions about the functions of constructing a special category of self as a 
defensive practice. The next stage will be to discuss the critical implications of 
what we have seen in these examples of lay people's discursive practice for our 
understanding of the discursive output of certain professional counsellors and 
psychotherapists. Finally, I will briefly sum up what it means to take a discursive, 
interactionolly sensitive approach to explanations for infidelity which use notions 
of personality and psychopathology and illustrate the advantages of that 
approach. 
In this chapter we have looked at three methods of constructing a special 
category of self: "poor general aptitude, " "unidentified or suspected 
psychological disturbance" and "verified and treatable disorder. " These three do' 
not only vary in terms of their gross content: they also vary according to the 
functions that they are able to perform. Versions of poor general aptitude explain 
individuals' infidelity in terms of fixed personality traits or character flaws. The 
unique interactional advantage of poor general aptitude is its compatibility with 
constructing a justificatory rationale for infidelity, which we will discuss in Chapter 
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7. The minority category of self-identified cheats and people who know that "if it's 
there, you'll have it" can be transformed into an elite; a group of individuals who 
possess the rare virtues of realism, insight and self-awareness. Versions of verified 
and treatable disorder invoke a discrete psychological illness such as addiction to 
account for infidelity. The special utility of this method of constructing a special 
category of self is that it permits an elaborate display of guilt, repentance and 
remedial action in the form of "getting treatment. " Constructing a version of 
unidentified or suspected psychological disturbance strikes a balance between 
these two. Speakers are conspicuously undecided about whether or not their 
inferable dispositional inclination to infidelity represents a psychological problem 
that is really serious enough to amount to "needing help. " This enables them to 
display reasonable concern and perhaps regret about their behaviour without 
rendering them accountable for not having already sought assistance with 
changing it. 
Across the board, constructing a special category of self is a defensive 
practice that claims diminished capacity for the habitual infidel. It represents 
them as a person who has less than the normal capacity to keep within the 
boundaries of morally correct behaviour. Like the generic rationales of Chapter 
7, this is a defence of low distinctiveness: that is, it admits that acts of infidelity are 
not unusual for this individual. However, the gene. -ic rationales tend to involve 
claims of high consensus, by which I mean that speakers argue that "everyone 
else" behaves just like them and/or they want to and/or they have a right to. 
Contrastingly, "special category of self" is a defence of low consensus, by which I 
mean that speakers acknowledge that everyone else does not behave like them, 
nor shou! d they. 
In previous chapters I have referred to Atkinson's and Drew's (1979) study 
of the Scarman tribunal hearings. In particular, recall that in Chapter 41 noticed 
that constructing an isolated episode of infidelity is a defensive practice that 
bears a marked resemblance to Atkinson's and Drew's type I (a) excuse. 
Interestingly, the same is true of constructing a special category of self. The 
infidels in this chapter do not try to claim that no alternative mode of behaviour 
was or is necessary. Neither do they come up with a convincing reason or 
decision that is presented as the motive for their behaviour. Rather, they engage 
in a form of description that shows how the contested behaviour come to pass- 
In the case of constructing an isolated episode of infidelity, speakers describe 
situations, events and circumstances that conspired to bring about a holiday fling 
or a drunken one night stand or whatever. In the case of constructing a special 
category of self, speakers describe their own patterns of behaviour and their 
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inferable psychological profile that makes them prone or vulnerable to cheating 
even though they can see that it incurs a cost to other people and indeed to 
themselves. Though personality traits and other psychological characteristics are 
what the attribution theorists conventionally call an internal locus of cause, from a 
discursive point of view there is clearly a sense in which these individual quirks are 
externolised such that they can be described, analysed and commented on by 
their owner. As Edwards and Potter (1992, p. 99) remark, "Even stable personality 
dispositions ] can be 'externalized' for blame reduction, as happens most 
dramatically in insanity pleas, but also in more mundane contexts, where trait 
attributions may be constructed as dispositions that can force themselves upon, 
and override an actor's best intentions. " 
While speakers constructing isolated episodes of infidelity produce narratives 
describing settings, circumstances and sequences of events that hearably exert a 
causal effect on behaviour, those constructing special categories of self produce 
character portraits. Priincipally they do this by making use of membership 
categories: "I'm a cheat and a coward, " "I'm a sex addict" and so on. They also 
provide for causal inferences about their disposition or internal psychological 
make-up by constructing descriptions of their own behaviour that incorporate 
episodes, instances and script formulations (Edwards, 1995,1997). Thus, as I 
observed in the above section on unidentified or suspected psychological 
disturbance, whether speakers and writers are trying to construct an internal or an 
external locus of cause for their infidelities, the discursive resources that they 
deploy are much the same. 
Now, in the conclusions to Chapter 41 criticised some of the studies based 
on attribution theory that use vignettes as stimulus material for participants. My 
criticisms were twofold. Firstly, I suggested that there is an under- 
acknowledgement in those studies of the researcher's vignette as itself a 
discursive phenomenon. Secondly, I noticed that research participants and other 
lay people are more than capable of producing vignettes - self-contained 
narratives that describe the circumstances surrounding contested events and 
thereby provide for and accomplish specific kinds of attributional work. This is a 
form of discursive behaviour which social cognition researchers practice 
themselves but fail to notice as relevant or interesting when it is displayed by their 
participants. An analogous situation exists in the professional discourse which 
deploys notions of individual psychology as a means of accounting for infidelity. 
The case study is a discursive form that is regularly found in the three strands of 
professional psychological discourse which I have highlighted in this chapter: 
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personality theory, self help texts on how to have better relationships and writing 
about sex addiction. This is particularly manifest in writing which is aimed at the 
general public but it also appears in writing that is aimed at a readership of other 
professionals. Let's take a quick example, a case study that first appeared in an 
article by Schneider (199 1) and has since appeared elsewhere in the sex 
addiction literature. 
CASE 3: A 32-year-old woman from a rigidly religious family married an alcoholic. 
After 2 years of marriage, she became involved in what was to be the first of many 
extramarital affairs. To prevent detection by her husband, she withdrew from him 
emotionally and neglected the marital relationship. She recognized that she was 
not spending enough time with her children. Despite feelings of guilt, she did not 
seek help until she cheated on her new lover. 
(Schneider, 199 1, p. 172) 
Like the array of research interviews, internet postings and journalists' reports that 
we have examined in this chapter, Schneider's case study uses membership 
categories and other discursive devices such as activity generalisers to warrant 
her claim that the woman's infidelitous behaviour was symptomatic of an 
individualised, psychological problem rather than attributable to the sorts of 
situational causes which we explored in the lost chapter. The article in which this 
case study first appeared is entitled "How to recognize the signs of sexual 
addiction" and it is aimed at "physicians" (Schneider's term) who may not know 
"how to spot addicts and coaddicts among your patients" (ibid.: 171). This 
particular case study is one of four presented by Schneider as illustrating certain 
1. characteristic findings of any addictive disorder, " namely compulsivity, 
continuation of the behaviour despite adverse consequences and obsession with 
the activity. Lest it is not immediately apparent how much this case study has in 
c ommon with the character portraits produced in the above extracts of non- 
clinical data, let me touch upon one or two key elements. 
Firstly, this is clearly intended to be a version of verified and treatable 
disorder and, just like Lee/Philip in Extract 5.05 and Wallis/Davidson in Extract 5.06, 
Schneider builds in an account for the woman having become "addicted" to sex 
in the first place. It is not just that she recklessly over-indulged (in which case 
Schneider might be heard as passing a pejorative moral judgement rather than 
caringly diagnosing a sickness); rather, she come from "a rigidly religious family" 
and (consequently) married "an alcoholic. " The most important part of this 
construction is "rigidly, " an emphatically abnormalised term that makes available 
the inference that being subjected to such rigidity in the formative years of 
childhood could reasonably have resulted in the sort of addiction-fuelling 
emotional impairment described by Philip and Davidson. 
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Secondly, recall that in Extracts 5.03 (3rd Eye) and 5.04 (Emma) in 
particular, we have seen the category bound activities of marriage and getting 
married invoked as fundamentally and accountably incompatible with serial 
infidelity. In those accounts marriage has been produced as the normalised part 
of a rhetorically organised contrast pair which helps to display the activity of 
repeatedly being unfaithful as a problem. Similarly, in this case study Schneider 
uses marriage as an abnormalising contrastive device. The woman did not just 
neglect her relationship but neglected "the marital relationship. " Moreover, 
notice the quantification rhetoric of "2 years of marriage. " The category term of 
marriage is one that invokes certain normative expectations about the length of 
such a relationship. That is, if the woman had merely been dating her partner, 
two years might seem like quite a long time. However, marriages are normatively 
expected to lost considerably longer than two years and so the specific 
formulation "after 2 years of marriage" (in contrast to "after 2 years, " say) provides 
for readers to understand that it was noticeably early on in the relationship that 
the woman's infidelities or "extramarital affairs" began. Indeed, as Edwards (1998) 
observes of his counselling data, references to length of marriage can serve as a 
basis for narrating particular kinds of relational difficulties. For instance, had 
Schneider substituted the formulation "after 7 years" or"after 15 years" or some 
such period of time, that might hearably provide for a story about how the 
married couple's sexual relationship had gone off the boil, tempting one or both 
partners to look elsewhere. However, after only "2 years" that kind of explanation 
is not so available and instead the reader is invited to understand that the 
woman's problems predated her marriage rather than directly arising from it. 
Case studies such as Schneider's are reflexively produced as emblematic 
instances, as illustrative examples whose point is to translate abstract theory 
(about addiction or whatever the case may. be) back into the realm of 
particularised, recognisable experience for the purpose of enlightening readers 
who might otherwise find such concepts difficult to grasp. They are not quite in 
the some league as the attribution theorists' vignettes which are treated as being 
somehow pre-discursive and prior-to-attribution events that can be relied on as 
such in scientific investigations of participants' cognitive attributional processes. 
That is, the illustrative rather than investigative use made of case studies renders 
them slightly less vulnerable to criticism along the lines that the authors have 
confused the descriptive with the ontological, thinking that their recipients are 
cognitively responding to an actual event, not discursively responding to a 
discursively constructed description of an event. If challenged, Schneider might 
quite reasonably argue that she is aware that she is presenting readers with a 
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description of a patient rather than the patient themselves and that that does not 
detract from the illustrative purpose for which the case study is being used. 
Nevertheless, workers in the three strands of professional psychological 
activity that I have identified in this chapter characteristically do not take 
account of their human subjects as discursive beings. No theory that reduces 
infidelity to the behavioural manifestation of underlying personality traits, 
generalised psychological disturbance or specified mental illness is paying 
adequate attention to the discourse through which infidelity is constituted, and 
especially not to discursive constructions of infidelity that in every respect are 
designed exactly like case studies so as to provide for the recipient's inference of 
underlying, psychological cause. This is regrettable because, as The Compleat 
Infidel evidences, lay people's individually psychologised (self-)reports of infidelity 
are not only discursive constructions that have a great deal in common with the 
discursive output of the professionals, but they are just one type of construction 
among many. A comparison of the accounts we have examined here with those 
in the other chapters reveals that discursive constructions of infidelity are variable, 
and that variability is meaningful to the extent that different explanations and 
accounts will be produced in different types of contexts and on different 
occasions, according to the unique interactional functions that they are required 
to perform. 
In light of the above observations, let me end this chapter by synoptically 
formulating the overall position or stance of discursive psychology regarding 
explanations for infidelity which use notions of individual personality and 
psychopathology. The most fundamental principle is that accounts like the ones 
we have seen in this chapter should not be taken at face value. The point is not 
to treat these accounts as more or less true descriptions of an actor's disposition, 
personality or mental state. be it healthy or disturbed. Rather, the primary 
question is how accounts are organised so as to display actors as having one or 
another kind of individual psychology (Edwards, 1997, p. 144: Potter, Stringer and 
Wetherell, 1984, p. 89). Secondly, the discursive psychologist will want to know 
what interactional functions are served through that display; how it productively 
attends to interactional issues to do with responsibility, blame and the 
management of accountability. 
When examining these accounts, it becomes apparent that there is a 
significant overlap in the discourse of ordinary lay people, psychologists and other 
kinds of professional writers such as journalists and novelists. The overlap is not 
surprising because any discourse user wanting to articulate some version of the 
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individual, inner self will necessarily draw upon the shared linguistic or discursive 
resources that are culturally available at the time (Potter, Stringer and Wetherell, 
1984, p. 140; Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p. 95; Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 150). 
This is true of the most basic accounts of personality which find a formalised 
expression in the psychological tradition of trait theory whereby people helplessly 
act according to their dispositions and also of the perhaps more sophisticated 
kind of accounts where selves become sick (as in Philip's report in Extract 5.05 of 
being "sexually violated" by his mother) and yet the owner of the self is able to 
recognise and comment on that sickness and take steps to remedy it. As 
observed by Potter, Stringer and Wetherell (1984, p. 158) and Potter and Wetherell 
(1987, p. 106), the individual speaker's ability to divide themselves into an 
objective, studyable "me" and a reflective, commenting "I" arises because of the 
provision for that kind of self-division in everyday language; its syntactic 
arrangement and the conventional discursive methods of explaining and 
justifying action. It need not be presumed to arise from the essential facts about 
inner human experience. 
The discursive psychological enterprise, then, is a theoretical one of 
exposing constructions of the individual self as discursive but it is also an 
investigative, empirical matter of discovering how various constructions of the self 
are used and what is thereby achieved for speakers in their particular 
interactional contexts. In recent years the body of practical research in this area 
has rapidly expanded. It prominently includes: Potter's and Wetherell's 
investigation of self-discourse in accounts of violent police behaviour during the 
South African Springbok rugby tour. of New Zealand in 1981 (Potter and Wetherell, 
1987; Wetherell and Potter, 1989); Wetherell's and Potter's examination of 
accounts of racial identity and prejudiced individuals in the talk of Pakehd New 
Zealanders (Wetherell and Potter, 1992); Edwards's and Potter's analysis of self- 
discourse in materials pertaining to the resignation of former British Chancellor 
Nigel Lawson (Edwards and Potter, 1992); Widdicombe's and Wooffitt's 
investigation of how members of various youth subcultures warrant their identity 
not only as authentic punks, gothics and rockers but also as ordinary people 
(Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995), Edwards's influential studies of scripts and 
dispositions in counselling talk (Edwards, 1995,1997): and Antaki's and 
Widdicombe's edited collection of ethnomethodological and conversation- 
analytic studies of identity talk in a range of interactional settings (Antaki and 
Widdicombe, 1998), to name but a few. 
For the purposes of The Compleot Infidel, the important findings to emerge 
from these studies are as follows. Discourse users draw upon different models of 
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the self in order to blame and accuse some parties while excusing and justifying 
I la 1he actions of others (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p. I 11). In particu r, notions of 
personality and psychopathology are used in a form of error accounting (cf. 
Edwards and Potter, 1992; Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Potter, 1984), being invoked 
to explain away some potentially blameable (in)actions and (non-)events as 
caused by individual quirks or by a minority of individuals who are distinguishable 
either from the speaker themselves or from people in general. Let me quickly 
highlight a couple of examples. 
In Potter's and Wetherell's study of accounts of disruption surrounding the 
South African rugby tour (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell and Potter, 1989), 
the protestors who ran into trouble with the police were discursively split into two 
sub-groups. According to Potter's and Wetherell's interviewees, as many as 90% of 
the protestors were "genuinely' anti-apartheid and therefore present at the 
demonstrations for "the right reasons. " However, the remaining minority were 
described as "trouble-makers" who were there for no better reason than because 
they enjoyed violence and fancied an opportunity to smash up property and 
attack the police. The discursive isolation of these naturally trouble-making types 
allowed speakers to explain and excuse violent behaviour on the part of the 
police (now characterisable as merely a response to the non-genuine protestors) 
without appearing to condemn the anti-apartheid demonstrations outright. 
In Edwards's studies of counselling talk (Edwards, 1995,1997), there 
prominently features a couple named Connie and Jimmy who are experiencing 
difficulties in their marriage. One of the most 
, 
interesting aspects of their talk is 
Jimmy's description of himself as dispositionally jealous. This is more or less 
consistent with Connie's account of Jimmy's nature, though she often chooses a 
comparatively more pathologising mode of description which of course makes it 
more incumbent upon Jimmy to make an effort to change. The point is that in his 
talk Jimmy recognises that not everyone is as jealous as himself; he highlights it as 
a noticeable aspect of his personality which thereby makes a special case of him, 
putting him in something of a minority category. This is invoked during the 
counselling sessions to explain and account for the sorts of behaviours that 
Connie is complaining about: losing his temper in front of their friends when it 
seems to him that she has been flirting and so on. Indeed, as Edwards observes, it 
even provides for Jimmy to claim that Connie ought to take special account of 
his constitutional jealousy and go out of her way not to aggravate him by flirting 
with other men (Edwards. 1997, p. 157). 
In this chapter we have added something to the body of discursive 
psychological research on constructions of the inner, individual self. We have 
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seen speakers and writers of various kinds put together accounts of the self which 
assign individuals to special minority catego(ies according to their personality 
traits, (dis)abilities and psychological disturbances and sicknesses. We have also 
witnessed discourse users construct a divided self such that individuals are 
apparently able to analyse and comment on the peculiarities of their mental 
state, even as they are suffering from and trying to deal with those peculiarities. It 
has become clear that lay people, journalists and other non-members of the 
category "clinicians" or "mental health professionals" are capable of using a 
clinical or otherwise formalised kind of vocabulary to build their accounts, and this 
was especially the case in the examples of addiction talk in the final analytic 
section. Moreover, a brief review of the discursive phenomenon of the case study 
showed that mental health professionals, in their turn, are capable of using 
category memberships, activity generalisers and other everyday discursive 
techniques to provide for and warrant causal inferences of the dispositional rather 
than the situational variety. Given this broad equivalence of resources and 
practices, it has not been our policy in this chapter to privilege the accounts of 
the professional psychologists over anyone else's. As a result, it has been possible 
to avoid a literal reading of the data and instead to examine the functions served 
by these psychologised accounts in the interactional business of defending 
infidels and infidelity. What we have discovered, namely that constructing a 
special category of self can be a means of claiming diminished capacity for the 
serial infidel, is not limited in its relevance and usefulness to the specific 
investigative project of The Compleat Infidel but is confirmed by, and confirming 
of, the larger discursive psychological endeavour of mapping the language of 
individual psychology. 
6 
Construct a Specific Reason 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters of The Compleat Infidel we have looked at claims that 
.. nothing happened" (constructing a non-event; Chapter 3) and at accounts that 
describe how infidelity comes about, by appeal to various causes, whether 
external to the infidel (such as the drunken holiday flings in Chapter 4) or internal 
(such as the psychological problems in Chapter 5). What we have not yet 
considered are accounts in which infidels say why they have behaved in such a 
way; accounts that feature some kind of motive or reason for the blameable 
behaviour. Constructing a specific reason for infidelity is one of the most 
common forms of defensive practice and there is no shortage of data to 
examine. Without further ado, then, here is the plan of action for Chapter 6. 
1 shall begin by presenting an overview of the specific reason for infidelity 
as a discursive phenomenon and a feature of the discursive landscape. The aim 
of this introductory section will be to familiarise readers with the subject matter of 
this chapter and to set out the analytic project that lies ahead of us. Following 
the introduction we shall move to the data analysis part of the chapter. There we 
shall look at extracts of raw data that show three varieties of specific reason 
being constructed in situ. The insights of previous research in discourse, rhetoric 
and conversation analysis will be brought to bear on this material so that we can 
identify the particular devices and techniques being used to construct specific 
reasons for infidelity and thereby discover something about the unique 
interactional functions that these specific reasons are designed to serve. Lastly, in 
the "critique and conclusions" part of the chapter we shall return to an aerial view 
of the data. The objective at that stage will be to round up the findings of the 
data analysis section and reach some conclusions about the overall functional 
capacity of the specific reason as a defensive practice. Moreover, the evidence 
that we have amassed that accounts of specific reasons for infidelity are 
constitutive and not merely reflective will be used as the basis for a critique of 'a 
relevant area of traditional psychological research. 
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The data to be examined in this chapter are accounts in which people 
explain infidelity by pointing to some unusual feature of the infidel's immediate 
social network. The object of their attention may be either a relationship or an 
individual person other than the infidel themselves. For instance, the first section 
of the following data analysis is entitled "unreasonable behaviour. " The data to 
be examined in that section describe the victim of infidelity, the dyadic partner, 
as having launched some offensive initiative prior to the infidel's own blameable 
action. The following section is entitled "being short changed. " There we will see 
some accounts that avoid direct victim-blaming and instead uncover a problem 
in the dyadic relationship such that the infidel can be characterised as not 
enjoying the full range of benefits from that relationship that one would normally 
and legitimately expect. The third and final section is entitled "true love and 
factors of the third party. " The accounts represented in that section are less 
hearable as complaint and focus on some aspect of the third party or the 
extradyadic relationship which is especially alluring or compelling. Specific 
reasons for infidelity are constructed by both dyad-bound and third-party infidels 
although, as we will see, the speaker's dyadic status can have a bearing on 
which of the three varieties of specific reason is produced on any given occasion. 
Specific reasons are invoked to account for singular, discrete cases of 
infidelity as opposed to a whole career of infidelitous behaviour or infidelity in 
general. In this respect the defensive practice of constructing a specific reason 
has something in common with constructing an isolated episode. However, the 
sorts of causal circumstances that are invoked in tales of isolated episodes of 
infidelity are limited in the amount of time which they can reasonably account 
far. A holiday or a bout of drunkenness can only be discursively spun out for so 
long. Thus, while isolated episodes of infidelity invariably put the events in 
question in the post it is also usually the case that they describe the infidelity as 
being of brief duration. In contrast, specific reasons account for longer 
relationships ("affairs" rather than "flings") including ones that are ongoing at the 
time of the defence. 
Lengthy and ongoing infidelities can be difficult to account for when the 
speaker is not willing to admit low distinctiveness (i. e., that this is the sort of thing 
they get up to all the time). For speakers who prefer to claim high distinctiveness 
but are willing to admit that something infidelitous has gone on, enduring affairs 
can present a problem because it is not possible to write them off as accidents or 
spur-of-the-moment behavioural blips. The longer a relationship lasts and 
especially if it is presently continuing, the more the infidel will be presumed to 
know what they are doing and to be in control of their behaviour such that they 
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could, if they chose, behave otherwise. By choosing a reason or motivating 
factor that is located somewhere within the classic triangle formed by the dyad- 
bound infidel, the third-party infidel and the victim, speakers can provide for as 
protracted an affair as is necessary. For instance, if the specific reason is some 
deficiency in the dyadic relationship, an affair can accountably lost for as long as 
the deficiency is held to persist. 
People who accept responsibility for their infidelitous behaviour can be 
held to account for not behaving otherwise. Dyad-bound infidels are held to 
account for not remaining faithful to their regular partners. Third-party infidels are 
held to account for not avoiding a relationship with someone who was or is 
already paired off. Moreover, when the affair is ongoing or of noticeable 
duration, blame may be attached to more than one stage of the relationship. 
The infidel may be held to account for having got into the extradyadic 
relationship in the first place and/or for continuing with it even though it should 
have been terminated. One way for infidels to deal with the actual or potential 
accusation that they have failed to behave "properly" is to claim that the 
normatively preferred action was precluded by the desirability or necessity of 
doing something else. For instance, a dyad-bound infidel who has an affair with a 
work colleague and is then held accountable for not having terminated the 
relationship as soon as the first inklings of a mutual attraction emerged may claim 
that that action was precluded by the necessity of continuing to go into work 
every day and behaving in a way that is not abnormally unfriendly towards other 
employees. The essence of such claims is that it is not possible to do both things 
at once. Alternatively, infidels may work with the idea that they chose to act 
infidelitously by arguing that in fact they chose the lesser of two evils. Their 
present situation is contrasted with an even worse scenario which (the speaker 
claims) would have resulted if they had not acted as they did. For instance, a 
dyad-bound infidel who claims that they are somehow deprived at home may 
additionally claim that having an affair is a source of nourishment which gives 
them the strength and patience to soldier on in their marriage. This admittedly 
less than perfect situation is favourably contrasted with an alternative scenario 
such as abandoning the marriage and getting a divorce. 
Of course, The Compleat Infidel is far from the first piece of research to 
address the topic of reasons and motives for infidelity. That has always been a 
focal point in the studies based on various social exchange theories of personal 
relationships that I highlighted in Chapter 1. In contrast to those studies I shall not 
make it my business to discover the truth about why people are unfaithful to and 
sometimes leave their dyadic partners, deploying concepts such as marital 
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dissatisfaction and comparisons between one's existing partner and a possible 
alternative. Rather, when we reach the end of this chapter I shall make the case 
that such studies fail to recognise that speakers and writers construct their 
infidelities precisely as motivated, in contrast to other possible constructions and in 
order to fulfil various interactional functions. In the meantime, we will do well to 
examine some specific reasons for infidelity being put into action. 
Data Analysis 
Unreasonable Behaviour 
Versions of unreasonable behaviour construct a motive or reason for infidelity 
through descriptions of the individual who would normally be thought of as the 
victim, the innocent party in the triangle. That person is described in such a way 
as to transfer the blame to them from the (dyad-bound or third-party) infidel. 
They are alleged to have behaved with an offensiveness that is equal to or 
greater than the offensive behaviour of the infidel and their actions are described 
as preceding the infidel's actions. 
Extract 6.01 shows a version of unreasonable behaviour being constructed 
by a dyad-bound infidel. It is one woman's response to a sex survey that was run 
by the women's magazine Cosmopolitan (US edition) in 1980, the results being 
published in book form in 1982. The survey questions were multiple choice with 
forced response options (e. g., "If married, have you had an affair outside 
marriage? Yes/No") but lots of respondents also sent in open ended comments 
and letters to supplement their questionnaire responses, of which Extract 6.01 
would seem to be an instance. 
Extract 6.01 
I have been having an affair for five years. ever since learning my husband 
had had one. Call it revenge if you wish. I guess it was. I had been raised 
strictly and had accepted the beliefs of my parents and my church. I 
would not have strayed except that my husband did. It was only when 1 
05 found out about his infidelity that I decided to forget about the faithfulness 
routine and enjoy some of the temptations which ore constantly available 
to me. As an executive, I have steady contacts with hundreds of men. So 
I pulled out all the stops and began to weed out the field. But believe me, 
there are very few really interesting men in the 45-55 age bracket. They 
145 
10 are generally overweight, bold, slovenly, just plain dumb or real phoneys. 
It took me a while to zero in on a man; but I did, and we have been lovers 
now - behind my husband's back - for five years. I've never let my 
husband know. He hasn't been hurt, the way he hurt me. 
(Wolfe, 1982, p. 269) 
As an anonymous survey respondent, this woman is at liberty to construct a 
version of unreasonable behaviour without risking a critical or undermining 
response from her recipient. Nevertheless, this does not mean that she is 
inattentive to issues of personal accountability in her story. Indeed, the fact that 
she constructs a specific reason of any description is itself evidence that she is 
attending to the likely assumption by recipients that there is an alternative set of 
reasons and motives underpinning her behaviour. These alternatives include the 
possibility that she is just "that sort of person" and/or that she failed to recognise 
the importance of fidelity in marriage. We can infer this much because these are 
the alternatives that the woman is discursively orientating to in constructing her 
own version of events. She emphasises that she was formerly capable of taking 
fidelity seriously, before her husband took the scales from her eyes. It was not just 
that she was formerly faithful as a kind of default state, an unthinking absence of 
infidelity, but that she had been "raised strictly" and recognised the moral 
authority of her parents and church (lines 2-3). Also notice her choice of the word 
.1 strayed" (line 4) which recognises infidelity as a moral failing and a way of 
trespassing outside the boundaries of a couple relationship, in contrast to some of 
the more light-hearted, recreational descriptions she could have chosen. It was, 
she claims, only when she became aware of her husband's behaviour that the 
practice of faithfulness was exposed and revealed to her as merely a "routine" 
(line 6). Moreover, she represents herself as a person who is not dispositionally 
given to infidelity and who is not insensitive to other people's feelings. That is, it is 
not just that she produces the disposition-implicative formulation "I would not 
have strayed except that my husband did" (lines 3-4). More than this, she invites 
her recipient to notice that she was thoughtful and discriminating in finding a 
lover (lines 8-11) and that although her behaviour is construable as revenge (line 
2) she has taken care not to add insult to injury by burdening her husband with 
the painful facts about what she is doing (lines 12-13). 
1 shall suspend further analytic comment until we have looked at a version 
of unreasonable behaviour being constructed by a third-party infidel. Clearly, 
third-party infidels are liable to be held accountable and to have their accounts 
undermined in a slightly different way than dyad-bound infidels. They both hove 
the same victim and a third-party infidel can be called to account for having 
injured that innocent party by interfering in their dyadic relationship. However, 
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the culpability of the third-party infidel is attenuated by the fact that they, unlike 
the dyad-bound infidel, have made no special promises to the victim of the sort 
that are implied by coupledom. Having said that, third-party infidels who claim a 
relationship of any significance with their dyad-bound accomplice are vulnerable 
to another sort of criticism. They may be confronted with the suggestion that they 
are being cynically exploited by the dyad-bound infidel, that they are gullible if 
they believe that the dyad-bound person will ever leave their partner or will ever 
think of them as more than a source of casual sex and so on. Describing 
unreasonable behaviour on the part of the victim can be a way of addressing 
those concerns. 
Extract 6.02 is a message that was posted in a public internet discussion 
forum. The title of this particular conversation, or "thread" in internet parlance, is 
"The Other Side of an Affair" (henceforth OSA). Background information about 
the accessibility and context of OSA was supplied in the data sources section of 
Chapter 2. Skatterkat, the author of the following message, is a third-party infidel 
who at the time of writing had succeeded in securing an exclusive, full time 
relationship with her formerly dyad-bound accomplice, Mark. Des M, whom 
Skatterkat addresses in the second paragraph, is a married woman who 
suspected that her husband was making her a victim of infidelity and who had 
harsh words for the third-party infidels of OSA. 
Extract 6.02 
SKATTERKAT -I1: 52om jul 31,1997 EDT ("" 60 of 1336) 
Alright. I was going to refrain from posting in this forum, because I am not 
married, but I think that this is going a little too for. I sincerely doubt that 
05 many of you ladies ore going to like what I have to say, or appreciate it, 
but it still needs to be said. 
Des, I've been following your posts all over the place ..... especially the 
ones in the"Adultery, Can we Survive? ". Your husband has got real 
problems, and he has been running roughshod over you. But these last two 
10 posts have been poisonous and uncoiled-for. I know you're bitter. I know 
you have every right to be. But Cindie is NOT, I repeat, NOT the bimbo your 
husband was sleeping with and may be sleeping with now. She is a 
different person, and at least they had the decency to break it off in their 
"legitimate" relationships very soon after the affair began. It sounds to me a 
15 lot like my life, actually. 
I'm probably asking to get bashed with this one, but I simply do not care 
anymore. I want all the hurt women in here to understand this before I 
begin my story: I hove the utmost respect for you, and for your struggles to 
deal with your partner's infidelity and put your relationships with them back 
20 together. You seem to be very smart, loving, giving women who deserved 
far better than what you got when you married. There are exceptions, 
however. 
I knew Mark for 2 years before he met Kelly. We were close friends, hod 
been through a lot together. We'd never doted, never really considered it, 
25 even. Eventually he got engaged to her and they moved in together. At 
first, everyone was happy for them. She was a small, pixie-like girl: quiet, 
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mostly. Then, things started going wrong. She was suspicious of his every 
move, manipulative. She'd threaten suicide if he did something she didn't 
like. She'd made him her whole life, dropping all of her friends and 
30 expected him to do the some. 
This was not stuff he told us about. In fact, at first, he tried to hide how 
bad things were. But some stuff couldn't be hidden. She was cold to all of 
his friends (and don't think it's because we were good-for nothing bums. I 
make twice the money of both of them put together. ) When I called to 
35 talk to him, or to ask the both of them if they wanted to go somewhere 
with me, I'd hear her accusatory screams on the other end ....... Why 
is she 
calling here? " And I'd hear from mutual friends that she often referred to 
me as "His other girlfriend. " Mark and I were in a bond together, and 
published a local magazine together; so it was natural that we spent time 
40 together and talked a lot, besides being very good friends. Sometimes *I* 
was the one who told him he should spend more time with Kelly. Eventually 
it came to the point where all of his friends hated her. and weren't 
bothering to hide it. She wrote me a frantic letter, asking me how she was 
screwing up and wanting advice, I gave it to her .... and she proceeded to 
45 ignore it. 
Eventually, Mark quit trying to hide how bad things had become. He 
would come over my house. at any time of the day or night, crying, 
because she'd kicked him out of the apartment, told him never to come 
back. I watched her mess him up so badly -emotionally that for at time, 1 
50 honestly believed he'd never hove a healthy relationship with ANYONE 
again. She'd call me, after she'd kick him out, looking for him ....... 
then 
would threaten suicide if he didn't come back immediately. 
I was the lost of his friends to try to be nice to her, to try to accept her. 
What I got in return was suspicion, accusations behind my back, and the 
55 chance to watch, close-up, how she was hurting mark. And watching was 
ALL I could do ...... I'd talked to mark about why he stayed with her. He said 
he'd made a committment to her, and he'd stick to it ..... even though she 
refused counseling ...... even 
though she refused to even admit she had 
problems. 
60 (bear with me. I'll have to finish this in another post) 
(The Hearst Corporation, 1997, 
http: //www. homearts. com/cgi-bin/Wet: )X6 I. htm) 
There is a lot that could be said about this extract-, here we shall focus on a few 
key points. Like the author of Extract 6.01, Skatterkat introduces into the Mark- 
and-Kelly story the theme of change. In Extract 6.01 the change is the author's 
shocked discovery that her husband had "strayed. " In Extract 6.02 it is the 
discovery of Skatterkat and indeed "everyone" (line 26) that all was not well 
between Mark and Kelly. The construction to notice is "at first everyone was 
happy for them 
... 
then, things started going wrong" (lines 25-27), supplemented 
by "at first, he tried to hide how bad things were" (lines 31-32), "eventually it came 
to the point where" (lines 41-42) and "eventually, Mark quit trying" (line 46). 
Skatterkat is using a device called "at first I thought ... 
but then I realized ...... 
originally identified by Socks (1984). The purpose of the device is to display the 
speaker's first impression of some phenomenon as an innocuous reading, the sort 
of thing that any normal person would think unless and until the facts revealed 
otherwise. It displays the innocence and normality of the speaker's reasoning. In 
Extract 6.02 it displays Skatterkat as not self-interestedly pessimistic about Kelly 
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from the start (line 26), not the gullible recipient of casual and possibly cynical 
complaints by Mark (line 31) and so on. 
Relatedly, notice Skatterkat's use of membership categoriies to bolster her 
case. She does not characterise herself as an actual or aspiring partner of Mark's: 
"we'd never dated, never really considered it, even. " Rather, she constructs 
herself cis his"close friend" (line 23). This not only contraindicates that Skatterkat 
was or wanted to be more than friends but it provides for her to claim some 
consensus and corroboration (Potter, 1996a, p. 158) in support of her version of 
events by discursively grouping her with "all of his friends" (e. g., lines 32-33,42) 
whenever she is being particularly critical of Kelly. Moreover, she does some 
interesting work with the membership category "girlfriend. " In lines 37-38 we learn 
that Kelly often referred to Skatterkat as Mark's "other girlfriend. " Insofar as this was 
not a term Kelly used to refer to Mark's other friends Skatterkat has to account for 
that, which she does by explaining that she and Mark spent a lot of time together 
and also giving a legitimate reason why (lines 38-40). However, following Wowk's 
(1984) analysis of membership categories and victim-blaming in a murder 
interrogation, I would suggest that this report of Kelly's mode of reference to 
Skatterkat helps to build for recipients a category puzzle. Kelly is, or was at that 
time, Mark's girlfriend. Indeed, she was a bride-to-be (line 25). Referring to 
Skatterkat as Mark's "other girlfriend, " along with "being cold to all his friends" (lines 
32-33), "messing him up emotionally" (line 49), "kicking him out" (line 5 1) and so on 
are activities which are highly disjunctive or incongruous with those category 
memberships, especially the latter. The question is raised of what kind of girlfriend 
or fianc6e would behave in such a way. The answer that Skatterkat suggests for 
recipients is one that is dispositionally destructive and confrontational and in fact 
"had problems" (lines 58-59), a euphemism for being mentally unhinged. Indeed, 
what Skatterkat ultimately achieves is a warrant for her argument that there are 
exceptions to the general rule that faithful but cheated-upon women deserve 
better than they get (lines 20-22). In this way, she provides a reason or motive for 
Mork's eventually being unfaithful to Kelly (which diverts attention away from 
Skatterkat's own reasons and motives for getting romantically involved with him) 
and at the same time attenuates Skatterkat's personal moral responsibility towards 
Kelly as someone who, by virtue of being friendly with Mork, should have been - 
and indeed tried to be - Kelly's friend. 
It would be nice to continue with this analysis but there is a final matter that I want 
to address before we reach the end of this section. Some readers may be 
familiar with Derek Edwards's analyses of discourse produced in relationship 
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counselling sessions. In his book Discourse and Cognition (1997), in the context of 
a chapter about narrative and discursive remembering, he comments on a 
stretch of data produced by a couple called Jeff and Mary. Those who are 
familiar with the text may by now be wondering whether Mary's construction is a 
version of unreasonable behaviour. I would like to say a few words about that; I 
reproduce Edwards's data below. 
I Counsellor: P'haps (. ) uh in in in your words 
2 or (. ) ýýither of your words you better 
3 start from the beginning as to why:, you 
4 went to Relate in the first place, (. ) 
5 and then the difference between thef: n and now. 
6 Jeff: LShall I 
7 start now or ( )? 
8 Mary: Uh? (. ) 
9 Jeff: 'n you jus (. ) keep on going. 
10 H 
II Mary: Yeh. (. ) U: m (. ) well. What happened, 
12 Jeff started doing some exa: ms (. ) which 
13 la: sted abou: t (. ) four years. =And before that, 
14 (. ) this is when we were living in the 
15 hospital, (. ) we was always doing some exa: ms, 
16 (. ) since we've me: t (. ) at some point, 
17 which has lasted some time. 
18 H 
19 Anyway Jeff was doing u: m (. ) a degree:, (. ) that 
20 (. ) la: sted must've bee: n about (. ) we were 
21 just coming to the e: nd. (. ) Just last summer. 
22 
23 A: nd during that time I felt that, (. ) u: m 
24 he didn't pay any attention to me: that J. ) um 
25 f. ) although we had a s- we still had a fairly 
26 good relationship. I didn't feel there was 
27 anything wro: ng, but (. ) at the time, (. ) 
28 1 didn't really think anything too much abou: t 
29 (. ) these problems, (. ) but it must have 
30 all like come to a head. Then I felt like 
31 he was neglecting me:, he didn't wanna know, 
32 1 was working too har: d, u: m, (. ) and then 
33 1 had the two children I felt I was being left on 
34 my ow: n, (. ) uhh (. ) an'them (. ) I started 
35 going round with my friends quite a bit, 
36 u: m. (. ) i1ist to get out of the house. 
37 H 
38 For sorne relief. 
39 H 
40 And then: I met somebody e1se, (. ) an: d u: m 
41 had (. ) an affair 
(Edwards, 1997, pp. 277-278, transcription simplified) 
Mary certainly seems to be doing some complaining about Jeff in this extract. 
Moreover, she describes her infidelitous relationship as "an affair" (line 41) rather 
than "a one night stand" or "a fling" or whatever. This suggests an infidelity of some 
consistency, which is consonant with the defensive practices described in this 
chapter. However, I would argue that what she is producing is not in fact a 
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version of unreasonable behaviour but an isolated episode, a discursive 
construction that we discussed in Chapter 4. Firstly, it is apparent from Edwards's 
discussion that Mary claims that the affair is now over, locating it firmly in the post. 
Secondly, we can see from this extract that Mary makes a considerable effort to 
distance herself from her complaints. She does not simply claim that "he didn't 
pay any attention to me" (line 24) and "he was neglecting me, he didn't wanna 
know" (line 31). Rather, she begins by describing a set of circumstances, 
particularly a specific period of time that was marked by Jeff "doing some exams" 
and was "just coming to the end last surnmer"(1ine 21). Mary emphasises that her 
complaints about Jeff's inattention and neglect were features of her experience 
at that time (lines 23,27). She stresses that she is describing how she felt she was 
being treated, which is very different from saying that that is what actually 
happened (lines 23,26,30,33). Additionally, notice "it must have all come to a 
head" (lines 29-30). Saying that that is what "must have" happened rather than "it 
all come to a head" discursively highlights a difference between Mary-then and 
Mary-now, the Mary who is looking back at that time and sequence of events 
and speculating with the benefit of hindsight about the chains of cause and 
effect that were in play. Because of what Jeff already knows about her affair, it 
may not be possible for Mary to claim that hers was a momentary, drunken 
accident of the sort that epitomises isolated episodes of infidelity. However, she 
constructs a narrative that displays her affair as very much the product of 
temporally bounded circumstances: the circumstances of Jeff still doing exams 
and of her (rightly or wrongly) feeling that he was neglecting her. Her affair was 
not a matter of consciously "deciding to forget about the faithfulness routine" as 
was the case for the dyad-bound infidel of Extract 6.01 but is presented as one 
stage in a chronologically organised series of events: first Jeff was doing some 
exams, then Mary felt that Jeff was neglecting her "and then" (line 40) she met 
somebody else and had an affair. It is this narrative arrangement that provides 
for recipients to understand that the former caused the latter. The affair was a 
part of "what happened" (line 11), not what Mary voluntarily did. The difference 
between an isolated episode and a specific reason can be subtle but I hope that 
this brief review of Edwards's data has helped to clarify it. 
Being Short Changed 
Versions of "being short changed" make a point of describing the failings of the 
dyadic relationship rather than the victim of infidelity. Again, the entity being 
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criticised is described in such a way as to transfer blame away from the dyad- 
bound or third-party infidel and as an important part of this the trouble is 
described as preceding the infidel's actions which are portrayed as a reasonable 
reaction or response. We have here an opportunity to follow up the previous 
discussion of membership categories and activities that are and are not 
congruous with those categories. 
In his analysis of blame-accounts sequences in couples therapy, Buttny 
(1993) characterises the classic dyadic or couple relationship as itself a 
membership category with associated category-bound obligations. That is, the 
normatively accountable couple relationship should display various attributes and 
perform various functions for the benefit of its members. For instance, as 
evidenced by Larry and Jenny, the couple whose discourse is Buttny's data, 
couples should enjoy "good communication" (ibid., p. 7 1). If they experience an 
inability to communicate then good communication is noticeably absent from 
the relationship and that absence becomes a complainoble matter. As a 
defence for dyad-bound or third-party infidelity, complaining of being short 
changed by one's relationship is perhaps a less inflammatory manoeuvre than 
trying to pin the blame on one's victim. However, infidels are still liable to be 
called to account for their actions in the ways that I mentioned in the previous 
section. 
Extract 6.03 shows a dyad-bound infidel constructing a version of being 
short changed. It is drawn from a story that appeared in the British broodsheet 
newspaper, The Guardian. The article is entitled "How to scratch that itch" and it 
reports on the emergence of a new kind of dating agency. 
Extract 6.03 
Arabella and Rich had never met-before. They only knew each other by 
code names: Queenie for her, Titian for him. They were brought together 
by David Miller, owner of a dating agency exclusively for people who are 
married or attached, called Loving Links. 
05 Miller, a former commercial video producer, started the agency in 1995: 
this time last year he had 300 people on his books. Now the number has 
inflated to 700 countrywide and is growing rapidly: he says he gets more 
than 40 phone calls a day, replying to advertisements placed in national 
newspapers and glossy lifestyle magazines. His advertisement 
10 reads simply: "Attached? Need a friend? Call David of Loving Links". 
Most of his customers, he 5ays, are in their 40S and 50s. I take on 
people who want a medium-term relationship with someone they're not 
going to abandon home and move in with. I don't accept people who 
just want a quick shag and I donI wont marrioge-breakers. " 
15 Arobella joined the agency in May this year. 
[8 paragraphs omitted] 
[L]ike many of David's customers, Arabella knows that whatever 
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20 closeness existed in her marriage has long evaporated, but isn't willing to 
cut the ties. "It's not a lack of courage, " she says, -it*s practicality. A lot of 
people don't want to lose what they've got at home. A lot of people are 
in o'caring but celibate' marriage. " 
Divorce, she says, would be terrible for the kids. But isn't that just an 
25 excuse? 'We have talked about it. My husband Is very concerned about 
how a divorce would be received by our friends, and he thinks he would 
be humiliated in the office and in the golf club. And I'm just terriified of 
taking steps out on my own. I know it's a weakness but how can I start 
now? " 
(Sanai, 1997, p. 9) 
Journalist Sonai's report shows both David Miller and Arobella doing some 
interesting rhetorical work to defend infidelity. Let's begin with Arabella. Like 
many dyad-bound infidels who defend themselves with a version of being short 
changed, Arabella is presented as having the sort of relationship problem that is 
fairly resistant to restorative effort. At the same time, it is not necessarily torturous 
enough to merit abandoning the relationship altogether. In lines 19-20, Sanai 
claims on Arabella's behalf that"whatever closeness existed in her marriage has 
long evaporated. " There are a couple of points to be noted about this 
formulation. Firstly, as is characteristic of accounts of being short changed, it 
avoids ascribing personal blame. This is accomplished through the use of 
empiricist discourse (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Potter, 1996a), including passive 
and impersonal grammar that erases human agency. As if by magic, the 
closeness evaporated. This is especially apparent when you notice Arabella's 
alternative formulation of the problem in lines 22-23. In common with lots of other 
people, she says, her marriage is "caring but celibate. " It transpires that "the 
closeness evaporated" is a rather coy way of saying that Arabella's husband is no 
longer interested in sex. This is the deficiency for which she compensates by 
dealing with David Miller. Secondly, notice that Arabella produces an account 
for not being "willing to cut the ties" (lines 20-21). This is a common practice in 
versions of being short changed that have been produced by dyad-bound 
infidels. Put another way, dyad-bound infidels often produce versions of being 
short changed on occasions when their main objective seems to be to defend 
their affairs without committing themselves to leaving their dyadic partners. 
Now let's take a quick look at the discourse attributed to David Miller. His is 
an interesting moral position. He is not obviously an infidel himself but he could be 
roundly condemned for his line of work. In lines II- 14 he anticipates and 
orientates to recipients' likely criticisms. He does this through judicious use of 
membership categories to describe his customers and their reasons and motives 
for doing business with him. Most of his clients, (Sanai says) Miller says, are in their 
40s and 50s. In rhetorical contradistinction from customers who are in, say, "their 
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teens and 20s, " this is a mature, responsible and level-headed population. 
Moreover, he fascinatinglyconstructs for himself a bit of neutral middle ground 
between two unacceptable extremes: "I take on people who want a medium- 
term relationship with someone they're not going to abandon home and move in 
with. I don't accept people who just want a quick shag and I don't want 
marriage-breakers. " It is for from self-evidently true that desiring a "Medium-term" 
affair is morally any better or worse than hoping for a "quick shag" or seeking to 
acquire someone else's partner for a full time, permanent relationship. However, 
Miller manages to construct it as a fact. "Medium" is a conspicuously bland, 
neutralised description when it is positioned between "a quick shag" (which 
alludes to the critical view of infidelity as mindless, exploitative sex) and "marriage- 
breakers" (which invests at least some infidels with the power to undermine an 
institution beloved of church and state, causing untold injury to dependent 
category members such as spouses and children in the process). Through this pair 
of contrasts, Miller constructs his customers (and by extension, himself) as relatively 
well behaved, morally responsible folk. This is quite an achievement for someone 
who has a commercial interest in helping people to commit adultery. 
Discursively, his position is similar to the radio interviewees studied by McKinloy and 
Dunnett (1998). These interviewees are gun-toting members of the National Rifle 
Association of the United States, yet they manage to construct themselves as 
simultaneously members of the category "normal, average citizens. " For instance, 
they do this by emphosising the tightly restricted circumstances in which they 
would be prepared to open fire on a human target. In a parallel manoeuvre, 
Miller emphosises the tightly restricted population for whom he is willing to arrange 
infidelitous affairs. 
Extract 6.04 is another, slightly later contribution to the internet discussion The 
Other Side of an Affair or OSA. The author is Cindie, whom Skatterkat spoke up for 
in Extract 6.02. Unlike Skatterkat, Cindie has contributed to OSA from the 
beginning of the discussion. Her previous messages suggest that she is presently 
cohabiting and in on exclusive relationship with her partner. When their 
relationship began, Cindie was engaged to another man and her present partner 
was married. Thus, she was simultaneously a third-party infidel and a dyad-bound 
infidel. Though she could potentially be blamed on both of these counts, in the 
context of OSA she has mainly been criticised for the third-party infidelity. In 
particular, a strong and hostile reaction was elicited when Cindie constructed a 
version of unreasonable behaviour, claiming that the man who is now her partner 
had endured 16 years of physical and emotional abuse from his wife before finally 
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embarking upon their affair. Some participants treated this as equivalent to a 
generalised claim that all victims of infidelity must have done something to 
"deserve it. " 
Extract 6.04 
Cindie - 06: 29pm Jul 31,1997 EDT (#68 of 1336) 
Skatterkat 
Thanks for showing your support. I agree with you that Des M is being 
05 very unhealthy in her attitude towards my situation and (ha ha) I think 
you've copped more of a beating in here than I ever did! 
I don't think any wife who has been cheated on EVER caused their 
husband to do the unspeakable (as someone suggested I thought in an 
earlier posM) - they are both partly responsible for the breakdown of a 
10 marriage. As if I would ever want to go through that myself -I think most 
people certainly don't want to cheat on their partner, most of us have 
enough brains to know the upheaval it causes in life. If our lives were 
fulfilled there wouldn't be any reason to stray. 
I know one couple who have been together for 16 years, married 10 
15 years and the husband in the partnership had been married for 3 years 
before he met his now second wife. They, like those of us in happy healthy 
loving partnerships, hove'normal' problems but they have the utmost 
respect and love for each other and do everything together- 
I think it is inspiring to see people find a 'suitable' partner eventually 
20 because like in every situation, there are just people that, no matter how 
hard they try, will just never get on. Take families for example - you can 
love your mother or your father, but you may not like them - you also don't 
have to live with them for the rest of your life which is what the marriage 
vows are all about. 
25 I'm sorry if I have offended any of the cheated on in this forum. 
Granted, your situation is totally different to mine, however I think you 
should refrain from mud-slinging. It gets messy and achieves nothing in the 
long run. 
I don't think it was ever intended to be an cll-in brawl in here was it? 
(The Hearst Corporation, 1997, 
http: //www. homearts. com/cgi-bin/WebX68. htm) 
Speaking as a third-party infidel, Cindie has earlier constructed a version of 
unreasonable behaviour. That account was designed to defend her partner by 
displaying his relationship with Cindie as an understandable next step, having 
11 stuck it out" in an abusive marriage for 16 years. It was also designed to defend 
Cindie herself against accusations of having injured his wife, the "innocent" victim, 
and against criticisms that she has blindly co-operated with a married man who 
cynically fancied a change and will sooner or later abandon her, perhaps 
returning home to his original partner. In this respect, her defensive practice was 
similar to that of Skatterkat in Extract 6.02. However, following strong objections 
from Des M and some cf the other participants, Cindie finds it necessary in Extract 
6.04 to do a little reconstructive work on her account. This work principally consists 
of volunteering a milder, less blaming explanation for infidelity: a version of being 
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short changed. Let me highlight a few of the ways in which Cindie goes about 
recovering the discursively tricky situation in which she finds herself. 
To begin with, like Arabella in Extract 6.03, Cindie takes up a relatively 
disinterested, empiricist form of discourse that avoids assigning blame more to 
one party than another. While Arabella is portrayed by Sanai as having 
eliminated blame from the equation altogether (knowing that "the closeness has 
long evaporated": line 20). Cindie tries to distribute the blame equally among 
dyad-bound infidels and their dyadic partners ("they are both partly responsible": 
line 9). In support of this move, notice that the contested actions and events are 
(re)described as "the breakdown of a marriage" (lines 9-10) in contrast to 
"infidelity, " "leaving your wife for another woman" or some other formulation that is 
more suggestive of individual human agency. "The breakdown of a marriage" is a 
passive construction that describes something that marriages do, not something 
that people do. A bit later, in lines 20-21, Cindie tries out another description of 
what goes wrong in dyadic relationships: "there are just people that, no matter 
how hard they try, will just never get on. " This is a slightly flawed argument, given 
that such persons would be normatively held accountable for having got married 
in the first place but it achieves an explanation for why marriages sometimes end 
that is effectively blame free. 
Cindie bolsters her fact-constructive effort in this extract by introducing 
emblematic instances (Edwards, 1995,1997) to illustrate her points (e. g., "take 
families for example": line 21). Of these, one is the example of a couple that she 
claims to know personally (line 14). What the couple exemplifies is the principle 
that second marriages do sometimes succeed. Here Cindie externalises and 
reifies her preferred version of the world by assuming the authority to provide a 
true description by virtue of her categor-y entitlement as a witness (e. g., Potter, 
1996a, p. 165). She also changes footing, playing down her category 
membership as a third-party infidel and foregrounding her membership of the 
category dyad-bound infidels (from line 10). This is in line with her preference for 
explaining phenomena such as "marital breakdown, " in contrast to third-party 
infidelity, "homewrecking" and so on. More consequentially for the interaction in 
which she participates, it allows her to follow Arabella in claiming some 
corroboration and consensus for her point of view. It is difficult for third-party 
infidels to find acceptable reasons and motives for what they have done. 
Unreasonable behaviour is always an option, especially if' the victim can be 
claimed to have offended the third-party infidel personally. However, being short 
changed is rarely available as an account for the third-party infidel's own 
behaviour because it was never their privilege to expect anything from the 
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dyadic relationship in the first place. Cindie's change of footing allows her to take 
advantage of being short changed as an explanation for her own behaviour: she 
now finds herself in a position to invoke groups such as "most people" (lines H, 12) 
who can corroborate her arguments, whose experiences and reasoned actions 
she can claim to share and understand and on behalf of whom she is entitled to 
speak. 
True Love and Factors of the Third Party 
Versions of "true love" and "factors of the third party"explain and defend infidelity 
through descriptions of the third-party infidel as an individual or through 
descriptions of the extradyadic relationship. This is a defensive practice which 
can provide for the speaker to make a display of not blaming the victim and/or 
not disparaging the dyadic relationship, where that is interactionally expedient. It 
makes particular use of an argumentative structure that I mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter: that of defending against actual or potential 
accusations that one has failed to behave properly by stressing that the 
normatively preferred course of action was precluded by the desirability or 
necessity of doing something else. As we will see, the "something else" could be 
responding to the unique appeal and compatibility of some particular third party 
or recognising and answering the call of true love, conventionally constructible as 
a highly powerful and compelling force. It is important to note that despite the 
rhetoric of compulsion that is so often evident in accounts of true love and factors 
of the third party, speakers do not attempt to totally discharge responsibility for 
their actions in the way that is provided for by the more causal explanations that 
we examined in Chapters 4 and 5. Discourse users constructing a version of true 
love and factors of the third party do not render themselves helpless in the way 
that people are helpless when having a circumstantially engineered accident or 
when in the grip of a disease such as addiction. Rather, they retain the idea that 
they are basically in control of and responsible for their actions but try to show 
that the course of action they have taken is understandable and perhaps the 
only one that makes sense given the unique features of the particular person or 
relationship that has entered their lives. 
Let's take a look at some data. Extract 6.05 is drawn from Adultery: An 
Analysis of Love and Betrayal, a lengthy report of the research activities and 
findings of sociologist Annette Lawson (Lawson, 1988). Lawson uses quantitative 
measures to package and present the results of her research but she also 
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reproduces bits and pieces of interview data to back up her claims. In this extract 
Lawson discusses the adventures of Dr. Reynolds, a GP and clyod-bound infidel 
who had an affair with one of his patients and went on to marry her. This patient 
is Katherine, the "extremely powerful woman" to whom Lawson refers in line 1. The 
block quotes that Lawson attributes to Reynolds himself appear in italics below. 
Extract 6.05 
On Dr Reynolds's description, she was an extremely powerful woman 
whose husband would hove been foolish, perhaps, to intervene in her 
private arrangements with her doctor. For example, she "made" Dr 
Reynolds "dismember"his marriage by setting new targets regularly for him 
05 about the extent to which he was to continue to have contact with his 
wife: 
At first, you know, I wasn't to touch her [his first wife]. Then they 
[Katherine and her husband] come to dinner as a couple. She 
10 didn't like me touching my wife. And then she didn't like me to 
make love to her. And then more and more and more - that I was 
to tell her ... that I was to tell her that I would never make love to her again. I cannot think now how - but she ... as I say, she's a 
powerful girt and she has - 
15 
He was very near to tears. His sense of shame was profound: 
I feel I am partly cold bread pudding and I think to have treated her 
like that is almost cold-blooded murder ... In church, we vowed. 20 
Although he felt so controlled by his second wife, he nevertheless had 
conducted the affair itself with careful planning and delight in his success. 
It was only after the anguish of divorce and (so it appeared) the mixed joy 
of remarriage, that Dr Reynolds reflected, with the advantage of distance, 
25 on what it had cost him to gain this fascinating woman and her children 
who detested him: 
No punishment is too great really. I think I should be put in the stocks 
for what I did. I feel very strongly indeed that what I did is reo! ty 
30 without any mitigation. Totally wrong. Because, honestly it wasn*t 
obadmarriage. It's just that Katherine was so exceptional in so 
many ways. It leaves me with an immense conviction really that 
the case against adultery is immensely strong. My marriage wasn't 
intolerable, and I really hove no grounds on any score. 
(Lawson, 1988, p. 153) 
It is evident from Lawson's commentary that she is fairly uncritical of Reynolds's 
version of events, taking at face value his displays of "shame" (line 16) and 
suggestions of being or feeling "controlled" (line 21). Her approach to her data is 
similar to the "life story method" that is criticised by Edwards (1997, pp. 279-280). 
That is, Lawson treats her participants' personal stories as having some built-in 
authenticity compared to more impersonal forms of data such as survey 
responses. She uses extracts from these stories to illustrate her gloss on various 
adultery-related phenomena - in this case, the business of "debating" whether or 
not to get into an extramarital affair. Lawson's "authorial voice and interpretative 
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commentarV' (ibid. ) tells readers how to understand her participants' reports, 
while the reports themselves are treated as revealing participants' subjective and 
individual perspectives on the things they describe. What Lawson does not do is 
to examine her interviewees' discourse as action orientated, such that 
authenticity is noticed as part of what is discursively accomplished in the 
construction of a narrative such as Reynolds's. Fortunately, despite Lawson's 
interpretative intervention, there is enough of Reynolds's discourse reproduced 
here for us to see that he is constructing a version of "factors of the third part, /' to 
account foi his behaviour. 
There are two or three key elements that I want to highlight in Reynolds's 
account. To begin with, it is evident that Reynolds does not merely single out the 
unique properties of the "exceptional" (line 31) and"powerful" (line 13) Katherine 
as an explanation for his infidelity but that he does so in contradistinction from 
blaming either his first wife as a person or their marriage as a relationship. His wife, 
he takes care to point out, deserved not to hove been treated "like that" (lines 18- 
19) and it emphatically wasn't "a bad marriage" (lines 30-3 1). Secondly, notice 
that although Reynolds's portrait of Katherine as "a powerful girl" in lines 8-14 
seems to cast Reynolds himself as someone who was helplessly compelled to 
withdraw from his marriage - an interpretation to which Lawson subscribes in her 
formulation "he felt so controlled" (line 21) - he in fact makes a point of accepting 
full responsibility for his behaviour. His talk of how he has "treated" his first wife (line 
18), his mention of the vows that it was his duty not to break (line 19) and ol 
course his voluntary admissions that what I did" (line 29) was without "any 
mitigation" (line 30) or any "grounds" (line 34) are all constructions which make a 
show of not trying to claim that he was a hapless victim of circumstance (cf. 
Chapter 4), at the mercy of mysterious psychological forces (cf. Chapter 5) or 
simply a puppet whose strings were being operated by somebody else. Thirdly, 
consider lines 32-33: "it leaves me with an immense conviction really that the case 
against adultery is immensely strong. " Reynolds is pointedly not trying to claim 
that his personal experiences of meeting and marrying Katherine in any way 
refute or undermine the general principle that marital fidelity is valuable and 
something to be adhered to. That is, he is pointedly not trying to justify his 
behaviour by arguing that he is entitled to do as he likes (cf. Chapter 7). Nor does 
he try to exonerate himself with regard to this particular set of activities by arguing 
, hal there was no call for him to have behaved any differently (cf. Chapter 3). 
On the other hand, Reynolds's story is not one that simply fails to offer an account 
for what he has done. His behaviour may have been wrong but it was not 
without reason: "it's just that Katherine was so exceptional in so many ways" (lines 
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31-32). Something is being contra-indicated here and that something is the 
possibility that Reynolds needed no special reason to behave as he did; the 
possibility that he is without any moral sensibility and cannot see that infidelity is 
an accountable matter. 
By way of a contrast, Extract 6.06 shows a version of true love, constructed by 
Meghan, a third-party infidel. It is a final extract from the internet discussion 
thread, 7he Other Side of an Affair. " 
Extract 6.06 
Meghan 115 - 01: 08aM Aug 3,1997 EDT (I"r 93 of 1336) 
Okay.... I can't believe I even have the guts to step into this situation, but I 
just cannot resist .... so here goes. 
First of all, I wont to offer my opinion on 
05 affair types. I really believe that there must be two types of affairs. Affairs 
that happen because of one spouses' total disregard for marriage vows 
are usually the type of affairs that are short lived and usually for the sake of 
sex. The second type of affair happens when the married person meets 
another person, and there is real, true love between that married person 
10 and the "other". Sometimes these affairs lead to something more, such as 
marriage, but usually they lead to a great amount of poin-for the wife, the 
husband, the "other"and children too. Before everyone starts attacking 
me for saying that the "other"person suffers too, I have to first admit that I 
am the "other". I am not a BIMBO, my reasons for believing this ore 
15 because I am highly educated, fairly religious, sexually responsible. I 
volunteer my time to those less fortunate than me, basically. ] give a damn 
about other peoples' feelings. my situation is a strange one. I met a man, 
(yes, Des.. older than me) who I knew was married. I had just come out of a 
very painful and abusive relationship from which a beautiful daughter was 
20 born. My emotional health at that time was very unstable. I felt very 
distrustful of men (my boyfriend hod many affair type # I's) and all I 
wanted to do was be alone with my daughter and try to gain some self 
esteem and heal. However, I met this man, whi I knew was married. He 
doesn't live anywhere near me, so a phone friendship developed. When 1 
25 first met him, I believed his marriage to be a healthy one. But, as our 
friendship become closer. I started to conclude that that was definitely not 
the case. He and I would talk about my prior relationship amd every now 
and then, he would add his own little horror stories to these conversations. 
But, the difference was, he wasn't only telling me bad traits of hers, he was 
30 also sharing bad traits of his. After a few months of friendship, I become 
aware that he was actually in a horrible marriage, a disfunctional 
marriage which he was always quick to take partial blame for. As time 
went by, and our conversations grew longer and longer and more 
meaningful: we realized, to our extreme discomfort, that we had started to 
35 care very deeply for each other. Now, he had left his wife before, only to 
come back time cnd time again because of the exteme guilt he felt over 
breaking up his family (he has three kids). Soon after grudgingly admitting 
our feelings for each other, feelings that COULD NOT be suppressed or 
denied any longer, he left his wife. We were both very honest in the 
40 obvious fact that this time was partially due to me. I was not happy with 
that knowledge and neither was he. But, they had been discussing divorce 
long before I come along. He is deeply religious, and he comes from an 
old fashined family-one that does not condone divorce. Our 
conversations on the phone after this centered around two subjects 
45 mostly ... his wife's pain, and his pain over leaving his kids. We loso mode 
plans for me to travel out to see him and finally try to understand these 
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intense feelings that matured over the telephone. It's very hard for me to 
give all the details, but to make a very long story a little shorter ... 
his wife 
11 suddenly" developed emotions that she had never experienced 
50 before-and begged him to come back and give her another chance. 
Now, he had done everything the typical "adulterous married man" isn't 
supposed to do. He filed for divorce, he put the house up for sale, he 
moved into his own place. But, his guilt and deep devotion the sanctity of 
marriage gave him no other choice than to go to counseling (counseling 
55 that he had been begging her for for the last ten years) and give his 
marriage one final shot. So, for the past few months I have been hearing.. "I 
don't know what is goiing to happen ... 
I just can't feel the feelings for h 
(The Hearst Corporation, 1997, 
http: //www. homearts. com/cgi-bin/WebX94. htm) 
Specific reasons for infidelity, by virtue of their very specificity, hinge on the 
discursive business of particulorisotion, the rhetorical counterpart of categorisation 
(Billig, 1987, p. 131). Particular people and relationships are singled out as special 
cases and therefore not exemplars of some category to which they might have 
been assumed to belong. The dyadic partner who behaves unreasonably is an 
exception to the category "undeserving victims. " Celibate relationships do not in 
that respect qualify as the "normal" type of relationship that married persons are 
entitled to expect. Similarly, as we can see from Extract 6.06, affairs that ore 
motivated and sustained by true love are distinguishable from the majority which 
are "short lived" and "for the sake of sex" (lines 7-8). It is this particularity that allows 
Meghan to preface her story with the claim "my situation is a strange one" (fine 
17), although for the purposes of The Compleot Infidel it is much like any other 
construction of true love. The point, of course, is that categorisation and 
particularisation are always tailored to the purpose at hand. For Meghan, in the 
interactional context of OSA, the purpose is to divide up the categorical, unifying 
description of infidelity produced by Des M and her allies so as to defend her own 
experiences and actions without denying outright the adequacy of that 
description for some (or most) other people's, ostensibly similar infidelities, 
Meghan's interest in defending her own affair against Des's construction is 
displayed in the category memberships that she resists for herself and her dyad- 
bound accomplice. Sue Widdicombe (1998: Widdicombe and Woof fitt, 1995), in 
her analysis of people's discursive management of their (non-) membership of 
subcultural groups such as "punks" and "gothics, " notices that one of their key 
methods of resisting category membership is to deny possession of certain criterial 
features. Her research participants were young people whose physical 
appearance made reasonable the assumption that they might be members of 
these groups. However, some of those who preferred to resist such categorisation 
did so by playing dawn the importance of appearance, selecting some 
alternative criterion for membership (e. g., "a certain way of thinking") and then 
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denying possession of that criterion. That is, they resisted category membership 
while orientating to the accountable context of looking as though they could be 
members. An analogous situation exists in Extract 6.06. Meghan resists 
categorisation of herself as a "bimbo" (line 14) and likewise of her accomplice as 
a "typical "adulterous married man'"'(1ine 51). She accomplishes this by 
emphasising her, and his, non-possession of criteria for category membership. 
Meghan is not a bimbo because "I give a damn about other people's feelings" 
(lines 16-17). Her partner is not the typical adulterous married man because he 
has done just what members of that category are crucially required not to do, 
itemised in lines 52-53 in the form of a three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) which 
collectively describes the actions of someone who is serious about ending their 
marriage. That is, Meghan resists categorisation while acknowledging and 
orientating to the highly accountable context of being involved with a man who 
is in fact married, that fact providing a basis for others to assume that she and her 
man are members of the decried categories. 
As for the nature of true love itself, we can see that Meghan externalises 
and reifies that phenomenon, just as Reynolds (Extract 6.05) reifies the power and 
other exceptional properties of Katherine, Cindie (Extract 6.04) and Arobella 
(Extract 6.03) reify certain marital problems and Skatterkat (Extract 6.02) and 
Wolfe's survey respondent (Extract 6.0 1) reify the unreasonable behaviour of 
certain so-called victims of infidelity. In particular, Meghan constructs her own 
and her man's recognition of their relationship as "real, true love" (line 9) as 
something that emerged slowly; a gradual but shocking "realization" (line 34) that 
developed alongside her dawning awareness that his marriage was for from 
"healthy" (line 25) and in fact was "horrible" (line 31) and "disfunctional" (sic). 
Notably, Meghan uses the "at first I thought ... but then I realized" device to display 
the harmlessness of her original intentions (lines 24-26,30-31,32-34) and similarly 
she adds details such as "he was also sharing bad traits of his" (lines 29-30) which 
display her [over as innocently acting counter-intuitively for someone who might 
be suspected of cynically wanting to engineer an affair. Upon these two artless 
characters, true love eventually imposes itself in the form of "feelings that COULD 
NOT be suppressed or denied any longe('(Iines 38-39) although even then the 
pair do not let themselves off the moral hook. Like Dr. Reynolds, Meghan makes a 
point of continuing to accept responsibility for her actions (lines 39-4 1). The 
feelings that unite the coupie are pointediy not made to excuse or justify whar 
has happened but they are constructed as an explanation and a reason for the 
blameable activities that Meghan narrates. 
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Critique and Conclusions 
In this chapter we have examined three varieties of specific reason for infidelity: 
1. unreasonable behaviour, " "being short changed" and "true love and factors of 
the third party. " I would like to begin this final section of Chapter 6 by saying a 
few words about how those different sorts of specific reason vary according to 
their interactional functions, over and above the variations of their gross structure 
and content. The data extracts that we have looked at under those three 
headings show that each variety of specific reason can be constructed by both 
dyad-bound infidels and third-party infidels. However, that is not to say that 
occupants of these different membership categories favour all varieties of 
specific reason equally. The dyadic status of a speaker or writer can have 
practical implications for what kind of specific reason is ultimately produced. 
Let's begin with unreasonable behaviour. Dyad-bound infidels whose 
dyadic relationship is still intact do not generally opt for the practice of direct 
victim-blaming that is represented by accounts of unreasonable behaviour. 
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the logic of normative accountability that 
surrounds couple relationships dictates that "it takes two to tango" (e. g., see 
Edwards, 1995). That is, there is a strong normative expectation that the person 
who is somehow dissatisfied in their relationship will accept some responsibility for 
improving matters, including making a display of sharing the blame for whatever 
has gone wrong. To do otherwise and produce an account that puts all of the 
blame on to one's partner is to risk being undermined by appeals to one's stake or 
interestedness. The account may be crificised as hearably one-sided and self- 
serving and the "two to tango" principle may be invoked to suggest that the 
complaining partner is leaving out crucial information about how they themselves 
have contributed to relational difficulties. Secondly, a person in a presently intact 
couple relationship who complains too vociferously about their partner may be 
asked why, if the other person is really so awful, they do not simply get out of the 
relationship and move on to pastures new. Though there is no reason, in principle, 
why an answer cannot be found, much of the discourse of dyad-bound infidels 
visibly orientates to the possibility of being asked such a question with an overall 
view to avoiding it. 
In contrast, unreasonable behaviour is a popular choice with third-party 
infidels compared to other varieties of specific reason. I mentioned earlier in this 
chapter that third-party infidels are liable to be held accountable in a slightly 
different way than dyad-bound infidels. They are relatively less accountable for 
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injuring the victim because, unlike dyad-bound infidels, they usually have not 
made any specific promises to that person of the sort that are implied by an 
exclusive couple relationship. However, third-party infidels do become 
accountable in an additional way that dyad-bound infidels are not so vulnerable 
to. That is, third-party infidels may have to contend with criticisms along the lines 
that they are being taken advantage of by their dyad-bound accomplices, that 
they can never expect the extradyadic relationship to amount to more than 
casual sex and that they are ncffve and gullible if they imagine otherwise. 
Describing unreasonable behaviour on the part of the victim addresses these 
concerns in two ways. Firstly, demonising the victim as someone who acts 
injuriously towards others helps reduce the moral fault of the third-party infidel 
who behaves similarly. This is particularly the case if the victim's actions can be 
claimed to have affected the third-party infidel directly, rather than the third- 
party infidel having to take offence on behalf of somebody else or otherwise at a 
remove. Secondly, descriptions of discrete, unreasonable actions and events 
that could potentially be verified provide for third-party infidels to do witnessing, 
corroboration and other kinds of externalisation. Such actions and events need 
not imply a special insight into the dyadic relationship but in fact can be 
rhetorically enhanced through presentation as phenomena that even someone 
outside the dyadic relationship is able to see. 
When it comes to the kind of specific reason that I have referred to here 
as being short changed, the patterns of preference are reversed. Dyad-bound 
infidels are relatively more given than third-party infidels to producing accounts 
that explain infidelity by appeal to some deficiency or inadequacy in the dyadic 
relationship. The advantage of this kind of argument for the clyad-bound infidel is 
that it allows them to make a display of not unfairly blaming the victim in their 
reports of marital dissatisfaction and the ensuing search for compensation. Unlike 
accounts of unreasonable behaviour, which highlight particular offences on the 
part of the victim and which consequently give rise to questions about why the 
dyad-bound infidel does not therefore resign from the relationship, accounts of 
being short changed can be couched in the most vague and general terms and, 
moreover, invoke an uncomplaining kind of consensus through instantiation as 
"the sort of problem that lots of couples have. " In Extract*6.03, Arabella's ideas 
about the prevalence of marriages that are "caring but celibate" are a good 
example and Sanai's gloss on "the evaporation of closeness" even more so. Other 
relational problems and deficiencies that are mentioned in the context of being 
short changed include "growing apart, " having "married too young" and finding 
that misadventures to do with illness or unemployment have made one partner 
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blamelessly but disproportionately dependent on the other. As for Arobella, these 
kinds of problems can be constructed as chronic and resistant to change but not 
necessarily acute in the sense that they demand action more drastic than a 
palliative affair "on the side. " Problems such as these offer little rhetorically to the 
third-party infidel. The principal drawback is that vague and generalised 
relationship problems leave third-party infidels wide open to criticisms that they 
are being duped or spun a line by their dyad-bound accomplices. Similarly, 
complaints to do with evaporated closeness, having grown apart and so on are 
diagnoses that suggest quite an intimate knowledge of the dyadic relationship; 
knowledge that third-party infidels typically cannot claim to have collected for 
themselves. 
Finally, consider true love and factors of the third party. In principle, dyad- 
bound infidels may construct either of these but in practice they overwhelmingly 
prefer to stick with versions of being short changed. One possible reason for this is 
that any account which hinges on the unique properties of the third-party infidel 
or the extradyadic relationship again raises the question of why the dyad-bound 
infidel does not leave their present' relationship and start afresh with the person 
who apparently means so much to them. In contrast, accounts that spread the 
blame between the dyadic partners or diffuse the problem into the dyadic 
relationship render the dyad-bound infidel relatively less accountable for not 
departing. Exceptions occur in cases such as that of Dr. Reynolds who is at liberty 
to locate the reason for his infidelity in his third-party accomplice because C' the 
time of making his defence he has already taken the plunge and committed to a 
new, exclusive relationship with that individual. For third-porty infidels, there is 
obviously too much self-congratulation implied in claiming factors of the third 
party for it to be a viable defensive option although, as we have seen, they do 
sometimes argue for true love. The special merit of this line of defence for the 
third-party infidel is that they can avoid sounding self-servingly hostile towards the 
victim, a hazard that accompanies accounts of, unreasonable behaviour. 
Moreover, true love as a description of the extradyadic relationship refers to an 
experience that the third-party infidel can claim to share in equally with the dyad- 
bound infidel. They can claim a certain first-hand knowledge entitlement that 
may be more difficult to construct when the object of discussion is a relationship 
to which they personally are not privy. However, because of the conventionally 
private, unobservable nature of the experience of true love and its confinement 
within a couple's relationship, it does not offer third-party infidels the same 
opportunities for externalisation and corroboration as concrete reports of 
unreasonable behaviour. Moreover, versions of true love do not help third-party 
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infidels to explain why their dyad-bound accomplices remain dyad-bound where 
that is indeed the case. Versions of unreasonable behaviour are less susceptible 
to that problem because they can be built from third-party infidels' first-hand 
experiences of the victim's behaviour and do not rely on making claims about the 
dyad-bound infidel's perceptions and personal (dis)satisfaction on their behalf. 
As well as identifying the functional variations among specific reasons for infidelity, 
it is possible to discern something from our analysis about their similarities and 
about the overall function of constructing a specific reason as a defensive 
practice. To begin with, specific reasons are characteristically invoked to 
account for infidelities where the speaker would like to claim high distinctiveness 
(i. e., they are not dispositionally or habitually unfaithful) but at the some time the 
infidelity to be explained is one of high consistency - an enduring and perhaps 
presently continuing affair as opposed to an isolated episode of the type that we 
saw in Chapter 4. Constructions of specific reasons accomplish this feat by 
claiming some sort of provocation that did not mechanistically determine or 
cause the speaker's behaviour but which gave them a motive for behaving in a 
particular way and thus rendered their actions reasonable. Like constructions of 
isolated episodes of infidelity, specific reasons are manifest in a very wide range 
of sources and media and this is no doubt an effect of their basically 
uncontroversial, common-sense appeal. In the world constructed by most 
contemporary, Anglo-American discourse users, fidelity is predicated on notions 
of two rational, autonomous persons committing themselves to a bond of 
romantic and sexual exclusivity with no need for elaborate definitions and 
provisos about what that entails. It is conventionally taken as read that they do 
this because they have each discerned something uniquely attractive or 
satisfying in the other as an individual and/or in their shared relationship. With this 
epistemologically uncomplicated, liberal humanist fable as a starting point, it 
does not require any lateral thinking to arrive at an explanation for infidelity 
whereby the individual is spurred into action either as a result of a growing 
dissatisfaction with the existing relationship or a developing attraction to 
somebody else. 
In previous chapters I have noted similarities between the defensive 
practices identified in The Compleat Infidel and those catalogued by Atkinson 
and Drew (1979) in their study of police officers' accounts for their failure to take 
certain normatively expected actions with respect to incidents of civil unrest. The 
present practice of constructing a specific reason for infidelity is no exception. In 
this case, the equivalent discovery of Atkinson's and Drew's is their type 2 excuse. 
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This is a discursive manoeuvre that particularly occurs immediately following 
counsel's specific noticing of the witness's failure to act. In the interests of 
continuity, here is a quick example from Atkinson's and Drew's own data. 
Counsel: In any event, when you mounted that second baton charge you 
took no steps to prevent the Protestant people following you? 
Witness: I was not in a position to take any steps. If I had taken any steps to 
prevent them I would have left more than half my party and the 
other three or four of us would have had no effect on chasing 
them from this fire that had been started at the Sarsfield Hall. 
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p. 166) 
Compare this with the data illustrating the type I (a) excuse that I presented in 
Chapter 4. Those data showed the witness constructing a narrative that 
conveyed how the blameable incident (in that case, people getting past the 
police) could have happened. The blameable incident was displayed as having 
followed from and indeed having resulted from the narrated events. 
Contrastingly, the above data show the witness providing a reason for not acting 
as Counsel suggests that he ought. He does not dispute the desirability or 
relevance of that recommended action but indicates that it had to be sacrificed 
because of the necessity of doing something else (i. e., chasing people from a 
fire); both actions could not be accomplished at once, Similarly, Reynolds of 
Extract 6.06 "dismembered" his marriage because Katherine "was so exceptional 
in so many ways"; Meghan's dyad-bound accomplice of Extract 6.05 left his wife 
because his feelings for Meghan could no longer be denied; Cindie of Extract 
6.04 "strayed" because her life was unfulfilled and so on. 
In this chapter we have examined considerable evidence that accounts which 
present specific reasons and motives for infidelity do not merely reflect the world 
but are actively constitutive of it. That is, the accounts we have looked at here 
actively construct infidelity as reasoned and motivated, in contrast to a range of 
other possible constructions. Skatterkat, Arabella, Reynolds and the others could 
have defended themselves by arguing that "nothing happened" or that "it was an 
accident" or that they'Just can't stop" being unfaithful - but they did not. In 
contradistinction to these and other possibilities, they defended their behaviour 
by giving it a specific reason, located somewhere within their own immediate 
network of personal relationships. Moreover, within the available range of 
specific reasons further constructive selections were made. Skatterkat 
constructed a version of unreasonable behaviour, Arabello went for a version of 
being short changed and Reynolds, with an unspecified amount of help from 
Lawson, constructed a version of factors of the third party. In this penultimate 
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analytic chapter, I hope it is becoming clear that the variations within and 
between these different kinds of defences of infidels and infidelity are not 
random, nor are they forced on people's talk by some brute, underlying facts. 
Rather, the discursive practices vary because people find themselves in situations 
where their talk (and text) is required to do various kinds of work and attend to 
various interactional concerns. 
The above findings raise certain theoretical problems for the studies based 
on various social exchange theories of close relationships that I considered in 
Chapter 1. Recall that those studies count among their practical concerns 
questions of how to explain and predict people's tendency to remain in their 
marriages (or similar dyadic relationships) or, alternatively, to leave. Infidelity 
comes in for some attention in this style of research, not least because it is an 
empirically observable and reportable form of behaviour that is intuitively at odds 
with conventional ideas about what happy, durable and otherwise successful 
relationships are like. Thus, some researchers, such as Forste and Tanfer (1996), 
find (in) fidelity or sexual (non-) exclusivity to be a convenient means of 
operationalising hidden psychological variables such as an individual's level of 
commitment to their dyadic relationship. That opera tionalisation can then serve 
as the basis for making claims about the relationship of "commitment" to other 
variables, such as the statuses of being "married, " "cohabiting" or "dating. " 
Without any apparent reserve or hesitation, Forste and Tanfer announce that "we 
use sexual exclusivity -a behavioral, instead of an attitudinal, measure - as an 
indicator of commitment. Having a secondary sex partner suggests 
dissatisfaction with the primary relationship, the availability of desirable 
alternatives, and reduced investment" (ibid., pp. 33-34) in the introduction to their 
research, which is informed by Rusbult's and Johnson's investment model (e. g., 
Johnson and Rusbult, 1989: Rusbult, Johnson and Morrow, 1986), itself a 
development from Thibaut's and Kelley's interdependence theory (e. g., Kelley et 
a/., 1983: Kelley and Thibaut, 1978). 
There are, in fact, lots of theoretical problems and criticisms of the social 
exchange school of research that could be raised from a discursive psychological 
perspective: here I will limit myself to two or three points that arise fairly directly 
from the analysis conducted above. Firstly, there are difficulties with the 
widespread assumption that having a secondary sex partner suggests 
dissatisfaction with the primary reiationship. We have seen in this chapter that 
dissatisfaction with the primary or dyadic relationship is a particular type of claim 
among others. Claims of being short changed or of being inadequately 
rewarded by one's dyadic relationship are produced mainly by dyad-bound 
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infidels to account for their own behaviour and in situations where their function of 
dissolving the blame for infidelity into the relational space between two partners 
usefully avoids the issue of pinning responsibility on either one individual or the 
other. It is useful in the sense that it allows speakers such as Arabella to explain 
their infidelities without it becoming incumbent upon them to leave their dyadic 
partners and start again with someone new. It is therefore not reasonable to 
assume, even tacitly, that dissatisfaction causes infidelity and may ultimately 
cause people to leave their dyadic relationships. We have seen evidence in this 
chapter that dissatisfaction is a way of accounting for infidelity and indeed a way 
of accounting for infidels not leaving their primary relationships. 
Secondly, there is the worrying assumption in this strand of research that a 
person's sexual partners are equivalent to one another, in the sense that they are 
to be regarded as "alternatives. " Similarly, it is often claimed or implied that dyad- 
bound infidels are rational decision makers who weigh up the costs and rewards 
of different relationships in comparison to each other and choose a course of 
action (commitment to one or another party or perhaps singledom) on that basis. 
However, the variability of descriptions and references to third-party infidels and 
extradyadic relationships shows that again this equivalence is a matter for 
discursive construction. Whether or not the third-party infidel represents a genuine 
alternative to the dyadic partner depends on who is telling the story and what 
sorts of interactional concerns it is designed to address. We have seen that in 
versions of being short changed, the third-party infidel or extradyadic relationship 
may be constructed precisely as not an alternative to the dyadic partner or 
relationship but as a supplement or adjunct to it. Moreover, in versions of true 
love and factors of the third party, speakers and writers may go out of their way 
to display that they did not coolly and calculatedly do a cost-benefit analysis on 
their two (or more) relationships in order to come to a decision in fovour of the 
extradyadic alternative but adhered loyalty to their dyadic relationships until "the 
facts spoke for themselves" so loudly that they could no longer be ignored and 
the significance of the extradyadic relationship had to be, sometimes reluctantly, 
acknowledged. 
Finally, it is understandable but regrettable that the social exchange 
theory style of research on infidelity and personal relationships has maintained a 
selective focus on reasons and motives as supplied by or attributed to the dyad- 
bound infidel. Resecrch participants are eitheý known to have had that category 
of experience (like those of Forste and Tanfer) or else they are invited to imagine 
themselves in that situation (e. g., Johnson and Rusbult, 1989). It is virtually never 
the case that reason and motive accounts are solicited from third-party infidels. 
169 
This is a great pity because third-party infidels are some of the keenest narrators of 
accounts that feature specific reasons for infidelity. As this chapter has shown, 
third-party infidels have to deal with their own characteristic sets of interactional 
concerns including criticisms that they are ncffve and being cynically exploited by 
their dyad-bound accomplices. It is this which explains their penchant for 
constructing versions of specific reasons for infidelity, particularly versions of 
unreasonable behaviour, which allow them to produce particular bits of 
information about the dyadic experience of their dyad-bound accomplices and 
through the telling of that story defend themselves and their own participation in 
the contested events. This kind of defensive practice on the part of third-party 
infidels surely costs a new light on the accounts of specific reasons produced by 
dyad-bound infidels who can be seen to attend to different yet similar 
interactional concerns. 
7 
Construct a Generic Rationale 
Introduction 
Some discursively engineered defences of infidelity and infidels centre on 
constructions of large entities such as human nature, society and social groups. 
Such defences are the focus of Chapter 7. As in the previous analytic chapters, I 
shall begin with a sketch that shows the prominent features and characteristics of 
that part of the discursive landscape which I have called "construct a generic 
rationale. " The objective at this stage will be to supply an overview of the gross 
content of generic rationales for infidelity and begin to describe the ways in 
which they use large scale constructions of nature and civilisation to argue their 
case. 
The middle part of the chapter is concerned with data analysis. There we 
shall look at a selection of extracts of discourse from a variety of sources that all 
show generic rationales being practically deployed. Each data extract will 
represent an opportunity to examine more closely the kinds of discursive resources 
that speakers draw upon in putting generic rationales together and to discover 
something about how those resourc es are used to manage the dilemma of stake 
that faces every defending speaker and writer. Part of the work to be done in the 
course of analysis will involve "reading the detail" in these accounts and cross- 
referencing the various bits of discursive and conversational machinery that we 
find being used in the text with those discovered by other discourse and 
conversation analysts. 
The last part of the chapter is titled "critique and conclusions. " There we 
shall return to the wider view of the subject matter of this chapter and deve! op an 
account of the overall function of constructing a generic rationale for infidelity. 
By that time we shall have amassed considerable evidence that rationalising 
infidelity by invoking notions of human nature and society is a constitutive as well 
as a reflective discursive practice. That evidence will be used as the basis for a 
critique of more formal academic accounts of infidelity - or extradyadic sex. as it 
170 
171 
is often known in such accounts - which also use natural and social theories to 
explanatory effect. 
What constitutes a generic rationale for infidelity? As the name suggests, the 
data to be examined in this chapter are accounts in which speakers and writers 
find defences that can, if necessary, account not just for their own actual or 
suspected transgressions but for any and every infidelitous adventure. I use the 
word adventure advisedly because generic rationales are the least apologetic of 
all the defensive practices I have described here in The Compleat Infidel. In the 
extracts to follow, self-acknowledged infidels are spoken of not as a disturbed or 
sick minority (as was the case in Chapter 5) but are potentially constructible as 
rebels and free spirits who have lifted themselves above the hypocrisy of the 
moral majority. The strongest, least compromising versions of generic rationales 
incorporate claims that nobody's private life is morally stainless but most people 
cannot admit that about themselves and prefer to recover their own moral 
virginity by condemning others and paying lip service to a standard that they 
cannot uphold. With this common potential, the data that describe generic 
rationales for infidelity are nevertheless divisible into three recognisably discrete 
strands. Accordingly, there are three sections to the forthcoming data analysis. 
Their names are "the sovereign infidel ... .. boredom and fun" and "public morality, 
mainstream society. " 
In this chapter we will deploy a number of analytic tools and concepts 
that have already been useful in previous chapters. I especially want to draw 
attention in advance to the twinned discursive practices of categorisation and 
differentiation between categories that were a topic of interest in Chapter 3 
(construct a non-event). While speakers in that chapter constructed categories 
so as to exclude their own actual or alleged activities from those which are 
nameable and blameable as "infidelity, " speakers in this chapter regularly 
construct inclusive, universalising categories which ensure that "other people" are 
no less culpable than the speakers themselves. I would also like to mention Billig's 
analyses of what he terms ideological dilernmas (e. g., Billig, Condor, Edwards, 
Gone, Middleton and Radley, 1988). Ideological dilemmas are contradictory sets 
of discursive resources, opposing maxims and nuggets of common sense that 
provide for argument and debate. In this chapter, an ideological dilemma of 
special interest will be the competition between, on the one hand. individual 
rights and freedom and, on the other hand, collectivism and the constraints of 
social obligation and public duty. The strongly individualistic tone adopted in 
accounts that feature generic rationales for infidelity makes relevant for speakers 
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and their recipients the opposing discourse of social responsibility. This can 
represent a problem for speakers but as we will see, attending to that problem 
can be a way of avoiding discussing more local, specific, interpersonal issues and 
injuries of the type that cropped up in Chapter 6. Other ideological dilemmas 
that are prominent in generic rationales for infidelity are those between"nature" 
and "culture" and notions of what is "public" and "private. " Again, these can 
sometimes seem to present argumentative difficulties for speakers but attending 
to those difficulties can also be a way of not attending to others. Readers who 
recall Chapter 3 may anticipate at this point that we are about to witness a 
certain amount of ontological gerrymandering of the sort that Bill Clinton 
engaged in Extract 3.03. 
We do not want to get ahead of ourselves so perhaps it would be better 
to postpone further discussion of these issues until we have examined some data. 
The important thing to bring to the analysis from this introduction is that generic 
rationales are defences of infidels and infidelity that do not excuse or apologise 
for the misdemeanours of individuals on a case-by-case basis but are more 
orientated to defending infidelity as a general practice. The discursive resources 
used to accomplish this include categories such as human nature, modern 
society and social groups; categories which are not fixed by any objective, pre- 
discursive truth but are available to be shaped and manipulated so as to fulfil 
certain interactional requirements and achieve certain rhetorical effects. Bearing 
this in mind, we may now proceed to the first kind of generic rationale: accounts 
of the sovereign infidel. 
Data Analysis 
The Sovereign Infidel 
In Chapter II mentioned studies which take infidelity to be a form of collective 
human behaviour and a societal phenomenon and which are informed by 
varying amounts of social theory. One of those studies is Adultery by sociologist 
Annette Lawson (1988). Others which are relevant to this section and that were 
not mentioned in the introductory chapter are "Women's Transition to First 
Extramarital Sex" (Atwater, 1979) and The Erotic Silence of the Married Woman 
173 
(Heyn. 1992). Like Lawson's study, these are broadly sociological accounts that 
use statistical measures, demographics and other kinds of quantification rhetoric 
to set out their stall and then illustrate the arguments being advanced with bits of 
qualitative data, usually interview material. As sociologists or commentators on 
society, these writers expectably have an interest in identifying social change. 
One kind of social change that is prominent in studies of infidelity and sexual 
behaviour generally is a shift to individualism. Without going into unnecessary 
detail (interested readers will find concise accounts supplied by Lawson, 1988: 
chapter 1, and Swidler, 1980), the premise is that in recent years, in the West, love, 
marriage and sexual behaviour have become somewhat detached from their 
traditional anchors of familial duty, procreation and ensuring the rightful 
inheritance of property, and proportionally more concerned with the expression 
of personal choice and the fulfilment of individual potential. Such claims are 
usable as explanations for quantitative observations that rates of infidelity and 
divorce are rising, especially those infidelities and divorces which are initiated by 
women. To illustrate this argument, authors such as Atwater and Heyn use 
quotations from interviews that show lay people reporting on and explaining their 
behaviour in highly individualistic terms. We will see some examples in the data 
extracts in this section, in which the speakers particularly emphosise the principle 
of sovereignty over one's own body, along with the moral virtue of being master 
or mistress of one's own destiny. 
Our first data extract is a quote from Lynn Atwater's study, "Women's 
Transition to First Extramarital Sex" (Atwater, 1979). It appears about ten pages 
into Atwater's report. In this particular section she is making the case that "women 
are changing their lives to place more emphasis on self-determination" and, that 
being the case, "an "affair"will no longer be something that "just happens" but will 
become a more consciously planned activity" (p. 47). Atwater's interview 
participants "did not just drift into "affairs" or enter them spontaneously, " she asserts 
(ibid. ); in fact, "three-quarters of the women thought about becoming involved 
before doing so" (p. 48). The following block quote, with Atwater's comment in 
brackets at the end, is presented by way of illustration. 
Extract 7.01 
01 1 began to realize that I had made a mistake by not having sex before 
02 marriage. It suddenly hit me that I- who was only 28 - would die having 
03 had sex with only one man! I decided that was not what I wanted to do 
04 with my body, and after that the idea of having sex with another man 
05 become something possible, even desirable. But I had nobody in mind at 
06 the time. (Thinking time about one year) 
(Atwater, 1979, p. 48) 
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In contrast to Atwater's sociological approach, let us take a more discursively 
orientated view of this woman's report and see what is thereby revealed. Two 
things can be acknowledged from the outset. Firstly, the woman articulates the 
individualistic principle of sole ownership of the right to dictate what happens to 
one's body: "I decided that was not what I wanted to do with my body'(Iines 3-4). 
This is indeed a hearable contrast to the more antiquarian, traditional sorts of 
arguments that married people "become one flesh" and that marriage rightly and 
properly sets limits on the couple's behaviour (especially the woman's sexual 
behaviour). Secondly, Atwater is not mistaken in noticing that the woman saying 
that she "hod nobody in mind at that time" (lines 5-6) is a way of anticipatively 
countering suggestions that she rushed indiscriminately into the arms of the first 
man available. She does indeed present her choice of a lover as more thoughtful 
than that (cf. the studied thoughtfulness of Wolfe's survey respondent in Extract 
6.01). However, as an example of a generic rationale from my database, this 
small piece of discourse displays certain features that Atwater overlooks. 
Most importantly, notice the two phrases "I began to realize" (line 1) and "it 
suddenly hit me" (line 2). This woman may indeed display her search for a lover as 
a relatively considered and thoughtful process but her representation of how 
"having sex with another man" initially come to seem like a good idea is quite the 
opposite. For from slow and thoughtful, the speaker's "realization" that she has 
made a mistake is depicted as striking her in a blinding flash. Like some of the 
constructions of unreasonable behaviour and true love that we examined in the 
lost chapter, this makes use of a version of the "at first I thought ... but then I 
realized ... " device (Socks, 1984). In this case, 
it displays the speaker, a married 
woman, as not premeditating the abandonment of sexual exclusivity in her 
marriage, not having always liked the idea of infidelity and finally electing to put 
theory into practice. Rather, it displays her as having entered into this 
conventionally exclusive relationship innocently and in good faith, only later to be 
"hit" by the sudden realisation that she has neglected to do something important. 
This practice is typical of accounts that feature versions of the sovereign 
infidel and it reveals much about the authors' interactional concerns. Versions of 
the sovereign infidel are produced by speakers who are or were dyad-bound 
infidels. As such, they can be held accountable for having got themselves into 
such a binding relationship in the first place. If they wanted to enjoy a range of 
sexual partners, a hostile recipient might enquire, why did the speaker bother to 
get married? Accounts that feature versions of the sovereign infidel address this 
problem. They do so by making the realisation of sovereignty part of a transition 
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story which explains through narration how the speaker transformed from an 
initially faithful dyadic partner into a self-acknowledged infidel. The transition is 
packaged in just the terms we see above, as an unexpected and unsolicited 
awakening or new awareness. 
As a point of interest, transition stories are usually narrated in the post 
tense, with obvious functional pay-offs for the speaker. Making a temporally 
compressed, historical event of one's transition from fidelity to infidelity can be a 
way of avoiding answering awkward, detailed questions about exactly what 
decision making processes the speaker went through, exactly what degree of 
moral doubt they might have accountably experienced and so on (compare this 
to the construction of isolated episodes of infidelity in Chapter 4, especially 
accounts of intoxication). However, this is not inevitably the case. I have one or 
two examples in my data-base of speakers claiming that they are in "the 
transitional stage" now, that they are just now waking up to this or that "fact. " 
Notably, these present tense accounts of transition occur only in very sympathetic 
contexts such as my own research interviews. 
Extract 7.02 is a quote from a research interview that appears in Dalma Heyn's 
book, The Erotic Silence of the Married Woman (Heyn, 1992). Heyn uses it to 
support the following argument. First, she says that her interviewees did not get 
married with the intention of having an affair. However, being "modern women" 
they had experienced premcarital sex, "so it was monogamy that was new to 
them, not multiple relationships. This sociological shift characterises research that 
shows a woman is more likely to have extramarital sex if she has had premarital 
sex, " however much she might consciously and personally intend not to commit 
adultery (p. 49). In a nutshell, Heyn claims that modern, sexually experienced 
women find the long term sexual exclusivity that comes with marriage more 
difficult and unnatural than women of previous generations. Nonetheless, their 
conventional assumption that marriage ought to be sexually exclusive makes 
necessary a certain amount of "emotional repositioning" so that an affair can take 
place. 
Extract 7.02 
"I can't explain how I was able to drop my long-held beliefs about 
monogamy and instantly adopt a Go For It! attitude toward sex. " June tells 
me, "but I did. Everything I thought I believed in simply dissolved and I did 
the quickest turnaround you can imagine. I went to my room the night 1 
05 met him and thought, "I want that guy; I'm going to have an affair with 
him'as if I were a practiced ... adulteress. I was as clear as I'd ever been. 
shocked myself, and double-checked my thinking, kind of like, 'Come on 
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now, June, that's not your style, that's the opposite of your style. ' 'Are you 
sure? ' I kept asking myself. And'You bet! 'wos my answer. So much for my 
10 superego. 
"I felt more than tempted to sleep with him, I felt determined to -I was on a 
mission - as if I'd found something I had to have and I'd be damned if I 
wouldn't have it. I felt greedy. Needy. All those words I'd scoffed at, 
words like'growth'and 'experience' come to me in a rush; I suddenly felt 
15 my own life was a human-potential movement and this was the only way 
to develop my human potential and I'd be throwing away what I knew 
was right for me if I didn't pursue it. I'd be a woman with no life in her, a 
silly, scared wimp. All my'Grab the Moment' impulses; all my'Don't Let 
Opportunity Pass You By' feelings come up and squashed my puny little 
20 'Don't Because You're a Married Woman' prohibitions, which suddenly felt 
about as compelling as my'Don't Eat Sugar'vows. I was surprised by my 
own vehemence, and about the stupidity I was able to ascribe to my own 
prohibitions. It wasn't as if morality didn't exist; it was as if a greater 
morality, one I hadn't yet been aware of, had finally made itself visible to 
25 me. This must be how people rationalize murder, I thought. They tell 
themselves: It Is Good. God wants it that way. Do it. 
"And so I decided, since I wasn't even on the fence about this, that I 
wouldn't dredge up some fatuous rationale to try to justify it or dissuade 
myself. I'd go with it, and deal with the rest later. " 
(Heyn, 1992, pp. 37-38) 
As before, we can see that this speaker, June, is telling a transition story which 
compresses her recognition of certain facts about her right to do as she pleases 
into a sudden revelation. The key phrases here are'instantly' (line 2), "the quickest 
turnaround you can imagine" (line 4), "came to me in a rush" (line 14) and I 
suddenly felt" (line 14). This helps to support her self-presentation as someone who 
did not marry in bad faith, with the intention of cheating on her husband: 
particularly notice the mentions that she was not at that time "a practised 
adulteress" (line 6) and the reflective remark "that's not your style, that's the 
opposite of your style (line 8). Like the speaker in Extract 7.0 1, she is very clearly 
using the language of individualism to couch her argument. While Atwater's 
participant speaks of "what I wanted to do with my body, " June deploys the 
rhetoric of "developfing] my human potential" (line 16) and knowing more 
authoritatively than anyone else what is "right for me" (line 17) 
Now, here are a couple of new points that need to be made before we 
move on from the sovereign infidel. Firstly, notice the expression "beliefs about 
monogamy" (lines 1-2), followed by references to "prohibitions" (lines 20,23). 
These are terms which allow June to skirt the issue of any personal injury that she 
might have caused her husband by breaking their relational contract. Consider 
the sorts of terms that she could have chosen but did not, the sorts of terms that 
might be preferred by someoneviho was keen to criticise her. Such a person 
might say that June did not merely "drop her beliefs. " find that her "prohibitions" 
had been "squashed" and revised her ideas about competing but quite abstract 
systems of "morality. " Rather, one could say that June committed adultery, broke 
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her marriage vows, cheated on her husband or whatever. All of these 
formulations refer specifically to June's marital status, her voluntary and personal 
promises and commitments, the rightful expectations of her particular partner 
and so on. Against this foil, it is clear that June has chosen terms that remove her 
behaviour from the realm of specific occasions, unique people and interpersonal 
relationships, launching it into a timeless, impersonal discourse of ideology. The 
some rhetorical move explains her choice of "monogamy'rather than "fidelity" as 
the category term for what she has rejected or abandoned. Fidelity describes a 
personal, moral promise exchanged between a couple as part of constituting 
themselves as such; monogamy describes a social system; a broad and 
impersonal organisation of relationships so that they are sexually exclusive and not 
polygamous. The infidelity/monogamy contrast is one that we will meet again in 
the section called "public morality, mainstream society. " 
Secondly, look at how June describes her decision about what course of 
action to take subsequent to her sudden revelation. "I decided, since I wasn't 
even on the fence about this, that I wouldn't dredge up some fatuous rationale to 
try to justify it or dissuade myself. I'd go with it, and deal with the rest later" (lines 
27-29). It is, of course, interesting that June explicitly refers to not "dredging up 
some fatuous rationale, " thereby orientating to the possibility that a "fatuous 
rationale" is precisely what her account risks being taken for. However, what is 
perhaps more interesting is the fact that June constructs two possible kinds of 
fatuous rationale: one that would hove persuaded her into infidelity and one that 
would have persuaded her out of it. This dual construction provides for her to 
reject both lines of reasoning and warrants her selection of a third option: not to 
reason at all, either for or against, and instead simply to "go with it. " This 
unthinking, un-rationalised "going with it" is controstively presented as more 
honest, uncontrived and therefore natural, discursively akin to "trusting one's 
instincts. " Through this formulation, June invokes the rhetorical authority of nature 
and the natural, a defensive manoeuvre that is a recurrent theme in constructions 
of generic rationales as we will see throughout the remainder of this chapter. 
Boredom and Fun 
In the variegated discursive fabric of contemporary social science, the strand that 
makes the heaviest and r-nost explicit use of notions of what is "natural" and what 
constitutes "human nature" is that based on evolutionary theory, exemplified by 
evolutionary psychology, previously a topic of discussion in Chaptdr 1. The stance 
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of researchers such as Baker and Bellis (1993,1995) is that instances of what are 
ostensibly couple or "pair"relationships spilling over into extradyadic sex, extra-pair 
copulation, non-monogamy and such are so common that humans may be 
presumed to be universally prone to such behaviours. This initial observation is 
usually well supported by comparisons with similar findings about the universal 
non-monogamy of non-human creatures, notably mammals and birds. The task, 
then, is to explain what evolutionarily adaptive purpose such human behaviour 
might serve. It is worth noting that many people take evolutionary explanations 
for human sexual behaviour to be deeply offensive: witness the current media 
portraits of feminists'and other groups'angry response to Craig Palmer's and 
Randy Thornhill's forthcoming book on the evolutionary psychology of rope; add 
to this the searing critique of such approaches published by Lynne Segal (1999, 
chapter 3; also see Segal, 1997, p. 209). The most common complaint is that such 
accounts ore instrumental in removing personal, moral responsibility from the 
perpetrators of such despicable actions. If they were not originally conceived as 
defences they are certainly usable as such (it is argued) which amounts to the 
some thing. I will return to this note a little later on. 
Similar accounts of the nature of human beings, their psychology and 
natural social arrangements, are evident in defences for infidels and infidelity 
which feature one or another generic rationale. This is particularly noticeable 
when the generic rationale in question is a version of boredom and fun. To fully 
appreciate this aspect of boredom and fun, it is necessary to recall the defences 
of unreasonable behaviour and being short changed from the previous chapter. 
Those defensive practices involved constructing accounts of individual victims of 
infidelity and of particular dyadic relationships as conspicuously and abnormally 
failing in some way. The crux of those specific reasons for infidelity was that other 
people's partners and other dyadic relationships are normatively not like this 
particular example. Some unusual and problematic deficit or excess was found 
to exist in the partner or the relationship which set them apart from the norm and 
thereby provided the infidel with a reasoned basis for his or her behaviour. In 
contrast, versions of boredom and fun construct dissatisfaction and disaffection 
with one's partner or relationship as a natural development. These are accounts 
not of disease but of natural decay. 
Let's look at some data. Extract 7.03 is another netizen's anonymous 
contribution to the Friends and Lovers online "poll" on the subject of "why do lovers 
cheat" (I have previously described this website and its format in Chapters 4 and 
5). This contributor identifies herself as "Ariel from Alabama. " 
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Extract 7.03 
01 People cheat because what's new is exciting, and therefore attractive. 
02 Being with the same person day after day soon loses it's novelty and we 
03 begin to look for the xcitement elsewhere. 
(Home & Leisure Publishing Inc., 1998, 
http: //cyberspud. com/friends_lovers/read I O. htm) 
Though this is a very short extract of data there is, as always, plenty to be 
unpacked. Perhaps the most important thing to notice is the "we" on line 2. The 
brief appearance of this first-person pronoun highlights the absence of human 
agency elsewhere in Ariel's account. She reifies and naturalises the phenomena 
she describes by mainly sticking to a passive, empiricist style of discourse. This is a 
form of talk that we have noted in earlier chapters, for instance, in the report of 
how "the closeness evaporated" in Arabella's marriage, in Extract 6.03. Moreover, 
Ariel's account is in the present tense. This is a device for representing things as 
continuous and reliable over time, just as the past tense can function to parcel 
things off as historical episodes, finished with and not part of the normal routine 
(cf. Chapter 4). Additionally, Billig's work on the structure of argumentation (e. g., 
Billig, 1987) highlights Ariel's opening statement (line 1) as almost syllogistic in form. 
What's new is exciting (A equals B), what's exciting is attractive (B equals C): 
therefore what's new is attractive (A equals C). Ariel does with her syllogism what 
other examples of boredom and fun in my database show being done with 
idiomatic expressions (Drew and Holt, 1989), known to be robust in the face of 
criticism and commonly produced in situations of conflict or at least a lack of 
support (Potter, 1996a, p. 168). For instance, another netizen in circumstances 
similar to Ariel remarked of sex in marriage that "the old saw about putting a 
penny in the jar for every time you do it the I st year then take one out after that & 
you'll always have a lot of pennies left is pretty true I think. " (This is a nice example 
because it not only invokes the idiom itself but additionally indexes it as such with 
the preface "the old saw. ") The net effect of these kinds of formulations and of 
Ariel's account specifically is a heavily fact-constructive argument about why 
people in general observably "cheat. " 
As anticipated, there is some highly inclusive categorisation going on here. 
It is not that some relationships lose their novelty, perhaps as a result of the 
unsatisfactory behaviour of some victims of infidelity. Ariel's is a universolising 
account, even more inclusive than Arabella's observations in Chapter 6 that"a lot 
of people" suffer from being in a "coring but celibate" marriage. The "loss of 
novelty" which explains why people are motivated to seek something new is 
presented as an unqualified fact and, because of its position in the sentence, is 
hearably a natural consequence of "being with the same person day after day" 
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(fine 2), that description being a robust and not challengeably incorrect 
characterisation of a normatively organised dyadic relationship. 
The'We" of line 2 is the single reminder in this extract that Ariel may be 
attending to a more personal stake in her account than is immediately suggested 
by the logically structured, impersonal facts that dominate her discourse. It calls 
attention to the ability of these universal facts to account for Ariel's own 
behaviour as well as that of the rest of the population. That is, it becomes 
apparent that invoking these generalised principles and observations about the 
world (like the universalising language of the individual's right to decide what 
happens to his or her body) is a move that functions to defend Ariel's own actual 
and/or potential attempts to "look for the excitement elsewhere, " irrespective of 
whether she is additionally argued to have intended it that way. A hostile 
recipient or argumentative opponent who could claim never to have "cheated" 
on their partner might expectably make that defensive function and Ariel's 
inferable stake the basis of their critique. This is comparable to the objections to 
Palmer's and Thornhill's evolutionary, universalised and naturalised account of 
rape that I mentioned earlier. 
The second piece of data in this section, Extract 7.04, is drawn from one of my 
own research interviews. We have previously met the respondent, Emma, in 
Chapter 5 (Extract 5.04). The following stretch of dialogue is taken from near the 
beginning of our conversation (page 5 of the transcript). 
Extract 7.04 
Emma: I live with (. ) four lads and one of the lads I live with I'm 
I'm seeinq, I wasn't seeing him when I moved into the 
house but (. ) I moved into the house and then the 
relationship occurred a: nd (. ) we haven't been together 
05 that long now, it's about four months 
Rachel: mhm 
Emma: and (. ) it's so: comfortable F[IoughingJ1 
Rachel: L mmm J 
Emma: and it's like f. ) I get in, and the first thing I probably do is 
10 put my trackie bottoms on (. ) a: nd (. ) I'll scrape my hair 
back (. ) and he sees me first thing in the morning and you 
know even offer a couple of weeks of seeing each other 
he was seeing me when I came out the shower (. ) walk 
down the lounge you know (. ) panda eyes with mascara 
15 down your face, things that you don't (xxx) and it's got to 
the point now where I have been unfaithful several 
times, several different people and J. ) it's not and 1,1, I'm 
convinced that if we weren't living together then I 
wouldn't have done but cus we're ýý together we've 
20 got to (. ) a comfortable kind of stage where um (. ) we 
don't always make the effort (. ) and I just think (. ) 
sometimes like you say I just think o: h you know (. ) I can 
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get away without making any effort (. ) but when um (. ) 
there's a couple of blokes that I'm sort of flirting with at the 
25 moment, interested in, when they (ing me up and say do 
you wanna come out for a drink, do you wanna come 
round to mine, do you wanna meet up (. ) u: m (. ) I 
suddenly find the energy, have a shower, wash my hair, 
shave my legs, do everything, go out, I'm suddenly Miss 
30 Charming, Miss you know Flirty and everything like that, 
and I come back into the house a: nd J. ) my boyfriend's 
there and I'm just like (. ) uh. 
Rachel: F[loughingll 
Emma: Lgo to bed. ] 
Emma's is an unusually graphic and detailed version of boredom and fun that is 
rich in clues about the action orientation of this defensive practice. Before we 
unpack her claims about how people and relationships work. notice the 
expression "like you say"on line 22. The universolising aspect of claims about the 
natural causes of infidelity can potentially present a problem in situations of face- 
to-face interaction (like Emma's situation and unlike Ariel's). The problem is that a 
universalising account co-implicates the recipient in whatever is being claimed or 
described, as well as the speaker and "people in general. " There is always the risk 
that recipients will respond to this co-implicotion as highly offensive when the 
topic at hand happens to be something like "routinely cheating on the person 
you live with. " Emma orientates to this risk in "like you soy, " an expression that 
works to construct the claims she is making now as in alignment or agreement 
with things that Rachel has said earlier. It is a kind of insurance against a response 
of outright rejection or contradiction. 
Emma uses a less impersonol, empiricist style of discourse than Ariel in 
Extract 7.03. She describes incidents in her own relationships to illustrate her case. 
However, Emma's argument, no less than Ariel's, is constructed so as to be 
generally applicable and therefore to draw attention away from questions of her 
unique and private relational contract with her partner, Ben. Following the 
analysis of Edwards (1994,1995,1997), Emma's descriptions of what goes on at 
home with her boyfriend and contrasting descriptions of what happens when 
other men ring her up are script formulations that characterise the boredom and 
fun as not unique to some particular occasion nor even unique to Emma and her 
consorts but as a generalised pattern. 
Ariel used the expression "being with the same person day of ter do, /' to 
refer to the conventional type of couple relationship. That is not a challengeably 
wrong description but it is a rather unflattering one that prepares the ground for 
her more controversial claim about the novelty inevitably wearing off. Emma 
accomplishes something similar with the word "comfortable" (lines 7,20). In the 
sort of discourse that positively advocates and promotes exclusive couple 
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relationships, the truism that people become comfortable in each other's 
company is taken to be a desirable development, a welcome sequel to an initial 
period of unfamiliarity and uncertainty in which the couple are still getting to 
know one another. Emma turns that discursive convention on its head and uses 
11 comfortable" in a critical way. It refers not to a welcome intimacy but to the 
onset of a chronic failure to "make the effort" (lines 21,23) and indeed a loss of 
the necessary "energy" (line 28), where "making the effort" is characterised by: 
being "charming" and "flirty" (line 30); doing the sort of grooming and preening 
that is indexed by Emma's three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) of "have a shower, wash 
my hair, shave my legs" (lines 28-29); and contrastively not appearing in utilitarian 
tracksuit bottoms with scraped-back hair and "mascara down your face" (lines 10- 
1,1,14-15). This not challengeably inaccurate yet rather despondent portrayal of 
the "comfortable stage" (line 20) that is naturally achieved by coupledom, 
especially when the couple live together, provides the warrant for the more 
controversial part of Emma's argument. 
Adel cites "looking for the excitement elsewhere" as the natural human 
response to the loss of novelty that accompanies stable relationships. Emma uses 
much the some reasoning but is more forthright in her description of the effects of 
boredom and over-familiarity: "it's got to the point now where I have been 
unfaithful (. ) several times, several different people" (lines 15-17). The upgraded 
description of the blameable behaviour and the emphasis on its severity is a 
means for Emma to present herself as a rational and indeed dismayed observer 
of her own infidelity, detaching the Emma who speaks now from the Emma who 
neglects her boyfriend but willingly rushes round after other men. Compare this to 
Chapter 5, where speakers made a display of observing their own behaviour and 
inferring something from that about their flawed personalities or dispositions. In 
this case, of course, the invited inference is not that Emma is dispositionally "that 
sort of person" but that infidelity is the result of her relationship having first become 
.. comfortable" and inexorably having arrived at that certain point where no-one, 
however dismayed, would naturally behave any differently. 
Public Morality, Mainstream Society 
In Chapter 1, under the heading "Some Unsatisfactory Treatments of Infidelity 
Discourse, " I reviewed some feminist, social constructionist approaches to the 
problem of infidelity. Scholars such as Burns and Griffin (1996), Dryden (1999) and 
Kitzinger and Powell (1995) recognise (in) fidelity talk as, (a) culturally specific and 
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(b) actively constructive in the sense that such talk is treated as having various 
undesirable material and emotional consequences, for social groups such as 
women and for individual members of those groups. Now, these authors are not 
just commentators on society but critics. As such they are quick to observe that 
notions such as "monogamy"and "infidelity" are not just social artefacts and 
therefore liable to change interestingly over time but, moreover, are part of a 
society-wide moral order that attempts to constrain and direct behaviour with 
real penalties for those who are identified as somehow failing to conform. Broadly 
speaking, it is usual for feminist critics to voice considerable anger about the 
content and application of this public moral code regarding sexual and 
otherwise intimate behaviour because of the preferential treatment it gives some 
members of society and the injustices it inflicts upon others. 
The research interviewees in the data extracts to follow are not feminists 
and the orientation of their discourse shows that they are far more concerned 
with defending themselves and their own behaviour than with emancipating 
entire social groups. That said, there are remarkable overlaps and similarities in 
their patterns of talk. My data show that identification of a socially constructed 
and socially enforced moral regime and a politically flavoured critique of that 
regime is not the exclusive preserve of academics and professional activists but is 
also part of a defensive practice adopted by unrepentant infidels. I have called 
that practice "public morality, mainstream society. " As we will see, it is a generic 
rationale that can accommodate themes and arguments from both the 
sovereign infidel and boredom and fun. 
Extract 7.05 is drawn from my interview with Kyle, an habitual infidel whom we first 
encountered in Chapter 5 (Extract 5.01). The following exchange occurred very 
early in our conversation (pages 1-2 of the transcript). 
Extract 7.05 
Kyle: do you want me to draw on personal um experiences or 
(. ) urn (. ) what, what I think about the situation 
Rachel: we can, we can do, I'm quite happy either with general 
theory or sort of personal reminiscences (. ) the sorts of 
05 ques- let me give you an example, the sorts of issues that 
interest me are for instance, a favourite topic of mine over 
the last couple of weeks has been (. ) if you find yourself in 
the situation of being a third party in on affair where 
you're having a sexual relationship with somebody who's 
io married or primarily attached to someone else, then (. ) 
what might your (. ) moral responsibility be, if any, towards 
um the e: r regular partner of the person that you're having 
this affair with? 
H 
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15 Rachel: that's the sort of thing that concerns me, I'm quite 
interested in that on an intellectual level and on a more 
personal level as well so: there's the sorts of questions that I 
really seek answers to (laughing] 
Kyle: yeah 
20 Rachel: what do you think about that one, for instance? 
Kyle: I think (. ) it's about (. ) your coping mechanisms and how 
much you want f. ) to get involved in a situation which on 
the surface is wrong to get involved in (. ) but um 
underneath (. ) you can jusfify it (. ) right, and if there's (. ) if 
25 there's options (. ) well not so much options but if (. ) yeah, 
you can Lusfify it. know what I mean, cus it's what you 
want. more to the point if you can get away with it, and 
I'm looking more on the idea of (. ) infidelity brings (. ) you 
know (. ) in a sense a spice of life, to do the things you 
30 shouldn't do, in a sense. and to enjoy the things you do 
do. 
Rachel: yeah 
Kyle: and (. ) Lisk comes into play (. ) personality, your 
character drive 
35 Rachel: when you said, you were saying about justifying it, did you 
mean justifying it to other people or to yourself or both? = 
Kyle: = to yourself 
Rachel: to yourself 
Kyle: to yoursel , because (. ) it's not a public act. it's 
(. ) private, 
40 so um other people shouldn't really come, other people 
shouldn't come into the equation. you know its u: m (. ) in 
this society a taboo (. ) so you don't really (. ) sing out loud 
your taboos do you, you just, you just keep them like 
discreet 
45 Rachel: mm 
Kyle: because then you come into the realms of emotions 
you know (. ) and um who's gonna get hurt and (. ) um 
unfortunately in, into the arms of people who are quick to 
point the finger at you because their lives are so fucking 
50 boring 
Rachel: mm 
Kyle: know what I mean f. ) and they ain't got the bottle 
Rachel: yeah 
Kyle: to do what you have done you know and um. (. ) it gives 
55 them something, you know you live for them 
Rachel: mm 
Kyle: you know, and fuck em. 
This very vivid piece of discourse invites two sets of analytic remarks. The first set 
concerns Kyle's use of various contrasts. The second concerns the relationship of 
generic rationales to special categories of self (the subject of Chapter 5). 
The extract begins with Kyle's construction of a rhetorical opposition 
between his "personal experiences, " on the one hand, and "what I think, " on the 
other (lines 1-2). There is, of course, no natural diktat that people's experiences 
and thoughts must be treated as mutually exclusive but Kyle constructs them as 
such and Rachel accommodates and affirms this construction with her contrasts 
1. general theor, /'versus "personal reminiscences" (lines 3-4) and "on an intellectual 
level" versus "on a more personal level" (lines 16-17). At the outset. then, Kyle 
effectively obtains permission to treat these two as independent and separate 
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categories of talk or available resources that he might "draw on" (line 1) as an 
interviewee. His subsequent remarks, from line 21, show the utility of this 
distinction: he opts immediately for the "general theory"sort of talk and in so 
doing legitimately avoids talking about any specific occasion of finding himself "in 
the situation of being a third party in an affair, " as Rachel constructs it in lines 7-8. 
The next contrast he produces distinguishes that which is "on the surface" 
from that which lies "underneath" (lines 23-24). This distinction exemplifies the 
appearancelreality device identified by Edwards (1997, p. 248). Edwards 
observes of this device that it is "rhetorically effective in that it recognises the 
obviousness of appearances and so acknowledges the basis for [anlother 
person's (defective) understanding. At the some time, it subverts that impression, 
in favour of a purportedly more insightful and adequate analysis" (ibid. ). In this 
particular case, as we can see, Kyle uses the device to characterise the type of 
.1 situation" Rachel has described as only apparently morally "wrong" (line 23) and 
in reality "justifiable" (lines 24,26). The question now arises of how third-party 
infidelity can be defended. We saw in Chapter 5 that one method is to construct 
oneself as less than averagely capable of resisting the temptation to mess with 
other people's partners. We saw in Chapter 6 that another method is to accuse a 
specific victim of unreasonable behaviour or to invest a specific extradyadic 
relationship with the allure of true love. However, in Extract 7.05 Kyle is defending 
third-party infidelity as a general practice, a much more difficult task. His success 
involves the production of another contrast pair. 
This third contrast separates the realms of "public" and "private" (line 39). 
Kyle does not attempt to deny the conventional wisdom that trampling on 
innocent people*s "emotions" (line 46) and causing them to "get hurt" (line 47) is 
wrong. His point is that the way to avoid that outcome is not necessarily to avoid 
interfering in their relationships in the first place but to protect them from finding 
out about it, which he refers to as being "discreet" (line 44). The responsibility of 
the third-party infidel is to "get away with it" (line 27) and if that much is 
accomplished, that is, if the "taboos" peculiar to "this society" (lines 42-43) are 
publicly seen to be respected and observed, then an infidel such as Kyle himself 
may behave in private exactly as he wishes. 
Kyle does not go so for as to claim that everyone else makes the some 
distinctions and behoves as he does. He allows that he is, in that regard. unusual. 
However, in lines 48-57 he is unsympathetic in the exirerne towards the 
hornogenised moss of "other people" (lines 36,40) who do not follow his example. 
While seerningly acknowledging that it would be better if they did not "get hurt, " 
his explanation for their collective failure to enjoy the "spice of life" that infidelity 
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naturally "brings" (lines 28-29) is not that they have considered reasons for 
eschewing such behaviour but simply that "they ain't got the bottle to do what 
you have done" (lines 52-54) and therefore rely on the occasional expos6 of 
activities like Kyle's to alleviate their own "boredom" (line 50) and indeed "give 
them something to live foe' (lines 54-55). Thus, Kyle universalises a private desire for 
and interest in infidelity but simultaneously particularises himself as somebody 
rather special: someone who has "got the bottle" to transform fantasy into action. 
As generic rationales go, this is clearly one that converts very neatly into the "poor 
general aptitude" type of special category of self in situations such as that of 
Extract 5.01 where he is required to discuss more specifically an experience of 
upsetting someone else. The essential skills of the successful infidel, in Kyle's 
construction of the world, are self-knowledge and realism about one's strengths 
and weaknesses (Extract 5.01), natural accompaniments of the ability to "keep 
things discreet" (Extract 7.05, lines 42-44). 
If anything, the next interviewee is even less forgiving. Extract 7.06 is drawn from 
my interview with Doug, whom you may remember from Chapter 3, Extract 3.05, 
in which Lizzy discussed her affair with him during his marriage to Kim. By the time 
Doug and I spoke, he had finally separated from Kim and was dating in a new 
relationship that permitted some extradyodic activity. The following extract is 
drawn from late on in our conversation (pages 57-9 of the transcript). Doug has 
just been remarking that with his very first affair come the surprising discovery that 
the secret, extramarital sex enhanced and indeed rejuvenated the sexual life of 
his marriage. This, he reminisces, was "a nice excuse to have. " 
Extract 7.06 
Doug: if I was in the some position again I wouldn't give C fuck 
about excuses you know [laughing] 
Rachel: no I just felt like it F [laughing] 1 
Doug: Lyea: h fuck itj I just felt like it (. ) fuck o: ff, 
05 leave me Falonel 
Rachel: Lyeah I 
Doug: don't you ever feel like it? be honest 
Rachel: (laughing] 
Doug: and there's there's there's the crux of it isn't it, you know 
10 how many people could honestly say (. ) they've never 
even thouqht about it 
Rachel-- mm 
Doug: you know they've never wrestled with it for a moment you 
know 
Is Rachel: yea-. h 
Doug: I think it's such a (. ) I think the reason that (. ) infidelity is 
seen as a hu: ge social problem, right (. ) but f. ) to me 
that's just (. ) it's looking at it from the wrong way 
Rachel: mm 
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20 Doug: to me, the the fact that infidelity is such a constant issue, 
because people are always doing it, (. ) surely doesn't that 
suggest that monogamy is a huge social problem 
Rachel: I do know what you mean, F yes (. ) yeah 1 
Doug: Lhght? you know? J I mean to 
25 me it's a case of like everybody's (. ) yelling away at the 
symr)toms 
Rachel: ITIM 
Doug: and not spotting where the actual disease is you know 
Rachel: [laughing] yeah F yeah 1 
30 Doug: Land theJ disease is is very obviously that 
humans can't behave monogamously. 
Rachel: mm 
Doug: we've been tryinq it now for three thousand odd years 
and are Ltýill not getting it fucking right, now this should, 
35 you know humans are good at getting things dght when 
they've had a bit of practise. 
Rachel: mm 
Doug: you know, for the most part 
Rachel: r mm mm 1 
40 Doug: Lyou know, sociallyJ we manage to stay civilised 
Rachel: mm = 
Doug: =I know it's only four square meals away from f. ) falling 
apart but we manage it on a fairly constant basis (. ) we 
manage to (. ) not actually kill too many of each other a 
45 lot of the time f. ) why can't we manage (. ) to (. ) to stay 
[laughing] sexually constant with someone, you know? 
Rachel: F mmm I 
Doug: Land theJ reason is (. ) it's just not (. ) in our nature 
Rachel: yeah 
50 Doug: you know, I think, I think that monogamy is such a (. ) an 
appa: llinq construct 
Rachel: tell me what you don't like about it 
Doug: it's censorship Rachel (. ) and it, it's self impo: sed 
Rachel: yeah 
55 Doug: [laughing] it's censorship masquerading as freedom of 
choice this is what gets me 
Rachel: mm 
Doug: you know? 
Rachel: ITIM 
60 Doug: and hopefull in ruture generations it'll be viewed as a 
very similar practice to the Chinese binding women's feet 
youknow? 
Rachel: mrn mm yeah 
Doug: it creates, it creates tortuous situations (. ) we wouldn't 
65 have (. ) break ups of families if families weren't designed 
to be broken 
Rachel: you're so right (laughing] I'm finding this, this is (. ) you know 
I'm finding it really difficult to a: rgue, devils, play devil's 
advocate with you because I aqree with you so 
70 thoroughly [laughing] 
Doug. you know 
Rachel: yeah [laughing] 
Doug: you know, how can you, how can, you can only break it 
up it's desiqned to be broken fyou knowl 
75 Rochek L yeah J 
Doug: it's like taking your best china and putting it in the middle 
of a room with a three year old in it and going now don't 
break anything 
Rachel: [laughing] yeah 
80 Doug: you know, three year old with a hammer 
Rachel: yeah (. ) that's right f. ) r (laughs] 1 
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Doug: LbecauseJ f. ) you know (. ) at the end 
of the day (. ) you're presented with the right horny 
opportunities (-) r(loughingll intelligence and social 
85 Rachel: L mm I 
Doug: responsibility just disoopea , you know we're just not built 
that way 
Rachel: mm (. ) h- how in that case I'm wondering do some 
people apparently manage to succeed at it? do you 
90 think anybody does? 
Doug: I think they probably ý; Lo (. ) you know? (. ) I think some 
people probably ý; Lo. and okay that's great f. ) but you 
know (. ) this, this only appears laudable Rachel because 
(. ) LhLir personal choice fits in with what's expected 
95 Rachel: mm 
Doug: right, it only appears to be a clesi: rable situation because 
th- their choice fits in with the narrow limits of the choices 
that they're allowed 
Rachel: = yes 
100 Doug: youknow? 
Rachel. mm 
Doug: and you know at the end of the day (. ) I'm not saying that 
monogamy is wrong 
Rachel: rmmi 
105 Doug: L I'm I not saying there's anything wrong with it, if you 
wonno be that way and that's the way you can live your 
life and you're happ with it and you're sure you're happy 
with it, well even if you're not, if you've chosen it fine 
Rachel: mm 
HO Doug: you know (. ) but what about the rest of us 1. ) probably the 
mciorit of us 1,1 would say 
Rachel: I don't know, it seems to me Doug that if you want 
sweeping generalisations then it seems to me that the um 
(. ) maiorit of people probably a: re (. ) unfaithful to their 
115 partners at some point and the majority of people feel, 
those some people feel very passionatel that they do 
not wont their partners to do this to them 
Doug: mm mm (. ) well yeah but you know (. ) contradiction's 
something we're really good at as a species, isn't it 1. ) it's 
120 ridiculous 
Rachel: it makes me wonder why: (. ) however passionately you 
might not like it (. ) the idea of your partner getting it on 
with somebody else (. ) it makes me, I wonder at people's 
optimism 
125 Doug: yeah 
Rachel: do you know what I mean? 
Doug. = well I'd call it ndfvetd to be honest. f. ) you know if you 
enter into a monogamous relationship with someone (. ) 
with the the rosy eyed (. ) view that (. ) that person is going 
130 to remain faithful to you (. ) I think that (. ) it's like buying a 
lottery ticket and expecting to fucking win. 
Like Kyle's, Doug's argument centres on universalising a hidden desire for and 
inclination toward infidelity (lines 7-14). An imaginary challenge is set up between 
Doug and the nameless "you" of line 7 who represents society's self-appointed 
moral guardians and is equivalent to Kyle's "people who are quick to point the 
finger. " Doug's adversary is represented as able to produce only one possible 
"honest" answer to his rhetorical demands to know whether they have never "felt 
like it, " never "thought about it, " "never wrestled with it for a moment. " Moreover, 
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this dramatic challenge turns out to be merely a preface to Doug's polemic of 
lines 16-131 in which he rails against the "appaTing construct" of monogamy (line 
51), attacking it in highly politicised terms (note the gender-specific reference to 
binding women's feet, line 6 1), and thereby successfully steers our conversation 
well clear of further discussion of any specific, personal harm that he might have 
caused to people such as his wife to whom he had certain normative, category 
bound obligations and responsibilities. 
As in Extract 7.02, Doug chooses as the contrast case for infidelity not 
"fidelity" but "monogamy' (lines 16-3 1). However, Doug goes further than Heyn's 
participant, June. He does not just select monogamy as an ideological object 
about which one harbours "beliefs" and which gives rise to certain worthy but dull 
11 prohibitions. " Rather, he goes all out to undermine monogamy as "a huge social 
problem" (line 22). This is partly accomplished through use of an 
appearance/reality device in lines 16-31. Particularly notice the expression "Surely 
doesn't that suggest" (lines 21-22). which displays Doug's take on (non-) 
monogamy as an irresistibly reasonable conclusion to anyone who can see the 
evidence that he is pointing out about the sheer prevalence and persistence of 
infidelitous behaviour - helpfully packaged in extreme case formulations on lines 
20 ("constant") and 21 ("always'). 
Availing himself of the resources of boredom and fun, Doug does not 
hesitate to infer that universal behaviours are natural behaviours. From line 28 he 
begins to talk in terms of the category"humans. " claiming that sexual exclusivity is 
-just not in our nature" (line 48) and that we humans are 'Just not built" (lines 86-87) 
in a way that provides for resistance when confronted with"the right horny 
opportunities" (lines 83-84). This lusty, spontaneous construction of human nature 
serves as the contrast case against which monogamy can be displayed as an 
.. appalling" artefact of culture or civilisation. However, his attack on monogamy 
on the grounds that it is unnatural and therefore. an unreasonable expectation 
does not stop him from additionally attacking it on political grounds. In lines 53-55 
and again in lines 94-111 he invokes the highly individualistic language of 
1. censorship" and "freedom of choice. " in this context, his reference to the 
practice of binding women's feet (line 6 1) is highlighted as more than a 
comparison of his experience of normative monogamy to the unjust oppression of 
gender-specific social groups. He describes an ancient practice, rhetorically 
contrasted against the "future" of future generations on line 6 1, and thus produces 
a typically liberal "up the mountain" account of social progress. Moreover, he 
attributes that practice to "the Chinese" and in so doing invokes an East/West 
cultural divide, with Western individual freedoms pitted against (Western 
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stereotypes about) Eastern collectivism generally and Chinese communism in 
particular. 
The hallmark of public morality, mainstream society is the construction of 
an imaginary opponent, some version of "mainstream society" or a personification 
of dogged conformity to (arbitrary and usually unjust or harmful) convention, 
against whom the speaker can be displayed as more honest, more courageous, 
more perceptive and/or more able to explain the known "facts. " That faceless 
figure is a discursive substitution for any unique and particular individual with 
respect to whom the infidel might be required to account for their behaviour. It is 
this straw man to which Doug returns in the final part of his account. By this time, 
Rachel has joined in with Doug's construction of those "other people" who are the 
demons of the piece and she'Wonders at their optimism" (lines 123-124) regarding 
their partners' fidelity given the observable "fact" that the "majority of people" are 
1. at some point" unfaithful (lines I 13-115). Doug picks up on the criticism in her use 
of "optimism" and upgrades it to "ncffvetd" (line 127), rounding off and ramming 
home in lines 130-131 the superiority of his (their) position relative to the others' with 
a well chosen idiom that summarises the extraordinarily remote likelihood that 
.. what's expected" (line 94) by society will ever be matched by reality: the (for 
Doug, expectably British, national) lottery represents odds of approximately 
fourteen million to one. 
Critique and Conclusions 
This is the final section of Chapter 7 and subsequent to the data analysis a 
number of issues await consideration. Let's take a look at the agenda before 
plunging in. It is roughly divisible into three parts. Firstly, there are questions of 
what our individual pieces of analysis suggest about the overall discursive 
practice of constructing a generic rationale for infidelity. Secondly, we have 
noticed that there are similar patterns in the discourse of, on the one hand. 
research participants and other lay people who use generic rationales to defend 
themselves and, on the other hand, scholars working in quite heterogeneous 
disciplines under the broad umbrella of social science. Further to our analysis of 
the former sort of discourse there are some critical observations to be made 
about the latter. Thirdly, in light of those criticisms there will be occasion to say 
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how an alternative, discursive-psychological approach to the topics of interest 
would manage to avoid the various identified problems and pitfalls. 
In this chapter we have looked at stretches of discourse that crucially include 
constructions of society, the human condition and other such grand, overarching 
conceptual objects. In the process of construction, speakers and writers have 
tackled big issues to do with human rights, competing systems of morality, the 
natural history of intimate relationships and so on. Analysing this material has not 
been a matter of weighing up accounts to find out which (if any) of them is "true. " 
Rather, the objective has been to learn about the local functions that are served 
by discursive constructions of this sort; to get acquainted with their interactional 
effects. 
The differences between varieties of generic rationale are themselves 
revealing. Versions of the sovereign infidel are notable for their function as 
transition stories in which people who are or were dyad-bound infidels account 
for their first steps beyond the limits of sexual exclusivity and simultaneously 
account for their being in a normatively exclusive relationship in the first place. 
Versions of boredom and fun are also characteristically produced by dyad- 
bound infidels. However, versions of public morality, mainstream society are 
comparatively rarely produced by speakers who describe themselves as presently 
committed to a traditional, exclusive dyadic relationship; this is more the preserve 
of third-party infidels and people who are (or consider themselves) freed from the 
demands of the traditional dyad. In other words, generic rationales vary 
meaningfully, not just in terms of their superficial content but in line with things like 
speakers' representations of their dyadic status. 
That said, the generic rationales for infidelity are also united by a certain 
similarity of function. Overall, the point of constructing a generic rationale is that it 
provides a justification for infidelity. This is a defensive practice that 
accommodates infidelity of low distinctiveness, to borrow from the argot of 
attribution theory. Because it rationalises infidelity as a general practice it is 
usable by speakers who cannot claim not to be "that sort of person" and who 
have a whole history of misbehaviour to defend. Concomitantly, generic 
rationales will account prospectively for infidelities that are anticipated but have 
not happened (or been discovered) yet. The only other form of defence that 
admits low distinctiveness is constructing a special category of self. However, you 
may recall from Chapter 5 that constructing a special category of self is a 
defence of low consensus, meaning that it acknowledges that other folk are not 
routinely unfaithful to their partners, and quite right too. In contrast, the generic 
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rationales uniquely accommodate low distinctiveness with high consensus, an 
audacious combination that enables serial infidels to co-implicate their recipients, 
their victims and even claim the moral high ground. 
I have previously compared the defensive practices of The Compleat 
Infidel to those emerging from the discursive study of the Scarman tribunal 
hearings by Atkinson and Drew (1979). The comparison extends to constructing a 
generic rationale. Along with constructing a non-event (Chapter 3) it is a 
practice that closely resembles Atkinson's and Drew's type I (justificatory) 
defence. For the purpose of contrast, recall that the other defences identified by 
Atkinson and Drew either; (a) respond to the noticing of a blameable (failure to) 
act with a reason for the speaker's behaviour, or (b) attempt to forestall 
accusation with a narrative that conveys how the blameable incident came 
about. However, the type I (justificatory) defence pre-empts trouble by 
volunteering descriptions that are constructed so as to display that no action (or 
no alternative action) was in fact necessary. In Chapter 3, this manifested as 
descriptions that showed that the speaker's actions either did not meet the 
qualifying criteria for catego6sation as "infidelity" (or whatever the category term 
relevant to that occasion happens to be) or else that special circumstances 
applied that rendered their ostensibly infidelitous actions"not prohibited. " In the 
present chapter, it is accomplished by steering the conversation away from the 
topic of individual victims of infidelity and their unique relationships, substituting 
abstract, impersonal topics such as ideology, human nature and culturally 
specific moral regimes. These impersonal entities are proportionally easier to set 
up for the purpose of being knocked down; "beliefs, " "prohibitions, " "taboos, " 
constructs" and "expectations" that disallow non-monogamy are relatively easy 
to display as so unrealistic and deluded that it is patently unnecessary to tailor 
one's behaviour in the way that they direct. 
In this chapter I have made a researchable topic of certain kinds of talk: social 
comment; n atural history; political critique. I have shown that research 
participants and other lay people are capable of using these kinds of talk as 
resources from which to build generic rationales for infidelity. The speakers and 
writers in this chapter are not producing' spontaneous, unsolicited reports that do 
nothing more than reflect the properties of the natural and social world. Rather, 
these people constitute the world as possessing certain properties, thereby 
orientating to and functionally performing the defensive interactional projects 
with which they are momentarily engaged. Now, people defending infidelity are 
not the only ones who use these discursive resources to bolster their arguments 
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and back up their claims. In this chapter and in Chapter II have cited various 
sociologists, evolutionary theorists and constructionist critics who demonstrably 
invoke similar "facts" about the natural and/or social world. These authors work in 
very different traditions but the point that I want to make subsequent to this 
chapter's data analysis applies across the board. 
The point is that these writers typically do not acknowledge their preferred 
versions of the world as resources. They may be willing to recognise some things 
as discursively constituted (e. g., as Burns, Dryden and company recognise 
infidelity) but they reify others (e. g., the gender disparity of the material and 
emotional consequences of infidelity talk). It could be argued that good reasons 
may underpin such reification; for instance, because the object of the exercise is 
to improve conditions for some oppressed or under-privileged group. One may 
undermine the ontological assumptions of the evolutionary psychologists in 
relative safety but it is another matter to appear to be taking pot-shots at political 
movements such as feminism which are not just science-for-its-own-sake but 
positive efforts to do some social good. Certainly, I do not intend to claim that 
such a social purpose is not a good and legitimate reason for reifying some 
aspect or version of the world. However, such practices invariably set limits on the 
sorts of analysis that can be performed and the range of phenomena that can 
be accounted for. 
Let's take a couple of examples. To begin with, take one more look at 
Doug's comment on monogamy in Extract 7.06, lines 60-61: "hopefully in future 
generations it'll be viev/ed as a very similar practice to the Chinese binding 
women's feet. " How is it possible for a recipient to understand that "the Chinese 
binding women's feet" is, in Doug's view, a bad thing? Other than the general 
clue that this remark occurs in the context of a long speech in which Doug 
explicitly complains about monogamy being "appalling" and so forth, what is 
hearably wrong about the practice he refers to here? The kernel of his criticism is 
the specificity of "women. " If he had said "the Chinese binding people's feet" he 
would have been describing a practice that is hearably archaic, restrictive and 
perhaps rather perverse to Western ears but his description would have lost much 
of its rhetorical force. Similarly, if he had retained the specificity of "women" and 
substituted something else for "the Chinese binding feet" - let's say for example 
that he come up with, "hopefully in the future it'll be viewed as very similar to the 
medieval practice of locking women in chastity belts" - then he would have 
sacrificed the exotic otherness of "the Chinese" but the social injustice implied by 
"women-and-not-men" would have been preserved. 
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Doug constructs a world in which the following things obtain: (a) women 
and men are discrete and distinguishable social groups; (b) social practices that 
restrict women's behaviour and not men's are unjust and therefore wrong. 
Through this construction he asserts a version of the world as true and launches a 
political objection to or complaint about that world. As a feminist I could, if I 
chose, ally myself with Doug on bo th counts. However, treating his remark as 
simply an accurate reflection of the world as it really is (i. e., populated by "men" 
and also"women") along with a politically correct observation that "men and 
women ought to be treated equally"would be to miss the point that Doug could 
have expressed himself entirely differently or even declined to say anything at all. 
The reason for the appearance in Doug's talk of this particular construction, at this 
point in the dialogue, is that it uniquely serves the interactional purpose at hand. 
That purpose, it turns out, has nothing to do with the cause of feminism. It has 
everything to do with invoking some moral support for Doug's construction of 
himself as a person who deserves but is denied the "freedom to choose" (lines 55- 
56). This freedom of choice is in turn produced to warrant Doug's overall, highly 
controversial rationale that he, formerly a married man and now a man with 
girlfriend, is entitled to not "give a fuck about excuses" for infidelity (lines 1-2); if he 
"feels like" being unfaithful then that is or ought to be enough. 
Here is the second example: it concerns nature and the idea that sexual 
exclusivity may not be a "natural" practice. We hove seen plenty of evidence in 
this chapter that naturalising extramarital or extradyadic sex can play an active 
part in such discursive business as rationalising and ultimately justifying it. That 
evolutionary theories of sexual behaviour pay insufficient attention to this 
defensive potential is all too obvious and since feminists of every stripe have 
wasted no time in pointing it out I shall not dedicate valuable space to re- 
inventing their arguments here. The case I want to make is slightly more 
challenging: that standard feminist objections to (usually men's) claims about 
sexual continence being unnatural do not go far enough. It is insufficient to 
notice that naturalising infidelity (or rape or whatever the sexual behaviour 
happens to be) can represent a means for men to defend it, and leave it at that. 
It is insufficient because it overlooks the other things that such a claim might be 
doing. Recall that in Chapter 1. in my discussion of Dryden's feminist, 
constructionist approach to talk about marriage, I quoted briefly from Dryden's 
interview with Gillian and Patrick Henderson, a married couple (Dryden, 1999). 
Dryden notices that Patrick makes a remark that she treats as reducible to the gist 
that there is something objectionably unnatural about remaining faithful. She 
additionally notices that Gillian appears upset by Patrick's remark and from these 
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observations goes on to develop her account of women's emotional insecurity 
and men's self-serving "separation behaviour. " 
I would like to attempt a more interactionally attuned reading of (what is 
available of) the data. The quite long interview extract that Dryden supplies 
shows the three discussing a range of marriage-reloted issues including the 
relative merits of marriage versus cohabitation, possible reasons why "one in three 
marriages break up, " the "positive aspects" of marriage and so on. The following 
material appears near the end of the extract. The bits of text within square 
brackets are Dryden's notes. 
[I then ask about difficulties - in marriage in general. ) 
PATRICK: I s'pose Fidelity's one of them isn't it. You - you're expected to remain 
faithful but er [pause] I don't think it's a very sort of natural thing to do. (pause] I 
happened to have - sort of - be faithful but um [pause] it's just um [slight laugh] no 
reason - there isn't a particular reason for that. 
[pause] 
[At this point Gillian looks as though she might burst into tears. ] 
(Dryden, 1999, pp. 139-140) 
It is not unreasonable of Dryden to conclude from this that Gillian has heard 
something that she doesn't like. However, I think it is a mistake to summarise it as 
"[Patrick says] that he doesn't think fidelity is natural, and he just 'happens' to have 
remained faithful" (Dryden, 1999, p. 141). There is a bit more to it than that. Sadly, 
we do not know exactly what question Dryden asked or how she phrased it but 
we can see that it solicited examples of something like "difficulties" and that it 
proposed as the site for those difficulties "marriage in general" - not just "marriage, " 
then, and not the Hendersons' marriage in particular. Now, a glance through the 
contemporary marriage guidance literature confirms (in)fidelity as C: highly 
available and prominent example of a difficulty that marriages sometimes run 
into. Others that Patrick might have volunteered include "arrival of your first child" 
and "retirement. " However, since marriage is a membership category that is even 
more normatively implicative of sexual exclusivity than it is of "having babies" and 
.1 not being at work, " there is no reason why "fidelity, " as Patrick describes it, should 
not appear at the top of his list. He then speaks as though it is incumbent upon 
him to say a few words about how fidelity could come to be a difficulty, why that 
should be. Having been asked about marriage in general, some of the 
explanations and accounts for infidelity that we have examined here in The 
Compleat Infidel clearly are not going to be appropriate, at least in the first 
instance. For example, "some married people are sex addicts" would not make a 
good first choice and neither would "sometimes a r-harried person goes away by 
themselves and gets drunk and accidentally has a one night fling. " Explanations 
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like these are good at constructing exceptions to some general category of 
infidelities but they are not good at accounting for the category itself. In contrast, 
the idea that humans (like other animals) may be "no tura Ily" disposed to 
promiscuity or polygamy and that fidelity is a civilising principle that has to be 
imposed on that natural instinct is one that will account for infidelity "in general" 
and not just the exceptional or unusual cases. 
In short, Patrick has responded in an entirely predictable and appropriate 
way to Dryden, remaining well within the normatively implied parameters of her 
request for talk about common marital "difficulties. " However, in so doing he has 
also created a small interactional hazard for himself, flogged up by Gillian 
showing signs of "bursting into tears. " That is, because his generalisable theory of 
infidelity accounts (prospectively and retrospectively) for any affairs participated 
in by Patrick himself as well as those of anyone and everyone else, the inference 
becomes available that he may have a personal interest or stake in what he is 
saying. His orientation to that possibility is revealed in the various pauses, 
hesitations, qualifiers and"slight laughter"that accompany his account. It is also 
indexed by his explicit mention that he personally has been faithful. 
Unfortunately, this claim about his own good record does not mesh well with the 
"human nature" type of explanation for infidelity that he has just offered Dryden. 
Saying that sexually exclusive relationships are not natural is an excellent way of 
explaining why people mostly or universally are unfaithful but it is not very good at 
explaining why some people aren't. (Turn back to Extract 7.06, lines 88-90: Rachel 
confronts Doug with this very question in reply to his universalising "human nature" 
account. ) So Patrick falters; having naturalised infidelity and then followed up 
with a disclaimer that of course he individually is faithful, he finds himself unable to 
come up with "a particular reason for that"; a reason that does not undermine his 
human nature account and does not involve boosting that he is somehow more 
civilised than everyone else. 
Let me round off Chapter 7 with a formulation of the alternative that discursive 
psychology offers to the social scientific treatments of infidelity and infidelity 
discourse that I have criticised above. In academ; c discourse, as in the discourse 
of lay people, there may be any number of good reasons for privileging entities 
such as society and social groups and principles such as gender equality and the 
right to sovereignty over one's body, as factual, reliable and non-negotiably real. 
There may indeed be various good reasons for treating things as universal 
features of the natural world. What these reasons are will obviously depend on 
whatever has to be accomplished by the discourse user on the particular 
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occasion of their speech or writing. However, if the object of the exercise is to 
gather materials in which people discuss, describe and account for infidelity and 
then to develop an analysis that leaves the fewest possible questions unanswered 
about the content and organisation of those materials, it is vital to know whether 
and how to distinguish between things that are part of the research topic and 
things that represent an analytic resource. 
In discussing infidelity, research interviewees and other non-professional 
speakers and writers draw freely upon social and natural theories and political 
critique, making of these things a resource routinely and apparently without the 
need for deliberation or effort. For discourse users, the point of doing this is that 
representing infidelity as principally an expression of the right to personal freedom 
or essentially a symptom of untameable human nature or definitively an artefact 
of "this society, " the name of an arbitrary behavioural "taboo, " is a move that has 
various effects and consequences for themselves and their recipients in that 
immediate situation. We know this not because each natural, social and political 
theory is permanently anchored to some unique social purpose but because it is 
evident from conversation transcripts and other discursive products that where 
such resources are introduced into the proceedings, participants will 
conventionally orientate to the introduction as consequential, treating it as 
having some interactionally relevant import. 
Because discursive psychology is reflexively self-conscious of acts of 
discursive instantiation as actively constructed and potentially consequential, it is 
able to account for the content and orgonisation of interview transcripts and 
other discursive materials more fully than analytic methods which do not 
recognise that the interpretative resources and conventional constructive 
practices used by the analyst and those used by the research participants who 
generate the data sometimes may be one and the some. For instance, discursive 
psychologists Potter and Wetherell (1987, Wetherell and Potter, 1989,1992) have 
made a point of studying lay people's naturalisation of categories such as race, 
culture and nation and their use of miscellaneous theories about the nature and 
structure of society, the dynamics of social influence and conflict, political 
principles of rights and responsibilities and the possible avenues for social reform 
as resources for characterising and explaining specific and concrete topics such 
as particular outbreaks of violence, the racism of Pakeha New Zealanders and 
the teaching in schools of Maori language. That is, these political and social 
theories are recognised as participants' resources and correspondingly as part of 
the discourse analyst's topic of research. Moreover, this perspective enables 
Potter and Wetherell to respond to mainstream social psychologists' similar use of 
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the some explanatory resources as part of the phenomenon that they are 
interested in studying. 
The discursive psychological approach espoused by Potter and Wetherell 
recognises that what they observe in their data are not simple references to pre- 
existing objects and entities but categorisations, not expressions of attitudes but 
evaluations, not identities so much as identifications. They take it that research 
participants and social psychologists alike are engaged in acts of discursive 
instantiation. The advantage for Potter and Wetherell is that they can avoid 
getting involved in their participants' various arguments and fact-constructive 
efforts. Similarly, in this chapter we have managed not to take the same road as 
Atwater, Baker and Bellis, Dryden et a/. in the sense of privileging some parts of 
the infidelity data as simple reflections of the facts, as literally true. A more 
thoroughly discursive perspective has opened up lines of analysis that would have 
remained unavailable if we had followed these authors' examples and retained 
among our analytic resources assumptions about the descriptive truth and 
necessary function of feminist principles of gender equality, for instance, or 
assumptions that claims about infidelity being unnatural are reducible to 
equivalence, such that if some are conspicuously serving a broad social purpose 
then all must be attempting basically the same thing. 
8 
Conclusions and Implications 
Final Analytic Conclusions 
In the preceding analytic chapters, by way of mapping the discursive terrain, I 
have identified five major themes or sets of resources used by speakers and 
writers who would defend infidels and/or infidelity. As captured in the titles of the 
five analytic chapters, the options are: 
" construct a non-event (Chapter 3); , 
" construct an isolated episode (Chapter 4); 
" construct a special category of self (Chapter 5): 
" construct a specific reason (Chapter 6); 
-9 construct a generic rationale (Chapter 7). 
In this final chapter, at the end of our analysis, we are in a position to say 
something about why some given instance of defensive accounting should come 
to depend on one of these themes or lines of argument in preference to any of 
the others. On what basis might a ý: ompleat infidel choose among these five 
Mal . or sets of constructive resources? This is a broad question of defensive 
practice. The answer can be approached through discussion of the interactional 
context into which each kind of defence is characteristically introduced. We 
have already encountered one dimension of this context: the twin possibilities of 
being a dyad-bound and/or a third-party infidel can have a bearing on which 
particular version of a defence is produced (e. g., recall the uniquely third-party 
design of "mistake of fact" in Chapter 4). in the following paragraphs some further 
aspects of the interactional context are discussed. The format of the discussion 
will be to focus on each of the five major constructions in series. 
As a preparatory measure, it will be useful to quickly compare the observations 
that I have made about the varying distinctiveness, consistency and consensus 
implied by these five lines of argument. Recall that distinctiveness is a term that I 
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have used in this document to characterise the practice of making available for 
recipients inferences about the cause of some individual's infidelity by assessing 
particular cases of infidelity against the person's usual or normal behaviour. Figure 
8.1, the first of four aerial snapshots, shows how constructions of high and low 
distinctiveness vary with the five lines of defence. 
high distinctiveness <-- 
specific reason 
isolated episode 
non-event 
-> low distinctiveness 
generic rationale 
special category 
of self 
Figure 8.1 High1low distinctiveness varies with defence. 
Constructions of non-events, isolated episodes of infidelity and specific reasons all 
make a case for high distinctiveness; that is, they try to display the individual as a 
person for whom infidelitous behavidur is not usual practice. They work to 
discourage any dispositional attribution on the part of recipients. It would not be 
surprising if infidelS were keen to convey a strong impression of high distinctiveness 
most of the time. This may not always be possible, depending on what evidence 
to the contrary recipients happen to possess. Moreover, as we saw in Chapters 5 
and 7, infidels sometimes volunteer an assessment of low distinctiveness. This is a 
phenomenon which will be discussed in more detail a little later. 
Consistencyis a term that I have used to capture features of the infidelity 
itself. Is it some brief, historical event that can be accounted for retrospectively or 
is there an infidelitous relationship currently ongoing? For infidels who are willing 
to admit to low distinctiveness, this kina of question about the duration and status 
of particular infidelities need not become an issue: where the cause of infidelity is 
voluntarily located somewhere in "the self" rather than in "the world, " ongoing, 
habitual and even career infidelity can be provided for. Meanwhile, those who 
prefer to construct a non-event are effectively claiming "zero consistency" in their 
argument that infidelity (or whatever sanctionable category of act or activity 
they are trying to avoid) simply never happened. For them too, the post or 
present, brief or protracted nature of some particular al! eged offence is not 
necessarily a problem. However, for speakers who want to claim high 
distinctiveness but are willing to admit that something infidelitous has gone on, the 
question of consistency is salient. It is for these speakers that the isolated episode 
and the specific reason serve two different purposes. As illustrated in Figure 8.2. 
the former deals with infidelities that can be plausibly packaged and presented 
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as having only low consistency while the latter accounts for more highly consistent 
infidelities. 
high consistency T specific reason 
low consistency ý isolated episode 
Figure 8.2 A specific reason defends infidelity that is 
constructed as highly distinctive and highly consistent. 
Given that a claim of high distinctiveness makes a point of externalisation, 
providing for the audience's or recipients' inference that the speaker is not that 
sort of person" who is dispositionally inclined to cheating on their partner, anything 
that can be written off as an isolated episode is going to be easier to defend than 
the sort of infidelity that seems to hove persisted over time, up to and including 
the present day. For example, consider the motif of "accidental infidelity" that we 
encountered in Chapter 4. As Scott and Lyman (1968) point out, while it seems to 
be a generally accepted feature of accidents that they may happen to anyone, 
a single individual may not repeatedly fall victim to the same accident if the 
description"accident" is to be sustained. To this I would add that the "folk logic" 
(Buttny, 1993, p. 49) underlying the notion of accidents is such that the term is best 
applied post facto: it is difficult to claim that I am currently having an accident. " 
The unique purpose of the specific reason, which identifies something in the 
infidel's local relationship network that has provoked them into action rather than 
simply explaining the action away, is that it reconciles high distinctiveness 
(implicitly a description of the infidel as "not that sort of person") with high 
consistency (a description of the infidelity as relatively enduring). This 
reconciliation is something that on isolated episode would expectably be unable 
to achieve. 
Consensus is a term that I have applied to the defences of constructing a 
special category of self and constructing a generic rationale. These are 
defences of low distinctiveness and the notion of consensus describes the extent 
to which speakers recognise that low distinctiveness as being both unusual and 
undesirable. Figure 8.3 shows how consensus differs between these two. 
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high consensus T gene6c rationale 
low consensus special category 
of self 
Figure 8.3 A generic rationale defends infidelity that is 
constructed as lowly distinctive with high consensus. 
Speakers constructing some special category of self to explain and defend their 
infidelities, by making an exception of themselves as individuals, acknowledge 
that most people's behaviour is electively not like their own. They describe various 
character flaws, behavioural deficiencies and psychological dysfunctions that 
provide for them to sound somewhat apologetic about their failures to live up to 
normatively expected codes of conduct even as they preserve the idea that they 
may never successfully achieve a wholesale reform or change. In contrast, 
constructions of generic rationales make more of a point of underlining the 
similarities between the individual speaker and the larger community. Even when 
it is conceded that most other people do not go so far as to actively engage in 
infidelity, generic rationales incorporate claims that they at least must want to, 
have been tempted to and/or are entitled to step outside the boundaries of 
conventionally correct behaviour. Clearly, this is a more controversial and 
potentially inflammatory line of argument than constructing a special category of 
self although as defences of low distinctiveness neither is notable for its likely 
acceptability to hostile recipients who would count themselves members of the 
moral majority. Again, this is a point to be discussed in more detail below. 
Having quickly reviewed the ways in which our five lines of argument are 
organised along the dimensions of distinctiveness, consistency and consensus, we 
are in a position to consider some new aspects of the various interactional 
contexts in which they are produced. In Chapter 21 commented on the 
deliberately inclusive and eclectic variety of sources and media from which the 
materials for this study were drawn. At that stage, prior to analysis, speculation 
about the defining characteristics of a research interview or the essential 
differences between works of academic and popular psychology could have 
gone on forever. However, at this end of the analytic project it is a different story. 
The five major defensive constructions have been r-nade to serve unique functions 
and applications that display what participants themselves take to be the 
relevant features of the discursive exchanges or endeavours to which they 
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contribute. Participant orientation is the key to understanding how these 
discursive environments (if I may describe them thus) vary with the construction of 
each major defence. 
Before considering each of the major defences in turn, there is one broad 
finding that can be reported with respect to the simply conceived sources from 
which they were culled. It is represented graphically in Figure 8.4. 
wide 
specific reason generic rationale 
isolated episode 
non-event special category 
of self 
T 
narrow 
range 
Figure 8.4 Defences appear in a wide or narrow range of source materials. 
Generic rationales, special categories of self and non-events were discovered in 
just a handful of all the many sources that were scoured for data - precisely which 
sources to be elucidated, below. In contrast, isolated episodes and specific 
reason were comparatively agrestal, cropping up in sources that ranged all over 
the data-base. Note that this is not to say that all terrains seemed equally 
.1 preferred" by these two common styles of defence: again, these particular 
sources will receive further comment in a moment. For now, the point is that 
"isolated episode" and "specific reason" exhibited from the outset a certain 
flexibility and ease of application that was not shared by the other three kinds of 
defence. This observation, and the earlier ones about distinctiveness, consistency 
and consensus, inform the following discussion in which I shall now consider each 
of the five major defences individually, drawing some final conclusions about the 
discursive environments in which they flourish. 
Construct a Non-Event 
The conceptual maps set out in the above paragraphs show that a unique 
feature of the defence of constructing a non-event is that while it claims high 
distinctiveness, it can be traced to only a narrow range of sources. The sources 
which have yielded examples of the construction of non-events notably include: 
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(a) my own, original research interviews on the subject of infidelity; (b) written 
responses to questionnaires and surveys on general issues to do with sex and 
sexuality such as that of Susan Quilliam. Readers may also recall that Chapter 3 
featured an excerpt from Bill Clinton's grand jury testimony of 1998. Across these 
different sources and media, speakers and writers treat as relevant two features 
of the discursive environment. 
(1) The situation requests personal information from the speaker and 
presupposes their ability and willingness to supply answers on the basis of relevant 
category membership. Following a national advertising campaign for her study 
on"women and sex, " Quilliam's respondents were obliged to contact her by mail 
to receive their copy of her questionnaire. It presumes a good deal of (hetero-) 
sexual experience on the part of respondents in its string of approximately 300 
direct questions. The section entitled "Unf aithfulness/Af fairs" is number 23 in a 
series of 28, following questions about respondents' body image, first experience 
of intercourse, usual habits in "foreplay'and so on. By this time, their knowledge- 
entitlement and capacity to function satisfactorily in the role of respondent to 
Quilliam's questions is well established. Similarly, participants in my own research 
interviews find themselves in the situation of having volunteered to take part and 
now being obliged to find something to say. Clinton, of course, faces a grand jury 
hearing that has convened for the specific purpose of interrogating him about his 
behaviour. In other words, non-events are constructed in situations where it is 
nearly impossible for speakers to say nothing or alternatively to say that they know 
nothing about the topic at hand and are unqualified to comment. Insofar as the 
topic is something sanctionable such as "infidelity ... .. being unfaithful, " "cheating, " 
"lying ... .. perverting the course of justice" or whatever, speakers are thereby 
presented with a problem: their co-operation with the presupposition of 
knowledge entitlement may provide for inferences about them that are highly 
unfavourable. Fortunately: 
(2) The requirement for "answers" does not restrict speakers to a yes/no, 
forced-response format but permits them some opportunity to negotiate and 
transform the point of a question or line of enquiry. Quilliam's respondents write 
statements of a few lines that address section 23, "Unf aithfulness/Af fairs, " in a 
general, overall way, a! lowing them to favour such questions as "What do you 
consider is meant by the word 'unfaithful'? " (question 23A) as primary and 
avoiding or glossing over more dangerously blame-implicative questions such as 
"How did you feel after the first time you were unfaithful? II How did this sex 
compare with that of your relationship? " (question 23D). Participants in my own 
study exploit the informal structure and ambiguous airns of the research interview: 
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is the point to collect attitudes on matters of widespread debate or to document 
personal experience? If the latter, should it only include experience of "actually" 
being unfaithful or can it include experience of nearly being unfaithful or being 
accused of being unfaithful? Is the role of participant restricted to reporting 
experience as an uncritical subject or can it include "going meta" and assuming a 
share in the job of commenting on and analysing experience? Meanwhile, 
Clinton famously avoids citing concrete examples of his'inappropriate behaviour' 
with Monica Lewinsky by focusing on what he has previously "understood" and 
"believed" to be covered by a certain definition of "sexual relations" attributed to 
"Judge Wright. " In short, non-events are constructed in discursive environments 
which: investigate and ask questions about culpable matters such as infidelity: 
oblige speakers to contribute something, but leave enough (in Clinton's case, just 
barely enough) room for speakers to protect their own interests through shifts of 
footing and through ontological gerrymandering. 
Construct a Generic Rationale 
Generic rationales admit low distinctiveness and are traceable to only a narrow 
range of sources, these being similar to the sources of non-events. They notably 
include: (a) my own research interviews; (b) anonymous, online responses to 
opinion polls about infidelity such as that of the "Friends and Lovers" website. 
Recall that Chapter 7 also featured quotes from interviewees of social 
commentators Atwater (1979) and Heyn (1992). 
The practical application of generic rationales displays one of the 
advantages of claiming low distinctiveness. Its capacity to account for habitual 
infidelity with an unspecified number of accomplices might, of course, become 
necessary, depending on what is known about the infidel by recipients. However, 
it is also good for boiling down individual victims to an homogeneous mass. As I 
observed in Chapter 7, criticisms about the dishonesty and ndfvet& of society in 
general and especially "those who point the finger" are employed to skate over 
individual distress, drawing attention away from the speaker's victims. Similarly, 
universalising talk about what everybody wants, what all relationships are like and 
so on can be used to shift the discussion away from specific events and activities 
in which the speaker is personally involved. As before, there is an element here of 
speakers taking the chance to protect their own interests by changing footing 
and "going meta" so that their role incorporates not merely reporting experience 
but also analysing and commenting on it. 
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The comprehensive inclusiveness of this line of argument - the higher 
authority of principles of individual sovereignty over one's body, the inevitability 
with which marriage becomes sexually boring, the human naturalness of following 
up"horny opportunities" - and its accompanying ability to co-implicate all victims 
of infidelity in their own downfall is the great rhetorical strength of justification by 
generic rationale. However, it also co-implicates the immediate recipient(s) of 
the account who, unless they too are positively pro-infidelity, are likely to treat the 
generic rationale as highly offensive. Consider the consequences had Clinton 
chosen it instead of negotiating a personal non-event, for instance. Constructing 
a generic rationale is rarely an easy or possible manoeuvre. 
It is possible when people are cloaked in anonymity and addressing an 
unknown, silent audience as when responding to a one-question, one-shot-reply 
survey'about infidelity on the internet such as the one at the Friends and Lovers 
website. In such a situation, speakers have the option to behave as though 
"freed from any restraining reasonableness, " to borrow a phrase from Billig's 
remarks about the unrepentant, even exuberant expressions of prejudice 
produced in group discussions by National Front supporters (Billig, Condor, 
Edwards, Gane, Middleton and Radley, 1988, p. 117). Constructing a generic 
rationale for infidelity is also possible in environments such as a one-to-one 
research interview with a recognisably encouraging interviewer. We do not know 
exactly what Lynn Atwater and Dalma Heyn said to their interviewees about their 
own feelings on the subject of infidelity. However, their published writing about 
the interviews conveys a marked sympathy. Atwater chooses the journal 
Altemative Lifestyles as her platform and waxes political about such matters as 
1. elimination of the sexual double standard" (Atwater, 1979, p. 53). Heyn goes 
even further, gushing that "adultery is, in fact. a revolutionary way for women to 
rise above the conventional" (Heyn, 1992, p. 10). 
In my own interviews the words exchanged between researcher and 
participant are available for study. Emma, Doug and Kyle quickly discover that 
movements in the direction of a generic rationale are given an enthusiastic 
reception. Moreover, these participants can be seen doing a lot of joint category 
membership in their constructions of generic rationales. For instance, through 
such expressions as "like you say" (Extract 7.04), participants draw in the 
researcher and remind her on which side of the moral fence her loyalties'are 
expected to lie. 
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Construct a Special Category of Self 
This is the only style of defence other than constructing a generic rationale that 
admits low distinctiveness. It derives from a narrow range of sources which 
notably include: (a) tabloid newspaper the Sunday People, (b) men's "lifestyle" 
magazine Arena, (c) journalist Virginia Lee's (1993) collection of interviews with 
infidels, entitled Affairs of the Heart. 
An advantage of the special category of self is that it provides for low 
distinctiveness without necessarily co-implicating victims or recipients in anything 
blameworthy. As can be seen from Kyle's contributions to Chapters 5 and 7, it 
can perform as a complementary alternative to a generic rationale, marking off 
a smaller category of people than a universal "everyone ... .. society in general" or 
whatever. Moreover, it does not evade the possibility that the infidel's behaviour 
has caused specific and unnecessary suffering as is the case with generic 
rationales. Manufacturers of special categories of self actively draw attention to 
the cost of their infidelities, to themselves as much as anyone else. Presentation of 
an account for one's infidelity as a voluntary confession of chronically diminished 
capacity co-implicates recipients in a new way: sufficient emphasis on being 
ongoingly insecure, scarred by abuse or living with a "driving emotional need" 
anticipatively constructs the response as not anger or objection but something 
softer such as sympathy and perhaps counselling (Edwards, 1997, p. 157). 
However, the special category of self is more than a complement to 
constructing a generic rationale. The range of sources from which the two derive 
are not coterminous. The special category of self is characteristically found in 
discursive environments where it can be presented not just as a confession but 
also as news. Now, in this case I am not speaking of self-consciously serious news 
such as that disseminated via television interviews (see Clayman, 1992) or the 
11 quality" papers studied by Edwards and Potter (1992, p. 59). Special categories 
of self are constructed as news in the sense of being newsworthy, bringing 
something new or remarkabie to the attention of audiences but with a more or 
less explicit ambition to entertain as well as inform. This ambition is particularly 
clear in the case of Arena: the article from which Extract 5.02 derives is presented 
as the transcribed proceedings of a group exploring the potentially newsworthy 
topic of "What men Want" from their sexual relationships. However, the word 
experts" appears inside ironising inverted commas in the subtitle, "Arena 
assembles a panel of "experts", " the pull-quotes from the main text draw readers' 
attention to talk of "big breasts" and "arse" (with bright colour images of the 
referred-to parts) and there is none of the empiricist discourse or quantification 
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rhetoric that one would expect from a serious attempt to convince readers of 
some set of facts produced by "real" experts about contemporary issues in gender 
and sexual relations. 
Lee's book (Extract 5.05) makes more effort after empiricist reportage ('The 
underlying motive for addressing this topic is to tell the truth, " p. 2) but 
counterbalances with a frivolous, even salacious aspect; for instance, her book is 
subtitled Men & Women Reveal the Truth about Extramarital Affairs (emphasis 
added) and on page 3 encourages readers past the introduction with the 
promise that interviewees have "dared to expose their most intimate selves" in the 
pages that follow. The Sunday People, an "actual" newspaper, characterises its 
report about sex addiction (Extract 5.06) as news through such devices as 
choosing a minor celebrity for its subject, describing the interview as exclusive as 
though it would have been considered a coup by rival newspapers and so on. 
However, readers are primed not to over-react to this"news. " The informal 
language of Jim's "cheating ways, " marital "bust-ups" and reported jokes about 
being "addicted to wedding cake! " make it clear that this is not a "grave 
confession" or a "disturbing confession" but an "amazing confession. " The report 
constructs infidelity not as a disaster but as an impropriety and even sets up 
laughter as the relevant next action (cf. Jefferson, 1979, Jefferson, Sacks and 
Schegloff, 1987). 
Construct an Isolated Episode 
Isolated episodes derive from a very wide range of sources in the original 
database for this study and it is perhaps expectable that this should be a popular 
choice of defence. It combines high distinctiveness ("I'm not like that") with low 
consistency ("it was only a brief encounter") while fulfilling the implicit or explicit 
expectation that something infidelitous has gone on and thereby avoiding the 
more ambitious project of total exoneration. Some sources turned out to be 
especially rich in isolated episodes and these include "women's" magazines such 
as Marie Claire, New Woman and Cosmopolitan. Recall that Chapter 4 also 
included a vignette from the popular mental health website at www. cmhc. com 
(Extract 4.07). 
Similarly to special categories of self, constructions of some isolated 
episode characteristically orientate to their discursive environment through 
presentation as one or another kind of confession. However, special cbtegories 
of self anticipate and accommodate the disalignment of recipients by attending 
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to what is exceptional - about the infidel (so as to avoid co-implicating those who 
would resist joint category membership) and about the defence itself (this making 
it a good basis for news and light entertainment). In contrast, isolated episodes 
foreground that which can be presented as unexceptional and ordinary. The 
infidel themselves is emphatically normolised and in their account of "how it 
happened" whatever factors are claimed to have contributed to the occurrence 
of some romantic or sexual slip-up ore made to seem as routine as possible. If 
objection is anticipated, it is not that the isolated episode of infidelity will be 
treated as implausibly outlandish, misplaced outside laddish magazines and 
prurient tabloid newspapers. If anything, the concern is that it might be criticised 
as an excuse that is too ordinary and familiar; over-used, old, a clich&. Isolated 
episodes make heavy use of idioms and other scripting devices (Edwards, 1995, 
1997), inviting recipients to recognise that the matter being confessed was 
caused by an all-too-familiar conspiracy of circumstances. They are invited to 
reflect that an accident can happen to anyone, not excluding themselves (e. g., 
see Extracts 4.03,4.07). This kind of defensive practice is not about making 
exceptions that leave room for recipients' disalignment with the infidel doing the 
confessing but about constructing an anonymous generality that paves the way 
for recipients to envisage themselves in the position of having an infidelity to 
confess. 
I have stressed this lost point because it makes sense of the use of isolated 
episodes to address mass audiences. These heavily scripted accounts of infidelity 
may not distinguish themselves as the exotic objects of "amazing" news reports 
but they are ideally suited to the sort of human interest journalism that concerns 
itself with readers' presumed worries and problems. At the Mental Health Net 
website such matters are characterised as the "moral and ethical dilemmas that 
society is grappling with today. " In Marie Claire they are the subject of a regular 
series of features entitled "Emotional Issues. " In New Woman they are fodder for 
that genre of writing known as "readers'true experiences. " In Cosmopolitan they 
are the business of "The Agony Column" and articles whose. titles take the form of 
questions that readers might hearably ask themselves, "Is it ever okay to be 
unfaithful? " being a case in point. Of all the problems and concerns that 
publishers of human interest stories anticipate as relevant to readers en masse, 
the "question of infidelity" is one of the most returned-to. 
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Construct a Specific Reason 
Like isolated episodes, specific reasons for infidelity admit for make little of 
denying) that something infidelitous has occurred and attempt to recover a 
sound moral character for the infidel. However, they do this without recourse to 
mitigating claims of low consistency. Specific reasons derive from a wide range 
of sources and many show people defending infidelity in contexts where it is 
necessary to acknowledge its high consistency because this is already being 
treated by recipients as a non-negotiable fact. However, the abundance of 
specific reasons in certain quarters of the data shows people also treating high 
consistency as something to be positively volunteered and turned to their 
advantage. These sources notably include discussion threads from public access 
internet newsgroups, forums and bulletin boards such as"The Other Side of an 
Affair" (Extracts 6.02,6.04,6.06). Recall that Chapter 6 also featured extracts from 
The Guardian and from sociologist Lawson's book, Adultery (1988). 
In the "Other Side of an Affair"clata or OSA, participants orientate to an 
interactional context of argumentation. As Billig (1989) observes, "the views put 
forward in an argument have a duality, which arises from the rhetorical nature of 
argumentation" (p. 213), "an argument can simultaneously be about an issue 
[e. g., infidelity] and about ways of arguing about the issue" (ibid. ). That is, 
participants may argue about the adequacy of each other's contributions as 
arguments, appealing to common "rules of play"and so on. For instance, in the 
OSA debate, criticisms of another participant's argument often take the form of 
complaints that s/he has ceased to argue "properly"and has instead lapsed into 
.. mud slinging, " "bashing, " "getting personal" and so on. Another oft-invoked 
principle is that people are entitled to hold on to "beliefs" and "views" that arise 
from their own, first-hand experience, even when these are unusual and in direct 
contradiction to pieces of knowledge and experience that are held by other 
parties. Claiming high consistency can be a real advantage in context such as 
this. For instance, the self-identified "other"women of OSA seem to start out from 
a morally and rhetorically weak argumentative position relative to the wives but 
they can legitimately remain unpersuaded thal "people have affairs out of 
selfishness [I with whatever gullible person they can find" and "the husband 
'always' returns to the wife" if their own experience of an ongoing, enduring, 
highly consistent relationship with a partner who was or is dyad-bound tells them 
otherwise: "there are real relationships [I and true love is found. " 
Sources such as The Guardian and Lawson's Adullery can be compared 
to those such as the Sunday People and Lee's Affairs of the Heart of Chapter 5. 
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The latter are examples of "popular"journalism and social science and they have 
a more or less explicit ambition to entertain readers as well as to inform. The 
former are correspondingly "serious" with more empiricist discourse. The Guardian 
is one of Edwards and Potter's "quality' broadsheet newspapers (1992, p. 59), 
willing to investigate a "dating agency exclusively for people who are married or 
attached" (Extract 6.03) but apparently not the sex addiction of'TV Jim" (cf. 
Extract 5.06). Lawson (Extract 6.05) does not seduce her readers with promises 
that "intimate selves" are about to be "exposed" (cf. Lee, 1993, p. 3) but prefers to 
impress them with diagrams, tables and other forms of quantification rhetoric 
(many of which also appear in The Compleat Infidel). Lawson and Guardian 
journalist Sanai are in the business of making the sort of news that reports facts. 
Their introduction of witnesses such as "Dr. Reynolds" and "Arabella" into the text to 
illustrate their stories is a fact-constructive manoeuvre in itself. Moreover, when 
witnesses can be quoted as engaging in affairs of relatively high consistency, the 
now-ness and immediacy of the news is enhanced. A gain is made for these 
reports that would be lost if Sanai and Lawson could find only witnesses who 
would admit to historical, isolated episodes of infidelity. 
Implications for the Study of Infidelity 
In the above section I have drawn final analytic conclusions that support my 
overall thesis that infidelity discourse is action orientated. Let me take a moment 
to expand on that. Chapter I ended with a section entitled "the research 
problem" and there I observed that among users of contemporary, Anglo- 
American discourse there is recognisably a broad, tacit agreement about what 
sorts of things can and can not be legitimately produced to account for infidelity. 
Holiday flings, attacks of true love, deficient and boring dyadic relationships and 
so on are familiar objects to anyone who has sustained the briefest of 
conversations on the subject of infidelity, even though the discursive terrain has 
not been formally mapped until now. Having mapped the terrain and marked 
out five distinct features or types of construction, in the opening section of 
Chapter 81 have shown that the variability among these five is more than a 
superficial matter of appearance or gross content. These constructions are 
produced and perform their defensive functions (exoneration: mitigation: appeals 
to diminished capacity and provocation; justification) in the course of orientating 
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to various aspects of the immediate inter-action-al (or intertextual) setting. This is 
a reflexive process, both context-sensitive and context-shaping. 
The finding that accounts of isolated episodes of infidelity, special 
categories of self, specific reasons and so on are constructed with a sensitivity to 
the interactional context of their production does not only apply to the discursive 
materials in this study that are most obviously recognisable as data (such as the 
extracts from my research interviews, for instance). It does not only apply to the 
discursive output of research participants. As we hove seen, it is also applicable 
to the discursive output of various kinds of professionals such as journalists and 
social scientists. Indeed, rather than having to impose from the outset an abstract 
taxonomy of kinds of journalistic discourse, kinds of social scientific writing and so 
on, we have seen that the significant features of these discursive styles and 
contexts are emergent from within the material we have studied: they ore 
orientated to and endogenously generated through the selection and 
configuration of various rhetorical devices and bits of conversational machinery. 
Of course, The Compleat Infidel is no exception to this practice. Devices 
such as membership categories, contrast pairs, idioms, evaluative and extreme 
case formulations, empiricist discourse, emblematic instances and a host of others 
have been selected and arranged in The Compleot Infidel as the means by 
which this document characterises itself as belonging to a particular genre and 
anticipatively orientates to the context of the vivo voce as an occasion for 
assessing and accrediting doctoral research (a discursive phenomenon that is 
reflexively explored in the unsurpassed analysis of Ashmore, 1989). In other words, 
the analytic principles that we have used to shed light on the materials treated 
herein as data additionally account for and render explicable The Compleat 
Infidel itself. 
This is an important point. I expressed in Chapter I the intention of 
developing an account of infidelity discourse that would accommodate this 
document as a discursive phenomenon in its own right as well as rival analyses 
and the materials called "data. " To the extent that I have been successful in that 
encleavour, The Compleat Infidel offers a considerable improvement on the 
traditional social scientific approaches to infidelity that I criticised in Chapter 1. 
For instance, the evolutionary psychologists are undoubtedly able to account for 
infidelity but they have yet to explain how it is evolutionaMy adaptive behaviour 
to spend one's time producing such accounts. The lengthy, self-imposed isolation 
entailed in such academic work does not seem to be a very good "reproductive 
strategy" compared to some of the alternative ways that these authors could 
have occupied their time. Now, let me anticipate a possible objection. At this 
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point, some readers may be thinking that the behaviour of psychologists - of 
whatever theoretical or methodological predilection - is not itself a universal 
activity and therefore does not fall within the remit of the task that evolutionary 
psychologists set themselves. However, I would argue that it is a mistake to 
assume that human activities easily and naturally divide into those that are 
universal and those which are not. In earlier chapters of this document, and 
particularly in Chapter 7,1 have attempted to show that reports and descriptions 
of things as universal need not be taken at face value as simply reflecting the 
properties of the pre-existing, pre-discursive world. They do more than that; 
reports and descriptions are reflexive in the sense of not just representing the 
world but also being involved in it and acting on it in a practical way. In the case 
of evolutionary theorists such as Baker and Bellis, for instance, their reports are 
involved in practical activities such as engaging in certain academic encleavours 
and debates. In the case of research participants such as Kyle and Doug, their 
universalising reports and descriptions are involved in the practical activity of 
defending themselves and their known infidelities. As speakers and writers go 
about conducting the practical business that is particular to their circumstances, 
they avail themselves of various rhetorical resources, one of which is 
universolisation. For the evolutionary theorists, no less than for Kyle and Doug, 
representing certain features of the world as universal is a constructive, discursive 
activity and a method of getting things done. This being the case, there is no 
reason to suppose that infidelity itself is in fact any more or less universal than the 
behaviour of attempting to explain and account for infidelity -a behaviour that is 
not exclusive to Baker, Bellis and their colleagues but is shared by the other 
psychologists and sociologists who have appeared in The Compleot Infidel and 
by the lay people whose talk has been treated in this document as data. 
Ultimately, then, whether or not the behaviour of psychologists is universal is not 
the issue. The point is that the business of explaining and accounting for human 
behaviour is potentially constructible as universal, to no greater or lesser an extent 
than the activity of infidels. 
Let me return to my original point with another example. It is undeniable 
that scholars of social cognition and close relationships have managed to 
account for infidelity. However, the cognitive motors they posit do not account 
equally well for the interpersonal behaviour of entering into a research 
relationship with people who are contrastively trealed as "participants" or even 
11 subjects. " Again, it could be argued that this is beyond the remit of the task that 
these authors have set themselves. Perhaps if the primary objective is, for 
instance, to explain the role of infidelity in the dissolution of couples' relationships, 
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one need not also be concerned with explaining the relationship between 
researchers and participants. Perhaps it is not of great import if tensions are 
discovered in social cognitive approaches between that which is reified and 
treated as a measurable feature of the real world and that which is relativised 
and treated as variable from one individual or situation to the next, or if it seems 
that authors in this field sometimes have overlooked a resemblance between 
their own accounting practices and those of the couples they study. Certainly, I 
am not going to suggest that researchers in this line of work ought to abandon 
their activities. As I have already pointed out in chapters I and 7, in both 
academic and lay discourse there may be very good reasons for privileging 
certain aspects of the discursively constructed world as factual, reliable and non- 
negotiably real, and for attending to some kinds of human relationships (such as 
couple relationships) to the exclusion of others (such as those between 
researchers and participants). Clearly, what these reasons are will depend on the 
interactional demands and requirements of the circumstances in which the 
speaker or writer finds themselves. However, in the case of the document The 
Compleat Infidel and the occasion of its writing, the object of the exercise has 
been to notice that the very possibility of infidelity is a discursive achievement and 
to provide an account of the discursive practices surrounding it that is reflexively 
able to accommodate itself as recognisably a part of the phenomenon that is 
being studied. To that extent, the approach to infidelity that has been taken in 
The Compleat Infidel offers an advance on these other, more partial forms of 
analysis. 
The findings described above represent a contribution to a broadly conceived 
knowledge-base about how to study infidelity. In the remainder of this section I 
would like to tailor my discussion to a more specifically conceived set of interests 
and concerns. The readers who expectably will hove the most interest in this 
discussion about the contribution and implications of The Compleat Infidel are 
those who have already recognised in a more or less formal way that discourse 
matters because it is unavoidably constructive and thereby political in its effects. 
These are readers with some political project at hand, be it feminism, socialism, 
anti-racism or whatever. In particular, the readers I have in mind are feminists: not 
just because of the feminist constructionist studies that I reviewed in Chapter I but 
because, as Lynne Segal (1999. p. 231) remarks, feminism is the n-iovernent most 
associated with the ongoing forging of links and connections between that which 
is obviously political and the detail of personal and private life. 
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At various points in this document I have described myself as "a feminist, " 
referred to "the cause of feminism" and otherwise constructed feminism as a 
unitary object. That is sometimes a sensible discursive manoeuvre, for example in 
circumstances where "feminism" is introduced to form one part of a contrast pair 
such that the other entity or category is something equivalent to "not-f e minis m. " 
These are cases where I have characterised 'feminism as a project of social 
reform: one with a specific emphasis on improving the lot of women as a distinct 
social group (cf. the first of the objectives of feminism described by Segal, 1999, p. 
200). However, as Segal points out, feminism can be equally well constructed as 
multiple versions or feminisms. For example, in Why Feminism? (1999) she contrasts 
feminism that has the very practical objective of bringing about change and 
ultimately justice for women through campaigning and similar forms of direct 
action with a postmodern or poststructuralist school of feminism. Indeed, it is this 
school of feminism rather than the campaigning, reformist school which better 
describes my own brand of feminist politics. In the following paragraphs I shall 
engage with some of the points that Segal raises about postmodern and 
p oststructura list feminist perspectives, by way of exploring the political character 
and potential of The Compleat InfideL 
In contrast to the reformist objective of traditional feminist activism, the 
objective with which Segal (1999, p. 200) associates pos tstru ctura list feminism is 
one of revolution, to be realised through such projects and activities as 
.. reinvent[ing] the meanings of womanhood" and developing discursive practices 
and modes of expression that manage to "radically subvert existing binaries of 
sex, gender and sexuality' (ibid. ). In comparison to the reformist kind of feminism it 
is not always clear how such revolutions are to be accomplished or what direct 
benefits will accrue to women in the event of success. On the other hand, these 
questions have not been entirely neglected. In particular, some fairly specific 
solutions inhere in popular treatments of Judith Butler's Gender Trouble (1990) and, 
to a lesser extent, Bodies That matter (1993). For instance, Corinne Squire (1995, p. 
152) cites Butler's"work on'performativity', tactical queerings of gender and 
sexuality through parody and theatricality"as an example of how a pragmatic 
approach within discourse analysis (loosely and inclusively defined) "allows 
feminists to propose short-term tactics aimed at goals [of social change] that 
otherwise look unattainable" (ibid. ). The specific sorts of change that Butlerian 
feminists have in mind prominently include increased empowerment for women 
through the achievement or recovery of agency. Acts of sexual dissidence that 
contradict or otherwise disrupt the norms that mark out the "proper' performance 
of gender and (hetero) sexuality are taken to be empowering experiences 
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through which individuals can discover new opportunities to form and fashion 
their own identities. Inviting as this may sound, certain limitations and potential 
problems or areas of difficulty seem to accompany this approach. Two of these 
can be summarised as follows. Firstly, it may be unwise to place too much 
emphasis on individuals' performances, strategies for resistance, acts of subversion 
and transgression, along with individualised notions of increased autonomy and 
choice. Segal (1994, p. 305) quite rightly points out that the language of liberal 
individualism is one that "serves conservative ends more readily than progressive 
ones. " Secondly, it is for from self-evident that announcements and performances 
that are intended to be subversive or disruptive are actually going to have the 
desired effects. As Segal (1999, p. 63) tartly observes, displaying "an awareness 
that gender is 'socially', 'performatively' or 'discursively' constructed" is a very long 
way from actually dismantling it. 
Having made a quick sketch of this "revolutionafy'rather than "reformist, " 
postmodern or poststructuralist, strand of feminism, I shall now say a few words 
about its relationship to The Compleat Infidel. In this document I have taken a 
disco urse-ce ntred, relativistic view of the world that is suspicious of gender and 
other apparently natural categories, along with claims about material and social 
reality. It clearly owes a debt to postmodern and poststructuralist theory, 
especially the Derridean variety in contrast to the Lacanian and Foucauldian 
strands. I think that Segal (passim. ) is substantially correct in her criticism of these 
latter approaches for making too little of the culturally and contextually specific 
social institutions and normative frameworks through which contemporary gender 
relations and sexual relations are organised, facilitated and maintained. These 
are matters neglected by the universalising tendencies of Lacanian theory and 
Foucauldians' characteristic vagueness when it comes to the details about how 
power is implemented and resisted in any particular situation. In my view, one of 
the merits of the ethnomethodological approach to normative accountability 
that I have adopted in The Compleot Infidel is precisely that it provides for close 
attention to the specific, situated social practices (including practices that are 
constitutive of one or another institution) through which people's intimate 
relationships are normatively arranged. 
Alongside the broadly poststructuralist theoretical persuasion of The 
Compleat Infidel, consider its unique subject matter. Infidelity, in its various 
incarna lions (especially "adultery"), is a topic that is easily regarded as intimately 
bound up with sexual experience and behaviour, gender and Butler's 
heterosexual matrix. It is just the sort of topic that feminism is interested to address; 
superficially private and personal but with readily exposed political dimensions 
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that are discovered to support the concept and give it its familiar shape. 
Moreover, were we to adopt the position articulated in some of the accounts 
literature (e. g., Scott and Lyman, 1968) whereby infidelity is defined as sonne kind 
of discrete offence or breach, it would not be difficult to imagine The Compleat 
Infidel as a promotion or recommendation for this sort of behaviour as a 
Butleresque act of disruption or subversion. As a corollary, one might expect to 
find that the point of following this recommended strategy or tactic for trouble- 
making is articulated in terms of its empowering and otherwise liberating effect for 
individual women. Recall Dalma Heyn's confident announcement that "adultery 
is, in fact, a revolutionary way for women to rise above the conventional" (Heyn, 
1992, p. 10). It would have been perfectly possible to craft this document in the 
same ringing tones. However, Heyn's sentiments are not mine. 
Despite the invitations that seem to be extended by this particular 
combination of theory and topic I do not intend to advertise either the practice 
of infidelity or the document The Compleat Infidel as instances of feminist revolt. 
Available expectations to the contrary notwithstanding, it is not my aim to re- 
invent the meanings of infidelity with a view to helping women (or anyone else) 
empower themselves. This is partly because I am cognisant of the limitations of 
the empowerment-through-disruption style of feminism that I described above. 
Firstly, I would not want to argue that this document, by dint of its sheer existence, 
is dismantling the technologies of normative heterosexuality. I have difficulty 
hearing most reported instances of infidelity as particularly revolutionary: 
compared to alternative possible methods of "making trouble" it usually seems to 
me rather unambitious. Secondly, the liberal-humanist, therapeutic style of 
discourse is one that I have made the object of criticism in this document. 
Indeed, it was the individualised, skills-based, therapeutic language of the 
psychology of close relationships (especially its counselling and self help 
branches) that I was objecting to when I settled on the topic of defences for 
infidelity in the first place. The question now arises of what. remains subsequent to 
these disclaimers. Is The Compleat Infidel doing nothing that could be politically 
interesting or useful? What are the relevant objectives and functional possibilities 
of this study? 
This is not a project of "reinvention" but it is one of explication and 
clenaturalisation. The five forms of defensive construction examined here are all 
familiar and commonplace but this study is the first to assemble a collection and 
display them side-by-side, thereby revealing the sensitivity to context that 
underpins their variability. I have argued the case that infidelity discourse is action 
orientated. My point in explicating the constructedness, contingency and 
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reflexivity of these accounts of and for infidelity has not been to reaffirm the truth 
of some other, preferred account of the "reality" of people's sexual behaviour and 
intimate relationships, be it hegemonic or oppositional. Rather, I hope that The 
Compleat Infidel serves to argue against taking any account of such matters at 
face value. For feminists, this is a matter of political import. For instance, 
comprehending the contingency and reflexivity of accounts pertaining to 
infidelity means that one can make informed, situationally appropriate decisions 
about which versions of the truth to ally with and participate in and which versions 
to object to, without being pre-empted by assumptions about what is "natural, " 
what is an objectively established "fact, " what is "known" about human biology, 
cognition, society and so on. 
Sceptical as I can be of simply conceived gender categories and theories 
of society, the reflexive approach I describe is not about reducing contrasting 
accounts such as the feminist and the evolutionary to wilfully depoliticised 
equivalence on the grounds that they are all "made up. " Quite the contrary: 
exposing the variety of versions and accounts that we have surveyed in this 
document as constructed and acti on orientated and (therefore) as political 
seems to me a basis for discursively-minded feminists to insist that proponents of 
evolutionary and other distasteful accounts must enter into the arena of political 
debate and answer political charges. It is a basis for insisting that they do not 
take refuge in empiricist claims that some things ore above politics by virtue of 
being simply true. Perhaps the principal contribution that The Compleat Infidel 
has to offer (post)modern feminism is knowledge about the rhetorical, 
interactional mechanics with which accounts of infidelity and its world are built. 
With that knowledge, one is better equipped to get involved in political 
endeavours such as fighting the dissemination and propagation of spurious "facts" 
which demean and discriminate against women (or whatever the objection 
happens to be) whilst benefiting from a coherent, principled system of reasoning. 
At risk of sounding overly critical, what I mean by that is that one can serve a 
pol; tical agenda without finding oneself in a position like Dryden's where political 
critique has to be wrapped in articles of conjecture about women's "emotional 
insecurity" and such, derived from a largely unexplicated, intuitive interpretation 
of one's data. 
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Implications for Discourse Studies 
The objective of this study has been to document and explicate the defensive 
practices of infidelity discourse. In Chapter 21 surveyed three categories of 
research that are relevant to f his objective; namely, the accounts literature, a 
small collection of action orientated approaches to discourse and of course the 
specific endeavour of discursive psychology. In this section I shall consider the 
contribution and implications of The Compleat Infidel for researchers working 
within these disciplines. 
The point of discursive psychology is partly to develop a critique and 
respecification of familiar concepts and topics in mainstream psychology 
(Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1998) but also, and just as importantly, to generate a 
coherent, discourse-orientated alternative perspective on psychological and 
social life (Edwards and Potter, 1992, p. 153). To this end, Potter (I 996b) observes 
that one of the distinctive features of discursive psychology and its antecedents is 
that it is cumulative. That is, "a set of studies can be combined together and can 
build upon the insights of earlier work. There is thus a sense in which each new 
study provides a check upon the adequacy of the previous studies that are 
drawn on" (ibid., pp. 138-139). Accordingly, I sholl frame the present discussion of 
the significance of The Compleat Infidel for discourse studies in terms of its 
cumulative validation of a selection of earlier programmes of research within the 
discursive tradition. 
Of these, perhaps the most important is Order in Court, the work of 
Atkinson and Drew (1979) to which I have frequently referred in the previous 
chapters. Their data were transcripts of the Scarman tribunal hearings and 
among their topics for investigation were the defensive forms of accounting 
produced by police witnesses in those hearings. Specifically, Atkinson and Drew 
were interested to identify some systematic features of the design of witnesses' 
talk by means of which speakers attempted to manage the allocation of blame 
(1979, p. 138). Despite the specificity of Atkinson's and Drew's data, the analytic 
emphasis was on "properties of defences which we do not think are dependent 
on the specific setting of the incidents being investigated in the cross-examination 
(i. e. in Northern Ireland)" (ibid. ). 
In The Compleat Infidel we have looked at five forms of defensive 
accounting and concluded that the variability among these five is not just a 
feature of their content or surface construction but also a reflection of their 
varying functions, from exoneration to justification. These functions have not 
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been conceived as an abstract typology of defences that has to be 
superimposed on the data (cf. the taxonomic approaches found in the accounts 
literature): rather, they describe and summarise the findings that have emerged 
from our scrutiny of speakers' and writers' discursive behaviour as they build up 
their various constructions. What we have noticed is that the discursive actions 
and manoeuvres displayed in the infidelity data have very often been paralleled 
by the behaviour of Atkinson's and Drew's police officers. 
To recall my earlier formulation of Atkinson's and Drew's overall findings, 
they discerned three discrete types of defensive practice: a "justificatory" 
defence type and two types of excuses. The type I (justificatory) defence 
included among its distinguishing characteristics the volunteering of descriptions 
that: (a) selectively fence off the ground to be defended, thus diverting attention 
away from alternative areas of possible blame, and, (b) in light of that selection, 
display that it was not necessary for the speaker to take any course of action 
other than the one they manifestly exhibited at the time. As such, the type I 
(justificatory) defence was echoed in the practices of constructing a non-event 
and constructing a generic rationale for infidelity. In Chapters 3 and 7 of this 
document we saw that speakers and writers exonerated and justified themselves 
either by manipulating the boundaries of categories such as "being unfaithful" in 
order to show that whatever they had been up to was not an instance of that 
category or by shifting the focus of the discussion from the particular to the 
general, the latter type of phenomena being relatively easier to criticise and 
disrespect without accruing blame. 
The type I (a) excuse discovered by Atkinson and Drew attended to 
blameable incidents and (in)actions by explaining how they happened. Police 
witnesses produced narratives and portraits of circumstances or events that were 
designed to show that the speaker's contested or blameable action occurred as 
a direct and unavoidable result of the things previously narrated or portrayed. 
This discovery was mirrored in the practices of constructing an isolated episode 
and constructing a special category of self. In Chapters 4 and 5 we saw that 
discourse users either described their infidelities as the product of mitigating 
circumstances or of unusual personality traits and other quirks in their individual 
psychological make-up. In contrast, the type 2 excuse unearthed by Atkinson 
and Drew distinctively involved providing some reason for the blameable 
behaviour. As such, it was matched by the specific reasons for infidelity that we 
encountered in Chapter 6. In both studies, speakers did not deny the relevance 
or superficial desirability of acting differently, nor did they defend themselves by 
appeal to mitigating circumstances or diminished capacity. Rather, they 
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displayed their contested actions as rational and reasoned, for instance by 
showing that they were necessary responses or solutions to something else. 
It is my conclusion that the findings of The Compleat Infidel substantially 
confirm the tripartite defensive practice described by Atkinson and Drew. 
Moreover, they evidently succeeded in their expressed aim of identifying 
properties of defences which would be generalisable beyond the highly specific 
subject matter addressed in their data. Atkinson's and Drew's study was 
unambiguously an exercise in conversation analysis; as such they make additional 
claims specific to the sequential organisation of verbal material (for example, to 
do with the constraints of pre-allocated turn-taking systems) that I shall not make 
it my business to confirm or deny. However, those aspects of their findings which I 
have highlighted here as differentiating the three types of defence have been 
demonstrated by The Compleot Infidel to apply in infidelity discourse as well as in 
discourse about Northern Ireland, and in a wide range of textual materials as well 
as in transcripts of conversation. 
I would now like to turn to a second, more inclusively characterised strand 
of research. In Chapter 2, in the section entitled "analytic procedure, " I referred to 
the investigations of Wooffitt (1992) and Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995) as 
examples of discourse studies which are distinguished by the relatively 
inauspicious position of the people who supply the analytic data. Wooffitt (1992) 
collected reports of paranormal experiences and remarked that "the mere act of 
claiming such an experiience can lead to assumptions of, at best, crankiness, or 
worse, some form of psychological deficiency" (p. 2). Widdicombe and Wooffitt 
(1995) interviewed members of various youth subcultures and noticed that one of 
the problems faced by their participants was the availability of a body of 
negative common knowledge about such persons as "punks" and "rockers" which 
could potentially be used as an interpretative resource by recipients of these 
young people's accounts. Meanwhile, the kind of censure that can be meted 
out to those known to be guilty of (dyad-bound or third-party) infidelity was 
illustrated in some of the data examined in the analytic chapters. In Extract 4.03 
we learned that the infidel's treatment of their dyadic relationship is equivalent to 
that of a "petulant brat" whose response to "a beautiful piece of machinery"is to 
11 smash it to bits. " In Extract 6.05 one infidel's treatment of his ex-wife was 
compared to "cold-blooded murder. " More prosaically, in Extract 6.03 aspersions 
were cast upon third-party "marriage-breakers. " in all of the analytic chapters we 
have looked at the ways in which speakers and writers deal with the highly 
inauspicious task of countering such censure with some defence. For analytic 
purposes, then, The Compleat Infidel, like the studies of Wooffitt (1992) and 
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Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995), "trades on the scepticism with which [such 
accounts] are commonly greeted" (Potter, 1996a, p. 160). 
Both the above-mentioned studies, in their various incarnations (e. g., 
Widdicombe, 1993,1995,1998; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1990; Wooffitt, 1988, 
199 1; Wooffitt and Clark, 1998) have contributed to a burgeoning crop of 
research on the discursive construction and management of identities (e. g., 
Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998). In particular, as a result of the peculiar 
challenges or problems of identity faced by Widdicombe's and Wooffitt's 
participants, these authors have attended to the use made by speakers of an 
alternative identity category: that of an ordinary person. The notion of "doing 
being ordinary" originates in the work of conversation analyst Socks (1984) 
although contemporary studies of ordinary identities such as that of McKinlay and 
Dunnett (1998) also acknowledge the emergence of the ordinary self in discourse 
analysis (e. g., Potter and Wetherell, 1988; Wetherell and Potter, 1989). 
The findings of The Compleat Infidel con be seen as broadly confirming 
Widdicombe's and Wooffitt's findings about the construction and management of 
ordinary identities by inauspiciously positioned speakers. For instance, in his study 
of 1992 Wooffitt discovers a rhetorical device that he calls "I was just doing X ... 
when Y. " It is functionally similar to the device "at first I thought ... 
butthenl 
realized ... " (Sacks, 1984) that we encountered 
in Chapter 6. In Extract 6.02 we 
saw the third-party infidel Skatterkat use that device to claim that, just like 
.. everyone" else who knew Mark and Kelly, she initially was "happy for them" when 
they moved in together; only later (she says) did it become apparent that things 
between Mark and Kelly were"going wrong. " The point, of course, was to display 
Skatterkat's alleged first impression as innocuous and the sort of thing that any 
normal person would think. By use of this device, in conjunction with the implied 
consensus and corroboration of "everyone, " Skatterkat attends to the possibility 
that recipients will take it that she had a stake in believing or pretending that 
Mark's relationship with Kelly was doomed from the outset (a very real possibility, 
given the hotly argumentative climate of OSA). 
To quickly gloss Wooffitt's findings, his interviewees use the device "I was 
just doing X ... when Y" to report their paranormol experiences such that they 
begin with a report of something hearably routine and mundane that they were 
feeling or doing just before the onset of the paranormal phenomenon, that 
business then being reported as interrupted. In so doing they attend to the 
possibility that recipients may not hear them as credible witnesses. As Wooffitt 
(1992, p. 136) remarks, recipients may try to "explain away" the mysterious 
phenomena. For instance, they may take it that the experience was merely a 
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self-fulfilling prophecy, the product of a ndfve desire to witness something 
poranormal. Thus, the point of I was just doing X" for speakers is to bolster their 
credibility by displaying their activities and circumstances as thoroughly 
unremarkable and thereby display themselves as normal, ordinary people. 
Alongside this discovery, consider the finding of Widdicombe and Wooffitt 
(1995) that their punks, rockers and other interviewees made a point of describing 
their activities and circumstances as routine and mundane in the course of such 
interactional projects as complaining about their ill treatment by authority figures 
and members of the general public who are (represented as) definitively not 
punks or members of any other subcultural group. For instance, one respondent, 
in talking about the disadvantages of life as a punk, complains about being 
treated rudely and even abusively "cos of the way you look" (ibid., p. 1] 8). The 
problem faced by this speaker is the possibility that stereotypical bits of 
knowledge about punks (that they are dirty, that they are violent and so on) may 
be taken by recipients as providing a reasonable explanation for the public 
reaction of which she complains. Her solution is a form of account in which her 
report of the complained-about behaviour is immediately and contrastively 
preceded by a description of her own, conspicuously normal activities and 
circumstances. These include going "for a quiet drink, " "standing at a bus stop" 
and "walking down the street. " Widdicombe and Wooffitt comment on these 
formulations as not just hearably innocuous but orientated to the conventional or 
institutional character of such activities as things that large numbers of ordinary 
people regularly do (1995, p. 1] 8). They conclude that: 
the description of the activity is designed to furnish certain inferences about the 
speaker. In representing her activity as an'anybody's activity', she occasions the 
relevance of her own character as an ordinary person; that is, in attending to the 
pragmatic business of making a complaint she is doing'being ordinary' as an 
interactional resource. 
(Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995, p. 1] 9) 
The some patterns are evident in the discursive practices of The Compleat Infidel, 
particularly the defences of high distinctiveness: constructing a non-event, 
constructing an isolated episode and constructing a specific reason for infidelity. 
For example. recall the efforts of Lizzy in Extract 3.05. In the analysis that 
accompanied that extract I included a discussion of the ways that Lizzy orientates 
to the possibility that recipients might infer that Kim had a legitimate reason for 
being angry, a discussion that I shall not repeat here. However, for the purposes 
of comparison with Widdicombe's and Wooffitt's study, let me draw attention to 
the fact that the principally complained-about behaviour - Kim's attempt to 
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throt tie Lizzy - is preceded by descriptions of Lizzy's own activities and 
circumstances such as "the five of us were waiting for a cob" (line 93), "there was 
about a hundred people in this taxi queue" (lines 124-125) and Lizzy's response to 
her friend Anne crying: I went over to see if she was okay" (line 127). These 
immediately and contrastively anticipate "this screaming harridan lurching herself 
at me" which was "the next thing I knew" (lines 127-129). Clearly, waiting for a taxi 
along with about a hundred other people and seeing whether a distressed friend 
is okay are activities of the some order as Widdicombe's and Wooffitt's "standing 
at a bus stop" and so on: activities that work to display the speaker as an ordinary 
person 
In addition to these kinds of examples in the data, a theoretical account 
of infidels' construction of themselves as normal, ordinary, law-abiding folk has 
been worked out in The Compleat Infidel through reference to Edwards's and 
Potter's (1992) insights on the mutual co-construction of "self' and 'World" and of 
course Edwards's (1995,1997) work on emblematic instances, episodes and script 
formulations. We hove seen that infidels (or people liable to be regarded as 
such) make a resource of the ordinary by constructing versions of the world and 
histories of events that are built from scriptible discursive objects and categories 
such as "the classic holiday situation" (Extract 4.06) and "two types of affairs" 
(Extract 6.06). These versions describe things which are ostensibly external to the 
infidel but which are implicative and constitutive of the person's normal, ordinary 
"inner"character or disposition. Overall, then, I am able to conclude that The 
Compleat Infidel supports Widdicombe's and Wooffitt's accounts of the 
construction of ordinary identities by inauspiciously positioned speakers: it confirms 
that such practices are manifest in the discourse of infidelity as well as the 
discourses of the paronormal and youth subcultures, and in a wide range of 
discursive materials other than interview-like, research-orientated conversations. 
Directions for Further Research 
In the present study I have used a large and eclectic data-base to produce a 
comprehensive overview of the defensive practices of infidelity discourse, from 
exoneration to justification. This ambitious project has naturally been at the 
expense of some attention to various specificities of the topic and the contexts of 
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the analytic data. Accordingly, I propose two major dimensions along which 
further investigation of these defensive practices could profitably continue. 
Firstly, there is the topic. This could be re-specified and narrowed down in 
any number of ways so I shall focus this short discussion on one or two that are of 
the most interest to me and expectably of the most interest to some of the 
anticipated readers of The Compleat InfideL Having surveyed the practice of 
defending infidelity I would like to make a more detailed investigation of some 
particular kinds of infidelity or areas of defence. Readers may have noticed from 
some of the interview extracts in this document that one of my special interests is 
the business of third-party infidelity and the extent of such an infidel's moral 
responsibility towards their victim, the main or regular partner of the third-party 
infidel's dyad-bound accomplice. Third-party infidelity is an under-researched 
phenomenon, to say the least, and the question of moral responsibility towards 
one's victim has proved a fascinating aspect of that phenomenon about which 
those of my research participants who are willing to admit to such experience 
have had plenty to say. The issues that they have raised in regard to that 
question have included, for instance, the pre-existing relationship between the 
third-party infidel and the victim, given that at the outset of the affair these two 
individuals might be strangers and entirely unknown to each other or they might 
be close friends or even relatives. Should a friend or relative be afforded greater 
consideration than a stranger? If so, how can a distinction between such 
membership categories be logically and morally made and sustained? Another 
topic that interests me is guilt. Some of my interviewees have had surpriising 
remarks to make about the sensation of guilt, its natural history and methods for 
coping with it, all of which I would like to make the object of some formal analysis. 
- In addition to the above-mentioned interests of my own, I expect that 
other analysts of discourse would appreciate a specific exploration of topics such 
as gender and sexual orientation. My data show that people are certainly 
capable of discussing infidelity as gendered and as part of an institution of 
heterosexuality when they are invited or required to do so. In the absence of 
such specific requests, it is my experience that people routinely do not invoke 
gender and sexual orientation as explanatory principles in their defences, any 
more than they invoke race, social class or physical (dis)ability. Occasionally, 
when men are constructing special categories of self such as "poor general 
aptitude" they hint at maleness as a relevant aspect of that self but overall it is 
apparently not (or no longer) usual to treat gender categories as a resource that 
can be invoked as part of a defence without hesitation or some accompanying 
account. Correspondingly, even the biologically-orientated accounts of the 
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evolutionary psychologists lately attend to infidelity (or extra-pair copulation, in 
their argot) as a behaviour manifested by both sexes and not the exclusive 
preserve of the male. This may be a significant research finding in itself, given 
earlier studies such as Hollway's (1984,1989) in which discursively produced 
objects such as the "male sex drive" have taken centre stage. Possibly the relative 
de-emphasis of gender and sexual orientation in my data is a function of my 
focus on contemporary practices of defending infidelity rather than, say, 
condemning it. Moreover, in the specific case of the interview data, it may or 
may not be a function of participants' orientation to Rachel as a female and 
indeed a feminist interviewer. Nonetheless, as I have already indicated. when 
people are required to engage in a general (not specifically defensive) discussion 
of infidelity and its connection to matters of gender and sexual orientation, they 
are undoubtedly capable of doing so. That capacity is an obvious avenue for 
further research. 
Secondly, there is the dimension of context. This study began with a 
deliberately inclusive policy of data collection and an effort to not impose upon 
the data a set of pre-conceived analytic categories. A major advantage of that 
strategy was that different kinds of discursive contexts were able to emerge from 
the data through analysis of speakers' and writers' orientations to their accounts 
as contextualised. This approach is consonant with studies in discourse and 
conversation analysis that have made a point of finding out how interviews, 
counselling sessions and other such phenomena are endogenously generated 
from within discourse (e. g., see Drew and Heritage, 1992, Schegloff, 1997). Thus, 
the findings recorded in The Compleat Infidel have included findings about the 
nature of question-and-answer sessions, of sympathetic and silent recipients in 
contrast to contexts of argumentation and of newsworthiness as a capacity to 
entertain as distinct from the capacity to inform. Clearly, there is room for these 
various findings about context to be developed and expanded upon. In 
particular, acknowledging studies such as those of Buttny (1993), Edwards (1995, 
1997) and Greatbatch and Dingwall (1997,1998) that investigate the 
conversational mechanics which underpin the institutions of "marriage guidance" 
and divorce mediation, further research on the defensive practices of infidelity 
discourse could be usefully narrowed down to a study of the construction of 
contexts of counselling and mediation within this defensive talk. Alternatively, or 
simply to put it another way, one could set out to investigate how institutionalised 
forms of talk such as those which generate the effect of counselling and 
mediation manage to accommodate and deal with participants' efforts to 
defend infidelity. Other research possibilities on the dimension of context suggest 
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themselves when one considers that counselling and mediation sessions are not 
unique in the sense of the topic of infidelity being more or less directly relevant to 
the context. It also becomes relevant where, for example, dedicated websites 
have been set up for the specific purpose of encouraging debate about 
relationship issues. Moreover, it is evidently salient whenever there is controversy 
to be stirred up on television and in the other mass media about the private life, 
character and ethics of some public figure. It would be interesting, then, to 
investigate further how discourse that defends infidelity simultaneously orientates 
to and constructs such publicity. Whichever among these possibilities for research 
may be eventually pursued, the preparatory groundwork has now been 
accomplished. 
Appendix A: 
Definition of Terms 
In this document certain key terms are used to describe the roles and relationships 
that constitute the "eternal triangle" of infidelity. These terms have not been 
chosen because they are somehow objective or neutral; evidently, none is 
available that does not have its own unique etymology and its own set of 
implications and constructive effects. Rather, they have been selected for their 
ability to identify and differentiate in a fairly clear and concrete way the 
phenomena that The Compleat Infidel sets out to discuss. 
Dyadic relationship. A romantic and/or sexual "couple" relationship, usually 
accompanied by the expectation of fidelity or exclusivity. 
Extradyadic relationship. A romantic and/or sexual partnership that takes place 
.. on the side" of a dyadic relationship, usually illicitly. An affair. 
Dyad-bound infidel. A person who is in an exclusive, dyadic relationship but who 
strijkes up an extradyadic relationship with some third party. 
Third-party infideL A person involved in an affair with someone who is already 
dyad-bound. Colloquially, a "lover, " a "mistress, " the "other woman" or 
"other man. " 
Dyadic partner. The regular or legitimate partner of a dyad-bound infidel. Also 
referred to as the victim because of the conventional truism that this is the 
person who is injured by infidelity. 
In practice, it is entirely possible for an individual to occupy the positions of dyad- 
bound infidel, third-party infidel and victim simultaneously, depending on their 
particular circumstances and network of relationships. The point of the above 
terminology is not to obscure that possibility but to provide for clarification of 
which position or relationship is the relevant one in the context of any given 
discussion. 
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Appendix B: 
Transcription 
Some of the data used in this study were transcribed from audio tapes, such as 
the extracts from my own research interviews. Readers interested in the 
theoretical aspects of transcription may wish to refer to the discussions supplied 
by discursive psychologists Edwards and Potter (1992, pp. 178-180; Potter, 1996b, 
pp. 137-138) and conversation analysts Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998, pp. 73-92). 
The transcription system appeariing in this document is a "light" version, designed 
for simplicity and easy reading; the symbols and conventions listed below are 
common to discourse and conversation analytic research. The examples in italics 
are adapted from extracts used in the main body of this report. 
A dot in round brackets indicates a pause. 
I live with this guy (. ) um (. ) and 171 be living with him for another (. ) month 
and a half 
(Emma, Extract 5.04) 
(uncertain) Words in round brackets indicate the transcriber's best guess at an 
(Xxx) unclear utterance. A triple 'Y'in round brackets indicates inaudible 
material. 
I put it over as a mad thing really, like (xxx what you giving the xxx) against 
me for? 
(Earl, Extract 4.08) 
Material in square brackets has been inserted by the transcriber for 
the sake of clarity. 
Doug had already arranged to go to Peacock's [a nightclub] with a load 
of people. 
(Lizzy, Extract 3.05) 
F1 LJ Extended square brackets indicate overlapping talk. 
Lizzy: it's not ended up in sex but you Fknowl I've been in bed with someone 
Rachel: LyeahJ 
(Extract 3.04) 
A dash indicates an abrupt cut-off of a word or sound. 
I re- obviously I realised at that point 
(Earl, Extract 4.08) 
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One or more colons indicate that the immediately preceding 
sound has been elongated or stretched. 
it coulda been very very tricky for me but it smoo: thed itself out 
(Kyle, Extract 5.01) 
The equals sign at the end of one speaker's utterance and at the 
start of another's indicates the absence of a discernable gap. 
Rachel: did you mean justifying it to other people or to yourself or both? = 
Kyle: to yourself 
(Extract 7.05) 
underline Underlining indicafes a speaker's emphasis. 
it's like buying a lottery ticket and expecting to fucking win 
(Doug, Extract 7.06) 
CAPITALS Words in capital letters are noticeably louder than the surrounding 
speech, as with shouting. 
all this time you've been SHAGGING MY HUSBAND 
(Lizzy, Extract 3.05) 
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